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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how routine social media use shapes political participation in 
Britain. Since the turn of the century, many commentators have argued that political 
activism has been compromised by “slacktivism,” a pejorative term that refers to 
supposedly inauthentic, low-threshold forms of political engagement online, such as 
signing an e-petition or “liking” a Facebook page. In contrast, this thesis establishes a 
new theoretical approach—the continuum of participation model—which illuminates 
what happens before political action occurs. This is explored in three interrelated 
contexts, using three different research methods: an ethnography of the political 
movement, 38 Degrees; an analysis of a corpus of individually-completed self-reflective 
media engagement diaries; and a series of laboratory experiments that were designed to 
replicate environments in which slacktivism is said to occur. 
I argue that Facebook and Twitter create new opportunities for cognitive 
engagement, discursive participation, and political mobilisation. 38 Degrees uses social 
media to support engagement repertoires that blend online and offline tactics. This 
organisational management of digital micro-activism provides participatory shortcuts, 
enabling large numbers of grassroots members to shape campaign strategy. But, in 
contrast to both advocates and critics of online participation, I find no evidence of a 
widespread, one-size-fits-all, self-expressive logic. Instead, I argue that we ought to 
think in terms of a typology of citizen roles in social media environments. Civic 
instigators and contributors engage in digital micro-activism by way of refining their 
political identity. Listeners use social media to consume political information but refrain 
from public forms of expression and instead take to private spaces for political 
discussion. When listeners do act it is not effortless, but carefully considered. 
Experiments show that these roles derive from pre-established personal preferences, 
rather than the stylistic presentation of information or visible indicators of the 
popularity of an information source. Overall, this study argues that slacktivism is 
inadequate and flawed as means of capturing the essence of contemporary political 
action. Social networking sites offer an important space for democratic engagement in 
the milieu of everyday life.  
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1. Introduction: Slacktivism and #Kony2012 
 
“Slacktivism” is an apt term to describe feel-good online activism that has zero 
political or social impact 
(Morozov, 2009) 
 
The more promising way to think about social media is as long-term tools that 
can strengthen civil society and the public sphere 
(Shirky, 2011) 
 
On March 5, 2012 Invisible Children, an American non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), released a 30-minute video entitled Kony 2012. The video was part of an 
ongoing campaign to raise awareness of the atrocities committed by Ugandan rebel 
Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and increase pressure on the 
US federal government to ramp up their efforts to capture Kony (Engelhardt and Jansz, 
2013). Featuring Hollywood-style editing and dramatic imagery, the video’s main focus 
was to highlight the role of Kony in the recruitment of children to fight in the LRA’s 
militia (Lotan, 2012). Released on YouTube and Vimeo simultaneously, the video took 
just six days to reach 100 million views, faster than the likes of Lady Gaga’s video for 
“Bad Romance” and Susan Boyle’s “iconic” performance on Britain’s Got Talent 
(Wasserman, 2012). The campaign witnessed an unprecedented level of sharing on the 
social networking sites Facebook and Twitter. The hashtag, #Kony2012, featured in a 
phenomenal 1,200 tweets per minute at the campaign’s peak (Lotan, 2012), with over 
12 million mentions of Kony on the service in total throughout March (Fox, 2012). This 
was a result of the video’s explicit encouragement of individuals to share the campaign 
within their online networks. In particular, those watching were asked to lobby a 
number of “elites” in order to raise awareness. These elites were not, as we may expect, 
exclusively politicians, but twenty so-called “culturemakers”; cultural icons, including 
twelve politicians, with an extensive reach and influence across large networks on 
Facebook and Twitter. This included the likes of Mark Zuckerberg, one of the co-
founders of Facebook, and popstar Rihanna, whose Tweet was shared 18,832 times 
(Zuckerman, 2012a):  
 
“Please go to Invisiblechildren.com Even if its 10 minutes… Trust me, you need 
to know about this! #1LOVE”  
(Rihanna, 2012)  
 
 14 
Invisible Children raised over $5 million in just 48 hours. Overnight, the campaign put 
Joseph Kony, and Invisible Children co-founder Jason Russell, firmly at the forefront of 
popular discussion; the questionable impact of low-effort digital activism followed. 
 Debate ensued regarding the controversial narrative that some suggested was 
promoted through the video, that by simply clicking “share” or “retweet” you could 
make an observable difference in the world (Lotan, 2012). This narrative spoke directly 
to an individual’s sense of personal efficacy, “the feeling that individual political action 
does have, or can have, an impact on political processes” (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 
1954: 187). A number of interconnected critiques quickly emerged in response to the 
video. Grant Oyston, a 19-year old political science student at Acadia University, 
Canada, published a Tumblr post challenging the notion that by sharing a video, or 
buying a wristband, an individual could contribute to the political aim of justice against 
Kony (Oyston, 2012). This argument gained increasing momentum as a number of 
bloggers began to delve into the financial accounts of Invisible Children; less than a 
third of Invisible Children’s revenues from 2011 were spent on direct services in 
Uganda, while a significant proportion were used for promotional materials (Carvin, 
2012; Kersten, 2012; Oyston, 2012). Ultimately, the campaign was deemed 
unsuccessful. It failed to turn the unprecedented mass of online activity into offline 
mobilisation, since the “Cover the Night” campaign—a call for activists to cover their 
neighbourhoods with images of the wanted warlord—amounted to little more than a few 
posters in major cities (Carroll, 2012). The campaign failed to turn awareness into 
observable political change. 
Why was this campaign so successful at raising awareness online, but such a 
failure in mobilising political action offline? In order to optimise the potential for the 
campaign’s message to be spread among online networks, its narrative was simplified. 
This is because Facebook and Twitter are examples of what Jenkins, Ford and Green 
(2013) define as “spreadable media,” platforms on which the success of content 
distribution depends on the user base circulating material within their social networks. 
The complicated array of factors that explain the rise of the LRA, and their recruitment 
of children as soldiers in Uganda, was underplayed. Instead, the campaign fixated 
around one man—the “bad guy,” Joseph Kony (Fisher, 2012; Laessig 2012). This 
perpetuated an easily relatable “good versus evil” dynamic—put simply, “catch the bad 
man who is kidnapping kids” (Hilsum, 2012). This overly simplistic narrative meant 
that the video was accused of obfuscating the complex role of militias in Uganda, with 
potentially disturbing consequences. For example, Zuckerman (2012a) argues that the 
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video provides tacit support for Yoweri Museveni, a dictatorial leader renowned for his 
poor track record on civil rights. Also, by focusing on a simplistic narrative designed to 
be expressed in 140-characters, a number of critiques claimed the campaign propagated 
an ever-present ideal within advocacy that Africa is helpless and dependent on the West 
to act as its saviour (Beckett, 2012; Drumbl, 2012; Fisher, 2012). Thus, while 
oversimplification increased the reach and inclusivity of the campaign, it also had a 
number of detrimental effects. 
In terms of raising awareness and facilitating online discussion, #Kony2012 was 
a success, but for a number of commentators this came at a high price. The campaign 
caused potential damage to public knowledge due to an emotionally provocative, but 
crucially misinformed, campaign message. The driving force of the widespread sharing 
of the video online was claimed to be political self-indulgence (Beckett, 2012); self-
interested political engagement intended to fulfil one’s personal desire to have political 
impact, or to boost one’s feelings of personal efficacy. Taking part was easy; simply 
click a button and become an activist. Taking part was deemed a social necessity; the 
simplistic narrative compelled those conscious of their virtual identity to become 
involved. How could you not take a stance against a man accused of recruiting 
thousands of children for military combat? As illustrated in Figure 1.1, a popular 
internet meme widely shared in response to the video, the critiques highlighted that a 
certain sense of inauthenticity was cultivated as citizens either succumbed to peer 
pressure, or were attracted by a purposefully misinformed and emotionally charged 
video. This phenomenon is conceptualised as slacktivism, and this contentious concept 
forms the starting point of this thesis.  
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!
Figure 1.1. An internet meme posted in response to #Kony2012 
!
 
Questions surrounding the authenticity and impact of social media on political 
engagement form the basis of slacktivism, a pejorative term that has recently emerged 
in popular commentary about the internet and politics. It refers to low-threshold forms 
of political engagement online, such as signing an e-petition, “liking” a Facebook page, 
or changing one’s avatar on Twitter in support of a cause. These forms of micro-
activism are perceived by many to have an insignificant effect on politics because they 
are characterised not by an ethic of solidarity, or an individual’s pre-existing political 
ideology and commitment, but merely the simulation of positive deeds or, worse still, 
inauthenticity (Morozov, 2009; 2011; Gladwell, 2010). The “substitution thesis,” a 
component of the slacktivist critique, claims that offline mobilisation is being 
compromised by this inauthentic online political action (see Christensen, 2011; 2012). 
Set in the context of these recent debates about the rise of online slacktivism, and due to 
the ubiquity of social media in everyday life, the aim of this research is to explore 
empirically what effect the routine use of social networking sites has on political 
engagement and citizenship in Britain. Do interactions on Facebook and Twitter affect 
our awareness and understanding of political events and issues? Do expressive forms of 
 17 
engagement online lead to instrumental forms of participation? Under what conditions 
do social media users engage in real space mobilisation?  
This thesis examines slacktivism as a reflection of, and judgement on, the 
routine use of social media within a political context. This conceptual approach is 
adopted due to the popularity of the term to describe actions that a typical user would be 
expected to perform through everyday use; for example, liking a Facebook page, 
sharing a video, or commenting on the status update of another user. Slacktivism forms 
part of a wider critique of the political use of social media within popular public 
discourse. This is problematic given that the concept itself is fundamentally flawed.  
Slacktivism has been the object of substantial criticism (see Christensen, 2011; 
2012). Most controversially, a handful of anecdotal case studies form the basis of a 
critique that is used to debase the significance of an entire medium. The Iranian 
presidential election protests in 2009 (Morozov, 2011) and the use of Facebook and 
Twitter to overthrow the Communist Party in Moldova during the same year (Gladwell, 
2010) are not representative of how citizens use these tools in day-to-day life. These 
isolated cases often equate the legitimacy of participation to the degree of impact it has. 
Tufekci (2012a) claims that this is misleading and, given the personalised and social 
nature of social networking sites, slacktivism should instead be seen as the 
encroachment of politics into people’s everyday life. Context, here, is key; often acts of 
slacktivism are not performed by seasoned activists, but by non-activists taking action 
in spheres traditionally controlled by political professionals (Tufekci, 2012a). Social 
media can provide a space in which these non-activists cultivate their political identity, 
shaping future participation. This thesis offers an alternative conceptual framework to 
the slacktivist critique, analysing both sets of hypotheses empirically. 
The #Kony2012 case study provides a fitting starting point to illustrate this new 
approach. Through the application of the slacktivist critique, the campaign was deemed 
to be an abject failure. The flash mob-inspired poster event was relatively ignored and, 
at the time of writing, Joseph Kony is still at large. This is despite the assurances of 
media scholar Clay Shirky, who in the immediate aftermath of the furore that followed 
the video wrote on Twitter, “I'm just going to put this here, so it's time-stamped: I bet 
they catch Kony in the next three months. Will follow up either way.” (Shirky, 2012). 
He did not follow up. However, if we move beyond judging engagement and activism 
purely on whether it achieves the stated aims, aims that in this specific case were 
obscured by the reaction, then there are a number of significant trends that require 
further exploration. 
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Firstly, the campaign demonstrated the potential of social media as a tool for 
mass political mobilisation online. By designing the campaign with the sharing 
functionality of social media in mind, #Kony2012 showed the speed in which wider 
networks can be activated (Mogus, 2012; Watson, 2012). This poses a number of 
questions as to the conditions in which viral campaigns transform into participation that 
requires further effort on behalf of the individual. When campaigns do translate into 
further participatory acts, what form do these acts take? Alternatively, what factors 
result in the failure to mobilise wider networks?  
Secondly, #Kony2012 highlighted the importance of the individual in 
contemporary political engagement. The campaign’s message was purposefully 
disaggregated in a way that was easy to personalise, encouraging the audience to 
participate on the basis of self-motivation (Chadwick, 2012; Gregory, 2012). Therefore, 
it is imperative that empirical research is undertaken to investigate how the use of 
online tools connects to citizenship and political identity more broadly. What motivates 
a citizen to share political materials or undertake political actions on social networking 
sites? How does this vary depending on their audience? Ultimately, are digitally 
networked acts undertaken as a result of self-interest, even narcissism, or an attempt to 
maximise personal efficacy on issues of personal relevance?  
Finally, the campaign exemplified how social networking sites can act as a space 
for political learning. A number of recent reports from the Pew Internet and American 
Life project highlight how users consume political news on Facebook and Twitter, with 
some using these platforms to contextualise and evaluate this information through 
interpersonal discussion (Rainie et al., 2012; Smith, 2013). This exposure can act as a 
spark for further interest. Their survey found that 43 percent of respondents say they 
have decided to learn more about a political issue because of something they read about 
on a social networking site (Smith, 2013: 33). As for #Kony2012, Invisible Children 
were successful in raising awareness about a still-active war criminal (Bugay, 2012; 
Domanski, 2012). Even though the campaign undoubtedly had faults, the critiques 
formed in response acted as a mass learning experience; those who shared the video 
were exposed to this information as a by-product of their involvement (see Chadwick, 
2012: 41-42). Oyston’s critical post on Tumblr was viewed over a million times and 
received tens of thousands of replies (Zuckerman, 2012a). Blogposts from scholars, 
such as Professor Henry Jenkins (2012) and Ethan Zuckerman (2012a), received wide 
exposure online. Mass media outlets, such as Al Jazeera (2012), the Independent 
(Okwonga, 2012), and Channel 4 (Hilsum, 2012), also offered further coverage to 
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different audiences. The campaign was therefore not only spreadable, illustrated by how 
widely the video was shared, but the response shows that it was also “drillable,” as a 
smaller number of highly informed actors were willing and able offer in-depth content 
(Gregory, 2012; Jenkins, Ford and Green, 2013). This has potentially important 
ramifications for political information consumption online. Do social networking sites 
provide an interconnected platform in which citizens can consume and discuss civic and 
political matters? Can this exposure mobilise those citizens who may have traditionally 
been on the periphery of political activism? 
These three trends highlight the need for more detailed empirical research on the 
relationship between the normalised use of social media and political engagement. 
 
1.1 Aims and Research Question 
 
This thesis examines the effect of routine social media use on political participation in 
Britain. By testing the hypotheses of slacktivism and an amalgamation of theoretical 
models from across political communication, notably Bennettʼs (2008; Bennett, Wells 
and Freelon, 2011) concept of the “actualizing citizen,” Papacharissiʼs (2010) concept 
of the “private sphere,” and Chadwickʼs (2012) hypothesis that social networking sites 
create new conditions for individuals’ political learning, this thesis explores the extent 
to which slacktivism has value as a judgement on contemporary political action.  
The study addresses the following research question: set in the recent debates 
around online slacktivism, what effect does routine social media use have on political 
engagement in Britain? Given the scope of this relationship between the independent 
variable and dependent variable, a number of supplementary questions are used to guide 
this research: what political information do citizens consume when using social 
networking sites, day-to-day? Do these social networking sites provide a space for 
discursive engagement, and if so, what is the nature of this discussion? And, crucially, 
do these low-effort interactions evolve into further participatory acts? When they do, 
what are the attitudinal motivations driving this involvement?  
As Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2012: 1) note, much of the literature focuses on 
groups or organisations when analysing the impact of digital media on political 
behaviour (see Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Chadwick, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2012; Karpf, 
2012a). While these book-length studies have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of the internet’s effect on political participation, there is a gap in the 
literature for an in-depth study of the individual level unit of analysis. As Howard 
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(2011: 2) notes, when we adopt a network perspective on the media, individuals become 
meaningful objects of study as they have more control and autonomy over their identity. 
By adopting a “deep data” approach, through the collection of thick, descriptive 
data tailored around individual level attitudes and behaviours, this study analyses how, 
and why, digitally active citizens use social media. This research seeks to establish the 
personalised context for the remarkable forms of digitally networked action that have 
taken place over the last decade; what happens before instances of collective, or 
connective, action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; 2013)? In doing so, this thesis 
contributes to the growing body of work on digital citizenship (Bennett, 2008; Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2013; Chadwick, 2013; Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Dahlgren, 2009; 
Graber, 2004; Howard, 2006; Karpf, 2012a; Papacharissi, 2010).  
This thesis sets out an alternative theoretical framework to challenge the 
assumptions of the slacktivist critique. I dispute the notion that participation is a public-
only phenomenon. Our private, everyday experiences shape our public behaviours. As 
such, I propose that access to social networking sites can create new opportunities for 
political learning, discursive engagement, and political action. I challenge the 
assumption that forms of micro-activism and online self-expression are lazy and easy 
forms of self-gratification, but contend that these symbolic acts provide evidence of 
active citizenship. 
The relationship between routine social media use and political engagement is 
examined in three different settings using an experimental, mixed-method research 
design. These represent the different spaces in which these tools can be used, outside of 
the isolated case studies offered by proponents of slacktivism. Firstly, in an activist 
context, through an ethnography of the political movement 38 Degrees. Secondly, 
within day-to-day life, by combining evidence of participant behaviour online with 
reflective diaries. Thirdly, in those conditions in which slacktivism is hypothesised to 
thrive, through a series of laboratory experiments conducted on Facebook.  
Although big data studies and cross-national survey research provide vast 
amounts of detailed statistics on user behaviour, these findings can often be superficial, 
focusing on specific actions or service functionality in isolation. As Neuman, Bimber 
and Hindman (2011: 32-33) note, much of this research is based on indictors that are 
not designed with a “ubiquitous and universal” internet in mind. Both approaches lack 
an understanding of the quotidian experiences that drive behaviour online—the why. 
This thesis seeks to address that void. The findings suggest that, in contrast to both my 
own expectations and those who support the slacktivist critique, there is no evidence of 
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widespread self-expressive logic amongst heavy social media users. Instead, many users 
take to semi-public and private spaces for political discussion as part of “multi-step 
flows of communication” (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). A typology of citizen roles in 
social media environments is set out to identify the different ways in which users 
engage with political material on Facebook and Twitter.  
These two social networking sites are the focus of this research. These services 
have been selected due to their popularity with both citizens (Rose, 2013) and political 
groups in Britain (Obar, Zube, Lampe, 2012). As of January 2015, survey data suggests 
that almost half (43 percent) of the UK population were “active” on Facebook, while 
one in five (19 percent) regularly use Twitter (Kemp, 2015: 343).1 Other online services 
will be examined as a by-product of their overlap with Facebook and Twitter. 
A number of research limitations should be noted. This study uses a non-
random, convenience sampling frame based on the target population, British citizens 
that use Facebook and/or Twitter. It is important to note that this population is not 
representative of the wider British public (Anstead, 2012; boyd and Crawford, 2012: 
669; Ofcom, 2013a; 2013b). For example, Table 1.1 illustrates that although the uptake 
of social media has increased universally since 2007, it is clear that the adoption rate is 
higher amongst younger citizens. 
 
                                                
1 Figures represent the percentage of the total national population using the platform in the past month. 
The survey is based on the respondents’ own reported activity (Kemp, 2015: 343). 
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Table 1.1. Set up own profile on a social networking site by age, gender and socio-
economic group, 2007-2012 
 % of respondents 
 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Age group     
16-24 54 77 86 90 92 
25-34 27 65 70 81 84 
35-44 12 40 58 58 67 
45-54 7 30 32 48 47 
55-64 8 11 27 24 35 
65+ 3 7 11 19 25 
Gender     
Female 22 48 56 63 67 
Male 21 40 51 55 61 
Socio-economic group     
AB 19 40 54 57 64 
C1 24 46 52 62 65 
C2 23 45 51 59 62 
DE 20 46 58 59 66 
Source: Data adapted from Ofcom (2013a: 91-92). 
 
While age was factored into the recruitment for this study, gender and income were not. 
As Table 1.1 demonstrates, adoption has increased at a similar rate across all cohorts. 
Although the participants in the diaries were skewed towards those with higher levels of 
education, participants were figuratively representative of this population. The sampling 
frame for each study is discussed in Chapter 4. All relevant participant information is 
included within the appendices provided (see Appendix A1; B1; B2; C1). Although the 
small-N research design does limit the external validity of this research, the 
methodology was necessary to generate rich, descriptive data at the individual level. 
The exploratory nature of this thesis provides a basis for future, large-N empirical 
research. 
This thesis explores social media use in Britain and, as such, all findings are 
culturally specific. However, the research will generate theoretically informed 
inferences at the individual level that may have salience in other advanced industrial 
democracies. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 8. This thesis does make use 
of academic work originating from the United States (US). Any cultural discrepancies 
that emerge between these theories and the findings are discussed in the empirical 
chapters. Furthermore, this study also uses a number of concepts that refer specifically 
to young people, notably the actualizing citizen framework (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, 
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Wells and Freelon, 2011). The differences and similarities that arise between different 
age groups will be reflected upon, when necessary. 
 
1.2 Plan of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 describes the utopian-dystopian dichotomy that has re-emerged within 
popular discourse. Characterised by a prevalence of unsubstantiated generalisations, 
anecdotal case studies, and a lack of empirical testing, slacktivism forms part of this 
vague and imprecise dichotomy. The critique has become synonymous with a negative 
perception of the political value of social media. However, it is flawed by an overly 
narrow focus. In order to critically analyse the relationship between the routine use of 
social media and political participation, we must first develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the environment in which these new forms of social and political self-
expression take place. The slacktivist critique cannot definitively represent everyday 
use, as it ignores the role that micro-activism plays in relation to other forms of political 
action, both online and offline. While each act, taken in isolation, may be deemed to be 
an “expression of benign idleness” (Rickett, 2013), the critique ignores how micro-
activism often complements other forms of participation, and can lower the threshold 
for involvement for those traditionally marginalised by high-cost activism. An 
alternative theoretical approach—the continuum of participation—is proposed, designed 
to capture the nuance of mediated citizenship at varying scales. 
Chapter 3 outlines the guiding theoretical assumptions for this thesis. These 
build upon the research agenda introduced in the first two chapters. Bennett’s (2008; 
Bennett, Freelon and Wells, 2011) actualizing citizen framework reflects the attitudinal 
shifts discussed in Chapter 1, as modern citizenship is characterised by individual 
autonomy, rather than duty and obligation. A combination of recent theoretical 
innovations in the field of political communication are used to operationalise the 
continuum of participation, introduced in Chapter 2. Chadwick (2012) suggests that 
social media users are exposed to political issues organically through their normal, day-
to-day use. Based on this exposure, Papacharissi (2010) describes how the convergence 
of what we consider to be public and private creates the conditions for new forms of 
participation online. This personalisation forms the basis of what Bennett and Segerberg 
(2013) describe as “connective action,” collective action that is mobilised through the 
use of digital media. Finally, this chapter sets forth two sets of expected findings to be 
analysed empirically. Based on this theoretical framework, I offer an alternative 
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prognosis to challenge the hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique; low-
threshold interactions conducted online are not ineffective and narcissistic acts of 
slacktivism, but integral components within a scaled continuum of participation. 
Chapter 4 describes the research design employed in this study. While cross-
sectional survey studies and big data methodologies are widely used in research on 
social media use and participation (see Boulianne, 2015), new methodological tools are 
required to get under the skin of micro-level attitudes and behaviours. By using an 
experimental and innovative mixed-method research design, that brings together 
qualitative, quantitative, and computational traditions, this thesis explores the 
relationship between social media and political participation from three perspectives.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the use of social networking sites in an activist context, 
through an ethnographic study of the hybrid mobilization movement 38 Degrees. The 
leadership use the seemingly mundane functionality of Facebook and Twitter to 
empower their membership. This organisational management of digital micro-activism 
is evident across the continuum of participation, as Facebook and Twitter are used to 
inform members, to involve them in the movement’s decision making, and to activate 
wider publics for further online and offline action. These findings challenge Gladwell’s 
(2010) hypothesis that “weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism,” as hybrid 
mobilization movements strategically use micro-activism as part of wider engagement 
repertoires. In line with MoveOn in the US (Karpf, 2012a), members pick and choose 
those campaigns they wish to be involved with. Social media is therefore key to 
cultivating a collective identity amongst the movement’s ideologically disparate and 
geographically dispersed membership. It is through exposure to emotionally salient 
“personal action frames” that members develop weak ties with like-minded others. 
By using diaries collected over a period of three months, Chapter 6 examines 
how citizens use Facebook and Twitter to access information and talk about politics 
within everyday life. The media diaries show that, for some citizens, these acts are not 
easy as they are keenly aware of their audience online. Instead, rich political discussion 
often takes place in private online and offline spaces with trusted others, with the cross-
platform mobile messaging application WhatsApp proving particularly popular with 
younger diarists. These “listeners” would only express themselves publicly on social 
media for those causes that they felt most passionately about. For those that do post 
political updates regularly—described as “civic instigators” and “contributors”—this is 
a way of raising awareness for causes they deem to be important. Self-expression on 
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social media is not immediately disregarded, as predicted by the slacktivist critique, but 
forms part of their political socialisation and political identity formulation. 
Chapter 7 focuses on a series of experiments designed to measure the likelihood 
of future engagement depending on the type of information that a participant is exposed 
to, and the popularity of content. The results suggest that both micro-activism and more 
substantive political acts are based on pre-established personal preferences, rather than 
the stylistic presentation of information or visible indicators of popularity. Young 
students, who formed the sample for these experiments, are more conscious of their 
actions than first assumed by the slacktivist critique.  
The final chapter brings together the results from the three empirical studies to 
analyse the relationship between routine social media use and political participation in 
Britain. By exploring each of the expected findings in turn, I conclude that both the 
slacktivist critique and the theoretical framework lack an appreciation of the dynamics 
of mediated citizenship at the individual level. As boyd and Crawford (2012: 669) note, 
“the very meanings of ‘user’ and ‘participation’ and ‘active’ need to be critically 
examined.” By conceptualising participation as a process and exploring the 
relationships formed between social media use and other modes of public and private 
communication, this thesis contributes to our understanding of individual level attitudes 
and behaviours. By comparing these findings to those from national and cross-national 
research projects, I consider the limitations of this thesis and suggest the need for future 
comparative research. 
This thesis will explore concepts that are disputed by media scholars and 
political scientists alike. How should we conceptualise citizenship? What is “effective” 
participation? How do we measure engagement? A brief literature review follows in 
which a number of these contested terms are considered. 
 
1.3 The Context: Conceptualising Citizenship, Political Identity and Engagement  
 
Contrary to the widespread view that citizenship is in crisis (Putnam, 2000), 
Britain at the start of the twenty-first century still enjoys a civic culture, albeit 
rather different from that outlined by Almond and Verba (1963) forty years ago. 
(Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 189) 
 
Citizenship is a concept with a number of competing definitions. Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley (2004: 22) define citizenship as, “[a] set of norms, values and practices 
designed to solve collective action problems which involve the recognition by 
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individuals that they have rights and obligations to each other if they wish to solve such 
problems.” As such, citizenship is enacted in relation to the authority of a political 
community. Traditional accounts of citizenship generally refer to a legalistic and rights-
based definition; the community is defined as the nation-state, in which citizens are 
represented by political parties, trade unions, and religious cleavages (Bellamy, 2008; 
Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005: 180). However, political community is no 
longer restricted to just the nation-state, but includes a diverse range of real and 
imagined communities at the local, national, and global level (Anderson, 2006: 6; 
Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005: 179; Svensson, 2011: 647). A void exists within 
the literature between these bounded notions of citizenship and the reality of life in 
advanced industrialised democracies. Citizens have more control over their own 
political identity, more choice over the political communities they join, and are more 
creative in the political acts that they undertake (Papacharissi, 2010; Zukin et al., 2006). 
This brief literature review will outline the socio-political conditions in Britain in which 
social media platforms operate. 
In order to analyse citizenship it must be deconstructed into two constituent 
parts: the attitudinal, an individual’s sense of norms, rights and values, and the 
behavioural, the ways in which an individual participates within their respective 
political community (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 129). The attitudinal and 
behavioural form a reciprocal relationship, as a citizen’s political identity shapes how 
they engage, while the norms of a political community are formed and established by 
the participation of its members (Svensson, 2011: 644). Therefore, political attitudes 
and behaviours are constantly evolving and the way in which citizenship is defined 
should reflect the normative desires of the citizenry at the time of inquiry (Dahlgren, 
2009; Dalton, 2008; Graber, 2004; Norris, 2011; Papacharissi, 2010; Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley, 2004).  
Numerous scholars have described this evolution, pointing to new sources of 
identity and the growth of unconventional forms of political engagement (Bennett, 
2008; Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005; Dalton, 2008; Dahlgren, 2009; Pattie, 
Seyd, and Whiteley, 2004; Schudson, 1999; Zukin et al., 2006). A distinct 
transformation has occurred from the dominance of uniformal ideologies, to a state of 
individuation, where individual autonomy and self-expression are sacrosanct (Bennett, 
2008: 14; Dahlgren, 2009: 33; Zukin et al., 2006: 14). A number of developments have 
facilitated this shift.  
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Firstly, the location of where “politics” takes place has become more diffuse due 
to the “information society,” as the mass adoption of new communication technologies 
undermines the monopoly the state holds over the spread of information (Castells, 2000; 
2001; Howard, 2011: 20). Citizens are no longer restricted by the limitations of physical 
proximity, but are instead connected to transnational political events and issues, with 
global ramifications in an abstract global space (Aikens, 1999: 186). Through real time, 
interactive, and global communication, a time-space compression has occurred, 
facilitating information flows between the local, national, and global spheres with 
relative ease. As Howard (2011: 72) notes, “digital media create a space of cultural 
flows that makes territorially distant places feel nearby.” Subsequently, the boundaries 
between foreign territories, and their respective political issues and identities, have 
become blurred (Gerodimos and Ward, 2007: 117; Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 
2005). In accordance with this diffusion, the locus of power shifts from government and 
elected representatives to new actors, such as those in the commercial sector and 
nongovernmental organisations. Therefore, citizens may see the need to achieve public 
goals through cooperative work that engages or targets institutions other than 
government (Zukin et al., 2006: 53). 
In alignment with the structural evolution of politics, the monolithic national 
culture often associated with individual nation-states has broken down into a state of 
cultural pluralism. This has resulted in the diversification of identity and the 
development of alternative socio-cultural frameworks (Dahlgren, 2009: 27, Dalton, 
2008; Giddens, 1991). Castells (2000: 128) traces the evolution of socio-cultural 
frameworks over time.  Primary networks, those concentrated around the family and 
religious identity, were the first to form. Secondary networks followed, in which 
citizens were bound together through group-based political associations. Finally, 
contemporary society is typified by tertiary networks, those centered around an 
individual’s own, personally-defined political identity. This breakdown of uniformity 
can be linked to a number of gradual cultural changes within society. As Inglehart 
(1990: 3) notes, “what people want out of life is changing.” 
Socioeconomic conditions have dramatically altered the characteristics of 
citizenship and political identity. As basic economic needs have been met and 
educational standards have improved, new, often niche, issues have become politicised 
(Dalton, 2008: 7; Inglehart, 1990: 4; Popkin, 1994). Inglehart describes this as a value 
change from “materialism,” and the need to secure physical and economic necessities, 
to “post-materialism,” and the pursuit of autonomy through self-expression (Inglehart, 
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1990: 68). Individuation is the modal social condition in post-industrial democracies 
(Bennett, 2012: 22). 
Traditional representative associations have experienced a significant decline in 
their influence on political identity in Britain (Dahlgren, 2009: 28; Giddens, 1991: 214; 
Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 79). For example, bar a slight increase following the 
2015 general election, political parties have seen their membership levels drop 
consistently, with less than 1 percent of the electorate now belonging to a party (Wilks-
Heeg, Blick, and Crone, 2012). As grassroots party activism has become increasingly 
subjugated by centralisation, public support for parties has become much more 
conditional, often dependent on certain issues (Denver, 2006; Dunleavy, 2005; Hay, 
2007; Heffernan, 2009: 445; Stoker, 2006; Whiteley, 2011). As Whiteley (2009: 55) 
argues, “cheer-leading is not an adequate incentive to promote their involvement.” 
Citizens increasingly identify with new emergent forms of group-based politics 
that are organised around personal identity (Dalton, 2008; Heffernan, 2009: 451; Norris, 
2011).  Such “new” political issues have little in common with the traditional left-right 
economic issues that previously delineated the partisan boundaries between the two 
major parties in Britain (Dalton, 2008; Denver, 2006; Inglehart, 1990; Heffernan, 2009; 
Sloam, 2012a: 7). These new organisations tend have less rigid hierarchies and offer 
self-actualisation rather than banal representation (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Karpf, 
2012a). 
As a result of these structural and socio-cultural changes, citizenship is now 
personally derived from one’s sociological positioning, and engagement is focused 
around issues of importance to the individual, rather than overarching platforms or 
ideologies (Bauman, 1999, 2001; Dalton, 2008; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 
2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Svensson, 2011; Zukin et al., 2006). This 
decentralisation has enabled individuals to form political communities over shared 
interests, even niche commonalities, rather than being limited to geographical 
restrictions or hierarchical institutions (Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011: 836; Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2012; Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Castells, 2001; Chadwick, 
2006: 106; Dahlgren, 2009; Deuze, 2012: 134; Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013: 16; Karpf, 
2012a; Papacharissi, 2010). Changes in citizenship are therefore facilitated, but not 
determined, by technological advancement, as new communication technologies enable 
these alternate, networked forms of political organisation to prosper. Group-based 
politics is more fluid, forming and dissipating on a seemingly ad-hoc, issue-to-issue 
basis. Described by some scholars as “networked individualism,” citizens have the 
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capacity to join and form networked communities, constructing their own collective 
experience around issues in which they have an emotional investment (Castells, 2001; 
Rainie and Wellman, 2012). 
A shift has therefore occurred away from structural models of citizenship, such 
as “civic voluntarism,” in which macro-level social forces are responsible for 
participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995), to “choice-
based citizenship,” where the personal identity of each individual citizen shapes their 
participation (Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 140). 
Personal efficacy is key to understanding this choice-based model; if a citizen believes 
that their own participation has little impact on outcomes, whether political, social, or 
psychological, then there is little incentive to get involved. These outcomes are not 
limited to policy impact or material self-interest, but also include the symbolic rewards 
and sense of empowerment that citizens can accrue through participation (Bucy and 
Gregson, 2001: 365).  
 So how do people form their political identity? Networks challenge rigid, 
territorially bound identity, as each citizen balances a competing set of fluid, 
postmaterialist values. These values become politically significant in certain contexts 
and scenarios (Coleman, 2007: 170; Dalton, 2008: 25; Dahlgren, 2009). However, I do 
not suggest that these changes necessarily result in transnational citizenship, whereby 
identity is no longer tied to national or territorial boundaries whatsoever. Rather, the 
nation-state, as well as social factors like class, gender, and race, acts as a foundation 
for the construction of identity (Bellamy, 2008: 597; Dalton, 2008: 25; Pattie, Seyd, and 
Whiteley, 2004: 21). Political socialisation is still important. 
 Citizens now have multi-layered identities, in which a number of attitudinal 
orientations compete and converge to form our own personal construction of identity 
(Dalton, 2008: 25; Yuval-Davis, 2007). As shown in Figure 1.2, Dalton’s (2008: 25) 
“hierarchical model of beliefs” illustrates how citizens mould their political identity 
based on the perceived importance of these different “layers” (Yuval-Davies, 2007; for 
examples in Britain see Ethnos, 2005; Wilks-Heeg, Blick and Crone, 2012). 
Consequently, digital media are used to shape and build upon the issue-interests that 
form at the intersection of these different layers. 
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Figure 1.2. A hierarchical model of beliefs 
 
Source: Dalton (2008: 25) 
 
Individual autonomy is central to modern citizenship. As traditional avenues of 
influence fail to diversify and evolve, alternative modes of self-expressive participation 
form and thrive (Coleman, 2007: 166; Dalton, 2008; Henn and Foard, 2012; Norris, 
2011: 242; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Sloam, 2012a: 7; Stanyer, 2005). Citizens 
seek new methods of influence that are reflexive to the different spatial domains in 
which political decisions take place, such as consumer activism (Bennett, 2012: 21; 
Micheletti, 2003; Ward, 2011). As Neuman, Bimber and Hindman (2011: 32) argue, if 
we look beyond formal, institutionalised politics, it is evident that citizens are not 
apathetic:  
 
[A] leading problem in this literature involves what constitutes political 
participation. Most research so far has focused on very traditional outcomes… 
but there are good reasons to think that many citizens, especially younger ones, 
are more interested in civic engagement, lifestyle politics, and citizen-directed 
advocacy than they are in institutionalised forms of participation. 
  
A more nuanced understanding of participation is therefore required in order to account 
for the growth of alternative forms of political behaviour. 
Political participation has been traditionally defined as those activities that aim 
to influence the selection of government personnel and the actions they take (Verba, Nie 
and Kim, 1978: 2). Acts typically include voting in elections, contacting representatives, 
party membership, and involvement in the policy process, such as through public 
consultations (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 2). Evidence from the Audit of 
Political Engagement (Hansard Society, 2013; 2014; 2015)—the Hansard Society’s 
annual “health check” on British democracy—shows that these acts are in decline in 
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Britain. Just 49 percent of those surveyed were certain that they would vote in the 2015 
general election, while only 12 percent had contacted a political representative, at any 
level, during the previous twelve months (Hansard Society, 2015: 30-31). While the 
causes of this disengagement are disputed, Norris (2011: 8) links these trends to a 
growing dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of political institutions. 
 Two conflicting schools of thought contest the ramifications of this democratic 
deficit. Firstly, those advocating the “generational replacement” thesis argue that 
democracy is in crisis, as older, politically active citizens are replaced by an 
increasingly apathetic and disengaged youth (Putnam, 2000; Putnam, Feldstein and 
Cohen, 2004; Whiteley, 2012). However, the validity of this interpretation depends on 
how democratic engagement is conceptualised. Minimalist approaches to democracy 
confine participation to mere representation and elite influence within institutionalised 
politics. As such, active citizenship becomes synonymous with the institutions that 
govern (Cammaerts and Van Audenhove 2005; Carpentier, 2011a: 17; Carr and Porfilio, 
2009: 134). However, as Fox (2013: 4) asks, should we focus on established 
“conventional” forms of behaviour, or do we need to take account of “unconventional” 
modes of engagement? 
I argue that democratic systems are dynamic; they are based on a loose set of 
ideals that are subject to interpretation and renewal (Dalton, 2008: 2; Papacharissi, 
2010: 11). As Papacharissi (2010: 11) argues, “if we accept that democracy as a concept 
is evolving and fluid, then the public or media (dis)engagement with the democratic 
system becomes consonant with that fluidity.” Although traditional forms of 
engagement may be on the decline, this does not account for claims of holistic political 
disengagement. Rather, our frameworks for understanding political participation have 
become outdated (Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005: 180; Coleman, 2007: 166; 
Inglehart, 1990: 422; Neuman, Bimber and Hindman, 2011: 32).  
A second school of thought, “post-modern citizenship,” has a very different 
evaluation of these trends. While recognizing the decline in these conventional acts, 
others argue that democracy is not under threat due to the rise of new forms of 
participation (Amnå and Ekman, 2014: 265; Bennett, 2008, 2012; Dalton, 2008; 
Dahlgren, 2009; Deuze, 2012: 156; Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley 2004; Papacharissi, 2010). A growing appetite for self-actualisation has 
fundamentally altered how citizens participate. As Norris (2011: 219) notes, “traditional 
political activities that arose and flourished in industrial societies during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries are often thought to have peaked in the postwar era and waned 
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in popularity today.” Participation is shifting to new, non-institutional forms of action, 
which are based on post-materialist values (Amnå and Ekman, 2014; Bennett, 2008, 
2012; Dalton, 2008; Dahlgren, 2009; Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2005; Henn and 
Foard, 2012; Norris, 2011; O’Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012; Papacharissi, 2010; Sloam, 
2012a; 2012b). Citizens increasingly prioritise issues that relate to their own personal 
political identity. Giddens (1991: 214) describes this as “life politics,” “political issues 
which flow from processes of self-actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where 
globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and 
conversely where processes of self-realisation influence global strategies.” As life 
politics drives social and political identity, micro-political engagement becomes more 
common and, thus, empirically significant. 
Academic research on political participation predominantly focuses on macro-
political activities, those actions that aim to influence rules, laws, or policies (Norris, 
2011: 247; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 76). However, given the evolution from 
structural definitions of citizenship to choice-based models, micro-political participation 
is equally important. As Couldry (2012: 125) argues, “too many accounts of politics 
concentrate on institutions and neglect the level of individuals… this level is crucial to 
understanding whether people have reasons to act politically.” Micro-politics refers to 
the day-to-day experiences that shape and form our political preferences (Norris, 2011: 
247; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 110; Scherer, 2007: 564). This emphasis on personal 
attitudes and private behaviours opens up new spaces for democratic involvement. 
 As the boundaries between the personal and political become more porous, 
civic forms of participation become politically significant. Civic participation is defined 
as “organized voluntary activity focused on problem solving and helping others. It 
includes a wide range of work undertaken alone or in concert with others to effect 
change” (Zukin et al., 2006: 7). Typical activities include volunteering, community 
outreach, and fundraising. A study of political life in the US illustrated how many are 
actively involved in forms of collective action in their community, but do not perceive 
these actions to be political (Zukin et al., 2007: 197). This highlights the disconnection 
between the evolution of political behaviour and the static, “voter-centric” definition of 
politics that is pervasive in advanced industrialised democracies. As Hay (2002: 3) 
argues, it is imperative that research adapts and explores the political significance of 
these seemingly non-political, social interactions: 
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…the political should be defined in such a way as to encompass the entire 
sphere of the social. The implication of this is that events, processes and 
practices should not be labelled ‘non-political’ or ‘extra-political’ simply by 
virtue of the specific setting or context in which they occur. All events, 
processes and practices which occur within the social sphere have the potential 
to be political and, hence, to be amenable to political analysis. The realm of 
government is no more innately political, by this definition, than that of culture, 
law or the domestic sphere. 
 
Similarly, other less visible, “passive” forms of engagement are often overlooked. 
Framing participation as active or passive has normative implications. Passivity is often 
synonymous with disillusionment or a lack of effort, when seemingly passive political 
behaviours may actually be beneficial to democracy (Amnå and Ekman, 2014: 263; 
Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 359). Bucy and Gregson (2001: 359) argue that, while 
passivity invokes a certain sense of detachment, activities such as news consumption, 
opinion formulation, and interpersonal discussion, represent important expressive 
behaviours that require time and effort. These activities are examples of “cognitive 
engagement,” broadly defined as “paying attention to politics and public affairs” (Zukin 
et al., 2006: 54), and they are a necessary pre-condition of instrumental action (Amnå 
and Ekman, 2014; Carpentier, 2011b; Dalton, 2008; Hardy and Scheufele, 2006; 
Scheufele, 2001; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). These behaviours are 
particularly significant when we consider political efficacy. Traditional forms of 
engagement can lack the same observable and immediate symbolic rewards as these 
forms of civic and micro-level engagement (Bucy and Gregson, 2001; Coleman, 
Morrison and Yates, 2011: 216). 
The growing popularity of these expressive forms of engagement means that the 
conventional-unconventional distinction is no longer relevant. We are not witnessing 
holistic political disengagement, or the erosion of British civic culture, but the birth of a 
new one that emphasises self-actualisation. The following chapter explores what role, if 
any, social media is playing in this emergent civic culture.  
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2. A New Research Agenda for Political Participation and 
Social Media 
 
Whether from digital enthusiasts or critics, hyperbole is unhelpful… there is 
often considerably more going on in DNA [digitally networked action] than 
clicktivism or facile organizational outsourcing of social networking to various 
commercial sites. 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 22) 
 
Current scholarly debate reveals a number of fundamental deficiencies among both 
proponents and critics of online activism. These include, for example, analysing social 
media in isolation from other media, the use of anecdotal generalisations based on 
context-dependent case studies, and hard technological determinism. As a result, there 
has been a return to the utopian-dystopian dichotomy that bedevilled the social science 
of the internet during the 1990s. Slacktivism forms part of this vague and imprecise 
dichotomy. This chapter will outline the flaws present within the slacktivist critique, 
and propose a new research agenda in order to systematically analyse the relationship 
between routine social media use and political engagement. 
 
2.1 Click Here to Save the World: The Roots of Slacktivism 
 
It has never been so easy to change the world; a horrible world, full of bigotry 
and social injustice and bankers and Starbucks and oblivious politicians. All you 
have to do is sit down at your computer screen, take a deep breath and tap a key. 
Abracadabra: suddenly, the politicians are a little less oblivious. And you, with 
your sense of common decency and rectitude, are empowered. That’s all it took, 
a second, maybe a fraction of a second if your computer has a good connection. 
You might not even feel the need to take a deep breath. 
(Liddle, 2013) 
 
Popular debate on the political value of social media is often framed as part of a 
deterministic dichotomy; either social media will usher in a new era of mass 
participation and political equality, or it will enable a dystopian, Orwellian future (see 
O’Loughlin, 2011: 350; Rieff, 2013; Thierer, 2010a; 2010b; Wright, 2012a; 
Zuckerman, 2013 for an overview).  This debate may invoke a sense of déjà vu, as 
similar divides have accompanied new communication technologies throughout history 
(Carpentier, 2011b: 24; Chadwick, 2006: 18; Nielsen, 2011a). This divide between the 
so-called “utopians” (Carswell, 2012; Jarvis, 2009; 2011; Negroponte, 1995) and 
“dystopians” (Bauerlin, 2009; Gladwell, 2010; Keen, 2008) is illustrated through the 
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work, and conflicts,2 of Clay Shirky (2008; 2010; 2011) and Evgeny Morozov (2011; 
2013). According to Shirky (2011), as networked communities expand and become 
normalised within everyday communications, it is irrefutable that social technologies 
will be used for all future coordination of rapid and mass political mobilisation. 
Morozov’s stance is markedly different. He refutes the ideals of the so-called cyber-
optimists, instead arguing that social networking sites are simply entertainment 
platforms that distract citizens. These passive political acts compromise legitimate 
forms of offline activism (Morozov, 2009; 2011; 2013).  
 This dichotomy is fraught with inaccuracies that fail to comprehensively explore 
the relationship between the use of social media and political participation. The 
literature too often relies on anecdotal case studies to formulate generalisations on the 
dynamics of political behaviour (Wright, 2012a: 248). For instance, Gladwell (2010) 
and Morozov (2011: 190) refer to just a handful of Facebook groups in constructing 
their critique of slacktivism.3 As Theocharis (2012: 2) notes, the political potential of 
social media is still relatively uncharted, and anecdotal evidence does little to address 
that research void. The problem at the heart of these debates is that both sides attempt to 
generate definitive conclusions about the nature of technological effects where none can 
be made. Furthermore, by resorting to hyperbole rather than rigorous empirical analysis, 
the debate has established a pervasive “either-or” frame in which academic work is 
often pigeonholed (Wright, 2012a: 248). 
Given the polarised literature from which slacktivism originates, the term’s 
precise definition is somewhat unclear. For example, slacktivism and clicktivism are 
often used interchangeably in popular discourse, despite clicktivism referring to a 
specific form of low-effort, online participation (Halupka, 2014), and slacktivism being 
used as a more general critique of participation that requires minimal effort (Karpf, 
2010). Evidently, the term has undergone a radical transformation since its inception, as 
it was originally coined by Clark to describe small, personal scale activities undertaken 
to benefit a community (Christensen, 2011). Therefore, it is important to clearly define 
the term. The interpretation of slacktivism used in this thesis comes from the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition, referring to “[those] actions performed via the Internet in 
support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring little time or 
                                                
2 For example, see: 
http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/15/picking_a_fight_with_clay_shirky.  
3 Morozov (2011: 190) refers to a Facebook group entitled “Saving the Children of Africa.” Gladwell 
(2010) refers to the Facebook page of the Save Darfur Coalition. 
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involvement.”4 I use slacktivism, rather than clicktivism, as it is the more commonly 
used term within the field of political communication (Christensen, 2012: 3). In this 
thesis I predominantly focus on digital forms of micro-activism—a term that I use to 
describe low-threshold interactions without normative judgement—on Facebook and 
Twitter. In essence, slacktivism is a modern depiction of Olson’s (1971) free-rider 
problem, as citizens avoid effort-intensive activism in favour of the gratification of 
easy, micro-activism online (Breuer and Farooq, 2012: 4; Christensen, 2012: 1; 
Morozov, 2011: 180).  
Christensen (2011; 2012: 3) identifies two themes that link the term’s use in 
academic (Breuer and Farooq, 2012; Karpf, 2010; Morozov, 2011; Rotman et al., 2011; 
Shulman, 2009), journalistic (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011), and activist (Khazan, 
2013; White, 2010; 2011) circles. Firstly, low-effort forms of online engagement are 
less effective than traditional, offline methods of participation. These actions rarely 
achieve any substantive political impact. As Morozov (2011: 180) notes, “while 
Facebook-based mobilization will occasionally lead to genuine social and political 
change, this is mostly accidental, a statistical certainty rather than a genuine 
achievement. With millions of groups, at least one or two of them are poised to take 
off.” Secondly, the futility of these actions is of paramount concern due to the 
substitution thesis, in which low-effort, online methods of engagement replace tried and 
tested activist repertoires. Examples of slacktivism include starting an e-petition, 
targeting a message at a politician on Twitter, or sharing campaign materials to wider 
networks on Facebook.5  
A number of additional themes can be observed amongst proponents of the 
slacktivist critique. Firstly, the design of social networking sites is not conducive to 
effective activism. Gladwell (2010) argues that weak ties are formed on services like 
Facebook, whereas high-risk activism requires strong ties. With this shallow 
commitment comes large networks (Granovetter, 1973). This hinders organisational 
efficiency, as it is difficult to establish hierarchy in large groups (Gladwell, 2010; 
Morozov, 2011: 193-195).  
Secondly, metrics are an indication of successful engagement on social 
networking sites, such as Facebook (followers, friend count, likes) and Twitter 
(favourites, followers, retweets). White (2010; 2011) contends that this logic permeates 
                                                
4 Slacktivism [Def. 1]. (n.d.). In Oxford Dictionaries Online, Retrieved August 19, 2013, from  
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/slacktivism. 
5 Although the slacktivist critique does not refer exclusively to political behaviour social networking sites, 
the term is most commonly used in popular discourse to refer to such cases (Morozov, 2011; Gladwell, 
2010; White, 2010; 2011). 
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into the political arena, as political parties and pressure groups adopt marketing 
practices, such as tracking the click-through rate of campaign material as an indication 
of the level of involvement. By reducing the demands of a participant to ensure high 
levels of engagement, a mirage of active citizenship is cultivated, one that mistakes 
quantity for quality (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011: 187; Shulman, 2009; White, 
2011). This appeal has resulted in some pressure groups inundating individuals with 
opportunities to engage, potentially raising political apathy as a result (Shulman, 2009).  
Thirdly, those advocating the slacktivist critique also question the authenticity of 
users’ actions online, claiming that these political behaviours are driven by self-
gratification, or narcissistic self-presentation (Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2009; 
2011). The platforms of social media offer a variety of quick and easy fixes to satisfy 
one’s desire for political involvement. Morozov (2011: 201) argues that this creates an 
illusion that a user is making a meaningful political impact, with potentially stark 
consequences for the balance of power between elites and the public. This also fuels the 
substitution thesis, as rigorous, traditional activities are compromised and replaced by 
ineffective micro-activism (Christensen, 2012: 5). 
This appeal of low-effort political behaviour on social media is strengthened by 
the public nature of the digital-self online. Given the various transfigurations of the 
audience online, both within and between different social networking sites, users are 
motivated to act as a means of cultivating their image amongst networked peers 
(Morozov, 2009; 2011). This can result in viral cascades, such as the #Kony2012 
campaign, that distort the salience of political issues as emotive matters gain excessive 
exposure (Sunstein, 2007: 84). This logic is epitomised by the title of Morozov’s (2013) 
book, To Save Everything, Click Here. These campaigns are presented on social media 
as a statement of one’s character (Morozov, 2011).  
I argue that the slacktivist critique is indicative of the polarised dichotomy from 
which it originates. The critique is based on a series of causal assumptions that fail to 
comprehensively account for the potential use of these new technologies within 
everyday life. Revisions are therefore required to extract the relevant concerns and 
create a new, systematic research agenda for understanding the environment in which 
these new forms of social and political expression take place. 
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2.2 Refuting the Assertions of Slacktivism: A New Research Agenda for the Study 
of Political Participation and Social Media 
 
These myths of technologically enabled utopias or dystopias then predispose our 
reaction to technological innovations in ways that operate outside the realm of 
pragmatism. 
(Papacharissi, 2010: 8) 
 
Slacktivism has become synonymous with a negative perception of the political value of 
social media. However, the critique is flawed by an overly narrow focus, analysing 
micro-activism in isolation from other modes of engagement (Knibbs, 2013a; Tufekci, 
2012b), and from other forms of media, in what is now a hybrid media system 
(Chadwick, 2013). As such, the critique lacks an appreciation for the complexity of 
normalised use, relying on anomalous case studies to support vague, grand theories of 
internet usage where none can be made (Theocharis, 2012: 2). In order to critically 
evaluate the relationship between social media and political engagement, one must first 
develop a comprehensive understanding of the environment in which this usage takes 
place. This thesis will examine the relationships formed between social media and other 
forms of online and offline communication, exploring the role of Facebook and Twitter 
as part of broader engagement repertoires. It is in the interactions that form between 
different modes of engagement within a hybrid media system that we will discover 
substantive conclusions on the relationship between social media and political 
participation. 
The intention of this chapter is not to discard the hypotheses of the slacktivist 
critique, especially without any empirical evidence. Instead, I propose a number of 
theoretical problems. In order to provide a more accurate reflection of day-to-day use, 
the theoretical scope must be broadened. An alternate research agenda is proposed 
based on five key revisions. 
 
2.2.1 A Nuanced Conceptualisation of the Participatory Process: The Continuum of 
Participation 
 
Politics is not defined by the locus of its operation but by its nature as a process. 
(Hay, 2002: 3, emphasis in original) 
 
Firstly, the slacktivist critique evaluates the relationship between acts of digital micro-
activism and the desired political outcome in isolation (Karpf, 2012a: 8). This 
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deterministic, causal relationship lacks an appreciation of the expansive, procedural 
foundations at the heart of political engagement (Arnstein, 1969; Carpentier, 2011b; 
Fung, 2006; Vegh, 2003). This emphasis on “end-product” actions ignores the role that 
social networking sites play in relation to information exchange, discursive engagement, 
and political mobilisation.  
 A key theme amongst proponents of the slacktivist critique is that campaigns 
conducted on social networking sites are ineffective in producing political change. As 
Rickett (2013) argues, “Facebook is not going to catch Joseph Kony and we won't tweet 
our way to peace in Syria.” However, as Figure 2.1—a meme shared in the aftermath of 
the #Kony2012 campaign—shows, this critique implies that low-threshold interactions 
form a causal relationship with the desired political effect(s). In doing so, the critique 
ignores the complex array of factors that result in a political outcome. Moreover, 
conventional forms of participation seldom bring such immediate results, be they party 
membership, voting, or even real space protest (Bucy and Gregson, 2008: 376).  Take, 
for instance, the 2003 protests which saw around two million people take to the streets 
of London to object to the imminent Iraq War (Kettell, 2006: 96). This shortcoming is 
exacerbated when these acts of micro-activism are compared to revolutionary change 
(Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2009; 2011; White, 2010; 2011). Instinctively, low-effort 
forms of online engagement will not feasibly produce systemic political change on their 
own (Couldry, 2012: 125). By focusing on this deterministic relationship, the slacktivist 
critique ignores the process of engagement that enables an individual to participate. 
Whether voting in an election or sending a tweet to your Member of Parliament (MP), 
active citizenship depends on access to informational resources, opportunities to take 
part in discursive spaces, and the capacity to organise. Moreover, forms of symbolic 
participation, like self-expression on social media, commonly complement other direct 
and representative forms of participation (Fung, 2006: 66). 
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Figure 2.1. A meme based on #Kony2012 that illustrates the causal relationship 
between digital micro-activism and political change 
 
 
These forms of symbolic involvement are overlooked because the slacktivist 
critique focuses on the macro-level as the arena in which power is contested and 
exercised. This emphasis on observable, end-product action omits the significance of 
the micro-level and the attitudes and behaviours of individual citizens. As Wright 
(2012a: 249) notes, it may be the case that more democratically important political and 
social changes occur amongst the interactions of ordinary citizens. Although a number 
of studies describe the individualisation of political identity and the rise of 
postmaterialist political action (Dalton, 2008; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 
2011), very few studies of online engagement account for levels of political interest, 
political knowledge, or include attitudinal measures (Boulianne, 2009: 195). I argue that 
our definition of political participation should be broadened, taking into account this 
process of enablement (Breuer and Farooq, 2012: 5; Carpentier, 2011b; Christensen, 
2011; Karpf, 2010: 29; 2012b; Rotman et al., 2011). As Breuer and Farooq (2012: 5) 
note, “it appears justifiable to regard the digital expression of individual political 
preferences as belonging to the larger set of activities defined as political participation.”  
Vegh (2003: 72) notes that online activism generally falls into three distinct 
categories across a “ladder of engagement,” each of which can either be internet-
enhanced, supporting offline efforts, or internet-based: (1) awareness and advocacy, (2) 
organisation and mobilisation, and (3) action/reaction. The slacktivist critique isolates 
the action stage. As such, the potential of online technologies to share informational 
goods, as a means for symbolic participation, and as an organisational tool, is 
 41 
discounted. Similarly, Carpentier (2011a; 2011b) offers a process-based approach 
entitled the “access, interaction and participation model,” arguing that access to political 
content and socio-communicative relationships represent prerequisite conditions for 
participation. 
However, while access and interaction remain important conditions for 
participation, Carpentier (2011a: 31) argues they cannot be equated to participation. In 
doing so, he disagrees with Jenkins (2006; Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013) who describes 
information consumption and political discussion as participatory acts. As Carpentier 
(2011b: 69) notes, “they are distinct from participation because of their less explicit 
emphasis on power dynamics and decision making.” As such, this model reinforces the 
concept of slacktivism by isolating acts that explicitly display the contestation of power 
between actors. I argue that this is conceptually problematic for a number of reasons. 
 Firstly, power is diffuse across the model as access and interaction are 
inextricably linked to participation. An awareness and understanding of a political issue, 
formed through media consumption or interpersonal discussion, may well define how a 
citizen acts. The consumption of information empowers a citizen, as it provides them 
with the informational goods on which to act (Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004; 
Jenkins, 2006; Norris, 2011). Power is also evident in the way that information is 
communicated between a producer and a receiver, a process defined as “framing,” 
“selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections 
among them as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation or solution” (Entman, 
2004: 5). Traditionally, this meant that elite actors exercised power by using media 
frames to shape how those consuming the information made sense of an event or issue 
(Castells, 2009: 115; Coleman, Anthony and Morrison, 2009: 2; Graber, 2004: 548; 
Ward, 2011: 167). Networked communications pose new questions regarding these 
established logics, as individual citizens can bypass traditional frames, challenge them, 
and even create new ones (Castells, 2009: 164; Chadwick, 2011; Dahlgren, 2009: 172; 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; Levy, 1997; Nip, 2007: 230; Rawnsley, 2005: 179; 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012: 163). As such, the desire and means to participate 
depend upon how political information is framed. 
 Similarly interaction, by definition, is always relational and power dynamics are 
displayed in the exchanges between actors (Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013: 12). This is 
especially true on social media, given the discrepancies in visibility and influence 
between users (Couldry, 2012: 122; Graham and Wright, 2013; Sunstein, 2007: 86). On 
the other hand, interpersonal discussion can help citizens contextualise and understand 
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political information (Eveland and Shah, 2003; Hardy and Scheufele, 2006; Scheufele, 
2001: 29). As McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999: 329) note, “communication plays a 
critical role in either motivating participation or making it possible.” Therefore political 
conversations, either face-to-face or online, shape the conditions for participation (Shah 
et al., 2005; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). 
 However, although I argue that access, interaction, and participation are 
interconnected, they do not necessarily form a causal model. Public actions are not 
guaranteed to follow, as information consumption and interactions may remain confined 
to private spaces. Bakardjieva (2009: 96) describes this as “subactivism,” “small-scale, 
often individual decisions and actions that have either a political or ethical frame of 
reference (or both) and remain submerged in everyday life.”  Actions include reading a 
newspaper, conversations with friends, either face-to-face (Eliasoph, 1998) or with 
networked peers (Wright, 2012b), playing videogames (Skoric and Kwan, 2011), and 
watching television (Coleman, 2007: 167; Jones, 2005). Power is contested in these 
seemingly insignificant activities. As Bakardjieva (2009: 96) argues, “it is not about 
political power in the strict sense, but about personal empowerment seen as the power 
of the subject to be the person that they want to be in accordance with his or her 
reflexively chosen moral and political standards.” The information that an individual 
consumes and the conversations they have, even if mundane or informal, can have an 
effect on how they shape their political identity (Bakardjieva, 2009; Couldry, 
Livingstone and Markham, 2010). Furthermore, these micro-political behaviours can 
wield substantial political power when considered collectively, either as a challenge to 
elites (Chadwick, 2012: 54), or in reinforcing the authority of a political community 
(Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 357; Svensson, 2011: 649). 
 This public-private distinction becomes more complex given the porousness of 
visibility online. Since clicks are measurable, and can be easily visualised, they become 
an easy proxy for engagement within the slacktivist critique. However, this neglects the 
complexity of how we use social media, as the boundaries between mass and 
interpersonal communication become blurred (Baym, 2010: 4; Papacharissi, 2010). 
Online self-expression can be published to public, semi-public, or private spaces 
depending on the service functionality. For example, a post to another user’s “wall” on 
Facebook, or a tweet directed at another user, can be interpersonal in that this 
communication is intended for another individual, but, under normal use, these can also 
be viewed by a wider audience (Baym, 2010: 4). Thereby, user generated content can 
even have political effects without the expressed intent of the user. One example of this 
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is what Anstead and O’Loughlin (2012: 4) describe as “semantic polling” techniques, 
which involve “pulling vast datasets from Twitter then machine-reading this content 
using natural language processing techniques in an effort to quantify the tone of public 
opinion.” 
 Owing to these limitations the access, interaction, participation model is too 
restrictive, neglecting the important power dynamics that citizens encounter in everyday 
life. The socio-communicative relationships that Carpentier distinguishes from 
participation are also sites of power, as individuals or groups try to persuade and shape 
the preferences of others through forms of communication (Lukes, 2005). However, the 
model does offer a way of overcoming the active-passive dichotomy in political 
participation research (Amnå and Ekman, 2014: 263; Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 359; 
Fox, 2013: 3; Theocharis, 2012). Carpentier links these seemingly passive behaviours, 
which are often ignored, to forms of political action. Based on the process-based 
approaches proposed by Vegh (2003) and Carpentier (2011a; 2011b), I offer an 
alternative model, the continuum of participation, illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2. The continuum of participation model 
 
 
The continuum of participation reflects the idea that engagement is a process, 
rather than an outcome. As Table 2.1 illustrates, the descriptive model consists of four 
stages. Access refers to cognitive engagement, and the ways by which citizens pay 
attention to politics and public affairs. Expression encapsulates forms of political 
communication between citizens. The effects of expression can vary across the 
continuum depending on the motivations of the user, how receivers use this 
information, and the composition of the audience, such as: one-many; real-imagined; 
online-offline; public-semi-public. Connection represents the processes of political 
organisation, as citizens use social media to establish and join networks for a range of 
purposes. These consist of both strong and weak tie relationships, depending on the 
issue. Finally, action signifies goal-orientated, public-political acts, as social networking 
sites are used for digital activism, or form part of interconnected engagement 
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repertoires. By using this approach, and exploring the relationships between the 
different stages, a new set of questions emerge regarding the value of social media as a 
tool for political learning, for the honing of personal identity, for discursive 
participation, and for public forms of self-expression. This model is developed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Table 2.1. Describing the continuum of participation model 
Stage of the 
continuum of 
participation 
Description 
Access Cognitive engagement and the ways by which citizens pay 
attention to politics and public affairs. Information 
consumption shapes personal political identity. 
  
Expression Users post a variety of personally expressive content on social 
media as a means of political participation. 
 
The effects of expression can vary across the continuum 
depending on the motivations of the user, the composition of 
the audience, and how receivers use this information.  
  
Connection The processes of political organisation, as citizens join like-
minded others to coordinate political action. 
  
Action Goal-orientated, public-political acts—online and offline—or 
those behaviours that complement other online and/or offline 
political acts as part of engagement repertoires. 
 
 
The marriage equality campaign lead by the Human Rights Campaign, an LGBT 
equal rights organisation based in the United States, demonstrates that a new theoretical 
approach is needed as the boundaries between self-expression, subactivism, and 
instrumental action become blurred. In March 2013, the group shared a red version of 
its logo to coincide with the Supreme Court hearing two, potentially groundbreaking, 
cases on marriage equality. The organisation encouraged its supporters to change their 
profile picture on a number of social networking sites to show their support (Knibbs, 
2013b). Advocates, in the form of individual supporters, other political groups, and 
commercial brands, went one-step further and remixed the logo, fusing it with a variety 
of political and cultural icons, including: the U.S. constitution; the popular video games 
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character “Super Mario”; the film franchise Star Wars; and the internet meme “Grumpy 
Cat,” as shown in Figure 2.3 (Garcia, 2013). If evaluated as a direct tactic to sway the 
opinion of those Justices adjudicating the case, as the slacktivist critique would propose, 
the campaign was most likely a failure. However, this overly simplistic approach lacks 
an awareness of the wider benefits of the campaign, which can be seen when mapped on 
the continuum of participation. Supporters personalised pre-existing content to fit the 
narrative and, in doing so, were simultaneously raising awareness and providing a 
platform for further action (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011; Deuze, 
2012: 165). As Knibbs (2013a) notes, “the fact that so many people were participating 
in this small way did bring attention to the issue, and underlined how mainstream the 
support of this once-fringe cause has become.”  
 
Figure 2.3. Examples of re-mixing content from the Equal Rights Campaign, March 
2013 
 
Source: Adapted from Garcia (2013) 
 
This thesis will describe how different forms of engagement enmesh across the 
continuum of participation, and the role that social networking sites play within these 
repertoires. Do social media form part of a meaningful participatory model (Rotman et 
al., 2011), or do services like Facebook and Twitter prove unsuccessful when trying to 
turn awareness into action (Morozov, 2011: 191)? 
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2.2.2 The Hybrid Media System: The Three Spheres of Hybridity 
 
If we understand political participation as solely within party, campaign, or 
movement organizations and if we look at its varieties (e.g., conventional and 
unconventional) as somewhat alternative to each other, than we lose sight of the 
many ways in which old and new political organizations and their supporters are 
integrating different modes of political engagement in everyday activities. 
(Vaccari, 2013: 222) 
 
The slacktivist critique focuses on social media in isolation. By claiming that tried and 
tested offline methods are more effective than digital micro-activism, the slacktivist 
critique falls foul of “digital dualism,” the belief that online and offline are distinct and 
separate realities (Jurgenson, 2011). As such the critique fails to account for the 
empirical reality of contemporary activism, as fluid online and offline tactics intersect 
throughout the continuum of participation. As Karpf notes (2010: 28), low-effort, high 
volume micro-activism makes up just a single tactic in the strategic repertoire of actions 
used by both citizens and organisations. The interconnectivity of social media, coupled 
with the mass adoption of services such as Facebook and Twitter, provides political 
parties, pressure groups, and social movements with a body of activists and 
organisational tools for collective action. As such, micro-activism often compliments 
other online (Christensen, 2011; Rotman et al., 2011) and offline tactics (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012: 22; Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Karpf, 2012a).  
Furthermore, the condemnation of an entire communication medium as low-
effort lacks an awareness of similar, relatively easy, offline political tasks such as 
political consumerism, postcard campaigns, or even voting (Breuer and Farooq, 2012: 
13; Christensen, 2011; Karpf, 2010; Leonard, 2009; Ward, 2011: 164). Moreover, users 
can also undertake high-effort acts on social networking sites, by creating political 
groups or devoting hours to civic discussion. It is therefore not a question of 
engagement on social networking sites being defined by low-effort slacktivism, but a 
renewal of these engagement forms within a new communicative space (Karpf, 2010; 
2012).  
In highlighting the weaknesses of digital micro-activism, and claiming that 
offline activism is more effective, the medium itself supersedes user behaviour as the 
focus of analysis. However, technology does not possess some innate quality to 
influence human behaviour (Chadwick, 2006: 18; Tufekci and Freelon, 2013: 843-844; 
Wright, 2012a: 246). Therefore, the slacktivist critique represents a form of 
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technological determinism, as the characteristics of the technology shape political 
behaviour, rather than the intentions of the user.  
The first sphere of hybridity refers to how social networking sites are often used 
to support other forms of online and offline engagement as part of interconnected 
engagement repertoires, where repertoires refer to the participatory tactics and structural 
form adopted by a political group. Traditionally, different organisational structures 
adopt different repertoires depending on their position and goals within a political 
system (Chadwick, 2007: 285). However, Chadwick (2007: 286) argues that different 
organisational forms are becoming increasingly hybridised as they adopt “digital 
network repertoires,” where online and offline techniques are being amalgamated, with 
new kinds of actions accompanying classic ones at the local, national, and transnational 
level. This blurring of engagement tactics is evident in a survey of 53 pressure groups in 
the US, where Obar, Zube and Lampe (2012: 10) found that groups adapted their use of 
social media around existing campaign strategy to suit their specific organisational 
goals. The leadership of these groups underlined the benefits of social media in 
facilitating new forms of activism, “helping groups to mount collective campaigns for 
issues that perhaps couldn’t have been addressed in the past due to the time constraints 
imposed by older communication models” (Obar, Zube and Lampe, 2012: 16).  
Theocharis (2012) has demonstrated this organisational flexibility in a study of 
the 2010 university occupations against the UK government’s planned cuts to higher 
education. Theocharis (2012: 179) notes two distinct contexts in which Twitter can be 
used. Firstly, the “mobilising stage,” where Twitter was used to provide information to 
wider audiences, to set an agenda for the movement through communication with other 
activists, and for the logistical planning of future protest events. Secondly, the 
leadership used Twitter during the demonstrations to disseminate crucial information to 
activists on the ground in real time, in what Theocharis (2012: 179) characterises as 
“dynamic” or “demonstrational” use. Subsequently, the use of Twitter was not simply 
an easy, symbolic online action, but a fusion of online and offline engagement tactics 
that were fluid throughout the mobilisation process. 
Therefore, social media enable a great deal of flexibility at the organisational 
level, as groups can vary their action repertoires depending on the issue or campaign 
(Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Chadwick, 2007: 
284; Karpf, 2012a). The speed and reach of networked communication platforms enable 
groups to switch and change their engagement tactics during a campaign. As such, 
social media do not replace the established norms of collective action, as claimed in the 
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substitution thesis, but they empower political parties, pressure groups and social 
movements to diversify their engagement tactics (Bimber, Stohl and Flanagin, 2009: 
74). Furthermore, these technological affordances have enabled the growth of entirely 
new political organisations. As Karpf (2012: 156) argues, “a new generation of netroots 
organisations has emerged… Their advocacy work extends well beyond ‘clicktivism,’ 
engaging supporters in large-scale, sustained collective action. Their work routines and 
campaign strategies are built around the Internet.” It is therefore crucial to evaluate the 
role of Facebook and Twitter within these wider engagement repertoires. 
Secondly, by focusing on social media in isolation, the slacktivist critique 
constructs an arbitrary barrier between online and offline that ignores the impact of 
media convergence on information consumption and interpersonal discussion 
(Chadwick, 2013; Jenkins, 2006). The slacktivist critique detaches moments of 
discussion and expression, focusing on just one service or one event (Wright, 2012a: 
252). This is problematic, as our everyday political experiences are fundamentally 
diffuse. As Wright notes (2012a: 254), “people don’t discuss politics in one place or 
using one technology; they use a variety of applications from email to Facebook and 
blogs to discussion forums – and these are often intertwined heavily and cross-fertilize.” 
Moreover, this one-dimensional approach neglects how our behaviours on social 
networking sites influence our offline relationships and networks (Baym, 2010: 9; 
Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011: 167). 
As such, a new approach is required—the second sphere of hybridity—that accounts for 
the convergence of media, where convergence is defined as “the flow of content across 
multiple media platforms, co-operation between multiple media industries and the 
migratory behaviour of media audiences” (Jenkins, 2006: 2). 
Chadwick (2013: 3) argues that Britain and the US now have “hybrid media 
systems,” which are built upon the interactions within and between different forms of 
media. Chadwick uses hybridity and flux to conceptualise a holistic approach to the 
study of media. Rather than differentiating between “new” and “old” media logics—
where logics are defined as “technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational 
forms”—he argues that power in empirical studies of political communication can only 
be understood in the relationships and tensions that form between them. The 
increasingly fluid power dynamics between content producers and consumers, both 
professional and amateur, is leading to significant changes for political citizenship in 
Britain: 
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This goes beyond the simple fact that citizens are now able to express 
themselves online in public forums. In the hybrid media system it is older 
media’s systemic integration and expectation of citizen expression occurring in 
newer media environments that often makes the difference. Internet-driven 
norms of networking, flexibility, spontaneity and ad hoc organizing have started 
to diffuse into our politics and media and these norms are generating new 
expectations about what counts as effective and worthwhile political action. 
 (Chadwick, 2013: 210) 
 
The hybrid media system is an important step in bypassing the aforementioned utopian-
dystopian dichotomy. It expands the parameters of media use, rather than isolating a 
specific social networking site or detaching participation as an offline-only practice 
(Boulianne, 2009: 195).  
The hybrid media system does not, necessarily, equate to a more inclusive form 
of democracy. While Chadwick (2013: 58-59) does propose that hybridity presents 
opportunities in which citizens can exert power, traditional elites can, and do, adapt to 
these new environments. In what Kreiss (2012) defines as “structured interactivity,” 
political parties restrict the agency of social media users by directing citizen 
participation to those tasks that the leadership need completing. Likewise, broadcast 
media are still a central cog in the mechanics of media production. For instance, most 
user generated content is dependent on the informational resources provided by mass 
media, including newspaper, radio broadcasting, and television (Chadwick, 2013; 
Jenkins, 2006: 13). However, as media systems become more hybridised, the control an 
actor has over these information flows weakens and more opportunities exist for 
citizens to disrupt and influence the framing of an agenda, issue, or event. 
This augmentation of digital and broadcast media can be illustrated by the 
convergence of television and social media. Putnam (2000) argues that television 
weakens citizen engagement, as isolated viewers passively consume television. 
However, interactive digital platforms change the viewing experience, creating what 
Anstead and O’Loughlin (2011: 441) describe as the “viewertariat,” users who 
comment, share, or re-mix content on social platforms as they watch television. Jenkins 
(2006: 3) argues that these new behaviours mark a cultural shift in which consumption 
is no longer passive but active, breaking down the distinctions between producer and 
consumer. This trend is increasingly apparent across television, with audience 
participation a key feature of: reality shows, such as Big Brother (Coleman, 2007: 167) 
and The X Factor (Wakefield, 2011); sports programming (Winter, 2012); and live 
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coverage of political events, such as the inauguration of Barack Obama (Wohn and 
Eun-Kyung, 2011).  
This activity is what Karpf (2012: 166-168) describes as “activated public 
opinion,” disorganised forms of online political speech that do not mesh with our 
traditional understanding of political participation or communication. Social networking 
sites offer a venue for citizens to speak out, share opinions, and spread news. What is so 
unique about this digital self-expression is the diverse range of effects seemingly 
identical acts can produce. A tweet can be an isolated instance of opinion expression 
that becomes submerged in the digital sea (Neuman, Bimber and Hindman, 2011). 
However, when undertaken collectively, the same action can be part of powerful, co-
ordinated political action. 
For example, in September 2012, the American weekly magazine Newsweek 
used a controversial headline, “MUSLIM RAGE,” to describe a number of anti-U.S. 
protests in the wake of a YouTube trailer for the low-budget film, Innocence of 
Muslims. Twitter users across the globe took offence to this sensationalist headline and 
the generalisations made from a protest in which only a few hundred participated (Nasr, 
2012). A hashtag, #muslimrage, was created to contest and reframe the narrative, 
drawing on a mixture of humour and personal anecdotes, as shown in Figure 2.4. This 
new narrative, generated by disorganised, large-scale self-expression, fed into broadcast 
media coverage, as the reaction was reported in the Guardian (Hotz, 2012), the 
Huffington Post (Mirkinson, 2012), and the New York Times (Kirkpatrick, 2012). This 
example illustrates the complex power dynamics in-play within the hybrid media 
system, as new and old media logics intertwine. Self-expression online often depends 
on the informational resources and reach of professional media, but simultaneously 
wields the potential to challenge established information hierarchies (Deuze, 2012: 137; 
see “cascading network activation,” Entman, 2004: 9). In isolation, this self-expression 
may seem trivial or insignificant, but using the theoretical lens of the hybrid media 
system we can see the disruptive effects of so-called slacktivism. 
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Figure 2.4. The Newsweek cover (17/09/2012), accompanied by two examples of 
#muslimrage tweets 
 
Source: Hend (2012); Hixson (2012) 
 
This example of remix culture, where existing content is adapted or built upon to 
convey a different meaning, highlights the third sphere of hybridity: the diffusion of the 
political into social, especially entertainment-orientated, spaces (Bennett, Wells and 
Freelon, 2011: 842; Chadwick, 2012: 45; Karpf, 2012a: 168; Lessig, 2008; Jenkins, 
2006: 208). The slacktivist critique tends to be dismissive of social media, arguing that 
it generally serves to entertain and distract a user with gossip, lolcats, and BuzzFeed, 
rather than provide civic or political informational goods (Morozov, 2009; 2011: 81-
82). However, the boundaries between what is deemed to be political and non-political 
are not static and vary from person-to-person.  
Political decisions are often made based on everyday experiences. As Delli 
Carpini and Williams (2000: 161, emphasis in original) argue, “individuals are 
simultaneously citizens, consumers, audiences, family members, workers, and so forth. 
Politics is built upon deep-seated cultural values and beliefs that are imbedded in the 
seemingly non-political aspects of public and private life.” Our personal life and private 
experiences shape the conditions of our participation (Bauman, 2001; Dahlgren, 2009: 
27-33; Giddens, 1991). As such, those conversations on social media that seem trivial 
may have unseen political consequences (Chadwick, 2012; Gaines and Mondak, 2009: 
218; Papacharissi, 2009: 230; Wright, 2012a; 2012b). Latent political actors exist in the 
form of those users who become accustomed to the self-expressive norms of social 
networking sites, sharing aspects of their daily life (Couldry, 2012: 122). Therefore, it is 
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necessary to adopt a porous definition of the political in order to understand engagement 
at the individual level. 
 For instance, culture can play an important role in guiding democratic 
citizenship. Howard (2011: 57) defines culture, from a network perspective, as “the 
relations of production, consumption, power and experience—along with the 
information infrastructure that support these relations.” Therefore, culture is not simply 
something we passively consume. Authority is maintained and contested through 
culture; it creates norms, expectations, and hierarchy that affect how a citizen behaves 
in political life (Hall, as cited in Procter, 2004: 1). As such, convergence culture does 
not mark a qualitative change in terms of where politics happens, as politics was always 
diffused through culture. We can see evidence of this porousness in “infotainment,” 
television programmes that blend entertainment and political information (Bastien, 
2009: 70; Brants, 1999; Baym, 2005: 259; Coleman, 2007: 185; Graber, 2004: 552; 
Jones, 2005: 118). Television shows, like The Daily Show with Jon Stewart in the US 
(Baym, 2005) and Have I Got News for You in Britain (Jones, 2005), use humour to 
lower the entry costs to news and political debate. However, the internet has 
fundamentally altered the way we consume and produce culture. The combination of 
cultural fragmentation and growing individualisation has led to the birth of new cultural 
artefacts (Howard, 2011: 62; Gerodimos and Ward, 2007: 116; Jurgenson, 2012). These 
include, for example, “memes”: an image, typically humorous in nature, that is copied, 
adapted, and built upon, and then spread online. Jurgenson (2012) argues that memes 
represent a rejection of passive consumption and an active attempt to assert individual 
autonomy. An individual chooses what to share, and repositions a mass, cultural artefact 
as a statement about oneself; “the meme is personal is political” (Jurgenson, 2012).  
 As such, the civic culture in Britain is far removed from the one described by 
Almond and Verba (1963). Dahlgren (2005; 2006; 2009) argues that we now have 
multiple civic cultures in which different cultural and social groups can express civic 
commonality in different ways. These civic cultures serve as the pre-conditions for 
participation, the everyday experiences that guide our sense making processes and 
stimulate political participation (Dahlgren, 2005: 157-158). In exploring these new civic 
cultures, we must engage with a diverse range of seemingly non-political, often 
informal, spaces, in which political issues emerge organically (Coleman, 2007: 167; 
Couldry, 2012; Dahlgren, 2009; Deuze, 2012; Wright, 2012a: 251-257).  
The transition from a broadcast era to a hybrid media system opens up a number 
of questions. Rather than focusing on examples of slacktivism in isolation, this thesis 
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will examine the three spheres of hybridity outlined. Firstly, in an activist context, how 
are Facebook and Twitter used alongside other modes of political action? Secondly, in 
day-to-day life, how do citizens combine forms of traditional media with social media? 
Is the audience now active (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 
2011; Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 367; Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011: 236-237)? Finally, 
using a diary methodology, I will examine in what spaces—online and offline—citizens 
consume political information, discuss issues, and engage in subactivism. 
 
2.2.3 A Matter of Scale: Time, Granularity and the Digital Divide 
 
Chief obstacles to realizing collective goals, including locating a critical mass of 
people with shared interests, providing opportunities for meaningful forms of 
distributed contribution, and coordinating people’s actions efficiently have all 
been diminished by technological tools that fundamentally enhance connectivity 
among people. 
(Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012: 2-3) 
 
 
A central component of the slacktivist critique is effort. Slacktivism is often described 
as a “lazy person’s activism,” as activists abandon effort-intensive, real space political 
action in favour of easier methods online (Breuer and Farooq, 2012: 4). As Morozov 
(2011: 190) argues, “thanks to its granularity, digital activism provides too many ways 
out.” Although this granularity—defined as “the extent to which the creation of 
informational public goods may be disaggregated into tasks of varying degree” 
(Chadwick, 2012: 40)—may amplify the number of participants involved, those 
advocating the slacktivist critique argue this masks the effortless and largely ineffective 
actions undertaken (Gladwell, 2010; White, 2010).   
However, how is effort defined in this context? If we return to the definition of 
slacktivism in the Oxford English Dictionary,6 it is apparent that effort is synonymous 
with time. This suggests that the depth of someone’s commitment to a cause, or the 
quality of democratic engagement at the individual level, can be measured by time. 
However, it is dangerous to simply assume that the more time a citizen devotes to 
politics, the more impactful their actions will be. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to claim 
that active citizenship requires such high levels of commitment. This relationship 
ignores the importance of scale in two respects. Firstly, it ignores the power of volume. 
                                                
6 “Actions performed via the Internet in support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring 
little time or involvement.” 
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A single e-petition signatory may seem insignificant but collectively, thousands or 
millions of signatories can have significant gravitas (Bochel, 2013). Secondly, scale is 
an important characteristic of the continuum of participation. If we consider the time 
pressure that citizens experience on a daily basis, then the granularity of digital 
engagement represents an important means of maintaining awareness, keeping a toe in 
the water so to speak, sometimes sparking further involvement at opportune moments. 
Therefore it is important to examine the context in which these apparent quick fixes 
take place. 
Time is a resource that has unique properties. Everyone, regardless of their place 
within society, has just twenty-four hours in a single day, making it a resource that is 
inherently scarce (Goodin et al., 2008: 3). As such, it is rational to assume that the 
amount of time that we allocate to politics indicates the strength of our involvement. 
But such an assumption disregards the complexity of political behaviour at the 
individual level, ignoring how our perception of time affects our actions. In their study 
on citizenship in Britain, Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004: 175) argue that citizens 
increasingly seek to make an observable impact with, often, the lowest time demands. 
This is a result of rising time-pressure, the all too common feeling that we just don’t 
have enough hours in the day to fulfil all of our ambitions (Goodin et al., 2008: 69). 
Goodin, Rice, Parpo, and Eriksson (2008) compare the amount of “discretionary 
time” that a person has control over across six countries. More commonly referred to as 
“spare time,” they argue that the two terms are conceptually different. Discretionary 
time is the amount of time that an individual has autonomous control over after 
deducting what is strictly needed for necessary activities, identified as bodily, financial, 
and household requirements (Goodin et al., 2008: 35). However, people do more in 
regards to these three necessities than is needed. Spare time is defined as “the amount of 
time you have left over after all the time you actually devote to paid labour, unpaid 
household labour and personal care” (Goodin et al., 2008: 36). Typically, the amount of 
spare time available to a citizen is much less than the level of discretionary time. 
Two factors account for this perceived restriction of temporal autonomy. Firstly, 
flux and instability characterise modern work, as citizens shift between different 
careers, temporary work, and spells of unemployment, a consequence of which is both 
an increase of autonomy but also stress (Bennett, 2012: 25; Goodin et al., 2008: 69). 
This anxiety permeates into our domestic duties, especially with the rise of single parent 
families (Goodin et al., 2008: 69). Secondly, being busy has become a social symbol, as 
people work harder for the microeconomic benefits and status derived from career 
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progression (Goodin et al., 2008). This is not to say that past generations did not possess 
a strong work ethic, but that these changes must be understood as part of broader 
cultural developments. Inglehart (1970; 1990) describes this as a by-product of the 
value change from materialism to post-materialism, as citizens seek more freedom over 
their time to pursue the things that they enjoy or, more broadly, value. 
The sum effect of these changes is the existence of a “time-pressure illusion,” 
the gap between one’s perception of their spare time and the actual level of 
discretionary time available to them (Goodin et al., 2008: 85). The anxiety and strain 
itself is evidently not an illusion, but the sense of pressure stems from the impression 
that work beyond a level of necessity is required (Goodin et al., 2008: 99). Evidently, 
this sense of time pressure varies at the individual level, as restrictions to one’s temporal 
autonomy depend on their lifestyle choices. However, unlike many other resources, the 
acute feeling of time-pressure is somewhat universal. Those citizens on a low-income 
must spend more time to fulfil their basic necessities, while those on a high-income 
exist within a culture of success that benefits those who work hardest. These economic 
and socio-political changes mean that, as time becomes increasingly scarce, individuals 
prioritise involvement with issues of their choosing (Gerodimos and Ward, 2007: 119).7 
What is derided as low-effort slacktivism may actually be a time-efficient way of 
maintaining an interest in politics. 
Given the time-pressure illusion that citizens experience day-to-day, the diverse 
array of engagement opportunities online pose new challenges for how we 
conceptualise active citizenship. It is true that those acts labelled as slacktivism often 
require small amounts of effort, or time, from the individual, but they are often designed 
with this very much in mind. By making political actions more granular, the barrier of 
entry to political participation is lowered.  
Such an interpretation challenges the model of citizenship inferred from the 
slacktivist critique. This critique suggests that the ideal citizen is one who devotes the 
most time to their activism. However, such a definition is problematic; this dedicated, 
informed activist type does not, and cannot, exist in most advanced democracies 
(Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010; Dalton, 2008: 
14; Dahlgren, 2009; Graber, 2004: 561; Papacharissi, 2010; Schudson, 1999; Stoker, 
2006).  
                                                
7 This development goes hand-in-hand with the emphasis on individual autonomy described in Chapter 1 
(Dahlgren, 2009; Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whitely, 2004). 
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As Graber (2004: 561-562) notes, it is not feasible to stay fully informed about 
all political developments, all of the time. In The Good Citizen, Schudson (1999) argues 
that the “monitorial citizen” model characterises the conditions of modern citizenship, 
as citizens need only survey the news enough to identify those political issues that have 
personal relevance. Despite this, much of the debate on citizenship in popular discourse 
is framed around whether citizens are engaged or apathetic (Fox, 2013; Hooghe and 
Dejaghere, 2007). This dichotomous approach obfuscates the value of scale, and what 
Amnå and Ekman (2014: 263) describe as the “standby citizen,” “those who stay alert, 
keep themselves informed about politics by bringing up political issues in everyday 
contexts, and are willing to participate if needed.” This citizen type, an extension of 
Schudson’s monitorial citizen, is normatively separate to those disengaged or 
disillusioned citizens who are similarly perceived to be apathetic. These citizens 
monitor those issues that have personal significance, and are prepared to take action, 
should circumstances warrant them to. Therefore, participatory shortcuts can be 
beneficial to active citizenship (Amnå and Ekman, 2014; Schudson, 1999; Zuckerman, 
2008).  
This thesis seeks to probe what value Facebook and Twitter have, if any, in 
providing participatory shortcuts across the continuum of participation. Past studies 
have shown that those who benefit from the political use of the internet, in general, tend 
to be skewed heavily in favour of those well-educated, computer savvy, and socially 
confident citizens (Brundidge and Rice, 2009; Coleman and Blumler, 2009: 184; 
Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury, 2003: 58; Sloam, 2012a: 9; Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley, 2004: 108). Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury (2003: 9) argue that the 
“digital divide” refers to more than simply an issue of access; a fully immersive 
experience online depends on a number of skill-sets. One must possess a variety of 
technical competencies and information literacy skills to use these resources to their full 
potential. However, as of writing, little empirical research has been undertaken that 
examines whether social media can help bridge these social and technical divides in 
Britain.  
Intuitively, by their very design, social networking sites can offer information 
shortcuts to those who may have become marginalised or excluded from political life 
(Kalnes, 2009: 251). Through interpersonal communication and asymmetric sharing on 
social media, users are exposed to political information they may not have intended to 
consume (Chadwick, 2012; Wright, 2012a: 255). For example, “Trending Topics” on 
Twitter can cover political events—alongside the constant deluge of hashtags related to 
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the British boyband One Direction—and, crucially, different information from a user’s 
own personal feed (An et al., 2011; Bode, 2008: 3). Similarly, the majority of political 
information that is consumed on Facebook tends to originate from those contacts that a 
user interacts with infrequently (Bakshy et al., 2012).  
Outside of these informational benefits, Jenkins (Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013: 
6) and Zuckerman (2008) have argued that regular access to social networking sites for 
personal enjoyment creates the latent capabilities for political action. Zuckerman’s 
(2008) “cute cat theory of digital activism” states that through the extended use of 
digital media tools for entertainment and social relations, citizens develop the 
organisational and technical capacities to use these tools for political ends, under the 
right circumstances.  
However, this theory assumes that all users are equally comfortable with 
political self-expression online, whereas closer examination indicates that many citizens 
are uneasy about digital forms of interaction, as opposed to face-to-face communication. 
Tufekci (2012c: 43) labels this characteristic as “cyberasociality,” “the inability or 
unwillingness of some people to relate to others via social media as they do when 
physically-present.” These feelings are in flux over time, depending on technological 
developments, personal circumstances, and the nature of the particular networked 
contact(s). As Rainie and Wellman (2012: 9) note, citizens must build upon their 
existing social skills in order to make the most of this expansive, networked 
environment. Undoubtedly, this social divide can impact a citizen’s ability to use the 
internet in ways beneficial for democracy. Just because the threshold of access to social 
media is lower does not necessarily mean that the opportunities gained through their use 
are evenly distributed across society. As such, the social divide must be factored into 
any conclusions drawn on the impact of Facebook and Twitter across the continuum of 
participation. 
Morozov (2011: 194) contends that social networking sites lead to information 
overload, as lazy, but image conscious, users share their political perspectives and 
obstruct collective action efforts in the process—“not everyone can be Che Guevara.” 
But users aren’t trying to be full-time activists. The reality is that a majority of citizens 
balance civic and political interests with the trials of daily existence (Dalton, 2008: 2; 
Goodin et al., 2008). Therefore, scale is essential when we consider the relationship of 
routine social media use and political engagement. Citizens are not conveniently 
divided between those who are active and those who are passive; engagement is not 
akin to an on/off switch. At various times we are more or less involved, depending on 
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our personal circumstances. With this in mind, the granularity built into social media 
must be explored across the continuum of participation, rather than in isolation as in the 
slacktivist critique. 
 
2.2.4 The Feel-Good Factor: Information Accuracy, Authenticity and the Digital Self  
 
"Slacktivism" is an apt term to describe feel-good online activism that has zero 
political or social impact. It gives those who participate in "slacktivist" 
campaigns an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without 
demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group. 
(Morozov, 2009) 
 
The underlying motivational logic behind acts of slacktivism is self-gratification. This 
can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the aspiration to feel-good by doing good. 
Critics denounce the effortlessness of slacktivism, providing cognitive rewards for the 
participant while minimising their contribution. However, this judgement is only valid 
when applied to the context of the action itself. If we isolate a Facebook post or a tweet, 
and then compare the depth of one’s participation with what are often ambitious aims, it 
may seem that a participant’s involvement is self-serving. However, what happens after 
and alongside these acts of slacktivism? Research has shown that those users engaging 
in digital micro-activism do so alongside a wide range of other civic and political 
activities (Christensen, 2012; Kristofferson, White and Peloza, 2014; Vaccari et al., 
2015). What may seem to be a low-effort, self-indulgent act in isolation could in fact 
lead to further involvement, a process in which the interdependency between different 
acts sheds light on the normative value of democratic engagement (Chadwick and 
Dennis, forthcoming). 
Secondly, the slacktivist critique argues that actors are more concerned by social 
presentation than the cause itself, as users seek to cultivate a particular image. In both 
cases one’s actions are deemed to lack authenticity, as narcissism trumps genuine intent. 
Flawed or problematic campaigns become viral at the expense of other, more deserving 
or urgent, causes due to this perceived self-indulgence (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 
2009; 2011: 190). As Morozov (2011: 194) notes, “while many students are wasting 
their energy on ‘saving’ Darfur by joining Facebook groups, their own universities are 
run without the scrutiny they deserve from the student body.” Well-documented 
examples include: the hundreds of thousands of Twitter users who made their avatars 
green in solidarity with the Iranian election protests in 2009; those Facebook users who 
changed their profile picture to an image of a cartoon character in December 2010 to 
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raise awareness of child abuse; and the aforementioned #Kony2012 campaign. In each 
of these cases the psychological or social benefits to the participant are seen to far 
outweigh any observable, “real world” impacts (Morozov, 2011: 186). 
However, this take on authenticity is imprecise as it conflates two interpretations 
of the term; authenticity refers to both the sincerity of political behaviour, and whether 
the campaign is accurate and based on fact. This confusion is understandable as the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition of authenticity refers quite clearly to both 
interpretations.8 However, it is important to distinguish between the two definitions 
when analysing political behaviour, as they are not one and the same. Someone may 
sincerely act on an issue that may be constructed on a suspect narrative. I know when I 
shared the #Kony2012 campaign video to my Facebook network on the morning of 
March 5, 2012, I had nothing but honest intentions. Seemingly, the slacktivist critique 
would deem this to be inauthentic, but in doing so it confuses authenticity for issue 
salience, as the authors own normative perspective on the issue frames whether the 
behaviour is credible (Morozov, 2011: 194; White, 2010; 2011). In simply labelling 
actions as authentic or inauthentic, we revert back to dichotomous thinking, when in 
reality authenticity is a fluid and hugely subjective concept. Therefore, in order to 
understand the complex personal motivations that occur prior to acts of digital micro-
activism at the individual level, it is important to differentiate authenticity from 
information accuracy. This will also highlight if, and under what conditions, the 
relationship between the two concepts is empirically significant.  
In this thesis I define information accuracy as the factual accuracy of the 
information on which political behaviour is based.  A measure of this kind can be highly 
subjective and difficult to operationalize methodologically. For example, a post on a 
social networking site may be more factually accurate than some news articles. 
However, as illustrated by #Kony2012, it is important to analyse what type of 
information sparks viral attention, examining both the format in which it is presented 
(for example a video, an image, or text) and the way that the content is framed. 
Authenticity is defined within this thesis as the extent to which behaviour is genuine, or 
a reflection of one’s “true self,” as opposed to the result of external social pressures 
(Yacobi, 2013). This definition intentionally avoids the debates surrounding 
authenticity and authentic living, as it is necessary to operationalise a somewhat limited 
                                                
8 “Authentic – of undisputed origin and not a copy; based on facts; accurate or reliable: an authentic 
depiction of the situation (in existentialist philosophy) relating to or denoting an emotionally appropriate, 
significant, purposive, and responsible mode of human life.” Authentic [Def. 1]. (n.d.). In Oxford 
Dictionaries Online, Retrieved August 19, 2013, from 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/authentic. 
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definition in order to empirically analyse individual level motivations. Questions 
regarding authenticity have become of particular significance given the emphasis on 
individual autonomy as an explanatory factor for political engagement (Bennett, 2012; 
Dahlgren, 2009; Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004). This 
thesis will examine both information accuracy and authenticity.  
Concern over the accuracy of information stems from the ease of use of social 
media, coupled with the speed of information dissemination online. The desire to 
produce content that reaches as many users as possible produces “a race to the bottom,” 
as actors seek to compress and simplify campaigns to suit the granular medium (White, 
2010). Stepanek (forthcoming, as cited in Watson, 2012) suggests that this can lead to 
“ad-hocracies,” networks that can be activated quickly and passionately around specific, 
single issue goals, but at the cost of context and depth in understanding. These fears are 
heightened amongst younger citizens given their apparent difficulties in distinguishing 
reliable and trustworthy information from deceit and conspiracy (Bartlett and Miller, 
2011). As I demonstrated when I shared the #Kony2012 video, a simple, emotive 
narrative can trigger our pre-reflective consciousness, causing us to act before we reflect 
on our actions. 
This unease is exacerbated by the growing prominence of a new group of 
influencers online, and the uncertain role that they play in shaping the preferences of 
other users. Described as “tastemakers” (Allocca, 2011), “power users” (Hampton et al., 
2012), and “culturemakers” (Lotan, 2012), these are users who wield significant social 
influence, usually due to their reach over large networks. For some users, celebrities in 
particular, this means additional influence within unfamiliar territories. As such, 
mobilising key influencers has become a key feature of campaign strategy for many 
pressure groups.   
New information providers have also experienced a rapid growth in audience 
share. The likes of BuzzFeed, the Huffington Post, and Upworthy use social media as 
their main vehicle for content distribution. These new hybrid media organisations blur 
the boundaries between entertainment, news, and activism. In doing so, they have been 
criticised for distracting citizens from serious political news through sensationalist 
reporting to drive click-through rates (Ball, 2014; Preston, 2014; Zara, 2013).  
However, these critiques are based on an analysis of each action, case, or 
content provider in isolation. If we explore the reaction to these digitally mediated 
behaviours over time, it is evident that citizens do not just passively consume 
information online. Sharing information publicly online opens up channels of 
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contestation, providing opportunities for users to challenge and correct misinformation. 
Conversation helps citizens process, understand, and question information, ultimately 
moderating participatory behaviour (Baek, Wojcieszak and Delli Carpini, 2012; Delli 
Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004; Hardy and Scheufele, 2006: 72-73). For example, 
research conducted following the 2011 riots in England suggests that social media 
enabled users to verify information and dispel rumours, such as the speculation that a 
lion had escaped from a zoo in London (Procter, Vis and Voss, 2013). 
Furthermore, the role of these new influencers should be contextualised within 
the broader literature on media effects (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 2004; Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Robinson, 2002). As Deuze (2012: xi) notes, “media benchmark our 
experience of the world, and how we make sense of our role in it.” Mass media and 
face-to-face communication have an equally important role in shaping our political 
attitudes, a role that is similarly prone to abuse (Beck et al., 2002). The processes that 
citizens use to form opinions are, and have always been, based on emotion, and 
vulnerable to manipulation. The likelihood of achieving organised, rational, consensus-
driven deliberative communication is highly unlikely (Chadwick, 2012; Delli Carpini, 
Cook and Jacobs, 2004). As such, it is vital to remain realistic and understand that 
throughout history audiences have been susceptible to trends or the sway of popular 
opinion; this is not a phenomenon that is exclusive to social media.  
Following #Kony2012, Zuckerman (2012a) posed two important questions. Can 
any political campaign truly be of mass interest without oversimplifying? And how do 
we balance the need for mass engagement, as a way of legitimising representative 
democracy, against the dangers of oversimplification? The slacktivist critique 
disregards the unique attitudinal factors that lead a person to a point of engagement. A 
more expansive approach is required to interpret how citizens consume, process, and act 
upon the information that they consume online. 
The slacktivist critique also proposes that the audience, both real and imagined,9 
exert social pressure that may cause a citizen to act inauthentically, as citizens ignore 
their own personal opinion and go along with the crowd in order to secure approval and 
validation from others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004: 606; Sunstein, 2007: 84). This 
includes refraining from political expression through fear of damaging one’s reputation. 
In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American Life 
Project, 73 percent of social networking site users admitted encountering political 
                                                
9 The imagined audience refers to the wider audiences, and their potential reaction, that a user may 
visualise when posting content to a public or semi-public space (Marwick and boyd, 2011; Papacharissi, 
2012). 
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content that they disagreed with, but only 23 percent responded with comments of their 
own (Rainie and Smith, 2012). This pressure originates from the very design of social 
media, as users struggle to manage their digital identity in public and semi-public 
networks (Baym, 2010). 
The user profile, a mandatory feature of most social networking sites, is 
designed to encourage transparency over anonymity. Users are asked to hand over 
personal information, offering a virtual representation of the self to their network, in an 
attempt to form a direct link between online and offline identity. As such, the 
boundaries between what Couldry (2003) describes as the “media world” and the 
“ordinary world” are in a constant state of flux. As Krotoski (2012) notes, “the days 
when people were allowed to be dogs [online] is coming to a close. The old web, a 
place where identity could remain separate from real life, is rapidly disappearing from 
the computer screen.”10 This calls into question the ways in which we construct our 
identities and manage our relationships with others, as users have multiple personas that 
they must manage across and within different services, with both real and imagined 
audiences in mind (Baym, 2010; Deuze, 2012: 247; Marwick and boyd, 2011; 
Papacharissi, 2010; 2012; Rainie and Wellman, 2012; van Dijck, 2013). The public and 
private converge on social media as private behaviours are broadcast publicly. As we 
navigate this treacherous and fluid terrain of public, semi-public, and private spaces, our 
personal identity must be reflexive. 
Based on the interpretation of authenticity stipulated in this thesis, a citizen can 
authentically cultivate multiple representations of the self; self-awareness and individual 
choice are deemed to be the central tenets of authentic living. In The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (1990), Erving Goffman states that human beings rely on 
appearance and perception to guide how they judge others when they interact (Goffman, 
Lemert, and Branaman, 1997: 21). The observer relies on the subject’s representation of 
the self in order to make a judgement. As to avoid misrepresentation, we try to manage 
the impression we give to others. We choose to adapt our persona depending on our 
audience, our own needs, and the technological affordances a platform provides (Deuze, 
2012: 247). As such, the social self that we display on Facebook is normally very 
different, for example, to the professional image that we relay on LinkedIn (van Dijck, 
2013: 204). What the slacktivist critique may deem to be narcissistic or inauthentic 
                                                
10 While this quote does not apply universally, given the large volume of hoax accounts on Facebook and 
Twitter, it does speak to the general service norms. 
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practice may be more accurately conceptualised as a consequence of our pursuit of 
individual autonomy.  
By presenting authenticity as a binary condition, we lack understanding of the 
complexity of personal motivation. As Baym (2010: 108) argues, “impression 
management may involve outright deception, total honesty, or, most often, a strategic 
balance of sharing, withholding, and distorting information.” It is not my intention to 
disregard the threat to democracy that reputational cascades pose, but to reframe the 
debate outside of the reductive labels that are applied within the slacktivist critique. 
Instead, we must explore both the informational sources that trigger micro-activism, and 
also the complex, personal contexts that precede it.  
 
2.2.5 The Importance of Technological Specificity and Service Design 
 
A problem that is pervasive across those accounts advocating the slacktivist critique, 
and the discipline as a whole, is the reference to social media as a homogenous entity. 
When making claims on the impact of social media on democracy, it is imperative that 
we clearly stipulate to which social networking sites they apply. Definitions frequently 
fail to note the fundamental differences between services. This is problematic given that 
site-specific design can influence the type, quality, and availability of information, 
whilst also shaping discursive opportunities and the possibilities for expressive 
engagement (Baykurt, 2011; Baym, 2010; Bimber and Copeland, 2011; boyd and 
Ellison, 2007; Pasek, more and Romer, 2009; van Dijk, 2013). For example, some sites, 
like Facebook, strongly support pre-existing offline relationships, while others, such as 
Twitter, facilitate connections between new contacts over shared interests (boyd and 
Ellison, 2007; Pasek, more and Romer, 2009: 207-8). Moreover, this potential must be 
clarified as social networking sites are, first and foremost, commercial entities; they do 
not seek to amplify the agency of citizens (Andrejevic, 2009). 
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010: 61) define social media as “a group of Internet-
based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 
2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” User 
generated content refers to the various forms of informational goods that are created and 
produced by end-users. As Table 2.2 shows, Kaplan and Haenlein (2010: 62) contrast 
media richness theory, the degree to which a service replicates face-to-face 
communication, against the level of self-presentation the service design allows for. In 
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doing so, social networking sites are differentiated from other examples of Web 2.0 
technologies by virtue of facilitating a rich, virtual replication of our identity. 
 
Table 2.2. Classification of social media by social presence/media richness and self-
presentation 
  Social presence / Media richness 
  Low Medium High 
Self 
presentation 
High 
Blogs Social networking 
sites (e.g. 
Facebook) 
Virtual social 
worlds (e.g. 
Second Life) 
Low 
Collaborative 
projects (e.g. 
Wikipedia) 
Content 
communities (e.g. 
YouTube) 
Virtual game 
worlds (e.g. World 
of Warcraft) 
Source: Kaplan and Haenlein (2010: 62) 
 
A more precise definition is offered by boyd and Ellison (2007), who describe social 
networking sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public 
or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system.” In this thesis social media and social 
networking sites are used interchangeably; both terms refer to this definition. 
Two distinctions are significant when comparing the democratic potential of 
different social networking sites. Firstly, one must differentiate between synchronous 
and asynchronous communication, as the difference in temporal context can affect user 
behaviour (Baym, 2010: 7-8; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). For instance, 
the immediacy of synchronous communication can make the information provided seem 
more personable (Ryan, 2007: 238-239), posing questions on whether this affects the 
likelihood of micro-activism. Secondly, different platforms produce different 
information flows between users. Symmetric sharing is common on Facebook, where 
each user confirms a connection and then content is shared privately, or semi-publically. 
The default sharing mechanism on Twitter is asymmetric, where a user shares content 
publically and anyone can subscribe to their updates. However, this description is 
somewhat reductive, as it does not account for the variety of information flows that 
exist within each of these social platforms (Wood, 2011). Therefore clarity, in terms of 
specific service functionality, is essential. 
This call for clarity may seem contradictory given the emphasis on hybridity 
throughout this chapter; how do we account for media convergence and, at the same 
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time, recognise technological specificity? I argue that it is possible to do both. Unlike 
the slacktivist critique, this thesis will not generate conclusions about the impact of each 
service in isolation; this would be problematic, as Facebook and Twitter do not exist in 
a vacuum. By using a combination of experimental and qualitative techniques, this 
thesis will analyse the role that Facebook and Twitter play within a hybrid media 
system, examining the functions of each service in-depth. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated the problematic nature of the slacktivist critique as a 
reflection of the relationship between routine social media use and political 
engagement. An alternate research agenda was proposed based on five key revisions. 
Firstly, the critique evaluates the relationship between acts of so-called slacktivism and 
the desired political outcome in isolation. It implies that easy online actions, like 
sharing a tweet, form a causal relationship with the desired political effect. However, in 
doing so this ignores the complex array of factors that result in any political outcome. 
Focusing on the relationship in this way lacks an appreciation of the procedural 
foundations at the heart of political engagement. By thinking of participation as a 
process, a new set of questions emerge regarding the value of social media as a tool for 
deepening knowledge, for political discussion, and for public forms of symbolic self-
expression. 
Secondly, empirical research on social networking sites must account for the 
three spheres of hybridity. Digital micro-activism often makes up just a single tactic in 
the vast strategic repertoire of political activism. By focusing on one social networking 
site, or one event, we ignore the relationships formed between symbolic digital micro-
activism and other forms of online and offline engagement. Furthermore, by focusing 
on social media in isolation the slacktivist critique treats online and offline as distinct 
and separate realities. Rather than differentiating between new and old media, Facebook 
and Twitter must be understood within the expansive, hybrid media system that such 
tools operate within (Chadwick, 2013). This must be inclusive of what Wright (2012a: 
254) describes as “third spaces,” non-political discussion forums—online and offline—
where political talk emerges within everyday conversations. 
Thirdly, slacktivism is often deemed to be lazy activism, as activists abandon 
effort-intensive, on-the-ground political action in favour of easier methods online. This 
suggests that the depth of someone’s commitment to a cause, or the quality of 
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democratic engagement at the individual level, can be measured by time. However, it is 
dangerous to assume that the more time a citizen devotes to politics the more impactful 
their actions will be, and it is unrealistic to claim that active citizenship requires such 
high levels of commitment. If we consider the time pressure that individuals experience 
on a daily basis, then the granularity of digital engagement affords an important means 
of maintaining awareness, sometimes sparking further involvement at opportune 
moments. Therefore, it is important to examine the context in which these “quick fixes” 
take place. 
Fourthly, digital micro-activism is often labelled as inauthentic. However, this 
definition of authenticity is inaccurate, as it refers to both the sincerity of political 
behaviour and whether the campaign is accurate and based on fact. It is necessary to 
distinguish between attitudinal motivations and information accuracy when analysing 
political behaviour online, as someone may sincerely act on an issue that is constructed 
on a suspect narrative. Furthermore, I argue that self-presentation online can be 
authentic. As users navigate the fluid terrain of public, semi-public, and private spaces 
online, our personal identity must remain reflexive. Personal motivations must be 
explored as users cross within and between these spaces. 
Finally, I argue for more clarity in our definition of social media, as service 
design can shape how these tools impact democratic engagement.   
Slacktivism is indicative of the dichotomous literature from which it originates. 
The critique refers to just a tiny proportion of actions that are in no way indicative of 
how the use of social media may benefit, or harm, a user’s understanding of and 
engagement with politics. Scale and context are crucial to understanding political 
behaviour. In this thesis I adopt what Chadwick (2013: 5) describes as, “hybrid 
thinking,” “nudging us away from ‘either/or’ patterns of thought and toward ‘not only, 
but also’ patterns of thought.” By focusing on an action, we analyse the technological 
functionality rather than how citizens use the tool. In order to critically evaluate these 
new forms of social and political self-expression, we must analyse them within the 
media environment in which they take place. This must be inclusive of both the 
multifaceted engagement strategies that political actors employ when using social 
media, and the expansive, hybrid media system that such tools operate in. It is within 
these interactions that we will discover more substantive findings about the relationship 
between the routine use of social media and political engagement. The next chapter will 
outline the theoretical framework for this thesis, offering an alternative prognosis to the 
slacktivist critique based on the continuum of participation model.  
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3. Theoretical Framework and Expected Findings 
 
Public political attitude expression is undergoing a transformation. It is no 
longer confined to certain events such as elections nor does it necessarily require 
the co-presence of others. The public can articulate its views on political matters 
via a greatly expanded series of protest repertoires and media outlets, and via 
new technologies. As the number of issues coming to the public’s attention has 
increased, attitude expression is less and less confined to national issues and 
conventional politics. 
(Stanyer, 2005: 19) 
 
This thesis has outlined the debates within the literature on citizenship and online 
political participation. These disputes arise from conceptual differences over how we 
define these key concepts. Much of the political science literature is fixated on a static 
conceptualisation of citizenship, which prioritises state-centric forms of participation 
and overlooks the structural transformations evident in everyday political behaviour 
(Coleman, 2007: 184; Dahlgren, 2009). Chapter 1 discusses these trends, describing 
how political identity has become personalised, leading to a diffusion of what 
constitutes political engagement. The slacktivist critique is based on an out-dated notion 
of the “model citizen.” The critique is symptomatic of other accounts of citizenship, in 
that it has unrealistic expectations and does not account for attitudinal and behavioural 
changes (Chadwick, 2012; Dalton, 2008; Graber, 2004; Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini, 
2009; Norris, 2011; Schudson, 1999; Stoker, 2006). Citizenship should be characterised 
by the attitudes, behaviours, and practices of citizens as they evolve. This chapter offers 
a theoretical framework that builds upon the alternative approach to analysing the 
relationship between routine social media use and political participation introduced in 
Chapter 2. 
The guiding theoretical assumptions for this thesis rest upon a number of 
complementary advances in the study of media and political engagement. Firstly, 
building on the fusion of the personal and political and the increasing importance of 
micro-participation, a conceptualisation of citizenship is proposed that represents a 
more reflexive, individually defined notion of political identity (Dalton, 2008; Norris, 
2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004). Secondly, the provocatively titled “Facebook 
Activist”11 seeks to illustrate an alternative prognosis to challenge the slacktivist 
critique. Through an amalgamation of the theoretical contributions from Bennett, 
                                                
11 The term “Facebook Activist” is used to challenge the negative connotations associated with its use in 
digital vernacular. For example, the Urban Dictionary—a crowdsourced online dictionary of slang 
words—characterises a Facebook Activist as a “self righteous individual that thinks forwarding Facebook 
pics with captions constitutes a real effort to assist their chosen cause(s).” 
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Chadwick, and Papacharissi, this thesis will contend that low effort interactions 
conducted online are not ineffective and narcissistic acts of slacktivism, but integral 
components within a scaled continuum of participation. Through information sharing on 
social media, citizens are exposed to a diverse array of political information, much of 
which—given the nature of social networking—is tied to personal preferences and 
private experiences (Chadwick, 2012; Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010; 
Papacharissi, 2010). Social media can subsequently provide a platform for self-
expression, networking, and the opportunity to engage in collective action on a 
privatized basis (Papacharissi, 2010). In what Bennett and Segerberg (2012: 36) outline 
as a connective logic, “taking public action or contributing to a common good becomes 
an act of personal expression.” This emphasis on self-actualization has led to the growth 
of new organisations and movements that use digital media to support a variety of 
online and offline political engagement repertoires (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; 
Chadwick, 2007; Karpf, 2012a). 
Given that a number of these theories were designed with American citizens in 
mind, they require further testing in a British context. This thesis will deduce a number 
of expected findings from the theoretical framework and explore them empirically.12 
These expected findings will act as an alternative to the hypotheses derived from 
slacktivism (see Christensen, 2011; 2012). By empirically testing these hypotheses, this 
study will assess the extent to which slacktivism has value as a judgement on 
contemporary political action. Together, the dual set of hypotheses will act as a guide 
for analysing the findings generated through the primary research. However, I will also 
remain open-minded to any new phenomena that emerge during data collection.  
 
3.1 Citizenship in the 21st Century 
 
If we are to understand political participation at all, we must explore how each 
new generation comes to develop its own conceptions of citizenship and 
expresses itself through civic and political engagement. 
(Sloam, 2012a: 4) 
 
How we define citizenship shapes the judgements that we reach on the health of 
democratic engagement (Dahlgren, 2005: 147). Clarity is therefore essential. This 
section will outline the conceptual framework that I adopt in this thesis. The way a 
                                                
12 Expected findings are used as opposed to generalisable hypotheses due to the non-random sample and 
the small-N research design.  
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researcher operationalises citizenship within empirical research can typically take one 
of two approaches (Svensson, 2011: 645). A researcher may adopt an inductive 
approach, in which an observation of political attitudes and behaviours forms new 
socio-political theory, or a deductive analysis, where one’s findings are compared 
against existing citizenship theory. This thesis will combine elements of both, by way of 
observing how social media affects how citizens envisage their citizenship, and then act 
upon it.  
 
3.1.1 The Actualizing Citizen 
 
Bennett (2008; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011) has recently outlined a cultural shift 
in political identity, as duty and obligation are being replaced by individual autonomy. 
As Table 3.1 shows, this evolution from the “dutiful citizen” to the “actualizing citizen” 
encapsulates the critique of state-centric citizenship, and embraces new, alternative 
forms of citizen culture. Citizens enjoy unprecedented levels of freedom to define and 
manage their identities. This is in contrast to the experience of past generations, who 
were essentially assigned broad social identities based on religious affiliations or social 
cleavages (Dahlgren, 2009; Dalton, 2008). Citizens manage these multiple identities as 
they compete and assemble in complex patterns, the result of which is a diffusion of 
political issues, interests, and modes of engagement (Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 
2005; Dalton, 2008; Yuval-Davies, 2007). 
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Table 3.1. The changing citizenry: The traditional civic education ideal of the dutiful 
citizen versus the emerging youth experience of self-actualizing citizenship 
Actualizing citizen Dutiful citizen 
Diminished sense of government obligation 
- higher sense of individual purpose 
 
Obligation to participate in government 
centred activities 
Voting is less meaningful than other, more 
personally defined acts such as 
consumerism, community volunteering, or 
transnational activism 
 
Voting is the core democratic act 
Mistrust of media and politicians is 
reinforced by negative mass media 
environment 
 
Becomes informed about issues and 
government by following mass media 
Favours loose networks of community 
action – often established or sustained 
through friendship and peer relations and 
thin social ties maintained by interactive 
information technologies 
Joins civil society organisations and/or 
expresses interests through parties that 
typically employ one-way conventional 
communication to mobilise supporters 
Source: Adapted from Bennett (2008: 14) 
 
Structural factors are key to understanding this evolution, as citizens move from 
one spatio-temporal location to another. Within digitally enabled networks, methods of 
engagement traverse between the local, national and global level (Bennett, Wells and 
Freelon, 2011: 838). In this networked landscape, issues often transcend the nation-state 
and involve a variety of alternative, transnational actors such as corporations. This has 
led to the emergence of self-organising networks, such as the Occupy movement, which 
are less hierarchical than the civil society organisations that preceded them (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012: 19; Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005: 179). 
In the actualizing citizen framework political behaviour is focused on generating 
feelings of self-efficacy, as personally expressive forms of engagement that represent an 
individual’s own social and political identity become more commonplace (Bennett, 
2008: 14). As such, citizens are increasingly expressive, acting on the basis of personal 
preferences and lifestyle choices (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1990; Stanyer, 2005). These 
diverse issues, such as environmentalism or consumer activism, often reflect a post-
materialist value orientation, and result in an assortment of new forms of participation. 
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As Table 3.2 shows, this creative media engagement often takes the form of self-
expression and user generated content online. Bennett (2008: 10) describes this as a new 
civic language, one that fuses social networks and entertainment with civic and political 
goods. As Karpf (2012a: 167) notes, “they share public sentiments through tweets and 
Facebook likes, and view this as a legitimate form of expression.”  Although this 
framework is based on the attitudes and behaviours of young people, it is important to 
note that this study will not focus on them in isolation. Instead, the actualizing citizen 
framework will be applied to a wider age range in the ethnographic research to explore 
whether these trends reflect a more general phenomenon. 
 
Table 3.2. Dutiful and actualizing styles of civic action and communication 
 Actualizing citizen Dutiful citizen 
Civic Style Open to many forms of creative 
input, ranging from government 
politics to global activism 
 
Rooted in self actualization 
through social expression 
 
Personal interests channelled 
through loosely tied networks 
Orientated around citizen 
input to government or formal 
public organisations, 
institutions, and campaigns 
 
Rooted in responsibility and 
duty 
 
Channelled through 
membership in defined social 
groups 
 
Communication 
logic 
Lines between content 
consumption and production 
blurred 
 
Individual content production and 
sharing over peer networks that tie 
personal identity to engagement 
(which can occur in traditional 
political contexts such as viral 
video sharing in political 
campaigns) 
Primarily one-way 
consumption of managed 
civic information (news and 
political advertisements) 
 
When individual content 
production occurs it is aimed 
at specific institutional targets 
(contacting elected officials, 
letters to newspapers) 
Source: Bennett, Wells and Freelon (2011: 840) 
 
One may argue that the actualizing citizen framework establishes a rigid 
dichotomy between citizenship styles, similar to those discussed in Chapter 2. However, 
Bennett, Wells and Freelon (2011: 839) dismiss this, arguing that the categories are 
fluid as citizens mix both actualizing and dutiful citizenship styles. For example, voting 
 72 
is still an important form of democratic engagement for many young people, but the 
motivations for casting a vote are changing. They critique the work of others, such as 
Dalton (2008), who—in their view—fail to reflect these relationships (Bennett, Wells 
and Freelon, 2011: 850). Rather than advocating that duty-bound citizenship has been 
wholly replaced, the framework describes a gradual shift in contemporary citizenship. 
Citizens increasingly shape and define their own political identity due, in part, to the 
structural freedoms afforded by the internet. This study will examine whether there is 
evidence to support the actualizing citizen framework in Britain, and the role that social 
media plays in sustaining this shift. 
Social networking sites offer unique potential for these mediated forms of 
engagement, as individuals use services like Facebook and Twitter to manage their issue 
interests (Castells, 2009; Howard, 2011: 69). Using these tools, citizens can form 
political communities around niche cultural phenomena. Furthermore, the technical 
difficulties of self-organising are also diminished somewhat by the skills that people 
develop using these platforms day-to-day.  Therefore, in light of the emphasis on 
individually constructed political identity, this thesis examines how individuals 
envisage public issues and collective action. What role do networked social media 
platforms play in this process? These questions are increasingly important given that the 
slacktivist critique claims that these behaviours are narcissistic and self-interested. 
 
3.2 The “Facebook Activist”: Political Engagement and Social Media 
 
The “Facebook Activist” framework draws upon an amalgamation of theoretical 
contributions that, when combined, dispute the hypotheses of the slacktivist critique. I 
argue that when we understand participation as a process, Facebook and Twitter can be 
important participatory tools for actualizing citizens. Firstly, they can provide access to 
information and contribute to political learning (Chadwick, 2012). Secondly, social 
networking sites also offer a public forum in which users can express themselves and 
talk to like-minded others about the issues that they privately deem to be important 
(Papacharissi, 2010). Finally, the networked design of these services facilitates a range 
of collective action opportunities that are based on personal action frames, “[which] are 
inclusive of different personal reasons for contesting a situation that needs to be 
changed.” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 744). A period of remarkable organisational 
change has followed, in which organisations and movements have built upon these 
technological developments and the evolution of participatory norms (Bennett and 
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Segerberg, 2012; 2013; Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Chadwick, 2007; 2013; 
Karpf, 2012a). The following section outlines the benefits of the routine use of social 
media across a continuum of participation. 
 
3.2.1 Accidental Exposure and By-Product Learning 
 
As the product page for Facebook clearly states, the service was not designed with 
political activism in mind, but for people to “stay connected with friends and family” 
(Facebook, 2015). Despite this, through our normal, everyday use of the service in a 
non-political context—browsing your news feed in a shopping queue; sending a private 
message to a friend; sharing a photo of a particularly appetising meal—we are often 
accidentally exposed to political information. Downs (1957), writing during the 
emergence of the broadcast era, was one of the first to describe this accidental exposure. 
In his classic text An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs applies economic theory 
to individual level decision-making. In doing so, he emphasised the time costs that 
citizens incur as they seek and reflect upon political information. One way that these 
time costs can be avoided is through information shortcuts. According to Downs (1957: 
223), “entertainment sources sometimes yield political information as a surplus benefit 
from what is intended as an entertainment investment.” In the mid-twentieth century 
Downs (1957: 222) suggested that this free data could be sourced through letters, 
conversations, and discussion groups, but as Prior (2007: 17) notes, the same can be 
applied to a “pleasant evening watching television with a little bit of political news as a 
‘surplus benefit.’” As a result, citizens can acquire political information as a by-product 
of normal everyday activities in seemingly non-political environments.  
Building on this model of by-product learning (Baum, 2003; Baum and Jamison, 
2006; Downs, 1957), Chadwick (2009; 2012) proposes that users are accidentally 
exposed to political information through their everyday use of social media:  
 
Hugely popular user generated content sites such as YouTube and social 
network environments such as Facebook encourage more by-product learning 
about politics than do static web pages. While the internet’s enormous potential 
for political information retrieval does not imply that individuals will always use 
it for those ends, and it is clear that attitudinal variables such as partisanship will 
act as important mediators, there is a danger that we neglect opportunities for 
by-product learning in the online environment.  
(Chadwick, 2012: 47) 
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Although people mainly use Facebook and Twitter for entertainment, the information 
that is shared within these services tends to reflect those issues and experiences that 
occur within everyday life. As such, feeds can often contain political content and civic 
discussions as users reflect on how current events or political circumstances affect their 
personal political identity. As Chadwick (2012: 52) argues, “political life in Facebook 
occurs amid the everyday life characteristics of the environment.” 
Chadwick offers an alternative prognosis to that presented by Prior (2007), 
Sunstein (2007), and Tewksbury and Rittenberg (2009), who suggest that, as technology 
evolves and provides the user with increasingly sophisticated ways of customising the 
content they consume, people become more efficient at filtering out political material in 
favour of entertainment. This could have severe consequences for the health of 
democracy in Britain, as citizens avoid the shared experiences that bind society 
(Sunstein, 2007: 6). However, these scholars were writing at a time before the 
maturation of services like Facebook and Twitter. 
With the development of new technologies come new questions. While some 
argue that Facebook and Twitter result in ever growing personalised information 
consumption, either user defined (Morozov, 2011: 80) or using algorithms (Dewey, 
2015; Jurgenson, 2015), Chadwick (2012: 35) suggests that social networking sites do 
not result in audience fragmentation. Instead, they cultivate the conditions for active 
citizenship, as users—intentionally or unintentionally—contribute political material for 
others (Chadwick, 2012: 35). These political stimuli can come in a wide range of forms, 
including, but not limited to, “first hand reports of events, personal narratives, 
conversations, commentary, opinion, archives, spatial and temporal information, and 
lifestyle and consumption behavior, all of which may be expressed in textual and/or 
audiovisual forms” (Chadwick, 2012: 40). In this state of informational exuberance, 
users are becoming increasingly comfortable with expressing opinions and discussing 
issues that relate to their political identity (Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 
2011; Papacharissi, 2008; 2010; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Shah et al., 2005; 
Stanyer, 2005: 19).  
In analysing the capacity of social networking sites to provide access to content 
and spaces for self-expression, scholars must be mindful of service design. Brundidge 
(2010: 1057) describes two important conditions for accidental exposure and by-product 
learning online. Firstly, “accessibility,” defined as the degree to which networks and 
communities are free to enter and participate in. Downs (1957: 224) first articulated the 
fear that those who benefit from this free data are those already well-informed, as 
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politically-interested citizens tend to socialise with like-minded others. Brundidge and 
Rice (2009) offer a similar hypothesis in modern democracies, arguing that the 
information divide is exacerbated online. Their findings suggest that political discussion 
is significantly and positively associated with politically heterogeneous discussion 
networks; “[the] information rich will get richer while the information poor will remain 
relatively poorer” (Brundidge and Rice, 2009: 145). Secondly, “traversability,” defined 
as the porousness between political information and discursive spaces. Empirical 
findings suggest that social networking sites facilitate a participatory form of 
information consumption (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; Brundidge, 2010; 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012). For instance, as part of their study on the use of 
Twitter during the topical debate television programme Question Time, Anstead and 
O’Loughlin (2011: 441) found evidence of “viewers who use online publishing 
platforms and social tools to interpret, publicly comment on, and debate a television 
broadcast while they are watching it.”   
The hypothesis that social media create the conditions for by-product learning 
has been tested empirically in large-N studies. Using a representative sample of British 
internet users, Vaccari (2014b: 7) found that 25.7 percent of respondents “often” or 
“always” come across political news when they use social media for a different purpose. 
However, there is still uncertainty about the cognitive and discursive processes that 
occur following this point of consumption. We cannot simply assume that every user 
pays the same attention to each piece of political content that they are exposed to. By-
product learning is dependent on individual level factors, such as the composition of the 
network and the issue interests of the user. Furthermore, we know little of the processes 
that an individual undertakes once they have consumed this information. For instance, 
do they discuss this with others? Do they verify or contextualise the material by 
researching the topic more broadly? This is of particular concern to those who suggest 
that a growing dependency on online sources has resulted in a decline of information 
literacy, as citizens passively consume and believe what they read online (Bartlett and 
Miller, 2011). Based on Chadwick’s (2009; 2012) theoretical contributions, this thesis 
will review how users access political information on Facebook and Twitter, if they 
learn from this exposure, and whether productive discussions take place as a result.  
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3.2.2 The Private Sphere 
 
Many of the challenges to conventional approaches to citizenship, outlined in Chapter 1, 
are due to a blurring of what is considered private and what is considered public. In The 
Private Sphere (2010), Papacharissi describes how this convergence has been triggered, 
in part, by technological developments. As a result, how individuals envisage and act 
upon their citizenship is fundamentally changing, as public-political acts emerge from 
the confines of one’s personal, privatised space. Papacharissi (2010: 166-167) offers the 
“private sphere” as a descriptive tool for understanding these new sites of identification: 
 
The meaning of the political lies in the ability to express dissent, to think 
differently. To the extent that the private sphere affords the autonomy, control, 
and expressive capabilities that enable dissent, it effectively reconciles the 
personal with the political in a way that enables connection with like-minded 
individuals. The private sphere, as metaphor, describes and explains the 
mechanisms for civic connections in contemporary democracies. Its value is 
descriptive and explanatory, but not prescriptive. Far from a recipe for 
democracy, the private sphere is an attempt at new space and a new sociality. 
 
The notion of the private sphere challenges the longstanding assumption that collective 
action requires a public face (Olson, 1971). Political acts increasingly represent and 
fulfil a personalised political identity that is both reflexive and fluid (2010: 131). 
Maximising personal efficacy underpins political behaviour within an individual’s own 
private sphere, “[as] citizens feel more secure in preserving their individual autonomy 
and the integrity of their civic identity, and in control of their civic fate” (Papacharissi, 
2010: 22).  
Social media acts as an important structural facilitator for these actions, 
providing the familiarity of a seemingly private space, but with a diverse range of public 
and semi-public audiences that are—to some extent—controlled by the user. Facebook 
and Twitter are examples of networked platforms on which users can tailor their 
information consumption, community membership, and engagement to suit their 
personal preferences (Papacharissi, 2010: 144). Although the slacktivist critique has 
labelled this behaviour as narcissistic and harmful to democracy, Papacharissi (2010: 
146) refers us to the work of Lasch (1979), who states that these seemingly egocentric 
behaviours “are self-directed but not selfishly motivated.” Self-expression simply 
reflects the importance of individual autonomy to modern citizenship.  
Papacharissi offers an alternative to the hypothesis that political actions 
undertaken on social networking sites are inauthentic, or conducted as a result of social 
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pressures. In disputing this, Papacharissi refers to The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life (1990), the seminal work of sociologist Erving Goffman. Goffman uses theatre as 
an analogy to describe how individuals engage in social interactions in everyday life; 
individuals naturally seek to control the way that they present themselves dependent on 
the composition of the audience (Goffman 1990; Goffman, Lemert and Branaman 
1997). It is therefore rational to try and shape the impression that we make on others by 
managing our behaviours.  
The juxtaposition of Goffman’s theatre analogy and the private sphere may seem 
somewhat contradictory; if our public actions are based on our private, personal 
identity, does this not make the analogy redundant? However, while contemporary 
citizenship is characterised by the personalisation of politics, we still have to manage 
the way in which we present our private beliefs. This management provides these low-
effort forms of expression with a sense of purpose. Users must adapt their online 
behaviour based on their audience (Bernstein et al., 2013; Marwick and boyd, 2011; 
Papacharissi, 2012). As such, self-expression, once confined to private spaces for many 
citizens, can have public implications: 
 
Participating in a MoveOn.org online protest, expressing political opinion on 
blogs, viewing or posting content on YouTube, or posting a comment in an 
online discussion group represents an expression of dissent with a public 
agenda... It stands as a private, digitally enabled, intrusion on a public agenda 
determined by others. 
(Papacharissi, 2010: 131) 
 
This research examines the salience of the private sphere in a British context, probing 
the relationship between private motivation and public actions across the continuum of 
participation. This research will also investigate how the composition of the audience 
affects the likelihood and form of online behaviour. 
 
3.2.3 The Logic of Connective Action and Personal Action Frames 
 
In line with Papacharissi (2010) and others who argue that citizenship is increasingly 
personally-defined rather than institutionally-derived, and that engagement is focused 
around issues of importance to the individual rather than coherent ideologies (Bennett, 
2008; Dalton, 2008; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley, 2004), “the logic of connective action” is a framework proposed by Bennett 
and Segerberg (2012; 2013) to explain how large-scale collective action is mobilised 
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through the use of personalised, digital media. 13  The logic of connective action 
describes how, as a result of social fragmentation and the decline of traditional group 
identification, individually expressive frames displace the collective action frames in 
many protest causes (Bennett, 2012: 22). As Bennett and Segerberg (2012: 6) argue, 
“people may still join actions in large numbers, but the identity reference is more 
derived through inclusive and diverse large-scale personal expression.” Through these 
“personal action frames,” political messages that are easy to personalise and inclusive of 
the diverse motivations for involvement, collective action is self-motivating as public-
political acts are akin to personal expression (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 36).  For 
example, the “we are the 99 per cent” frame, that emerged following the Occupy 
protests in the US in 2011, was personalised by activists involved in the movement. In 
adapting these political messages around one’s personal identity, collective action can 
gain momentum and leverage across a wide range of digital networks, including 
Facebook and Twitter (Bennett, 2012: 4; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 1-2).  
The design of Facebook and Twitter makes them ideal platforms for the 
dissemination of these frames. Users are connected through public profiles, on which 
they are encouraged to construct a virtual representation of the self. The service norms 
of both social networking sites invoke a self-expressive logic by virtue of their design, 
as users are encouraged to share content across a variety of public, semi-public, and 
private communication channels. These messages are more than just benign self-
expression, as they have organisational properties. As Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 42) 
argue, “communication mechanisms establish relationships, activate attentive 
participants, channel various resources, and establish narratives and discourses.” As 
such, these personal action frames provide an outlet for expression on issues of personal 
relevance while simultaneously mobilising friends, trusted others, and wider audiences 
(Bennett, 2012: 22; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 6). 
The logic of connective action has significant implications for the literature on 
political participation as it challenges the classic work on which the title of their 
framework is based, The Logic of Collective Action (Olson, 1971). Olson (1971: 60-65) 
offers a rational choice account of collective behaviour, arguing that citizens undergo a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they should participate. Olson argues that 
people cannot be expected to act together simply because they share a common 
                                                
13 In The Logic of Connective Action, Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 45-54) explain the role of digital 
media in transnational protest movements. In doing so, they offer a convincing three-part typology of 
connective and collective action networks. However, I do not engage with this typology given my focus 
on the everyday use of social networking sites, rather than their use in mass mobilisations such as the 
Arab Spring or the Occupy Movement.  
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dilemma. In what Olson conceptualises as the “free-rider problem,” rational individuals 
are discouraged from involvement if they can accrue the same benefits without 
contributing. In response to Olson’s rational-choice proposition, social movement 
scholars identified that “collective action frames” could be used as a way of maintaining 
the commitment of a large group. Leaders construct a shared understanding of a 
problematic condition, together with a rationale for change, to maintain the emotional 
commitment of those involved (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615; Tarrow, 1998: 109-111). 
Sustaining such frames in a way that forges strong tie bonds between a large group can 
be challenging, as individuals can be discouraged if they do not see their own interests 
represented. Developing a collective identity frame that is inclusive of the divergent 
personal preferences of a large membership has proved to be a significant dilemma for 
organisations in the 20th century. 
However, the combination of vastly reduced communication costs and the 
emergence of the private sphere creates the conditions in which Olson’s free-rider 
theory can be challenged, as those involved in digitally networked action can engage on 
the basis of personal motive. As Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 36) argue, personal 
action frames encourage participation as they are inclusive of the different personal 
motivations for involvement: 
 
In place of the initial collective action problem of getting the individual to 
contribute, the starting point of connective action assumes contribution: the self-
motivated (though not necessarily self-centered) sharing of already internalized 
or personalized ideas, plans, images, actions, and resources with networks of 
others. This “sharing” may take place on networking sites such as Facebook or 
via more public media such as Twitter and YouTube through, for example, 
comments and retweets, potentially building connections as it goes. 
 
This thesis will explore how citizens are exposed to and enact upon these personal 
action frames within their use of social media. In particular, I will investigate the 
dynamics and interrelationships among different social networking sites, exploring 
whether the spread of these frames differs between Facebook, on which users share with 
trusted contacts, and Twitter, where a user’s posts tend to be public and can involve 
interaction with relative strangers (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 36). 
As Bennett and Segerberg note (2013: 39), “personal action frames do not 
spread automatically. People must show each other how they can appropriate, shape, 
and share themes.” A number of new organisations have emerged that use digital 
technologies to do precisely that. This connective logic goes hand in hand with the 
evolution of organisational politics in advanced industrialised democracies, where new 
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organisational forms are emerging that reject hierarchy and traditional conditions of 
membership (Chadwick, 2007; 2013; Chadwick and Dennis, forthcoming; Dennis, 
2015; Karpf, 2012a). The likes of MoveOn, founded in the US in 1998, GetUp!, 
founded in Australia in 2005, and—the group I explore in this thesis—38 Degrees, 
founded in the UK in 2009, represent “hybrid mobilization movements” (Chadwick, 
2007). By modelling their organisational infrastructure around digital technologies, this 
new organisational form is structurally fluid, blending older repertoires typically 
associated with parties, pressure groups, and social movements. Those involved with 
these movements are not characterised as members, who have traditionally shared an 
ideological frame, but as affiliates, with more choice over the conditions of their 
participation (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 52). Hybrid mobilization movements have 
used personal action frames in e-mail communications to offer personalised pathways to 
engagement (Chadwick, 2013; Karpf, 2012a). This research will observe the logic of 
connective action on social media, exploring how organisations and non-elites create 
and share personal action frames across Facebook and Twitter.  
Based on this theoretical framework, three important questions need addressing 
in order to understand political attitudes and behaviours at the individual level. Firstly, 
how are individuals engaging? Do low-effort interactions online, such as information 
sharing or e-petitions, transfer into other participatory acts? Or does the slacktivist 
critique represent Olson’s free-rider theory in a modern context, as citizens avoid effort-
intensive activism in favour of the rewards gained from easy, micro-activism online?  
Secondly, why do they engage? What different types of information are 
individuals particularly responsive to in terms of their engagement online? If, as 
research suggests (Zukin et al., 2006: 205), one of the most important predictors of 
engagement is being asked to participate, how does access to such calls on social media 
affect a user’s willingness to engage? Does this differ between Facebook and Twitter? 
Thirdly, what is the end result when hybrid mobilization movements combine 
new technologies alongside more traditional methods of engagement? Are individuals 
empowered within these organisations through their use of social media? Or do we still 
see hierarchies forming? The following section outlines the hypotheses that will guide 
the empirical research. 
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3.3 Expected Findings and Hypotheses 
 
These theoretical contributions require further investigation in a British context. This 
thesis will be deductive, as a set of expected findings are outlined based on this 
theoretical framework. These will be compared and contrasted with a number of 
hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique. However, given the conceptual 
weaknesses raised in Chapter 2, the hypotheses are explored on the basis of a number of 
caveats. This research will also be theory-building, as rich data at the individual level of 
analysis will be generated through an experimental, mixed-method research design. 
 
3.3.1 Expected Findings 
 
A number of behavioural and attitudinal expected findings have been mapped onto the 
continuum of participation, as shown in Figure 3.1. These expected findings have been 
formulated as an alternative prognosis to slacktivism, and set out to capture the nuance 
of mediated citizenship at varying scales.  
Based on Chadwick’s (2012) model of accidental exposure and by-product 
learning online:  
 
EF1: Facebook and/or Twitter users are accidentally exposed to political 
information as a by-product of everyday use. 
 
This is important, given the positive relationship between the consumption of political 
information and feelings of self-efficacy (Baum, 2003; Baum and Jamison, 2006; 
Coleman, Morrison and Yates, 2011; Downs, 1957; Jones, 2005). This research will 
examine whether participants are exposed to political information and, if so, what kind 
of content they consume. In contrast, this thesis will also consider whether 
personalisation results in harmful issue fragmentation, in line with those that argue the 
internet leads to audience fragmentation (Atkinson, 2009: 138; Eveland and Hively, 
2009: 209; Morozov, 2011: 80; Prior, 2007; Sunstein, 2007). 
Perhaps more importantly, this study will observe what style of content drives 
attention. As Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2010) argue, we cannot assume that 
access equates to attention. This is a key drawback of any inferences that are made on 
the basis of content reach online. A significant intervening variable that must also be 
accounted for is the variation of each user’s self-selected network. As Downs (1957: 
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224) notes, “the president of a giant firm receives information of national political 
significance... a dishwasher may never hear politics at all.” The makeup and size of a 
participant’s network will be reflected on in the empirical findings. 
Secondly, due to the porous boundaries between content production and 
consumption embedded within the design of social media, political conversation is 
fostered by virtue of access to the content shared (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; 
Bakshy et al., 2012; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011; Brundidge, 2010; Chadwick, 
2012; Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). Users 
have the option to discuss and share content with others as they consume it, fostering an 
active, rather than passive, consumption experience (Brundidge, 2010: 1057): 
 
EF2: The use of Facebook and/or Twitter facilitates political conversation 
between users due to the porous boundaries between information consumption 
and production. 
 
If, as predicted, users comment and engage in political discussion, is there evidence to 
suggest that this discussion enhances political knowledge (Hardy and Scheufele, 2006; 
Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini, 2009; Prior, 2007; Zukin et al., 2006)? Furthermore, 
what motivates, or inhibits, discursive engagement? While the technological boundaries 
may be porous, a user’s social boundaries may be less fluid. As such, does the 
relationship between the user and the networked contact affect both the likelihood and 
sentiment of an interaction? 
Thirdly, existing empirical research has shown how users post a variety of 
personally expressive content on social media as a means of participation (Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2011; Aslan, Dennis and O’Loughlin, 2015; Bennett, 2008; Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012; Papacharissi, 2010; Stanyer, 2005). As Papacharissi (2010: 131) 
argues, private-political acts can have a range of public effects: 
 
EF3: Facebook and/or Twitter are used for personally expressive forms of 
engagement on public-political agendas, the purpose of which can vary. 
 
As the dashed line on Figure 3.1 illustrates, the public permutations of self-expression 
online can vary depending on the motivations of the user, the composition of the 
audience, and how those receiving the message use this information. These acts cannot 
be arbitrarily categorised, as they may serve a number of functions. For example, when 
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taken to its extremes, this could refer to a comment expressing a personal grievance 
amongst a closed group of friends, or an update used to co-ordinate a real space 
mobilisation, as evidenced through the use of hashtags during the 2010 student protests 
in Britain (Theocharis, 2012). The update may be a form of digital activism, such as 
“tweet bombing,” where large groups of users post messages at a strategically relevant 
moment (Zuckerman, 2012b). Conversely, the message may not even have been 
intended for a wider audience, as publicly available content is collected, mined, and 
analysed by political and commercial elites (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2012; 2015). 
Moreover, an update that at first might seem trivial may later become politically salient, 
as public content forms part of an archive of informational goods. This research will 
seek to observe these various forms of self-expression and micro-activism in action. 
Fourthly, online, low-effort tools are not substituting high-effort offline 
participation at the individual level, or within emergent, digitally enabled advocacy 
groups (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Chadwick, 2007; 2013; Karpf, 2010; 2012). 
Instead, these online tools—such as co-ordinated representative contact and e-
petitions—replace redundant offline equivalents, such as postcard campaigns and paper 
petitions. As Karpf (2010: 1) notes, “[they] represent a difference-of-degree rather than 
difference-in-kind”: 
 
EF4: The use of Facebook and/or Twitter as a low-effort political tool does not 
substitute high-effort, offline engagement, but instead equivalent low-effort, 
offline engagement at both the individual and organisational level. 
 
Through participant observation of the political activist movement 38 Degrees, this 
thesis will also examine the organisational level. As Howard (2011: 2) proposes, 
researchers can often learn more by exploring the links between different units of 
analysis. In doing so, I will investigate how ordinary members interact with the 
leadership. What is the level of involvement that members have within these networks, 
and what actions are undertaken as a result? Therefore, this study will observe whether 
these low-threshold actions are used to complement other forms of activism, or isolated 
as an easy replacement for political self-satisfaction (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011; 
Rickett, 2013). 
Fifthly, as Bennett’s (2008) actualizing citizen framework explains, political 
engagement online is not narcissistic, but the result of sweeping attitudinal changes. 
Each citizen increasingly prioritises those issues that they deem to be important, as 
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individual autonomy—the individual’s capacity for self-directed, independent action—
and self-efficacy—the belief in one’s capabilities to achieve a goal or an outcome—are 
key determinants of participation (Bennett, 2008; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; 
Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005; Dalton, 2008; Downs, 1957; Giddens, 1991; 
Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004). This is self-
actualisation, rather than self-interest: 
 
EF5: Individual autonomy and self-efficacy are the overriding motivational 
logics throughout the continuum of participation. 
 
Through in-depth ethnographic research in an activist context and in an “everyday” 
setting, this thesis will observe what drives self-expression and micro-activism online in 
different environments. A range of different informational stimuli will also be used in 
the experiments to ascertain whether content style, rather than pre-existing issue 
support, impacts the likelihood of engagement. 
 Finally, in mapping these expected findings across the continuum of 
participation, as shown in Figure 3.1, a number of antecedent variables must be 
addressed. These impact the extent to which users become actively involved in this 
expressive political culture: 
 
EF6: Political actions across the continuum of participation vary depending on 
the user’s (1) social boundaries, (2) technical competencies, and (3) level of 
internet access. 
 
As identified in Chapter 2, these social and technical divides are expected to have a 
significant effect on behaviour. Firstly, according to Tufekci’s (2011) concept of 
cyberasociality, some users find difficulties in expressing themselves online, in both a 
social and political context, as opposed to through face-to-face communication. This 
varies depending on the audience, both real and imagined (Bernstein et al., 2013; 
Goffman, 1990; Marwick and boyd, 2011; Papacharissi, 2010; 2012). Secondly, the 
digital divide, outlined in points 2 and 3 above, refers to the disparity in skills amongst 
social media users, with variation in technical competencies, information literacy, and 
differences in the level of access to the internet, based on income and geographic 
location (Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury, 2003; Mossberger, Tolbert and Franko, 
2013). The combination of these antecedent variables represents the futility of causal 
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models that apply to large populations, such as the slacktivist critique. Through thick 
description of individual level usage habits, this research will observe the impact of 
these antecedent variables across the continuum. 
 
Figure 3.1. Expected findings mapped onto the continuum of participation model 
 
Note: The black text refers to the behavioural expected findings. The red text refers to the attitudinal 
hypothesis. The blue text refers to the antecedent variables.  
 
If accurate, these expected findings offer practical solutions to some of the 
obstacles to participation that were raised in the civic voluntarism model (Verba and 
Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). As Verba and Nie (1972) suggest, a 
number of social factors can determine the likelihood of participation, including an 
individual’s: (1) perception of free time; (2) their level of civic and political skill, where 
skill is defined as an awareness and understanding of politics, broadly defined, and the 
ability to use this knowledge to organise and influence other actors; (3) their perceived 
political impact or contribution from their actions; and (4) their access to recruitment 
networks. Social media could address some of these problems.14 Firstly, these tools can 
alleviate time-pressure through the quick dissemination of information, and the ability 
to debate, discuss, and display political affiliations in a time efficient manner. Secondly, 
social networking sites may lower the entrance requirements to these discursive and 
political spaces. Thirdly, the design of Facebook and Twitter offers users the 
opportunity to tailor their information consumption around their own personal 
preferences, increasing the likelihood of involvement as issues become more personally 
relevant. Finally, there is an abundance of political networks online that are vying with 
each other to recruit willing activists. This thesis will assess the extent to which these 
propositions are an empirical reality. 
 
                                                
14 Address, but not solve. I do not advocate a technologically determinist argument that social media will 
resolve deficits in participation. 
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3.3.2 Hypotheses Derived from the Slacktivist Critique 
 
In order to explore the slacktivist critique empirically, the following hypotheses will be 
considered.  However, due to the aforementioned conceptual deficiencies of slacktivism 
as a reflection on the routine use of social media, these hypotheses will be considered 
alongside a set of exploratory questions. These have been formed on the basis of the 
research agenda outlined in Chapter 2. 
 Firstly, a common concern held by those advocating the slacktivist critique is 
that forms of micro-activism do not result in political change, especially when 
compared to tried and tested activist repertoires: 
 
H1: Political acts that are undertaken on social networking sites are less effective 
than offline methods of participation. 
 
A limitation of this critique is the suggestion that the legitimacy of political behaviour is 
determined by its impact (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov 2009; 2011). This is problematic, 
as it suggests that the only acts that are beneficial for society are those that are 
successful, negating the significance of symbolic empowerment (Bucy and Gregson, 
2001: 359). This thesis will operationalise effectiveness based on the aims of the 
individual undertaking the political act, analysing both the psychological and symbolic 
benefits from their perspective, alongside the material effects of their engagement. 
Based on this definition of effectiveness, a range of online and offline modes of 
participation will be considered in activist and day-to-day settings. 
 Secondly, this concern over the effectiveness of digital engagement is 
exacerbated given the substitution thesis, in which online micro-activism is replacing 
traditional forms of participation (Christensen, 2011): 
 
H2: Low-effort online forms of engagement are replacing “tried and tested” 
offline methods. 
 
In a case study of internet activism in Finland, Christensen (2012) concluded that those 
acts derided as slacktivism actually have a positive impact on offline mobilisation, the 
opposite of the substitution thesis. However, this research was based on a survey that 
differentiated online forms of participation from those offline, focusing on the 
correlations that emerged in the responses as an indication of behaviour. This approach 
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lacks a contextual understanding of how organisations mix different engagement 
repertoires, and the role that digital micro-activism plays in relation to real space 
mobilisation.  
Furthermore, political interactions on social media platforms are not always low-
effort. Some acts can be high-effort, such as cultivating a political network on Twitter, 
or maintaining a Facebook Page. Likewise, acts that are disregarded as being easy, 
quick fixes require a substantial personal investment when added up over time. 
Therefore, rather than treating online behaviour in isolation, this research will examine 
the relationships between online and offline forms of engagement over time (Arnstein, 
1969; Fung, 2006).  
Finally, the slacktivist critique questions the authenticity of political behaviour 
on social media, as these forms of self-expression are likely to be conducted in public: 
 
H3: Acts of slacktivism are inauthentic as they are based on “reputational 
cascades,” where users cease to rely on private information and instead go along 
with the crowd to maintain the good opinion their peers. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this conceptualisation of authenticity is problematic as it has 
no empirical support. We cannot assume that these behaviours are narcissistic based 
only on the design of social networking sites. Doing so ignores the rich body of work 
that demonstrates the personalisation of politics (Bennett, 2012; Dalton, 2008; Giddens, 
1991; Papacharissi, 2010; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Zukin et al., 2006). The 
only way that a researcher can understand whether an act is genuine is through a study 
of the individual unit of analysis. Furthermore, cascades can still take place when those 
involved feel their behaviour is authentic, in what Sunstein (2007: 94) defines as 
“informational cascades,” where “people cease relying, at a certain point, on their 
private information or opinions. They decide instead to act on the basis of the signals 
conveyed by others.” As shown in the #StopKony case study, citizens may place their 
faith in dubious sources. This research will establish the personalised context for micro-
activism through diaries and interviews. In addition, this study will also investigate 
informational cascades through a series of experiments that examine the sources that 
participants are receptive to on Facebook. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this chapter, I have presented the theoretical framework that 
underpins this thesis. Based on this, I provide an alternative prognosis to challenge the 
hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique: low-threshold interactions conducted 
online are not ineffective and narcissistic acts of slacktivism, but integral components 
within a scaled continuum of participation. In the following chapter, I present the 
mixed-method research design that will be used to explore these hypotheses. Given the 
expansive scope of the continuum of participation framework, designing a robust 
methodology proved to be challenging. Rather than relying on widely used survey 
methods or big data solutions, I argue that a combination of experimental and 
qualitative methods are the most suitable approach for getting under the skin of the 
routine use of social media at the individual level.  
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4. Methodology and Research Design 
 
The new media environment demands new techniques. Those techniques carry 
risks – they have not undergone the years of seasoning and sophistication that 
dominant methods have. But they also carry the promise of expanding the scope 
of our inquiry and applying intellectual rigor to topics of broad social 
significance. 
(Karpf, 2012b: 641) 
 
The research design used for this thesis will be mixed-method, combining 
computational, experimental, and qualitative methods. This chapter begins with a 
justification as to the suitability of this unconventional approach as opposed to more 
established methods that explore the intersection of social media and politics, such as 
survey research and big data analysis. Importantly, the methodology used in this thesis 
is based on Karpf’s concept of “kludginess,”15 using experimental workarounds to 
generate empirically based observations in a fast changing, spatially diffuse, and 
subsequently chaotic media environment (Gerodimos and Ward, 2007; Karpf, 2012b). 
The methodology employed by this research, at its core, is a workaround; a creative, but 
problematic, fix designed to explore the relatively uncharted terrain of micro-level, 
digitally mediated engagement practices. Furthermore, given the emphasis on political 
engagement and media use at the individual level of analysis, this study will use what 
Salmons (2012) defines as a “deep data” approach, drawing on rich, thick descriptive 
data that is tailored around micro-level attitudes and behaviours. In order to achieve 
this, this thesis will combine in-depth ethnographic data, collected through a participant 
observation of the hybrid mobilization movement 38 Degrees and media diaries, with a 
laboratory experiment based on small samples of young internet users. This chapter will 
explain each method in detail, and highlight the limitations of each approach. Reflecting 
on the shortcomings of the experimental design is important, as Karpf (2012: 665) 
notes, “if we are to understand the digital landscape, we will need to get our hands dirty 
and then take note of the dirt under our fingernails.”  
It is important to outline why a mixed-methods research design has been used in 
this thesis. Primarily, this is because mono-method research designs that examine 
political participation often fail to encapsulate both political attitudes and behaviours. 
By combining three complimentary methods, this study seeks to ground observation of 
online political engagement within an understating of the motivational context on which 
these acts are predicated. However, this task is problematized by the increasingly 
                                                
15 “The essence of a kludge is that it is inelegant, but usefully solves a problem” (Karpf, 2012b: 654). 
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personalised understanding of what comprises the political (Couldry, Markham and 
Livingstone, 2010; Dahlgren, 2009; Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and 
Whiteley, 2004). Given these developments, in-depth qualitative techniques are deemed 
most appropriate, as qualitative research allows respondents to discuss the areas of 
political knowledge with which they are familiar and try to frame information in their 
own way (Graber, 2004: 560).  
Secondly, the fluid and rapidly evolving nature of the internet poses a number of 
methodological challenges (Bimber and Copeland, 2011; Gerodimos and Ward, 2007; 
Karpf, 2012b). Gerodimos and Ward (2007) pinpoint two problems in particular that 
call for a re-evaluation of how we conduct research of political participation online; the 
diffusion of “what” encompasses political acts and “where” they take place. This 
combination of the growth of new forms of political behaviour and the porous spatial 
characteristics of the internet, creates difficulties for the researcher, as it is near 
impossible to define the parameters of precisely where political behaviour takes place 
online.16 Despite the hopeful proclamations of big data enthusiasts (Mayer-Schonberger 
and Cukier, 2013), or the anxieties raised by those wary of holistic data accumulation 
(Croll, 2012; Morozov 2011), the sheer amount of content online and the seemingly 
limitless virtual space in which it exists within means that information is often 
ephemeral. It is intrinsically difficult to record who accesses online content, and what 
they do with it post-consumption, especially if they leave no digital trace (Gerodimos 
and Ward, 2007: 120-121). This makes for a messy landscape, one in which the use of 
quantitative methods, which require isolated variables and measurement precision, may 
not be appropriate (Karpf, 2012b: 645). Bimber and Copeland (2011: 2) claim that the 
more embedded digital media becomes within everyday life, the more difficult it will 
become to deconstruct causal relationships online. As such, Gerodimos and Ward 
(2007) advocate an in-depth qualitative approach that focuses on smaller case studies. 
This will be adopted within this research through an ethnography of 38 Degrees and by 
using media diaries to capture detailed self-reflection of an individual’s own political 
experiences. 
 
  
                                                
16 See Wright (2012b) on “third spaces.” Political discussion can happen on any platform that allows for 
user generated content. 
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4.1 Go Your Own Way: A Rejection of Survey Research and Big Data Analysis 
 
The diffusion of the political into new, personally defined spaces across an expansive 
hybrid media environment poses a number of measurement difficulties for survey 
research and big data methodologies. Although both methods have value in generating 
inferences on large samples, new methodological tools are required to get under the skin 
of individual level attitudes and behaviours. 
John, Reynolds, and Mycoff (2008: 181) define survey research as, “the direct 
or indirect solicitation of information from individuals by asking them questions”, 
predominantly through questionnaires. Survey research benefits from large-N sampling 
frames and measurement precision through standardised measures (Bryman, 2004). As 
a result, survey research is often well placed to make valid and reliable statements on 
causal relationships, especially regarding indicators of participation that are easily 
measured such as voting (An et al., 2011; Coleman, 2007; McLeod, Scheufele and Moy, 
1999). However, a number of problems emerge in the use of survey research to examine 
micro-level participation, particularly from the perspective of the respondent. 
Firstly, survey research often relies on closed questions to measure a 
respondent’s political attitudes and their level of engagement (Henn, Weinstein and 
Forrest, 2005: 557). While this does offer benefits in terms of generalisibility, data is 
often shallow. The use of closed questions compels a respondent to choose an answer 
that may or may not represent their position. This can often oversimplify a participant’s 
contribution or, worse still, distort reality (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008: 325). 
As such, survey-based studies offer a limited, retrospective presentation of examined 
behaviour, neglecting the important contextual factors on which political behaviour is 
based (Dell Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004: 324; Eliasoph, 1998: 18). Furthermore, a 
researcher can never be certain that the accounts provided in response to written or oral 
questions are accurate. This is especially pertinent for studies of political engagement. 
Respondents may feel compelled to provide a socially desirable response due to the 
research setting or their own perception of behavioural norms (Bryman, 2004: 165; 
Wilhelm, 1999: 163). This may be reduced if the survey is undertaken online as 
opposed to face-to-face (Christensen, 2012). However, this may trigger further 
complications, as an individual may not pay the same care and attention to a survey 
conducted in an abstract, digital setting.  
Secondly, due to the importance of reliability and validity within survey design, 
measurements and indicators often replicate a very narrow, static conception of politics 
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that is fixated on institutional forms of engagement (Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011: 
837; Bennett, 2012; Boulianne, 2009; Dalton, 2008; Eliasoph, 1998: 18; Henn, 
Weinstein and Forrest, 2005; Sloam, 2012a; 2012b). As politics becomes increasingly 
personalised, and the locations in which it plays out become more diverse, the indicators 
we use must remain equally reflexive. 
 This alludes to a more fundamental problem with survey research; the 
assumption of shared understanding between the researcher and the survey respondent 
(Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2005: 557). In order to examine lived-in political 
experience a research design must take into account the diffuse, often unstructured, 
nature of political action. For example, a respondent may deem political talk on 
Facebook to be inappropriate within a survey context, given the nature of the act in 
comparison to more formally recognised modes of participation. Just like debates over 
key terms within academia (Carpentier, 2011b; Fox, 2013; Jenkins and Carpentier, 
2013), respondents may also have dissimilar interpretations of concepts like citizenship 
and participation. As such, designing operational indicators that facilitate shared 
understanding is challenging (Bryman, 2004: 105). 
Surveys often require specific knowledge about certain topics as proof of 
political interest. However, this is problematic as the topics that are selected by the 
researcher may be alien to the respondent’s own civic and political experiences. This is 
evident in the survey designs used by Prior (2007: 138) and Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, 
Jenkins, and Delli Carpini (2006: 57). Both draw upon a narrow definition of political 
awareness by asking questions that refer to specialised, “schoolbook” political 
knowledge, rather than everyday political experiences and related knowledge of policy 
issues (Graber, 2004: 561). Granted, survey research can include open-ended questions, 
but this reduces the reliability and generalisability of the results as such responses rely 
on the subjective interpretation of the researcher (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008: 
328). 
Although survey research can offer detailed statistics on usage habits (see for 
example the Pew Internet and American Life project), a survey is not feasible for the 
explorative nature of this study. Instead, qualitative techniques are more appropriate 
given the unit of analysis and the emphasis on micro-politics. As Graber (2004: 562) 
notes: 
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When ordinary people discuss major political issues using their own words and 
perspectives, even groups that generally score poorly on typical tests... they 
display political insight and cognitive complexity in addressing major political 
issues that they regard as matters of concern. 
 
This thesis aims to examine how politics and political engagement is framed and 
enacted at the individual level, rather than a survey of predetermined notions of politics 
that may have little relevance to the respondent. This is significant if we consider the 
growth of a new, digitally enabled civic vernacular online (Papacharissi, 2010: 161).  
While survey research may rely on a respondent’s own interpretation of their 
political behaviour on social networking sites, big data methods provide a potential 
solution; the ability to draw generalisable inferences on the basis of large-N studies of 
natural behaviour (boyd and Crawford, 2012: 663). Big data methodologies draw upon 
large data sets, collected through a range of commercial and free-to-use computational 
sources, to identify a range of patterns. The opportunities presented by big data for 
social media research are intuitively quite clear. Huge datasets collected from social 
networking sites offer large amounts of increasingly rich data on user behaviour outside 
of the confines of a research setting. Enthusiasts claim that this data is not prone to 
issues of researcher bias, as in survey research, and the content collected may even rival 
some qualitative research for depth (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013). However, 
this reliance on size as a determinant of quality is a fundamentally flawed logic, one that 
compromises the methodological rigour of the research. As boyd and Crawford (2012: 
663) argue, such an approach cultivates a harmful and pervasive myth that large 
collections of data offer access to a higher form of knowledge, surpassing the insights 
that are possible through small-N research designs. The weaknesses of big data analysis 
are outlined as to convey why this is not suited to the research aims of this thesis. 
Firstly, although data voluntarily produced outside of a research setting does 
offer a more accurate representation of user behaviour, the motivational influences 
behind the action are difficult to gauge without communication with the actor (boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Crawford, 2013). The intention of a user is often not clear when based 
solely on the evidence of their action. As such, inferences based on big data offer only 
part of the whole picture. 
Secondly, big data analysis offers little clarity on how content that is produced 
online is subsequently consumed or acted on by others. While it is possible for research 
conducted on Twitter to accurately track the volume and type of communications within 
the service (An et al., 2011; Bruns and Stieglitz, 2013; Conover et al., 2011; Wohn and 
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Eun-Kyung, 2011), claims on consumption are often made on the basis of user reach: 
the total number of unique Twitter users whose timeline will feature a specific tweet. 
This neglects the personalised nature of consumption, such as the amount of attention 
devoted to the material, if any, and whether any actions occur following consumption in 
other spaces, both online and offline (Wright, 2012b). Big data research exploring 
political behaviour therefore lacks clarity on information consumption and the resulting 
behavioural effects that this can have following the point of exposure.  
A factor that can be a key determinant of consumption habits is the dynamics of 
the relationship between the receiver and the producer.17 Patterns in large datasets can 
be misleading when trying to understand network effects, and those relationships that an 
individual values (Bernstein et al., 2013; Marwick and boyd, 2011). Although 
computational techniques can produce an assortment of network diagrams describing 
the flow of communication, this data can result in spurious causal relationships as the 
volume of communications between users does not necessarily signify the strength of a 
relationship. For example, boyd and Crawford (2012: 670) highlight how mobile phone 
records may suggest that the user values work contacts over others. Therefore, the 
context available through qualitative methods is necessary when analysing individual 
level network effects in depth. 
Thirdly, claims to objectivity are misleading as big data research still involves a 
level of subjective interpretation. When a researcher creates a coding framework they 
cannot be neutral, as subjective decisions must be made when designing and applying 
the coding schema (boyd and Crawford, 2012: 667). This is evident in the study by 
Wohn and Eun-Kyung (2011), which examines the two-screen phenomenon in which 
users are active on Twitter whilst watching television. The authors coded tweets on the 
basis of four separate categories: attention, emotion, information, and opinion. Even 
when intercoder reliability and intracoder reliability are accounted for, the authors had 
to make subjective decisions (Bryman 2004: 197). Subjectivity is also present when a 
researcher decides on a sampling frame (Bruns and Stieglitz, 2013). Using keywords to 
refine large collections of social data can compromise the data collected, because the 
sampling frame may systematically exclude other relevant tweets (see Jungherr 2014). 
Although the use of hashtags and keywords are an option for those analysing the 
behaviour of users in relation to a specific event (see Conover et al., 2011; Dennis, 
Gillespie and O’Loughlin, 2015), it would not be appropriate within this research given 
                                                
17 Users can refer to diverse range of contacts, including celebrities, family, close friends, work 
colleagues, acquaintances etc. These different connections can have contrasting effects on user behaviour 
depending on the dynamics of the relationship. 
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the focus on social media in day-to-day life. As Jungherr (2014: 244) notes, “the active 
use of hashtags presupposes a certain level of Twitter proficiency; users below this level 
are thus excluded from the analysis.”   
Finally, perhaps the biggest stumbling block is the availability of robust datasets 
and reliable data scraping tools for graduate-level researchers. As boyd and Crawford 
(2012: 673-674) note, there is a considerable unevenness in terms of who gets access to 
what data on Facebook. While a number of studies have focused on user behaviour in 
specific contexts, such as during election campaigns (see Boulianne, 2015; Kalnes 
2009: 259), those studies able to make generalisable claims about a wider proportion of 
the user base are undertaken by scholars who have privileged access to Facebook data. 
Compare, for example, the scope and scale of this thesis with a recent study undertaken 
by Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015)—in collaboration with the Data Science Team 
at Facebook—that draws on over 10 million subjects.18 Likewise, Twitter increasingly 
restricts access to large volumes of historical user data to those willing to part with 
significant sums of money.19 Researchers can access the freely available Streaming API 
to harvest tweets, but this limits the user to a 1 percent sample of all public tweets. As 
such, it would be logistically and financially unfeasible to secure a dataset from either 
Facebook or Twitter that would be suitable for this research. 
The research design of any study should always be designed based on the 
research questions that it seeks to address. Neither survey research nor big data methods 
offer a suitable approach for observing individual level political engagement within a 
hybrid media system. As the relationship between digital media use and participation is 
highly dependent on social and political context (Bimber and Copeland, 2011: 2), this 
study seeks to collect what Salmons (2012) describes as “deep data”: 
  
Qualitative research approaches allow us to dig below the surface to explore 
how, why or what, and to explore relationships and connections not readily 
evident in Big Data—which is why I’ve taken to describing it as Deep Data. 
 
By drawing on both experimental and qualitative traditions, this thesis aims to gain an 
understanding of the complex processes that connect personalised political attitudes, 
participatory behaviours, and media practices. 
 
                                                
18 For further information on the Data Science research team at Facebook: 
https://research.facebook.com/datascience.  
19 For example, see http://gnip.com/pr_gnip_first_to_market_historical_coverage_twitter/. 
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4.2 Indicators and Measurement: Issues of Definition and Interpretation 
 
That political actions of many kinds—often aimed more at expressive than 
instrumental goals—occur constantly at the intersection between digital media, 
mass media, and people’s social lives does not necessarily mean that citizens 
will participate more, or more effectively. It does, however, imply that people’s 
definition of what it means to engage with politics and their understanding of 
how it can—and, perhaps, should—be done have changed substantially 
compared to the standard definitions employed in political science research. 
(Vaccari, 2013: 222-223) 
 
The conceptual foundation on which a researcher constructs their study has an integral 
impact on one’s methodological design and, subsequently, the conclusions reached, 
given the often-deterministic nature of those variables under review. This is especially 
true of research exploring political participation. How a researcher conceptualises 
engagement can shape their conclusions on the health of a political system. For 
example, Whiteley (2012) warns that Britain is teetering on the edge of becoming a 
flawed democracy, given the declining membership of political parties, waning voter 
turnout, and decreasing engagement with community organisations. However, as Fox 
(2013) highlights, these conclusions are inexorably tied to Whiteley’s definition of 
participation. This represents a wider problem within academic research in this area. As 
Carpentier (2011a: 14) notes, “in communication and media studies... participation is 
still used to mean everything and nothing.” 
Whiteley loosely bases his prognosis on a definition of participation derived 
from the seminal works of Verba and Nie (1972; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). Political 
participation is understood as those activities by private citizens that are directly aimed 
at influencing the selection of government personnel, the decisions they take, or both 
(Verba and Nie, 1972: 2). Evidently, this definition is bound to political institutions and 
does not reflect the evolution of citizenship and subsequent diversification of 
participatory styles (Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011; Coleman, 2007; Dalton, 2008; 
Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2005; Gerodimos and Ward, 2007; Neuman, Bimber and 
Hindman, 2011; Sloam, 2012a). Studies that adopt this approach often emphasise the 
importance of macro-level indicators of participation, like voting, at the expense of 
micro-level acts, the type which prosper within online environments (Bennett, Wells 
and Freelon, 2011: 836). It should not come as a surprise that findings of this nature 
often support the “reinforcement thesis,” that the internet sustains pre-existing patterns 
of participatory inequality (Brundidge and Rice, 2009; Margolis and Resnick, 2000; 
Mesch and Coleman, 2007). However, such a conclusion is problematic as political 
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disconnection in this context refers to the disjuncture between citizens and political 
institutions, rather than a disconnection with politics more broadly (Coleman, Morrison 
and Yates, 2011: 215; Dalton, 2008; Gerodimos and Ward, 2007: 114; Norris, 2011). 
As Fox (2013: 2) notes, there is no “true” definition of political participation; 
researchers must construct and adopt a definition that fits their research context. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight why conventional, macro-level indicators are not 
appropriate for this research, before providing an explanation of the type of micro-
political acts, both online and offline, that this study seeks to observe. 
Firstly, it is important to recognise that a substantial proportion of the literature 
on digital participation tends to focus on the effect of the internet on a narrow selection 
of offline political acts, rather than other forms of online activism (Boulianne, 2009: 
195; Neuman, Bimber and Hindman, 2011). These studies operationalise macro-level 
indicators of political participation, those acts that are explicitly aimed at political 
institutions or public policy, rather than micro-level measurements, which track 
everyday political experiences (Norris, 2011: 247). As such, a number of studies have 
found evidence of a relationship between internet use and political disengagement 
through measures such as party membership or voting (Bode, 2008; Coleman, 2007; 
Ward, Gibson and Lusoli, 2003). However, this does not represent holistic political 
disengagement as these indicators lack measurement validity in this context; they do not 
embody the changes to political identity and citizenship in Britain outlined in Chapter 1. 
This thesis defines participation as a process, linking the disparate mediated and 
non-mediated acts that occur across the continuum of participation. As such, this thesis 
will not attempt to draw arbitrary parameters prior to data collection. This would 
contradict the emphasis on individual level sense-making that forms the focus of the 
literature review and theoretical framework. Essentially, every citizen has a certain 
degree of political sophistication, but this varies depending on personal issue interest 
and everyday experiences. The most effective way to capture this dissimilarity is 
through thick description, a technique that allows for self-reflection. By using diaries 
and interviews, this study will encourage participants to describe what they perceive to 
be political or non-political, and to reflect on their engagement from this perceptive 
(Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010; Eliasoph, 1998; Zukin et al., 2006: 55). 
Participation will be measured on the basis of an amalgamation of indicators 
from other studies (Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011: 842; Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 
357; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 78; Zukin et al., 2006: 57). For example, this 
research will emulate the approach used by Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli 
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Carpini (2006) in measuring participation as a process, from information dissemination 
to action, as shown in Table 4.1. 
  
Table 4.1. The core indicators of engagement, based on Zukin et al., (2006) 
Modes of participation Indicators of engagement 
Cognitive engagement Following government and public affairs 
Talking with friends and family about politics 
Political knowledge 
Attention to news media 
Public voice Contacting officials 
Contacting the print media 
Contacting the broadcast media 
Protesting 
E-mail petitions 
Written petitions 
Boycotting 
Canvassing 
Civic action Community problem solving 
Regular volunteering for a non electoral organisation 
Active membership in a group or association 
Participation in fundraising run/walk/ride 
Other fundraising for charity  
Political action Regular voting 
Persuading others 
Displaying buttons, signs, stickers 
Campaign contributions 
Volunteering for candidate or political organisations 
Source: Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins and Delli Carpini (2006). 
 
This list of indicators, while not exhaustive, provides a useful platform on which 
to build, albeit with some alterations. Primarily, the diversity of political behaviour on 
social media significantly blurs the different modes of participation, making the use of 
discrete categories somewhat redundant. The continuum of participation is therefore 
used as a solution to harness the complex diffusion of personally expressive political 
engagement online, as illustrated in Table 4.2. Civic and political forms of engagement 
are merged within this list, as participants will determine the parameters of what 
constitutes political or civic involvement. 
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Table 4.2. Example indicators of political participation 
Continuum of 
participation Indicators of engagement 
 
• Attention to news media 
• Attention to information created and shared by peers 
• Following ‘political’ interests (including government, 
public affair, issues) 
• Opinion formulation 
• Interpersonal political discussion 
• Contacting the broadcast or print media 
• Mediated interactions or face-to-face contact with an 
elected representative  
• Mediated interactions or face-to-face contact with other 
political actors 
• Expressions of civic or political orientation 
• Self-produced forms of digital media 
• Membership of peer-defined networks and groups 
• Membership of traditional, hierarchical organisations 
• Organising and mobilising future civic and political actions 
• Donating to civic or political causes 
• Signing a petition 
• Voting in an election 
• Consumer activism (boycotting and buycotting) 
• Political party activities (canvassing, campaigning) 
• Campaigning and advocacy work (including raising 
awareness, fundraising for a civic or political cause, and 
self-produced forms of digital media) 
• Volunteered time for a civic or political cause 
• Taken part in an legal public demonstration 
• Taken part in illegal protest activities  
 
It is important to note that this list of indicators will act as a descriptive aid 
during data collection, rather than a definitive list.20 This research seeks to observe how 
citizens envisage participation through their own experiences, rather than the researcher 
imposing a mandatory definition through a rigid set of indicators. Furthermore, the 
research also aims to unearth evidence of new practices online that are currently absent 
from the existing literature. 
A similar inductive approach will be undertaken in evaluating why citizens 
participate. Participants will be given the opportunity to define and discuss politics, and 
                                                
20 This list is exemplary rather than prescriptive. The ordering mimics the four stages on the continuum of 
participation but, as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, these acts are fluid and can correlate with 
different categories depending on the context of use.  
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their political motivations, in their own terms (see Eliasoph, 1998). Structural factors, 
such as time demands and technical competencies, will also be recorded during data 
collection as a means of contextualising the findings (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 
140). Demographic factors are also significant when we consider how citizens construct 
and understand their political experiences. As the “civic voluntarism model” (Verba and 
Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) notes, demographic factors are 
important in shaping participatory behaviours, including age, income, geographical 
background, and level of education. While this thesis has noted the declining influence 
of such structural models of citizenship, both Dalton (2008) and Yuval-Davies (2007) 
stress that demographic factors are still very much important. As such, it is important to 
note that the sampling frame used within this thesis will not form a representative 
sample of the wider population, that is those British citizens active on Facebook and 
Twitter. Instead, this study will rely on a number of convenience samples (Bryman, 
2004: 100; Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008: 225). As a graduate researcher, 
random sampling is not feasible for this study due to cost and time restrictions. This 
thesis will instead attempt to ensure that samples are figuratively representative of their 
population. The sampling frame for each method is discussed in the following section, 
and the influence of demographic factors will be considered during data analysis. All 
relevant participant information is included within the appendices provided (see 
Appendix A1; B1; B2; C1). 
 
4.2.1 Service Selection and Measurement Online 
 
Given the broad scope of the term social media, it is important to reinforce what this 
research refers to when using the term (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). This study will 
focus on two social networking sites in depth, Facebook and Twitter. These two 
services have been selected due to their popularity in Britain, as a social and 
entertainment tool for citizens21 and an organisational tool for political groups (Obar, 
Zube and Lampe, 2012). Other online services will be examined as a by-product of their 
overlap with Facebook and Twitter. Table 4.3 provides a list of active interactions 
available on each service, correct as of September 2013. This will act as a guide for data 
collection.  
                                                
21 Figures from 2013 show that there were just under 33 million live Facebook accounts in the UK, and an 
estimated 34 million Twitter accounts (Rose, 2013). Both figures should be taken with a healthy dose of 
scepticism given the lack of transparency in how each service measures an “active account.” Finding 
reliable user information is difficult as neither company publishes this data. 
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Table 4.3. Active interactions available to users on Facebook and Twitter 
Active interactions on Facebook Active interactions on Twitter 
• Like content posted by a friend, a page, 
or an application 
• Post a comment on content posted by a 
friend, a page, or an application 
• Post a comment on content provided by 
the user 
• Re-share content posted by a friend, a 
page, or an application 
• Share content from a source outside of 
the Facebook platform 
• Join a group 
• Subscribe to other contacts within the 
Facebook platform 
• Post content in a group 
• Create an event page 
• Join an event page 
• Undertake a political act within the 
Facebook platform (e.g. Causes) 
• Post a status-update 
• Upload a note 
• Upload a photo 
• Upload a video 
• Tag a user(s) in a post 
• Use of the messenger platform 
(asynchronous communication) 
• Use of the chat platform (synchronous 
communication) 
• Create and manage a list 
• App-specific interactions 
• Tweet – no user mentions and 
not a Retweet 
• Interaction (@ mention) with 
another user 
• Retweet of another user 
(native style) 
• Retweet of another user 
(traditional style) 
• Modified tweet from another 
user 
• Use of hashtag(s) 
• Share content from a source 
outside of the Twitter 
platform 
• Embed content in a tweet 
(e.g. YouTube video; TwitPic 
photo) 
• Share content from an 
external source using the 
tweet button 
• Favourite a tweet 
• Create and manage a list 
Note: The following interactions are omitted from this study: poke feature; “Facebook Questions”; 
“Facebook Gifts”; and “Listen with Friends.” Traditional style retweets refer to this format: RT 
@username. List correct as of September 2013. 
 
A difficulty with the empirical study of social media is what Karpf (2012b: 640) 
labels as “internet time,” the rapid speed with which digital technologies develop and 
change. This unpredictability can make life difficult for those trying to analyse media 
effects in a digital environment. In just a few years, Twitter has “moved from the lead 
adopter stage to the late-majority stage of diffusion” (Karpf, 2012b: 641). Similarly, 
Facebook has continued to grow and diversify as a platform with a number of notable 
acquisitions, such as the photo-sharing application Instagram and WhatsApp. As service 
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functionality evolves and changes, research can quickly go from cutting-edge to 
irrelevant (Bimber and Copeland, 2011: 6). This thesis will attempt to overcome this 
potential pitfall through thick description of holistic service use, exploring each 
platform in relation to other online and offline behaviour, rather than isolating the 
specific functions listed in Table 4.3. As such, the findings will offer a snapshot of how 
Facebook and Twitter integrate within broader media and engagement practices at the 
individual level. 
Time, and its relationship with effort, is an important measurement in 
contextualising this snapshot of user behaviour. Effort has long been considered a core 
indicator in assessing the depth of an individual’s political participation (Verba, Nie and 
Kim, 1978: 55). The slacktivist critique operationalises effort in terms of the time 
expended when undertaking a political act. Citizens are deemed lazy when the action 
itself—such as the click of button (Morozov, 2013)—only takes a small amount of time. 
As a result the often unseen processes that may precede such an act, such as cognitive 
mobilisation and private deliberation, are ignored (Dalton, 2008: 38; Inglehart, 1970). A 
similar logic can be applied to voting.  
The time expended to physically vote can be a matter of seconds, especially 
when we consider the growing popularity of the postal vote (Cracknell, 2014). 
However, unlike low-threshold acts online, this does not mean voting is perceived to be 
a lazy or insignificant act. Such an assessment underplays the time a citizen spends 
considering which candidate to vote for. This process may involve a range of mediated 
and face-to-face interactions. If a citizen simply turns up to the polling booth and 
chooses a candidate at random then he or she may be deemed to be “lazy.” However, 
we cannot assume that all of those who vote are lazy based on the costs associated with 
action; the same should also apply to digitally mediated expression and micro-activism. 
This thesis operationalises time as a measure of the depth of one’s engagement. 
The amount of time that a participant devotes to political actions across the continuum 
of participation will be compared to their own perception of their spare time; the 
amount of time available after bodily, financial, and household necessities are 
accounted for (Goodin et al., 2008: 35). It is important to recognise that the amount of 
spare-time available to an individual depends on their personal context. The time-
pressure illusion—the gap between actual spare time and potential discretionary time—
is an increasingly important factor when accounting for the nature of contemporary 
citizenship. 
The analysis will be structured around three cases, outlined next. 
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4.3 An Ethnography of 38 Degrees 
 
38 Degrees is a non-profit, political activist movement based in the United Kingdom. 
Since their foundation in 2009, the group has amassed a “membership” of over 2.5 
million people, with donations from their members totalling over £2 million (Babbs, 
2012).22 The group boasts an impressive track record across a range of political issues, 
most notably their campaign against the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government’s plans to sell off public forests in 2011 (Chatterton, 2011). However, what 
is most striking about the group is their organisational ethos, “People. Power. Change.” 
Named after the angle at which snowflakes come together to form an avalanche, 
individual autonomy is central to the movement’s modus operandi: 
 
38 Degrees puts power into people’s hands. We’re helping to strengthen 
democracy by giving 38 Degrees members a new way to be involved in politics. 
We want to be more than just voters and ensure our voices are heard all of the 
time, not just once every five years.   
 
We are a community of people who want positive change. We are a loud and 
persistent knock on the door of the politicians, influencers and institutions who 
make the decisions that affect us all. We hold them to account and make sure 
they listen and respond to our calls for positive change. 
(38 Degrees, 2013a) 
 
However, despite their evident impact on Britain’s political landscape, little academic 
research has been undertaken on how the group operates and whether they deliver on 
their ethos of member-led political campaigns. This research will provide a detailed 
account of 38 Degrees from inside the organisation, illustrating the role that members 
play within the movement. Furthermore, this thesis will analyse how Facebook and 
Twitter are used to complement their activism. 
Following in the footsteps of MoveOn in the US (Karpf, 2012a) and GetUp! in 
Australia (Vromen and Coleman, 2014), 38 Degrees is an example of a new 
organisational form, what Chadwick (2007: 283) describes as a hybrid mobilization 
movement, using digital technologies to adapt and transform their organisational 
structure and repertoire of actions during campaigns in real time (Chadwick, 2007: 
283). Members engage with the movement through a range of online and offline 
political “actions,” “specific activities that the leadership aims to structure for its 
                                                
22 Figure correct as of November 2012. Members do not have to pay a membership fee but can donate to 
the organisation if they wish. As with MoveOn in the United States, 38 Degrees “redefines membership 
from ‘small donor’ to ‘message recipient’” (Karpf, 2012a: 31). 
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members to enable them to exert influence on the mainstream news media, online 
networks, and the policy agenda” (Chadwick, 2013: 189). Although these actions vary 
depending on the context of the campaign, they are generally underpinned by their use 
of the internet. 38 Degrees mobilises vast, national networks through the use of new 
communication technologies, predominantly email, but increasingly using Facebook 
and Twitter. These online tools are often used to co-ordinate offline participation, as 
demonstrated by the group’s localised campaign to halt further privatisation of the 
National Health Service in 2012 (Harris, 2012). Their use of e-petitions and other forms 
of digital micro-activism has resulted in criticism from journalists (Rickett, 2013) and 
politicians (Burns, 2011; Davies, 2014). As such, 38 Degrees offers an ideal case study 
for exploring how Facebook and Twitter are used within an activist context.  
This fieldwork has three principal research aims. Firstly, this research aims to 
observe and document the political behaviour of 38 Degrees members. How do 
members engage with the movement’s leadership throughout the campaign process? 
What role do members have in the selection of new campaigns and in directing 
campaign strategy? How do members organise and mobilise? Fundamentally, how is 
power diffused throughout the organisational structure? Are campaigns really “people-
powered”?  
Secondly, if we are to understand the extent to which social media can facilitate 
collective action then we must also establish a clearer understanding of how activists 
themselves perceive the role of these tools. It is not enough to simply know how social 
media is being used, we must also engage with the intentions and motivations of the 
user (Obar, Zube and Lampe, 2012). Therefore, this study aims to investigate the 
political attitudes of members. Why do members engage? What forms the basis of 
individual motivation? How do members make sense of public issues? Crucially, are 
digitally networked acts undertaken on the basis of narcissistic self-interest, as 
hypothesised by the slacktivist critique, or do they reflect a genuine attempt to 
maximise personal efficacy on issues of personal relevance?  
The third and final research aim of this study focuses on the role of social media 
across the continuum of participation in an activist context. Do social media platforms 
provide an interconnected space in which members learn about and discuss political 
issues? And does micro-activism online—through awareness building, e-petitions, and 
forms of representative contact—transfer into further participatory action, or is offline 
engagement compromised by inefficient online engagement? 
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In order to explore these questions this study will focus on two distinct strands. 
Firstly, while assuming the role of a volunteer in their central London office, I will gain 
an appreciation of the organisational dynamics of 38 Degrees. This will provide an 
insight into how the leadership use social media within the movement’s day-to-day 
operations (H2) and whether these tools enable grassroots members to influence 
strategic decision-making (EF3). Furthermore, I will investigate the purpose and 
function of social media within the movement’s wider campaign repertoires, exploring 
the factors that motivate members to participate (EF5; H3). 
Secondly, this thesis will examine how Facebook and Twitter are used for 
activism through two short case studies (EF3; EF4; H1): a national mobilisation to 
compel a leading energy company to pay more tax, and a series of local level efforts to 
galvanise resistance to the British government’s controversial 2012 healthcare reforms. 
 
4.3.1 Logistics and Details 
 
The ethnography of 38 Degrees took place over three months, between May and July 
2013. During this time I acted as a “participant as observer,” contributing to the day-to-
day running of campaigns as a volunteer (see the classification of participant observer 
roles, Gold, 1958). This was an overt observation, as staff and members were aware of 
my role as a researcher. In undertaking ethnographic research I aim to develop an 
understanding of the culture that underpins 38 Degrees as a political movement, and the 
role that members fulfil within it (Geertz, 1975). This study will not analyse the 
effectiveness of the organisation in achieving their own campaign aims,23 but will 
instead generate observations on the attitudes and behaviours of individual members 
and the strategic use of social media at the organisational level.  
Ethnographic research is a proven research tool for exploring attitudes and 
behaviours at the individual level. In Avoiding Politics (1998) Eliasoph offers a unique 
insight into how citizens discuss politics within everyday life. By embedding herself 
within a local community, Eliasoph provides evidence of a growing political 
disconnection between public-political issues and private-political attitudes in the US. 
Similarly, in Ground Wars (2012), Nielsen challenges the conventions of contemporary 
political campaigning through an ethnographic study of two campaigns, noting the 
                                                
23 For further research on the policy influence of 38 Degrees, see Chadwick (2007; 2013) and Chadwick 
and Dennis (2014). For further research on other hybrid mobilization movements, see Carty (2010), Eaton 
(2010), Karpf (2012), Kavada (2012), Vromen (2015), and Vromen and Coleman (2013). 
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significance of personalised communication with voters for successful campaigns. As 
these studies show, ethnographic research provides the researcher with unique access to 
their object of study on which to build a contextual understanding of political 
behaviour. 
I collected rich ethnographic data through interviews, field notes, and a 
combination of e-mails, social media content, blogposts, and online news articles. This 
approach is based on Howard’s (2006) “network ethnography,” later developed by 
Karpf (2012a: 18).  Interviews were conducted with members and staff in order to 
construct a sense of grassroots involvement throughout the campaign process, from 
conception to action. All interviews were semi-structured, so as to provide opportunities 
for interviewees to discuss political issues in their own terms (see Geertz, 1975). 
Interviewees were selected through snowball sampling on the basis of contacts made 
throughout the placement. Interviews were conducted either face-to-face or over Skype, 
and were recorded and transcribed. Two sets of field notes were taken; one recording 
observations throughout the placement, and a second reflective diary completed at the 
end of each day (Bryman, 2004: 306-308; Ortlipp, 2008). Finally, I collected a range of 
materials to contextualise the campaigns that were active during my observation, 
including all e-mails and blogposts published by 38 Degrees during this period. A list of 
emails is provided in Appendix A1. Data from Facebook was also collected manually 
from the movement’s Facebook page.24 Data from Twitter was compiled via Sysomos 
Media Analysis Platform (MAP),25 a commercial text mining platform which grants 
access to the complete Twitter “firehose” archive ensuring that analyses are based on 
100 percent of the tweets that match the user-defined search criteria. 
 
4.3.2 Limitations 
 
There are a number of limitations associated with ethnographic research due to the 
predominantly interpretive approach. It is possible that the pre-existing assumptions of 
the researcher may cloud the objectivity of the findings. Even if a researcher conducts 
the ethnography in an impartial manner, they still have to interpret and construct their 
object of study for other social scientists (Geertz, 1975). This emphasis on personal 
interpretation compromises the reliability of the results, as the ethnography will not be 
                                                
24 38 Degrees Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/peoplepowerchange. 
25 For further information on Sysomos MAP: http://www.sysomos.com/products/overview/sysomos-
map/.  
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replicable. However, the observation will follow the standard procedures for 
ethnographic research. Overt observation also runs the risk that the objects of study may 
change their conduct. However, these concerns will be minimised, as the ethnographic 
data will be complemented by evidence of natural member behaviour from Facebook 
and Twitter. 
The use of Sysomos MAP to collect data from Twitter is limited for researchers, 
due to the lack of transparency about the sampling frame used when exporting large 
amounts of tweets from the service (see Dennis, Gillespie and O’Loughlin, 2015: 443). 
As of August 2012, the export function was restricted to 5,000 randomly selected tweets 
per search term. However, rather than depend on the tool for analysis, this study used 
the platform as a means of pinpointing the peaks and troughs in Twitter flows. The 
trends identified were used for further in depth qualitative investigation. 
 
4.4 Media Diaries 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine the use of social media for political 
participation within everyday life. However, two conceptual realities pose 
methodological difficulties in achieving this goal. Firstly, given the emphasis on 
personalised political identity in the literature review (Bennett, 2012; Dalton, 2008; 
Norris, 2011), this study aims to generate the participants’ own reflections on what 
constitutes the “political” and therefore portray what they understand to be political 
engagement. Secondly, these attitudinal and behavioural reflections must be explored in 
relation to media use within a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), where online and 
offline informational stimulants converge and overlap in unpredictable ways. As such, 
the data required to analyse the effects of social media on political learning, on the 
formulation of political attitudes, and on the undertaking of action, is fragmented. The 
interactions that shape these often take place across a range of public, semi-public, and 
private spaces. Based on the research design used by Couldry, Livingstone and 
Markham in Media Consumption and Public Engagement (2010), this thesis will use 
media diaries to produce 29 individualised accounts that describe the effect of mediated 
and non-mediated interactions on the continuum of participation.26 
This research will draw on a mixed-method approach, combining personalised 
diary data, interviews, and survey data, with evidence of participant behaviour collected 
                                                
26 Although 30 participants were recruited, one diarist withdrew from the project prior to writing their 
first entry. As a result they are not included in any of the analyses in Chapter 6. 
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from Facebook and Twitter. Combined together these methods balance their own 
respective weaknesses. While the diaries are highly interpretive, they can provide clarity 
as to the motivations behind digital self-expression. Diarists will be asked to track what 
media content they have regular access to, to reflect on political issues that they deem to 
be important, and to keep a record of their political behaviour over a period of three 
months. Although a diarist’s opinions may not explicitly change over time, nor may 
they undertake political actions during this period, the reflective process of completing a 
diary enables the researcher to track the different sources of information that citizens 
consume (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010: 47). Similarly, the diary 
methodology provides an opportunity to observe the spaces in which diarists discuss 
news and political topics. As such, reflective diaries allow the researcher to track both 
online and offline interactions to see how they impact both political attitudes and 
behaviours. This is an important contribution, as the current body of literature often 
focuses on social media in isolation from other media. Furthermore, by requiring 
participants to complete the diary over a period of three months this thesis avoids the 
limitations of event-specific analysis, a trait of the slacktivist critique. This thesis will 
instead explore the relationships formed between expressive and instrumental forms of 
participation. 
The empirical data produced from the diaries will provide a foundation for 
probing a number of the expected findings and hypotheses derived from the slacktivist 
critique. Firstly, rich accounts of media habits at the individual level offer a chance to 
explore whether social media provides a way of filtering out political material, or 
whether users become accidentally exposed to political information (EF1) and 
discursive spaces (EF2) as a by-product of their day-to-day use. Alongside the diaries, I 
will also maintain a database of the cover stories from the front pages of four British 
newspapers: the Sun, the Daily Mail, The Times and the Guardian.27 This data will be 
used to compare the relative prominence of news stories in the press with those reported 
in the diaries. This will provide a basis to investigate whether diarists use Facebook and 
Twitter to personalise their news consumption, and, in doing so, avoid the communal 
experiences deemed necessary to form societal bonds (see Sunstein, 2007). Secondly, 
by analysing reflective diaries alongside user data from Facebook and Twitter, I aim to 
observe what political actions occur, online and offline (EF3; EF4), and assess how these 
actions relate to media use. Finally, by drawing on reflective diaries and interviews, I 
will explore the factors that influence political action, and whether this varies online as 
                                                
27 Further details for how this comparison was conducted are provided in Appendix B6. 
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opposed to offline (EF5; H3). The introspective diaries, in which participants discuss 
those issues relevant to them, will be used to investigate questions of authenticity, as 
participant’s consider their reflexivity: “the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared 
by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and 
vice versa” (Archer, 2007: 4). 
 
4.4.1 Logistics and Details 
 
I recruited 29 diarists using a non-probability, convenience sampling technique. As 
such, this study is not representative of either the general public or the British user base 
of Facebook and Twitter. Participants were recruited through advertisements across two 
pre-existing networks available to the researcher:  Royal Holloway, University of 
London, and the South Derbyshire Centre for Voluntary Services. As a result, this 
sample has an overrepresentation of participants linked to the Department of Politics 
and International Relations (nine in total). Participants were paid a fee of £10 for 
volunteering to take part in the research, and entered into a prize draw for a tablet 
computer. Details of all participants are provided in Appendix B2. 
This convenience sample was designed intentionally, to identify participants 
with media habits and a political interest that was reflective of the slacktivist critique. 
Of the 29 diarists, 24 had a Facebook account and 20 used Twitter, with two diarists 
included who do not use either service as a control. Political interest was calculated 
through a measure of political activity, which, when compared to the findings of the 
Audit of Political Engagement (Hansard Society, 2014), suggested that participants 
were generally representative of the target population. Participants were not excluded 
on the basis of their age, gender, or level of education, although there was a slight 
overrepresentation of young males. Further discussion of the sampling frame is 
provided in Appendix B1. 
The dataset for this study consists of the diaries, content from Facebook and 
Twitter where applicable, pre-diary interviews, and post-diary survey data. Diarists 
were asked to complete weekly, free-form diary updates over a period of three months. 
A diary template was provided on request, as shown in Appendix B3. The template was 
designed to be plain, to minimise researcher influence. Diarists were not given direction 
over the length or structure of the diary, but encouraged to develop a style that worked 
for them. This was done purposefully to motivate reflection on what participants deem 
to be political (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010: 48).  
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Diarists were encouraged to discuss how they use different forms of media, 
online and offline. For example, on Facebook do they read the entirety of their news 
feed, or do they only follow certain lists of friends? By combining evidence of user 
behaviour with a record of how diarists use each service in detail, the diaries provide 
valuable insights into whether forms of political behaviour relate to specific social 
networking sites, or even particular service functionality. This is an important design 
feature as it is vital that research begins to drill deeper into moments of media 
convergence, providing clarity as to the conditions in which political behaviour 
materialises.  
Participants were given the option to record their diaries through a number of 
different mediums to minimise the inconvenience caused, and to avoid participant 
withdrawal. Diarists used the following methods to submit their entries: email (12 
participants); Microsoft Word, using a template provided by the researcher (10); 
Evernote, using a shared notebook (4); Google Drive (1); Facebook, through a series of 
messages (1); and 1 participant completed their diary by hand. The Evernote web 
clipping add-on28 was recommended for those who favoured digital submissions as a 
means of collecting content of interest from closed environments, such as Facebook. 
The diary entries submitted varied dramatically, both in terms of their depth but 
also substance. “Joshua” would send a few lines, highlighting the topics that caught his 
attention over the last week, while “Joe” would go into great depth. Precisely what 
formed the main topic of reflection differed from diarist to diarist. Some, such as 
“Deborah,” “Leo,” and “Thomas,” used the diary to discuss specific items in the news 
each week. Others, like “Charlie,” “Christian” and “Claudia,” reflected on their use of 
social media, even addressing slacktivism directly at times. These different styles are 
important, as they illustrate that the diaries were already highly interpretive before any 
analysis was undertaken.  
I also conducted a semi-structured interview with each participant before they 
began the project. This interview provided an opportunity to discuss the scope of the 
research, in which diarists were asked to include all interactions that they deemed 
relevant to the research, whether that be debate on Twitter or one with friends in their 
local pub. This pre-diary interview also enabled the researcher to establish some sense 
of each participant’s background, and the issues that he or she may have an existing 
interest in. See Appendix B4 for the pre-diary interview questionnaire. 
                                                
28 Evernote Web Clipper: https://evernote.com/webclipper/.  
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A survey was conducted with the 26 participants who completed their diary in 
June 2014. This took place some months after end of the study, to provide a period of 
reflection in which each participant could consider what they had learnt about their own 
media habits and provide feedback on the project more generally. The post-diary survey 
also included a series of questions on their political engagement to compare with the 
evidence from the diaries. The survey is included in Appendix B5.  
All public posts on Facebook and Twitter were collected during the three-month 
period in which each individual diarist was active, details of which are provided in 
Appendix B8. In total 561 posts on Facebook and 1,008 tweets were collected. The 
interview data and diaries were then analysed using NVivo. The interviews were coded 
inductively to get a sense of the diarists and the themes emerging from their 
experiences. These formed the basis of a coding framework, included in Appendix B9. 
This was designed to identify the service functions being used, the content of the post 
itself, and, if identified as political, its purpose. The level of interaction on each post 
was also recorded by way of identifying those updates that triggered reactions from 
wider networks. These moments were then studied in further detail. 
The attrition rate for the diary research was relatively low. Of the 30 diarists that 
were originally recruited for the study, four participants withdrew before completion. 
“Alan,” Christian, and “Ron” gave consent for their partially completed diaries to be 
included in the research, contributing five, six and seven entries respectively. As such, 
none of these diarists took part in the exit survey. Of the 26 diarists who did complete 
the survey, one participant, Charlie, only produced eleven entries due to work 
commitments. Furthermore, due to a range of factors including family crises, vacations, 
and the logistics of participant recruitment, diaries were not always completed 
concurrently. This did not jeopardise comparability between the diaries and the 
newspaper sources, as mentions of political issues were weighted to account for the 
number of active diarists. This approach is outlined in Appendix B6. All diary entries 
were collected between October 2013, and March 2014. 
 
4.4.2 Limitations 
 
A number of difficulties were encountered during the diary study. One of the problems 
of interpreting reflexivity is the level of performance in each diary (Couldry, 
Livingstone and Markham, 2010: 53). Just as users may alter their behaviour online 
depending on their audience, participants may also structure their diaries in line with 
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their own perception of what the researcher seeks to find. I attempted to identify any 
inconsistencies by drawing on multiple data sources.  
The exit survey raised a number of methodological limitations. Firstly, some 
participants reported that they had difficulty recalling detailed reflections due to the 
weekly format. As such, issues and events that occurred closer to the date in which the 
diarist prepared the entry were more likely to included, irrespective of their comparative 
importance to earlier topics.  
Secondly, a number of participants highlighted the demands of the research on 
their time. Both “Angela” and “Sam” informed the researcher relatively early on in the 
project that they found writing the entries to be cumbersome, so, to avoid them 
withdrawing from the project, guidance was offered as to make their entries briefer.  
Thirdly, it is not possible to claim that the entries provided an entirely accurate 
representation of normal, day-to-day experiences. “Arnold,” Joe, and Joshua all noted 
that they were more attentive to political news during the diary period than they 
otherwise would be. Others noted how their participation trigged mediatisation, an 
engagement with the way that information was portrayed across different mediums. For 
example, “Zoey” noticed that the way in which the stories were presented could have as 
significant an effect as the content itself. In his penultimate entry Leo (entry 11) offered 
a similar observation:  
 
Writing a media diary has made me realise that I have started ignoring/blocking 
out journalistic spin, sometimes stopping reading stories if 'sensationalism' 
annoys me. 
 
This illustrates the difficulty of balancing the need to inform participants about the 
nature of the study, while also trying to avoid priming those involved.  
 
4.5 Laboratory Experiments 
 
Experimental research is an increasingly valuable, but often ignored, methodological 
approach within the academic subfield of internet politics. Although the ethnographic 
research design used in this thesis will provide a rich and detailed descriptive account of 
social media use at the individual level of analysis, there is a pressing need for 
experimental research that directly captures those conditions in which slacktivism is 
hypothesised to thrive  (Karpf, 2012b; Wright, 2012a). As such, the final component of 
this study’s research design is a series of laboratory experiments built within the 
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Facebook platform, designed to test the value of micro-activism in relation to: (1) the 
type of information that a user is exposed to; and (2) the popularity of content (EF6; H3). 
These experiments will explore whether acts of micro-activism are merely the result of 
social media cascades, or a contemporary form of political engagement. This 
experimental approach finds its roots within the field of political communication, in 
those studies that use different media messages as an experimental treatment (Entman, 
2004; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Tewksbury et al., 2000; Zaller, 1992; 2001).  
 
4.5.1 Experiment 1: Testing for the Effect of Information Type 
 
The first experiment presents participants with varying types of information on the same 
issue to measure if exposure affects the likelihood of future political mobilisation. The 
slacktivist critique claims that viral content can vary substantially in terms of its 
reliability, which, due to the speed of communication on social media, can lead to 
political actions being formed on the basis of erroneous information (see H3; Morozov, 
2011: 179-186). However, information accuracy is a difficult variable to operationalise, 
as there is no deterministic relationship between the medium and the reliability of 
information. Therefore, as exemplified by the Hollywood-style editing of the 
#Kony2012 video discussed in Chapter 1, it is more the style of content that is designed 
to be shared on social media that forms the basis of the critique. By exposing 
participants to a range of content that reflects the diversity of political materials shared 
on social media (Chadwick, 2013; Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012), this experiment 
will investigate what type of sources trigger attention and engagement among young 
social media users. 
As Figure 4.1 shows, five separate Facebook groups were designed, each with 
an identical news feed excluding the treatment post. The following sources, outlined in 
Table 4.4, were included as the treatment: (1) an article from BBC News Online; (2) a 
post from BuzzFeed UK; (3) an e-petition from Change.Org; and (4) a post from 
Upworthy. As Nelson, Bryner and Carnahan (2011: 202) note, most experiments that 
analyse media effects concentrate on the variation within a source category, rather than 
across mediums. However, this experiment focuses on online news where there is less 
uniformity in information type.  BBC News Online is more text-heavy, while BuzzFeed 
articles tend to contain a large number of images. E-petitions have an overt political 
frame designed to persuade, while the emotive video content published on Upworthy is 
more subtle.  
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BuzzFeed and Upworthy are both representative of a new type of information 
provider, whose main vehicle for content distribution is over social media. Both sources 
fit the sampling frame used in this study. The core demographic for BuzzFeed is much 
younger than most newspapers or broadcast media, with 60 percent of the audience for 
BuzzFeed UK aged between 18 and 34 (Gorkana, 2014). Similarly, the target 
demographic for Upworthy is progressive, young citizens, often described as 
“millennials” (Ball, 2014; Thompson, 2013). A rationale for case selection is provided 
in Chapter 7. 
A control group is also included within this design, in which participants were 
not exposed to any of the treatment posts. This is important to ensure that the design 
itself, without the treatment, does not lead to behavioural change (Gaines, Kuklinski and 
Quirk, 2007: 8-9; Sniderman, 2011: 103). 
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4.5.2 Experiment 2: Testing for the Effect of Facebook Likes 
 
The second experiment investigates the willingness of participants to sign an e-petition 
on the basis of its popularity. Facebook likes were used in this experiment as a proxy 
measure for exploring social information (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004: 606). Four 
separate, identical Facebook groups were designed, as shown in Figure 4.2. The level of 
Facebook likes on each of these treatment posts varied across three conditions: high (16 
likes), low (3 likes), and no likes. The petition itself, and the wording of the post that 
accompanied it, did not change. Social information was controlled for in the control 
group as none of the posts had any likes. 
A live petition could not be used as the treatment due to the effect that the 
number of e-petition signatories may have on the participant (see Margetts et al., 2011; 
2013). Furthermore, it was not possible to include an existing petition as participants 
may have pre-existing biases toward certain petition platforms and campaign groups. 
An artificial petition was designed as an alternative using Squarespace,29 a website 
builder platform. Producing a website that looked legitimate was essential for the 
success of the experiment. A poorly designed treatment could act as an intervening 
variable, particularly given that some subjects actively seek to identify the deception 
during the experiment (Dickson, 2011). During the pilot study a number of volunteers 
noted that the original petition design, created using a standard Google Forms template, 
was clearly not trustworthy and that this stopped them providing their personal details 
as a signatory on the petition. As such, great care was taken designing a website that 
was trustworthy.  
Two attributes of the website were carefully considered to create an authentic-
looking platform. Firstly, it was necessary to create a title, or more precisely a brand, 
that could conceivably exist; this was mypetition.org.uk. This title was selected as it is 
representative of the type of campaigning platforms that I was hoping to emulate, 
namely self-organising petition websites like Change.org and 38 Degrees’ Campaigns 
By You website. Secondly, as shown in Figure 4.3, the design of the page was also 
based on these websites. The petition page was distributed to colleagues prior to the 
experiment to ascertain whether they felt that the website appeared trustworthy. All 
agreed the branding and design seemed legitimate. 
                                                
29 For further details on Squarespace: http://www.squarespace.com. 
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Figure 4.3. Mypetition.org.uk - the petition used as the treatment in the experiment 
 
 
The treatment was designed to minimise the level of deception. The petition was 
based on an existing campaign led by 38 Degrees, the hybrid mobilization movement, 
analysed in Chapter 5. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, the petition text, and all of the fields 
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required to sign, were copied from the live petition page30 and an accompanying blog 
post.31 On completion of the experiment all participants were provided with a link to the 
live petition. Any data entered on the treatment was linked to a password-protected 
spreadsheet hosted on Google Drive, accessible only to the researcher. This personal 
data was destroyed on completion of the experiment.  
This petition was selected given its popularity at the time that the experiment 
was designed. As Chadwick and Dennis (forthcoming) note, the success of an e-petition 
often depends on its momentum within wider public discourse, brought about by the 
interdependency of campaigners and the news media. In October 2014, the issue of 
expenses for Members of Parliament (MPs) was prominent in the press, as the 
Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) launched a public consultation 
on whether those MPs under investigation for the improper use of expenses should be 
granted anonymity (Doyle, 2014; Swinford, 2014). 
To determine the values for the treatment conditions, I calculated averages for 
the number of Facebook likes on petitions shared by 38 Degrees. I collected data for 50 
petitions shared on the movement’s Facebook page, as shown in Appendix C4. This 
data was collected on August 5, 2014, with petitions shared in August omitted by way 
of avoiding those posts that were still in circulation amongst their membership. I then 
calculated the inter-quartile range and divided these values by 100 to produce levels of 
Facebook likes that were more manageable for the researcher to reproduce. The high 
like condition had 16 likes and the low condition had three. Likes were included on the 
majority of the other content posted on the feeds as to mask the treatment. The number 
of Facebook likes on these posts were in proportion to the values calculated for the 
treatment posts. 
The feeds were populated with likes by drawing on volunteers amongst my own 
Facebook network. A staged process of liking material was co-ordinated during the 
weekend prior to the experiment. Volunteers were sent an ethical release form so that 
they were aware that a participant may click and view their public user details during 
the experiment.32 
 
                                                
30 For further details on the petition: https://secure.38degrees.org.uk/page/s/keep-mps-expenses-
public#petition.  
31 For further details on the blog post: http://blog.38degrees.org.uk/2014/10/02/mps-expenses-keep-them-
public/.  
32 These contributor guidelines are available online: https://db.tt/SefPYvxa. 
 121 
4.5.3 Logistics and Details: Common Features of Both Experimental Designs 
 
Both laboratory experiments have a post-test only design (see Campbell and Stanley, 
1963). A control group is used to determine the effect of the treatments on the outcome 
variables, attention and engagement. Any differences between the experimental groups 
and the control group are compared and analysed.  
The sampling frame used within experimental research is integral to its success 
or failure. As De Vaus notes (2005: 392), experiments should be designed in a way that 
allows the researcher to identify whether any differences that emerge between the 
experimental groups and the control group can be attributed to the treatment. It is 
therefore vital to ensure that the participants are randomly assigned to each group, or 
that they share near identical demographic traits. Both approaches were adopted in this 
study. Recruiting a homogenous sample was necessary as randomisation is only at its 
most effective when working with larger samples. 
Recruitment focused on those who share similar characteristics with so-called 
“slacktivists” — namely, young citizens with an interest in politics, who are active on 
social media. This was achieved by focusing on three demographic factors: (1) age, (2) 
political interest, and (3) media use. As such, all participants in these experiments were 
students based at Royal Holloway, University of London. As Druckman and Kam 
(2011: 41) argue, students do not inherently pose a problem to an experiment’s external 
validity if a study aims to test a specific theory rather than generate inferences on 
behaviour that are generalisable. The intention of this study was to test a number of 
hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique. Further details of the sampling frame 
used are provided in Appendix C1. This includes the demographic information for all 
participants. 
Participants were recruited through posters placed across campus. All 
participants were entered into a random prize draw for a tablet computer and gift 
vouchers. While incentives can change the way that subjects behave during an 
experiment (see Dickson, 2011), it was not plausible to recruit the required number of 
students without some form of prize draw.33  
In total 90 students were recruited for the experiments, with 50 participants 
signing up for the first experiment exploring information type and 40 for the experiment 
analysing the effect of social information. Although they had the choice between the 
                                                
33 This decision was made on the basis of initial enquiries with students as to their potential engagement 
in the study on a voluntary basis. 
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two dates on which each experiment would be held, participants were randomly 
assigned to an experimental group using an online tool, Research Randomizer.34 In 
total, each group was allocated 10 participants. The attrition rate for this study was 
relatively high for the first experiment at 20 percent, with 10 participants not taking 
part. This did lead to some inconsistency in the size of each treatment group. The 
second experiment had a much lower attrition rate at only five percent. 
The experiments are designed to explore two outcome variables: attention, 
operationalised by each subject’s interaction with the news feed, and political 
engagement. In order to analyse attention and engagement it was necessary to collect a 
number of different sources of user data. TimeStats,35 a Google Chrome extension, was 
used to measure clickthrough rate, the ratio of clicks to exposure, and the amount of 
time that a participant spent on each page. As discussed throughout the thesis, time is a 
valuable measure of attention, as it shows the depth of a subject’s engagement with the 
material rather than just relying on page views, which can be misleading in isolation. 
For example, a number of participants opened all of the links in new tabs as soon as 
they started the experiment, but then devoted the majority of their time to a select few 
items. TimeStats also provided the data to calculate the clickthrough rate on the 
treatment, as the application only records URL information for those websites that a 
user visits. In addition to these measurements, the history from each browser was also 
collected in the second experiment to identify whether social information influences the 
order that participants click on posts within the feed. Engagement was also measured 
through petition signatories. 
Both experiments included a post-test survey to measure behavioural intention 
measures. An 11-point likert scale was used to measure the likelihood that subjects 
would participate on a political issue in the future. A post-test only design was used, 
rather than the conventional pre-test-post-test design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963), as I 
did not want to prime the participants when attention is a valuable measure within the 
experiments. These behavioural measures are based on those used in the Audit of 
Political Engagement (Hansard Society, 2014: 90). Political engagement is 
operationalised through seven modes of participation, shown in Table 4.5. These reflect 
the variety of forms of engagement across the continuum of participation, as the effort 
threshold varies from low-effort acts, such as discussing a political issue with friends, to 
those acts that require a higher level of involvement, such as taking part in a real space 
                                                
34 For further details on Research Randomizer: http://randomizer.org. 
35 For further details on TimeStats: https://goo.gl/GzSh9G.   
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action. By offering a range of actions, weighted to account for the variation in the 
commitment required from the individual, it is possible to gain a more accurate sense of 
a subject’s future intention to participate on an issue. This list also includes two 
indicators specified by the slacktivist critique, as the experiment examines how the 
stimuli influence public self-expression on social media and the likelihood of signing an 
e-petition. 
 
Table 4.5. List of indicators for political engagement 
Forms of political engagement 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances 
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration 
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official 
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
Source: Adapted from the Hansard Society (2011: 90)  
 
In order to mask the treatment and the purpose of the experiment, a deception 
was used. While the use of deception as a tool for experimental research is common in 
political communication research, it does have some drawbacks. If a participant expects 
that a deception may be part of the experiment then this can distract their attention and 
compromise results (Dickson, 2011). The use of deception brings a number of ethical 
questions. Participants can become annoyed or angry at being deceived, which in turn 
can affect their attitudes to experimental research more broadly. As such, the 
experiments were designed to ensure that the deception was minimal and caused no 
harm to those taking part. Subjects were informed that the experiment was part of a 
study investigating how young people interact with information on social media feeds. 
Participants were also asked a number of other questions in the pre-test survey, such as 
their opinions on other topics included in the news feed and a series of questions about 
their preferred media providers. The full survey is provided in Appendix C2. Although 
these questions did risk experimental realism, as subjects noted their lack of enthusiasm 
due to the length of the survey in the debrief,36 they were necessary in order to mask the 
purpose of the study. 
                                                
36 The question asking participants to reflect on their use of a range of media providers was originally 
conceived to explore who was aware of BuzzFeed and Upworthy. However, many subjects did not fill out 
their responses accurately given the length of the list so I cannot use this data. 
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A number of design decisions were taken to preserve comparability between the 
treatment and control groups. All of the experimental groups were identical in each 
experiment, except the treatment. This included the content of the posts, the order in 
which they were placed within the feed, and the number of likes on each post in the 
second experiment. All posts in both experiments were submitted by a single user 
account created for the purpose of the experiment to ensure the reputational dynamics of 
the user account were controlled for.37 Furthermore, in order to minimise the risk of 
intervening variables, participants were asked to refrain from interacting with the feed, 
through likes, comments, or shares, for the duration of the experiment.  
Access to the Facebook groups was time-controlled. Each subject had 11 
minutes to interact with the feed. In trying to design a realistic reproduction of normal 
Facebook use, the duration of the experiment was based on pre-existing data measuring 
the average time spent per visit.38 However, this is most definitely a “kludge,” as data 
for the amount of time a user spends on Facebook is unreliable given the wildly varied 
nature of Facebook use, especially when we factor in mobile use. A simple timer was 
used during the experiment.39 Subjects were required to start the timer when prompted 
to do so by the survey. Although it was not mandatory for participants to complete the 
full 11 minutes, the vast majority of participants did so. All participants spent at least 8 
minutes engaging with their respective news feed. 
Both experiments were designed within the parameters of Facebook, to 
strengthen the external validity of the study. These groups were private, closed groups 
inaccessible to non-participants. Participants took part using their own user credentials. 
This is a necessity when we consider that both the slacktivist critique (Morozov, 2011) 
and the more positive theoretical interpretations of digitally mediated online behaviour 
(Baym, 2010; Papacharissi, 2010) point to the pressures of managing one’s personal 
identity when using social media. This is in direct contrast to earlier experimental work 
on the internet which suggested that citizens were more expressive in online spaces due 
to their perceived anonymity (Nelson, Bryner and Carnahan, 2011: 205). 
Mundane realism, “the likelihood the events represent or are similar to those in 
the real world” (Druckman and Kam, 2011: 44), was central to the design of this study. 
Given the aims of this thesis, it was important to ensure that the treatment and control 
groups reflected something that a Facebook user may experience in their normal, day-
                                                
37 https://www.facebook.com/npclabstudy [Link no longer active]. 
38 For data on the average length of time a user spends on Facebook in a single-visit see: 
http://www.teachthought.com/social-media/twitter-vs-facebook-competing-for-your-time/ and 
http://infographiclabs.com/news/facebook-2012/.  
39 For further details on SnapTimer: http://dan.hersam.com/software/snaptimer/.  
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to-day use. This is a near impossible task given that each user has a personalised news 
feed that is dependent on who they are connected to and what pages they follow. In 
order to produce something that reflects a “standard” news feed, each group contained a 
range of different articles. The news feeds in both experiments are accessible through 
the URLs provided in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6. Experimental news feeds for both experiments 
 Treatment URL: Experiment news feed 
Laboratory experiment 1: 
Information type 
BBC News Online https://db.tt/FY8npW5h  
BuzzFeed UK https://db.tt/EqvxwjJs  
Change.org https://db.tt/1IzyX3JW  
Upworthy https://db.tt/kwYeiGR6  
Control group https://db.tt/jIMEJ5NV  
Laboratory experiment 2: 
Facebook likes 
High: 16 likes https://db.tt/vdLZfymI  
Low: 3 likes https://db.tt/0xVDjEHU  
None: 0 likes https://db.tt/DHFoPiyy  
Control group https://db.tt/AbzcS1CT  
 
By designing the control and treatment groups shortly before the experiments 
were due to take place, I was able to ensure that the information included was reflective 
of the items that a participant may conceivably have been exposed to in their own 
personal news feed during that day. Temporal immediacy was essential for external 
validity. All publishers were selected on the basis of the most shared content producers 
on Facebook during September 2014, as reported by the social media research agency, 
News Whip (Corcoran, 2014). See Appendix C3 for further details on the news feed 
design. 
The study took place within two offices at the university. The rooms were set up 
with comfortable seating and posters. While the nature of Facebook means that there is 
no such thing as a natural environment in which users access the service, I tried to 
ensure that the setting for the experiment did not distract those taking part. 
 
4.5.4 Limitations 
 
These experiments were designed to balance the interpretivist nature of the 
ethnographic fieldwork with an approach rooted in the positivist tradition. However, as 
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expected when designing an experiment within a live and constantly changing social 
networking site, I encountered a number of challenges.  
The most significant limitation of this experimental research design is the 
artificial nature of the news feeds. It is impossible to recreate an archetypal news feed as 
none exists. Each user has a unique news feed, personalised on the basis of their 
network of friends and the Facebook pages that they choose to subscribe to. How a user 
manages and constructs their personalised network can have an effect on the 
information that they are exposed to. Similarly, the order of the posts included in both 
experiments was not an accurate reflection of the algorithm used on Facebook. It is not 
possible to replicate this algorithm in a laboratory experiment setting, given that over 
100,000 personalised factors are used to determine content prioritisation on the news 
feed (Constine, 2014). As such, the information that subjects were faced with may not 
resemble that which they would encounter in day-to-day use. 
Furthermore, the experiment overlooks the effect of specific contacts on user 
behaviour, be they close friends, celebrities, or particular organisations (Baym, 2010; 
Hampton et al., 2012; Smith, 2013: 33-34). In both experiments just a single Facebook 
account was used to populate the groups with content for the experiments.40 This 
account, entitled “Lab Study,” had no profile picture, no user details, and had one 
publically accessible friend – the researcher leading the study. While this is not 
representative of everyday use, where a news feed would contain posts from a range of 
strong and weak tie contacts, this bolsters the internal validity of the experiment as it 
controls for the potential intervening variables associated with a user account. However, 
this does mean that the study omits the influence of strong ties, which, as Chapter 6 
shows, can influence behaviour. 
Building the experiments within a Facebook group also raises problems. Past 
research has shown that the imagined audience, those that we perceive may be exposed 
to our online actions, influences our behaviour (Bernstein et al., 2013; Marwick and 
boyd, 2011; Papacharissi, 2012).  Therefore, by placing participants within a network 
created purely for the purpose of an experiment, the imagined audience for a subject is 
not their own contacts but their fellow participants and the research instigator. This may 
in turn lead to social desirability bias, as participants adopt traits that they perceive to be 
the norm within this new network.  
                                                
40 I originally intended to include 50 artificial user accounts to simulate an experience more representative 
of day-to-day use. However, Facebook closed these accounts during the planning phase. 
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For some, the flaws in the design of the news feeds compromise the validity of 
the experiments. A colleague in my department, with expertise in experimental 
research, expressed reservations about the design for the first experiment, claiming that 
information type would have been more effectively explored outside of the Facebook 
ecosystem. In their view, internal validity should be paramount to any experimental 
design as to maximise the strength of causal evidence (see Iyengar, 2011). Their 
concern was that participants could choose to avoid the treatment, thus reducing 
exposure. As shown in Chapter 7, this proved to be the case, with noncompliance 
especially high amongst those presented with the petition from Change.org. However, I 
deem this to be a strength of the experimental design rather than a weakness.  
The design of an experiment should always be based on the aims of the research 
(Druckman and Kam, 2011: 43). This study was not designed to generate strong causal 
inferences that could be generalised to wider populations. Instead, it is an exploratory 
experiment, designed to explore the dynamics of political attention and engagement on 
Facebook. In realising this goal it is necessary that the experiments provide those taking 
part with a choice of content to engage with, as they would have if they were browsing 
their own personalised news feed. Druckman and Kam (2011: 41) argue that neglecting 
to provide participants with a choice of content is a significant intervening variable in 
political communication research, as media effects weaken substantially when 
participants can choose whether to receive it (Arceneaux and Johnson, 2008, as cited in 
Druckman and Kam, 2011: 43). A design in which users are simply exposed to each of 
the treatments in turn would not only detach the participant from Facebook, but it could 
also result in a higher rate of socially desirable responses, especially without any sense 
of network or audience effects.  
Therefore, while this section seeks to outline the shortcomings of the 
experiments, their design is actually a strength. External validity is fundamental to this 
experimental design as the young, digitally active, and politically interested subjects are 
representative of the target population (Druckman et al., 2011: 19), and selective 
exposure on the experimental news feeds represents everyday use (Holbrook, 2011: 
148). While controlling for exposure may produce stronger causal relationships, these 
are not reflective of normal behaviour on social media.  
There were two features of the experiment that deviated from this pursuit of 
mundane realism. A significant service norm that was absent was the ability for 
participants to like, comment on, or share the content within each of the Facebook 
groups. This was a necessary step to control for the effects of these interactions. For 
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example, if the treatment post received negative comments, this would have invalidated 
any claims that I could make regarding the treatment itself. Furthermore, participants 
were required to remain within the confines of the Facebook group when taking part in 
the experiment. This is problematic given that citizens sometimes refer to other sources 
as a means of verification when confronted by new information on Facebook, as shown 
in Chapter 6. These changes were necessary in order to know that the conclusions 
reached were a result of the manipulation. 
The final disadvantage of the design is the uniform way by which subjects 
accessed the experiment. Both experiments were undertaken using identical PCs 
installed with Windows 7 and the latest version of Google Chrome. However, user 
experience on Facebook varies depending on the platform used to access the service. 
The norms of interaction may differ depending on if a user interacts with Facebook via 
mobile, tablet, or on other devices. 
Outside of its design, there are a number of other limitations to this study. 
Firstly, the sample size was small. Although 78 participants took part in both 
experiments, no group had more than 10 subjects. Secondly, attention, when 
operationalised by clickthrough rates and the amount of time spent browsing a page, 
does not necessarily indicate positive support for that source. A participant may spend a 
significant amount of time on the stimulus but may be doing so in a state of indignation 
at its content, or as a result of the experimental conditions. As such, these findings in 
Chapter 7 must not be taken as tacit support for either the information provider in 
experiment one, or the e-petition in experiment two. However, irrespective of sentiment, 
evidence of attention is still substantively important for understanding what type of 
content persuades a participant to interact. Thirdly, there are drawbacks in measuring 
media effects immediately after the experiment. Chong and Druckman (2010) found 
that post-test attitudinal and behavioural measures are exaggerated when taken directly 
after exposure. While it would have been preferable to capture these intentional 
measures a few days after the experiment, this was not feasible given the demand on 
resources.  
Finally, the second experiment, exploring the effect of Facebook likes on 
behaviour, had two specific weaknesses. Although the number of likes was based on the 
spread of likes on petitions posted by 38 Degrees on their Facebook page, the overall 
volumes were significantly smaller. The threshold was much lower than the critical 
mass of support that Margetts, John, Escher, and Reissfelder (2011; 2013) observed in a 
study on the level of e-petition signatories. While I originally intended to have higher 
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volumes, I was unable to do this given the resources required to recruit contributors (i.e. 
those volunteers who liked the posts). These volunteers also acted as an intervening 
variable, as a handful of participants browsed the list of users who had liked the posts. 
While all efforts were made to ensure that no participant was a mutual friend of any of 
the contributors, this is a tacit acknowledgment of the role that social influence may 
play in directing behaviour on social media. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have set out the research design for the thesis. I propose that, while 
cross-sectional survey studies and big data methodologies offer top-level findings on 
the basis of large samples, new methodological approaches are required to analyse 
political behaviour online at the individual level. I use a deep data approach, drawing on 
thick, descriptive data, to explore the diffusion of the political into new, personally 
defined spaces across an expansive hybrid media system. As a result, the 
methodological framework designed for this thesis is based on a series of workarounds 
(Karpf, 2012b: 654).  
By using an experimental mixed-method research design, that brings together 
qualitative, quantitative, and computational traditions, I explore the relationship 
between social media and political participation across three perspectives. Firstly, 
through using diaries collected over a period of three-months, I observe how citizens 
use Facebook and Twitter to access information and talk about politics within everyday 
life. Secondly, a series of laboratory experiments have been designed within Facebook 
to explore the conditions in which slacktivism is hypothesised to thrive. Finally, in the 
next chapter, I investigate the activist context through an ethnographic study of the 
hybrid mobilization movement, 38 Degrees. 
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5. 38 Degrees: Exploring the Role of Social Media Within an 
Activist Context 
 
5.1 Organising With New Organisations: A Glimpse of Campaigning at 38 Degrees 
 
On May 14, 2013, the Conservative Policy Forum (CPF) issued a 12-page discussion 
paper to their national membership. The CPF is a policy discussion network formed of 
250 local groups, which provides grassroots members of the Conservative Party with a 
role in shaping party policy. This particular survey sought the opinions of party 
members on the ways in which local healthcare provision could be improved, with a 
focus on dentistry services and the care provided by local doctors’ surgeries 
(Conservative Policy Forum, 2013). The briefing paper included a list of purposefully 
provocative statements on which respondents were asked to identify their level of 
agreement across a five-point scale. One such statement asked if “there should be no 
annual limit to the number of appointments patients can book to see their GP [General 
Practitioner]” (Conservative Policy Forum, 2013: 11). Despite the authors clearly 
stating that the brief should not be seen to represent the views of the Conservative Party, 
this question was the trigger for a national mobilisation involving over 200,000 
citizens.41 
The following Sunday, May 26, four newspapers covered the briefing paper: the 
Daily Mail (McCann, 2013), the Daily Mirror (Beattie, 2013), the Independent 
(Merrick, 2013), and the Daily Telegraph (2013). These articles claimed that the 
Conservative Party was considering proposals to limit the number of GP appointments 
that a patient could make in a calendar year. The story prompted condemnation from the 
Royal College of General Practitioners, the professional body for GPs, and the leading 
opposition party, the Labour Party. Both argued that the proposal revoked a founding 
principal of the National Health Service (NHS), that access to treatment should be based 
on clinical need (Merrick, 2013). As one may expect with a topic as politically charged 
as healthcare, the proposal was met with a mixture of outrage and disbelief. 42 
                                                
41 The discussion paper is available here. The disclaimer, “CPF Discussion Briefs exist to stimulate 
debate. They do not represent the views of the Conservative Party,” is included in the footer of the 
document: 
http://www.conservativepolicyforum.com/sites/www.conservativepolicyforum.com/files/local_health_dis
cussion_brief.doc. 
42 For instance, see this discussion thread on the entertainment forum, Digital Spy: 
http://forums.digitalspy.co.uk/showthread.php?t=1830281.  
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On Tuesday morning, May 28, 15 employees sat around a desk in a stylish 
office space in Farringdon, central London. This small group make up the leadership of 
38 Degrees, a UK-based hybrid mobilization movement. The team, ranging from 
seasoned campaign professionals to bright-eyed volunteers, were deep in discussion. 
The conversation moved at a frenetic pace, darting between a rundown of what 
colleagues got up to over the bank holiday weekend and the important news stories that 
had emerged in their absence. After a few minutes, the hum of chatter fell away and the 
first meeting of the day began. This “huddle” was normal practice, as the staff sought to 
establish their workload for the week ahead. As is customary for the first working day 
of the week, the group discussed the results of a poll completed over the weekend. Each 
week, the leadership survey a random sample of the movement’s membership by way of 
tracking their priorities. The results showed that threats to the NHS were deemed to be 
the most pressing issue. Volunteers, who monitor communications over email and 
social media, noted that this issue also featured heavily in member correspondence over 
the previous week. 
The team then moved on to determining which campaigns would take priority 
for the week ahead. For most pressure groups this is a relatively straightforward 
process, as campaigns are planned weeks, or even months, in advance. For 38 Degrees, 
this is not the case. Staff monitor both the priorities of the membership and salient 
issues within professional news media to identify the point at which a campaign could 
have impact. The movement is therefore somewhat dependent on, and responsive to, the 
news agenda. A campaign manager mentioned the reports from the Sunday papers, 
which suggested that the Conservative Party was considering limiting access to GP 
visits. The team agreed that, based on the results of the weekly poll, this may be 
something of interest to their membership.  
A decision was made that members should be consulted over whether they 
should launch a campaign in response to the proposal. By midday “Jonathan,” a 
campaign manager, had posted a link to the Daily Mail article on the movement’s 
Facebook page (38 Degrees, 2013h). As shown in Figure 5.1, members were asked to 
indicate their approval by liking the post and were asked to offer suggestions about 
how, strategically, the movement could respond. 
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Figure 5.1. A screenshot of the leadership of 38 Degrees using Facebook to gather 
feedback from members 
 
Source: 38 Degrees (2013h) 
 
Within a few hours the post received 3,289 likes, a clear signal of approval from those 
members who follow the group on Facebook. A significant proportion of the 344 
comments expressed outrage at the proposed restriction. Some reflected on how their 
own personal circumstances made regular contact with a GP a necessity. Others 
highlighted the potential risks to public health if sick people were discouraged from 
seeking medical attention. The post was also shared 803 times, raising awareness of the 
proposal amongst wider networks that may not have been exposed to the original media 
coverage.  
 An e-petition was launched on the back of this tacit approval. This is a typical 
first step for the organisation, as e-petitions are an efficient and widely used proxy for 
translating the disparate voice of its large membership into a tangible form of citizen 
action. The petition was shared on Facebook, Twitter, and, most importantly, through 
an email to the “full list” of 38 Degrees members.43 Email is essentially 38 Degrees’ 
organisational infrastructure (Chadwick, 2013: 190). From the leadership’s perspective, 
one becomes a “member” of the movement by virtue of signing up to become an email 
recipient. The full list refers to all those citizens who have agreed to receive email 
communications from 38 Degrees. In May 2014, there were over 2.4 million members 
                                                
43 action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. NHS: A serious threat. [email]. Sent 28/05/2013. Retrieved 
28/05/2013. 
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(Dennis, 2014). The email itself has two functions. Firstly, as the excerpt from the email 
below illustrates, it was a call to arms, a way to rapidly mobilise members to take part in 
a campaign action: 
 
This could be very serious. The Conservatives are floating plans to cap the 
number of times we are allowed to visit our GP. [1] If we run out of visits – 
because we've got a sickly child or long-term health condition, for example – we 
could be forced to pay to go elsewhere. 
 
At the moment it's just a proposal. [2] But if the Conservatives don't see a big 
public backlash, it could soon be a grim reality. So let's raise an outcry as 
quickly as possible and push them to drop the idea immediately. 
 
Please sign the urgent petition now: tell health minister Jeremy Hunt to 
rule out limiting our access to NHS GPs. [Emphasis in original] 
(action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. NHS: A serious threat. [email]. Sent 28/05/2013. 
Retrieved 28/05/2013. Emphasis in original) 
 
Secondly, the email also fulfilled an educative role. For each action request, the 
leadership provide links to a range of sources from professional news coverage to 
detailed policy documents. This enhances the transparency of the movement, providing 
an opportunity for members to consult source material prior to deciding whether or not 
to take part.  
Particularly striking here is the speed and agility of these processes. In less than 
24 hours the movement was able to identify a potential campaign that was in line with 
the priorities of their membership, measure the level of support for this specific issue, 
and launch an “action,” a specific activity designed by the leadership that enables its 
members to exert influence on the policy agenda (Chadwick, 2013: 189).  
The following day, May 29, saw the movement’s leadership take to Facebook 
once again, this time to drum up support for the campaign (38 Degrees, 2013i). 
Mobilising members to share campaigns within their own personal networks enhances 
the legitimacy of the movement, and the reach of an action. One way in which the 
leadership encourage engagement in an extended repertoire of actions is by using 
success as a motivational tool (Eaton, 2010: 180-181). In this example, the number of 
petition signatories, now over 145,000, was used to motivate users to share the petition 
across wider networks (38 Degrees, 2013i). By Thursday, May 30, the petition had 
reached over 200,000 signatures. 
On Thursday morning, as the campaign continued to gather momentum, the 
Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt (Hunt, 2013), took to Twitter to offer a 
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response. As shown in Figure 5.2, Hunt refuted the story and questioned the 
movement’s intentions. 
 
Figure 5.2. A screenshot of the response to the campaign on Twitter from the Secretary 
of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt MP 
 
Source: Hunt (2013) 
 
As news of Hunt’s tweet filtered through the office, a meeting was called to discuss 
how to respond. The team were visibly perturbed by the allegation made regarding their 
neutrality, a trait that a number of members mentioned as a key reason for their 
involvement (Interview 15, August 2013; Interview 19, October 2013). “Amy,” the 
campaigns director who was leading the meeting, pointed out that the campaign 
explicitly stated that this was a proposal and not policy. Jonathan noted that Hunt's 
response was a little ironic given that the CPF was seeking the opinions of its grassroots 
members, asking “what can be more resolute than the voice of over 200,000 citizens?” 
The group agreed that this marked a significant campaign victory and that this success 
should be shared with their membership. 
 As Jonathan prepared an email to update the membership on the turn of events, 
David Babbs, the Executive Director of 38 Degrees, consulted the group’s Facebook 
page. The movement had shared a screenshot of Hunt’s tweet immediately after it was 
posted. The comments that followed were mixed, with some revelling in the group’s 
success, while others were more sceptical of the accuracy of the petition (38 Degrees, 
2013j; Williamson, 2013). David fed a selection of these comments back to Jonathan as 
the email took shape. Here, Facebook provides a discursive space in which members 
can shape the leadership’s actions. As David notes, “it’s a very good way of bringing 
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our members into the room” (Interview 7, June 2013). By late afternoon an email had 
been dispatched to the full list of members, explaining the actions taken, the 
significance of their involvement throughout the campaign, and the importance of 
member donations in sustaining the movement.  
This example, which took place during my participant observation, provides a 
fitting starting point for my analysis, as it sheds light on both the norms and practices 
associated with the movement’s style of digital campaigning. 
Firstly, lasting just four days from conception to completion, this campaign 
illustrates the speed in which the organisation operates. Jonathan claims it is this agility 
that separates 38 Degrees from other advocacy groups, it is “because 38 Degrees are 
who 38 Degrees are, that we were able to do this” (Interview 3, May 2013). Secondly, 
this example demonstrates how the group’s style of campaigning thrives on the 
momentum of news-cycles, for better or for worse. Although the news coverage 
resonated with members, the way in which the discussion paper was framed in these 
articles was evidently problematic, as the significance of the briefing to Conservative 
Party leadership was exaggerated. This can, in turn, affect the legitimacy of the 
movement. Thirdly, it shows how the movement tries to launch campaigns in the 
direction set by its members, establishing its priorities through regular polling and the 
“seeding” of ideas on Facebook and Twitter (Chadwick, 2013: 190). 
Where does social media fit within this activist context? This campaign 
illustrates how such platforms are not only used as an outlet for self-expression, but are 
also used as sites of learning. They also demonstrate how “access,” broadly understood 
as the consumption of information, can also empower members within the movement, 
as they are able to shape strategic decision making by virtue of their low-threshold 
interactions with material shared on Facebook. Finally, this example shows the value of 
Twitter as a space to interact with established elites. By taking to Twitter to announce 
the response of the Conservative Party to the campaign, Jeremy Hunt reveals the 
important space the service now fills in capturing the attention of multiple audiences. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
Drawing upon participant observation, ethnographic data from interviews with staff and 
members, as well as campaign emails, content from Facebook and Twitter, and online 
news articles, this chapter explores how citizens use social media within an activist 
context. In what I describe as the organisational management of digital micro-activism, 
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the leadership of 38 Degrees creates opportunities for meaningful participation through 
its use of social media. These low-effort technologies, deemed to be ineffective by those 
advocating the slacktivist critique, form part of wider engagement repertoires. 
Firstly, I offer an overview of 38 Degrees at the organisational level, describing 
how the group is structured and the role that the leadership plays within the hybrid 
mobilization movement. The popularity of 38 Degrees comes from its member-centric 
approach. Through the use of digital technologies, members are able to shape and 
influence campaign strategy. However, while the group is member driven, it is not 
leaderless. As the campaign to halt the proposed limits to GP visits shows, the staff in 
the London office translates the priorities established by the membership—through 
communications over email, Facebook, and Twitter—into campaign actions. These 
leaders draw on their political expertise to design a wide range of sophisticated online 
and face-to-face engagement repertoires. 
This may seem contradictory to the calls for further empirical research at the 
individual level made throughout this thesis. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
researchers can often learn more by exploring the links between different units of 
analysis (Howard, 2011: 2). Throughout this chapter, I explore the attitudes and 
behaviours of individual members within the engagement repertoires that are crafted at 
the organisational level.44 I argue that we can only understand how members make use 
of social media in this activist context by examining the relationships formed between 
ordinary members and the leadership. By doing so, I illustrate when a 38 Degrees 
campaign transforms into substantive forms of instrumental engagement, and when 
their activism fulfils the hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique.  
Secondly, I analyse how the leadership at 38 Degrees uses social media to craft 
opportunities for member involvement across the continuum of participation. These 
processes illustrate how low-effort forms of digital engagement are not only used for 
self-expression, but are connected to other forms of digital activism and real space 
participation. By sharing information on the movement’s social media feeds, members 
are exposed to political information as a by-product of day-to-day use (EF1). 
Furthermore, by “liking” and commenting on these posts on the group’s Facebook page, 
members can influence both issue selection and broader campaign strategy. 
When members do engage in emotive forms of self-expression, this fulfils a 
number of functions that go beyond the self-gratification hypothesised by the slacktivist 
                                                
44 The term “craft” refers to the processes in which campaign staff design opportunities for citizen 
engagement using digital technologies. This originates from Kreiss’ (2010: 23) study of Howard Dean’s 
campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004.  
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critique (EF3). These forms of personalised communication can raise awareness of 
political issues amongst wider publics, form bonds between the geographically 
dispersed and ideologically disparate membership (EF5), and in certain public spaces, 
they can represent a form of digital activism in their own right. Through the 
organisational management of digital micro-activism, the leadership offers granular 
campaign actions based on the priorities set by their membership. These low-threshold 
forms of digital engagement on social media act as participatory shortcuts, providing a 
bridge to the processes of policy making for time-poor citizens. As such, these tools do 
not just replace equivalent offline behaviours (EF4), but contribute to a new form of 
organisational politics. 
Finally, I illustrate how, without the campaigning expertise of the leadership, 
campaigns can fulfil the hypotheses of the slacktivist critique (H1; H2). On a new 
platform launched by the group, Campaigns By You (CBY), members are provided 
with the tools to start their own campaigns. However, these self-organising networks do 
not share the same characteristics as the group’s leader led campaigns, as the 
technological platform locks members into set engagement repertoires. As a result, 
campaigns rarely develop out of the e-petition stage. Therefore, in this activist context, 
political behaviour on social media is not deemed to be ineffective by virtue of 
technological design, as these actions are given value by their strategic deployment by 
political professionals. As Karpf (2012: 3) has argued in the U.S. context, this is not 
“organizing without organizations” but “organizing with different organizations.” 
 
5.3 The Role of Leaders in a Hybrid Mobilization Movement: Exploring the 
Context of the Organisational Level  
 
Prior to analysing how Facebook and Twitter are used within the group’s campaigns, I 
offer a contextual overview of 38 Degrees at the organisational level. This is necessary, 
as the significance of low-threshold, digital micro-activism only becomes apparent 
through an evaluation of the role that the leadership plays. Much has been written about 
the group’s influence on British politics, but this is often anecdotal or politically 
motivated (Harries, 2014; Liddle, 2013; Rickett, 2013). By offering clarity on the 
movement’s structure, or lack thereof, and by determining how its member-centric 
philosophy operates in practice, this section will highlight the factors that set apart the 
hybrid mobilization movement as a new form of organisation.  
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38 Degrees bears little resemblance to the organisational models that scholars in 
political science have become accustomed to. Unlike political parties or traditional 
pressure groups, 38 Degrees operates on a more level playing field. Members play an 
important role in directing the group’s day-to-day decision making. The movement tries 
to foster what Amy describes as a “culture of mutuality” between the leadership team 
and the members (Interview 4, May 2013). Essentially, the organisation is designed to 
act as a conduit for its membership, removing the layers of elite-level decision making 
that characterised political groups of the late twentieth century.  
Members are responsible for a number of decisions made throughout each 
campaign. By using digital tools that are diffused widely amongst its membership, 
members are able to express their opinion and set the movement’s priorities very 
quickly on an unprecedented scale. These priorities are generated through a number of 
qualitative and quantitative data sources, the most important of which are the results 
from a weekly online survey of a random sample of members, the analysis of e-mail 
feedback, and the collection of communications on Facebook and Twitter (Interview 7, 
June 2013). By drawing on these data sources, forms of low-threshold, digital micro-
activism are linked to substantive forms of political participation.  
The leadership use ad-hoc surveys so that members can influence key decisions. 
As Amy (Interview 4, May 2013) notes, “we talk to our members about tactics... we 
regularly poll on key pivots within a campaign.” During the recent campaign to lobby a 
leading energy provider to pay more corporation tax, members were consulted on 
whether the movement should launch the campaign, their ideas were sought for 
potential campaign tactics and, as shown in Figure 5.3, they were given the final say as 
to whether or not 38 Degrees should try to organize a mass, “people powered” switch 
away from the energy provider to alternative suppliers. Outside of specific requests 
during a campaign, the leadership frequently seeks feedback on the movement’s 
overarching strategy. Members shape the long-term direction of the group through 
detailed surveys, such as in the run up to a new calendar year (38 Degrees, 2014a), or 
prior to an election (38 Degrees, 2014b). For those involved, this is a clear and visible 
way of exerting their influence.  
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Figure 5.3. A screenshot of a poll for members of 38 Degrees to decide on a campaign 
tactic 
Source: Babbs (2013) 
 
This member-centric approach was evident from the moment that I arrived at the 
group’s London office. The leadership function performed by the office was 
immediately downplayed. A number of statements stood out during my induction for 
the role of volunteer: “use we, as opposed to us or them”; “talk about the movement and 
not the office”; and “never answer questions on a policy position as the central office 
does not make a position—members do.” At first I was sceptical about the feasibility of 
this in practice, but throughout my time observing the movement it became clear that 
the leadership does try to design actions with the will of their members in mind.  
However, 38 Degrees is not an example of “organizing without organizations” 
(Shirky, 2008). As we explore these digitally enabled activist movements in more detail, 
we are likely to find that the relationships formed within them are less hierarchical than 
traditional organisations, but they are not flat. As Jenkins argues, “leadership is a very 
necessary condition for participatory organizations to function” (Jenkins and Carpentier, 
2013: 15). The staff, based in the organisation’s central London office, performs a 
gatekeeping role. They have an enhanced level of influence over the design and 
selection of campaign actions. Yet, equally, this is not an elite-dominated hierarchy 
pretending to be member driven. The movement relies on the central office to assimilate 
the priorities of its members, and then offers repertoires of engagement. As such, the 
movement’s overall direction is decided by its membership. Gerbaudo (2012) describes 
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this as “soft leadership,” as the staff organises and structures the group’s campaigns 
whilst minimising encroachment on the will of each individual member. The central 
team provides the technological capacity and campaigning expertise to realise the 
priorities established by the membership. 
Karpf (2012) proposes that we consider this as characteristic of a new type of 
organisation. These new organisations challenge our traditional conceptions of 
collective action, as they are structurally fluid. 38 Degrees, like GetUp! in Australia 
(Vromen and Coleman, 2014) and MoveOn in the United States (Chadwick, 2007; 
Karpf, 2012a), uses the internet to adapt and transform its organisational structure and 
repertoire of actions during campaigns in real time. These hybrid mobilization 
movements mobilise their membership across sedimentary networks; loose affiliations 
of individuals that exist across a diverse range of issue campaigns. Sedimentary 
networks provide 38 Degrees with the flexibility to reconfigure and alter its structure on 
the fly, transforming the balance between centralised control and relatively autonomous 
but highly connected subunits (Chadwick, 2007: 294). As such, the leadership crafts 
opportunities for members to have substantive involvement through a range of digital 
and real space actions. This expertise is essential given the characteristics of the group’s 
membership base.  
The terms of membership in a hybrid mobilization movement are unique. 
Traditionally, one would become a member of a political organisation, be it a political 
party or a trade union, by opting into a shared, collective identity. The terms of 
membership were relatively straightforward: you paid your membership, received some 
kind of formal recognition, often by way of a card, and signed up to a broad set of 
shared ideological principles. In this way, membership was deemed to be a reflection of 
one’s character. By comparison, 38 Degrees operationalise a much more flexible 
definition of membership. From the leadership’s perspective, one becomes a member by 
virtue of signing up to become an email recipient. In his analysis of MoveOn, Karpf 
(2012: 31) suggests that many email recipients may not actually be aware that they are 
in fact deemed to be members. However, what may appear disingenuous—after all, 
many political parties have substantial mailing lists—is actually a distinctive feature of 
the movement and part of its attraction for citizens.  
The imprecise parameters of this definition speak to the attachment formed 
between a citizen and the movement, a relationship that is in constant flux. Some may 
seldom open the emails that they receive marked “38 Degrees,” while others may take 
part in each and every action.  By defining membership in this way, those involved are 
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not tied into one fixed ideology but have the freedom to choose those campaigns they 
wish to be involved in. “Mike,” a 24-year-old engineer from London, cites this self-
determination as the primary reason for his association with the movement (Interview 9, 
June 2013). Likewise, “George,” a 63-year-old member from Birmingham, appreciates 
that the leadership does not pressure members to get involved (Interview 13, June 
2013). Members value this control over the conditions of their participation. 
In providing this choice, members are able to personalise and adapt their 
engagement to fit their own interests. A number of those members that I spoke to drew 
on their own personal experiences when justifying why they originally got involved 
with 38 Degrees. For “Mary,” this was a campaign to stop the impending closure of her 
local hospital (Interview 16, June 2013). For “Liam,” his involvement grew out of his 
concern for members of his family who are public sector employees (Interview 19, 
October 2013). By campaigning on issues that have relevance in day-to-day life, the 
bond between the participant and the cause is intensified.  
Perhaps where the significance of this new form of identification is most evident 
is when it is juxtaposed against a traditional custom of group-based politics. During my 
observation of the movement I organised a members meal in Wallington, South 
London. In this conventional, face-to-face setting the fundamental divides that exist 
between different members soon became apparent, be it on climate change, same-sex 
marriage, or one’s right to privacy. However, following the animated debates that 
ensued, what was made abundantly clear to me was that what united my dinner guests 
was how much they all valued the freedom to act collectively, but on their own terms.  
This ad-hoc, issue based involvement speaks to the type of citizens who take 
part in 38 Degrees campaigns; these are not hardened activists, but, as one interviewee 
put it, “ordinary people” (Interview 13, June 2013). The members that I interviewed 
were all passionate about politics, broadly defined, but spoke of the struggles they 
encountered when pursuing this interest given other family (Interview 13, June 2013), 
work (Interview 19, August 2013), and social commitments (Interview 17, October 
2013). For instance, “Geraldine,” a 68-year-old member from Liverpool, spoke of the 
difficulties of remaining politically active whilst also caring for her husband. As George 
(Interview 15, August 2013) reflects, “[38 Degrees] provide a voice that otherwise 
would not be heard. Voices of people who may be stuck at home or very busy and have 
relatively little time to get out there and say what they want to have heard.” Therefore, 
when designing an action, the leadership must strike a balance between the group’s 
commitment to providing a member driven movement and the reality that many of its 
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members lack the expertise, skills, and/or time to take on substantial campaigning 
responsibilities (Interview 2, May 2013).  
Rickett (2013) has criticised these forms of engagement, arguing that they only 
require a shallow commitment from participants. It is true that the actions designed by 
the central office often require small amounts of effort, or more precisely time, but they 
are designed with this in mind. By making campaign actions granular, the leadership 
seeks to lower the barrier of entry to political participation and negate the exacerbation 
of existing participatory inequalities, in which only those who are politically active 
offline enjoy the benefits of online activism (Brundidge and Rice, 2009; Margolis and 
Resnick, 2000). As Amy (Interview 4, May 2013) argues, lowering the costs associated 
with participation is part of the movement’s commitment to “people power,” as the 
leadership tries to involve those citizens who may have been marginalised in the past: 
 
Time, who has time? As a rule, people with money and people without care and 
responsibilities, so that has a massive impact on class and politics, a massive 
impact on gender and politics, a massive impact on the way in which people 
who have a disability can engage with politics, etc etc. You make it the preserve 
of people who are time-rich and who are often also money-rich. To me, it isn’t 
the kind of political system that I am very interested in perpetuating. So, do we 
make it easier for people to get involved? Absolutely, and I am massively proud 
of that.  
 
The members that I interviewed also value this granularity (Interview 8, June 2013; 
Interview 22, November 2013).  
Furthermore, 38 Degrees is not an online-only campaigning organisation. The 
leadership does not offer these forms of digital micro-activism in isolation, but connects 
them to different forms of participation as part of interconnected engagement 
repertoires. As “Adam,” a technology manager at 38 Degrees, explains, each campaign 
will involve a range of ways a member can get involved, from an e-petition to more 
“high bar” actions, such as organising a local meeting or attending a demonstration 
(Interview 5, May 2013).  
Therefore, I identify three factors that the leadership consider when designing an 
action, as shown in Figure 5.4. Firstly, is this based on the priorities established by the 
membership? As previously discussed, the central team use a range of digital 
technologies to track these priorities. Secondly, is the action inclusive? In other words, 
is it granular in a way that anyone could get involved, regardless of their comprehension 
of the subject matter, their campaigning experience, or the amount of time that they are 
able to offer to the cause. Finally, is there a clear theory of change (Vromen, 2015)? 
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Can members see why taking a specific action could lead to a desired result? What 
motivates members to devote more effort to a campaign is the belief that the movement 
can produce substantive change. Ultimately, these three factors underpin what I describe 
as the organisational management of digital micro-activism, as the leadership of 38 
Degrees craft opportunities for meaningful participation through the use of low-effort, 
widely diffused forms of digital media.  
 
Figure 5.4. Three factors that guide the organisational management of digital micro-
activism 
 
 
Given its role in providing these opportunities, it is necessary to ask whether 
there is an ideological grounding that underpins the leadership. I found no evidence to 
suggest that the staff share a cohesive set of ideals, as one may expect when we consider 
social movement theory (Benford and Snow, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). Just like the 
discussions I witnessed at the members meal, there were often fundamental differences 
amongst the leadership over campaign strategy. Instead, I argue that the underlying 
principles that guide the movement are the mechanism and form of 38 Degrees as a 
hybrid mobilization movement, and its commitment to repertoires of action that are 
based on these three factors.  
In using low-effort forms of digital communication to influence the way in 
which members act together, the leadership possesses significant agency over the group. 
However, contrary to liquid forms of leadership in other leaderless movements, where 
those who influence group behaviour wish to be seen as “anti-leaders” (Gerbaudo, 
2012: 13-14), staff at 38 Degrees are very transparent about their role in the movement. 
As David Babbs (Interview 7, June 2013) notes, the relationship between the staff in 
Member 
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Granularity of 
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Campaign 
impact 
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London and ordinary members is one of mutual dependency; the members provide the 
legitimacy and overall direction of the group, while the leaders bring the campaigning 
expertise and technological platforms that make their activism possible. This member 
driven model of political mobilisation marks a remarkable development in the ongoing 
evolution of democratic engagement. What follows is a series of examples that 
illustrates how the central team uses Facebook and Twitter to craft these opportunities 
for member involvement across the continuum of participation. 
 
5.4 When Slacktivism Becomes Digital Micro-Activism: The Use of Social Media 
Across the Continuum of Participation 
 
A critique frequently levelled at 38 Degrees is that its style of campaigning encourages 
slacktivism, displacing the established activist repertoires used by social movements 
and legacy pressure groups (Baker, 2014; Burns, 2011; James, 2014). As Rickett (2013) 
argues, its campaigns are not an extension of resistance, but an expression of idleness. 
However, the engagement repertoires used by the movement are not just limited to e-
petitions or hashtag activism. Such critiques are formed on these behaviours in 
isolation. As an alternative, I explore slacktivism in relation to the continuum of 
participation, a process in which the interdependency between different acts sheds light 
on the normative value of democratic engagement. In what I describe as the 
organisational management of digital micro-activism, the leadership uses low-effort 
forms of digital engagement alongside other modes of online and real space 
participation. If we explore the movement’s use of social media across a process-based 
definition of participation, then we can observe how the leadership crafts opportunities 
for substantive forms of democratic involvement that require minimal time demands. 
 
5.4.1 Access: Political Learning and Priority Setting 
 
“Access,” as defined in Chapter 1, refers to cognitive engagement, the process that we 
experience when faced with new information. At first glance one would perhaps not 
categorise 38 Degrees as a news provider, but it often fulfils this function for its 
members (Interview 4, May 2013). Prior to launching an action, the leadership will post 
information relating to the issue on Facebook. This acts as an educative space for those 
who may be exposed to new information as a by-product of their routine use of 
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Facebook. Furthermore, it provides a forum to evaluate the level of support behind an 
issue, with clear mechanisms embedded within the design of Facebook for members to 
register their backing or opposition (i.e. likes, comments, shares). 
For some members, the group’s Facebook page acts as a site of political 
learning. In our interview, “Danni,” a 24-year-old account manager at an advertising 
firm, spoke of the difficulty of maintaining a healthy interest in current affairs given the 
competing demands of her job and busy social life. Although she visits the BBC News 
website daily, she feels that the selection of political news on offer is limited. By 
following 38 Degrees on Facebook she claims that she can keep track of “alternative” 
issues and perspectives that she would not otherwise be exposed to (Interview 22, 
November 2013). This sentiment was echoed by “Claire,” a 25-year-old archive centre 
operative, who feels that the group keep her “in the loop” (Interview 8, June 2013). 
Therefore, for some members, the group’s social media accounts act as a source of 
information. 
This educative function is particularly important when trying to ensure that a 
complex campaign is transparent. One way in which the leadership tries to achieve this 
is by designing infographics, a visual representation of data intended to present 
information quickly and clearly. This was necessary during their campaign to compel 
the energy provider npower to pay more corporation tax. The leadership created an 
infographic to show how npower moved loans from their parent company in Germany 
through Malta to avoid tax, as shown in Figure 5.5. Transparency and clarity are central 
to the movement’s legitimacy given its member-centric approach; campaigns often 
falter when members do not feel that they fully understand their rationale (Interview 14, 
July 2013). 
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Figure 5.5. A screenshot of an infographic used during the “Big Tax Turnoff” 
campaign, 2013 
 
Source: 38 Degrees (2013d) 
 
Facebook is also used to determine the level of support for a new campaign, or a 
specific action. The leadership at 38 Degrees does not arbitrarily choose an issue and 
then impose this on the membership; instead, the organisation strives to include 
members in the selection of new campaigns. One way of translating these vague 
priorities into a clear and coherent strategy is through social media. By posting news 
items that may be of interest to the members on the group’s Facebook page, the central 
office is able to obtain a trove of qualitative and quantitative data from a significant 
proportion of the membership in a short space of time. David Babbs (Interview 7, June 
2013) proposes that Facebook offers a vital consultative space, in which the leadership 
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can ascertain the level of member support for an issue and how a potential campaign 
should be framed and conducted: 
 
[Social media] is a real time conversation space… I think it gives us two forms 
of input. It gives us a sense of energy levels around something, which helps us 
to decide whether we should campaign on this or not, but also, when we are 
communicating with our members about an issue, it gives us insights into the 
language they are using and the tone that they would expect us to adopt. 
 
Therefore, Facebook is used to collate the views of the membership, determining 
whether they want to launch a campaign and, if approved, what form the action should 
take. 
For example, prior to launching their campaign in response to allegations of tax 
avoidance by npower, a member of staff posted an article from the Sun onto their 
Facebook page, asking the membership to “Click LIKE and SHARE if you think 38 
Degrees should campaign on this. Comment and let npower know what you think of 
them” (38 Degrees, 2013b). Within hours the post had received 2,042 likes and 1,254 
shares, deemed by the leadership to be a sign of approval from the membership. 
Reflecting on this process, Jonathan (Interview 3, May 2013) notes how this source of 
member feedback enables the movement to respond quickly to current events: 
 
We spotted the news story as a staff team... I popped it straight up onto 
Facebook and asked 38 Degrees members the standard line, which is ‘click like 
if you want to campaign on this and if you want to do something about this.’ We 
saw a really big response. We saw lots of 38 Degrees members chatting with 
each other online and that was the key reason why we decided to launch the 
campaign so quickly. 
 
Although members had established tax avoidance as a priority in past surveys and in 
feedback on social media, Jonathan’s comments also illustrate the agency of the 
leadership, as it selects the news stories on which members offer their opinions. While 
this does diverge from its claims to “people power,” the quick actions of the central 
staff allow the group to strategically adapt, responding to ongoing events to ride the 
groundswell of enthusiasm and interest that surrounds current affairs (Chadwick, 2013: 
193). As such, the leadership has a larger influence over the selection of campaigns, but, 
by virtue of its access to the materials posted on Facebook, some decision making 
power is diffused away from the central staff to ordinary members. 
As one might expect, this feedback is not always positive. If a member is 
unhappy with the orientation of a campaign then communication on Facebook is one 
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way in which they can express their reservations. Prior to the 2012 Summer Olympics 
in London, the leadership proposed a campaign in response to the temporary tax 
exemptions that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) would be providing for 
major international corporate partners of the games. However, Paul Soper (2012), an 
accountant and a member of the movement, disputed this, arguing that the campaign 
was constructed on a misreading of the legislation. He stated that a number of those 
companies targeted, such as Adidas, McDonalds, and Coca Cola, were not able to 
qualify for this exemption as their UK subsidiary would be operating at the venues and, 
as a result, they would be liable for all applicable UK taxation. The post received 12 
likes, notable support from other members. In response, the leadership consulted tax 
blogger Richard Murphy for clarification. He offered an alternative reading of the 
exemption, which a staff member posted on Facebook in response to Paul (38 Degrees, 
2012). This example illustrates how Facebook can facilitate two-way communication 
between the leadership and rank and file members. However, as I discuss in the next 
section, this kind of response is not necessarily standard practice for all 
communications. 
 
5.4.2 Connection and Expression: Strengthening Weak Ties 
 
“Connection,” the second stage on the continuum of participation, refers to the 
relationships and networks formed by citizens. Due to the episodic involvement that 
members have with the group, often on an issue-by-issue basis, the leadership must 
craft ways to foster bonds swiftly amongst these sedimentary networks. However, 
cultivating connection and a perception of commonality between members who have 
highly personalised intentions and motivations can be challenging, especially with such 
a geographically dispersed membership base. Although email is an essential tool for 
mass organisation-to-member communication, it has little value in facilitating member-
to-member communication due to the movement's mailing list being closed. Originally, 
the movement relied on UserVoice, an internet forum platform, to facilitate 
interpersonal discussion. However, this proved to be less than ideal, as the lack of 
familiarity with the platform acted as a disincentive for those members who face high 
time pressures or lack the required digital competencies to use the platform; the service 
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was not granular. Facebook addresses some of these weaknesses as many, but by no 
means all, of their members already use the service in day-to-day life.45  
The leadership feels that users’ relationship with the service makes it a suitable 
space for cultivating bonds between members, rather than through email or on a 
dedicated web forum. Facebook encourages users to set up their profile as a reflection 
of their identity. Therefore, when a user then engages with the group’s Facebook page, 
their digital self is exposed to a highly politicised space. As Amy (Interview 4, May 
2013) notes, “social media can reintegrate people’s political self with their wider self.” 
David Babbs (Interview 7, June 2013) argues that this provides opportunities for the 
creation of new activist networks with those who would traditionally be identified as 
non-activists, or even apathetic:  
 
Campaigning used to grow out of the workplace or your neighbourhood. As 
economies have got more complex, and communities more atomised, those 
frameworks for organising have broken down… There used to be quite a hard 
membrane between my activist friends and my normal friends. I think social 
media allows people to share stuff with all of their friends. It has become a bit 
more normalised again. 
 
As members use Facebook for social reasons, politics becomes submerged within this 
everydayness. The leadership recognises this and tries to encourage member-to-member 
conversation on Facebook, as by using the service to interact with others, or even by 
observing these conversations on the group’s Facebook page, members can develop 
connections and a sense of collective identity around ad-hoc issue campaigns. 
Nonetheless, these attitudinal changes, and the willingness to connect with 
others online over political issues, are not universal. “Expression,” the third stage of the 
continuum of participation, signifies the variety of ways in which citizens share their 
opinions. Amongst those members that I interviewed, some felt that politics is not an 
appropriate topic for discussion in public and semi-public spaces online. “Liam,” a 60-
year-old teacher from Brighton, suggests that Facebook is not the right forum for 
“thrusting” one’s opinions onto others, instead preferring to talk to people about politics 
face-to-face (Interview 19, October 2013). Others, like Mike, use specific functionality 
when discussing politics on Facebook, sharing items with others privately (Interview 9, 
                                                
45 There is a significant discrepancy between the total number of members included on the group’s 
mailing list, at 2.5 million, and the 122,331 Facebook users who follow the 38 Degrees page. However, 
given that anyone who has signed a petition on the movement’s website is included on their mailing list, 
this total is not an accurate measure of active members. These figures are correct as of October 2014.  
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June 2013). Therefore, this self-expressive logic is dependent on individual preferences, 
a theme explored in further detail in the following chapter. 
Secondly, social media is sometimes used for connection between the leadership 
and members, although not in the same way as e-mail. In fulfilment of its ambition to be 
member driven, maintaining regular contact with members is the responsibility of all 
staff at 38 Degrees. Organisation-to-member communication is facilitated through a 
repertoire of contact techniques (Interview 3, May 2013). Internal workflows prioritise 
email feedback. All emails sent to the office, either directly or indirectly through the 
contact box on the group’s website, are read and replied to. However, messages on 
Facebook and Twitter are dealt with less formally and have a much lower response rate. 
During my observation, feedback on these platforms seemed to be prioritised when staff 
responded to criticism from the membership. Given the public visibility of their social 
media accounts, this is perhaps unsurprising. For example, upon receiving negative 
comments on Twitter in response to a video produced by the group, the leadership was 
quick to respond to those affected, asking how practices could be improved (38 
Degrees, 2014c). Likewise, on Facebook, staff will often post responses to comments 
made on their own updates, but they will not reply to posts by others on the group’s 
page. 
Given the absence of a systematic protocol for replying to member 
communication on social media, Carpen (2013) asks whether the leadership is using 
social media for its designed purpose: 
 
They are using social media tools, but are they using social media? They are not 
one and the same thing… Social media implies a conversation. They are using 
the tool, but not for the purpose it was necessarily designed for. 
 
Staff at 38 Degrees acknowledge this criticism, and see social media as an area in which 
they must improve (Interview 3; Interview 4, May 2013; Interview 7, June 2013). When 
I asked why staff were not more vocal on social networking sites I was told that it was a 
difficult balancing act. Firstly, responding to messages is resource intensive. The high 
volume of posts, coupled with their relatively small staff, makes a high response rate 
unrealisable. Secondly, an active staff presence within the member-to-member 
conversations on Facebook and Twitter would compromise the group’s claim to be 
member driven (Interview 4, May 2013; Interview 7, June 2013). The leadership tries to 
intervene only when necessary, as it is fearful of arbitrarily setting the agenda. 
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Thirdly, the central team uses social media platforms to involve the membership 
when the movement has success. Relatively early on in the campaign to lobby npower 
to pay more corporation tax, the group shared the front page of the Sun, a British tabloid 
newspaper, in a Facebook update. The update made a direct link between the actions of 
those members involved, in this case through donations for a report that the leadership 
commissioned on the energy provider’s tax affairs, and a tangible form of impact. As 
Figure 5.6 shows, the update claimed that the front-page exposé would be “read by 
millions” (38 Degrees, 2013c). At the time the paper had a print circulation of 2.1 
million (Ponsford, 2015) and, prior to moving to a subscription-based model, their 
website had a unique visitor count of 30 million per month (O’Reilly, 2014). This 
generates feelings of self-efficacy amongst members and helps to strengthen their 
attachment to the group (Interview 8, June 2013). The leadership shares campaign 
successes on social media to motivate members to engage in an extended repertoire of 
actions (Interview 7, June 2013). Therefore, what the slacktivist critique may deem 
inauthentic self-gratification can actually spark further action.  
 
Figure 5.6. A screenshot of the leadership of 38 Degrees using exposure in the Sun 
newspaper to motivate their membership 
 
Source: 38 Degrees (2013c) 
 
Finally, Facebook and Twitter are important spaces for self-expression. The 
movement’s digital infrastructure is built upon a suite of technologies provided by Blue 
State Digital (BSD), a political consultancy that provides digital solutions for a range of 
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organisations, such as political parties and pressure groups. Founded in the aftermath of 
Howard Dean’s presidential campaign in 2004 and renowned for their innovations 
during Barack Obama’s historic victory in 2008 (Karpf, 2012a; Kreiss, 2012: 88-89), 
the tools have a set of campaigning norms embedded within their design. Figure 5.7 
illustrates a standard user journey for a 38 Degrees campaign on BSD. Although this 
workflow is not used in every campaign, as the leadership adopts a specific strategy 
depending on the issue, it does provide a template for action. In this user journey 
members are encouraged to share evidence of their behaviour with wider networks. 
Self-expression is therefore linked to other forms of political behaviour. 
 
Figure 5.7. A flowchart of a typical user journey for a 38 Degrees campaign on Blue 
State Digital 
 
 
In isolation, sharing evidence of one’s behaviour would seem to represent an act of 
slacktivism. However, this ignores wider network effects. Expressive engagement can 
be fulfilling for the participant, but can also educate and mobilise others in their 
network. Those members that I spoke to recognised the value of raising awareness 
amongst their peers (Interview 10; Interview 11, June 2013). For instance, Danni uses 
evidence of other people's actions acts as an entry point for her involvement (Interview 
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22, November 2013). As such, the leadership tries to tap into the self-expressive logic 
on social media to amplify campaigns amongst wider networks. 
What makes this amplification so effective is the nature of the contacts who 
make up these networks, as members share campaign material on social media with 
other users who, to a varying degree depending on the nature of the relationship, have a 
vested interest in them. This expression is often framed around one’s own personal 
preferences. For instance, during the campaign to influence the Transparency of 
Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill in 2013, 
referred to as the “Gagging Law” due to the restrictions the bill proposed for political 
campaigning in general, the leadership provided a poster on Facebook and Twitter that 
members were asked to print off. Those involved personalised the posters, indicating a 
cause of deep concern to them that would be restricted under the bill. Members were 
then asked to upload a photo of their poster to Facebook. A collection of these images is 
shown in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8. A collection of personalised campaign posters in response to the “Gagging 
Law” campaign, 2013 
 
 
This individualisation triggers attention amongst the personalised networks on 
Facebook and Twitter. This is a rather explicit example of what Bennett and Segerberg 
(2013: 6) describe as personal action frames, as ties are formed amongst groups of 
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activists on the basis of personalised political messages. As part of each campaign, the 
leadership encourages their members to express how a specific issue impacts them. For 
example, during the campaign to halt the proposed restrictions on GP visits, members 
reflected upon their experiences with the NHS. This expressive engagement provides 
symbolic empowerment and psychological rewards, such as enhanced feelings of 
efficacy for the individual (Bucy and Gregson, 2001: 370-371), but also represents a 
powerful tool for mobilisation. Therefore, given that the leadership mobilises the 
membership across sedimentary networks, social media acts as a site of activation, in 
which emotive, personalised campaign material forms bonds between loose affiliations 
of digitally connected individuals.  
 
5.4.3 Action: A Service-Specific Logic 
 
“Action,” the final stage of the continuum of participation, refers to goal-orientated, 
public-political acts; those behaviours that complement other online and/or offline goal-
orientated, public-political acts as part of engagement repertoires. During my time spent 
observing 38 Degrees, it was evident that the leadership uses social media for both 
purposes. What follows is a snapshot of two case studies, a national mobilisation in 
which the group demands that a leading energy company pay more tax, and a series of 
local level efforts to galvanise resistance to the British government’s 2012 healthcare 
reforms. These campaigns show how the movement uses social media to undertake 
digitally mediated and real space action. Facebook and Twitter are explored 
independently, as each service performs a different function. 
In reading this chapter, you may be surprised by the lack of discussion of the 
group’s use of Twitter; this is a significant observation. For 38 Degrees, the service has 
clearly defined roles. For members, besides sharing their campaign action within their 
own network, Twitter is used to lobby corporations, journalists, and political 
representatives, on the instruction of the leadership. There was little evidence to suggest 
that members used the platform for discussion outside of amplifying another member’s 
action through a retweet (Interview 10; Interview 11, June 2013). Furthermore, based on 
data collected by the leadership team, Twitter is not as effective as email or Facebook in 
supporting further engagement by members (Interview 2; Interview 5, May 2013). 
The “Big Tax Turnoff,” the campaign to persuade npower to increase its tax 
contributions, illustrates how the movement use Twitter. The leadership initially 
launched an e-petition to signal members’ collective anger at the energy provider's tax 
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affairs. Members were encouraged to share this petition on Twitter. This was 
strategically significant, as companies seek to preserve and strengthen the reputation of 
their brand on the service. The staff provided members with pre-formatted tweets that 
included the energy provider’s Twitter username. For example, “.@npowerhq paid 
ZERO corporation tax in the last 3 years while our bills rocketed. Tell #npower to pay 
up: http://38d.gs/npowertax” (Rigg, 2013). This enabled each individual member to 
share their outrage with npower directly, while also providing a public record of their 
tax affairs for other consumers to see. As a result of this consumer activism on Twitter, 
npower published a press release defending the amount of tax paid, arguing that its tax 
affairs were both legal and common practice (Npower Press Office, 2013). Therefore, as 
members shared the petition on Twitter, the movement benefited from a growth in the 
number of actors taking part as npower simultaneously suffered damage to its brand. 
38 Degrees adopt a similar approach when lobbying elected politicians. Given 
the prominence of MPs on Twitter, with 461 of the 650 elected representatives now 
using the service,46 the leadership use the social networking site as a way of providing a 
means of elite contact for members in a highly visible, public space. Using a practice 
described by Zuckerman (2012b) as “tweetbombing,” the leadership organises members 
to send a tweet to their local MP at a specific time, strategically targeting the MP as a 
way of drawing attention to an issue. This is an established logic amongst pressure 
groups, be it through postcard campaigns or mass email tactics (Karpf, 2010). During 
this campaign, the leadership encouraged members to send tweets to their local MP 
during Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs), a weekly session in which MPs scrutinise 
the Prime Minister, encouraging them to raise the issue of the energy provider’s tax 
affairs (Rees, 2013). A common criticism of 38 Degrees is that it bombards MPs with 
communications from members who do not reside in their constituency (Raab, 2010). 
However, this technique is more nuanced than this critique suggests. The leadership 
designed a website for this campaign where members could enter their postcode and 
access the account details for their local MP. This ensured that MPs only received 
tweets from their local constituents, and reduced the costs incurred by members in 
finding this information. Although the material benefits of these techniques are 
questionable, for instance no MP raised the issue in PMQs, these examples show how 
Twitter is used by 38 Degrees as a platform for direct action. 
The leadership also use Twitter to capture the attention of professional news 
media. As Jonathan (Interview 3, May 2013), the campaign manager leading the npower 
                                                
46 Figure correct as of December 2013 https://twitter.com/tweetminster/status/412881045130719232.  
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campaign, reflects, “I see the value in Twitter in terms of the media. The media are all 
over Twitter and they take notice of things that are on Twitter.” Ensuring that a 
campaign receives coverage in professional media is vital to both the scale of an action 
and ultimately, its level of success (Chadwick and Dennis, forthcoming). We can 
observe how the ebb and flow of news cycles affects the visibility of a campaign 
through an analysis of the level of discussion on Twitter. Using the commercial 
platform Sysomos MAP, I collected a dataset of 10,850 tweets. These were collected 
between April 16 2013 and May 28 2013, the dates between which the leadership 
actively worked on the campaign. Tweets were collected on the basis of a Boolean word 
search. By plotting these tweets on a timeline we can observe the events that triggered 
peaks in conversation. As shown in Figure 5.9, peaks in activity correlate with coverage 
from professional media. 
 
Figure 5.9. The volume of mentions of npower on Twitter during the “Big Tax Turnoff” 
campaign, 2013 
 
Note: Tweets were collected from April 16 to May 28, 2013 on the basis of a Boolean word search, as 
follows: npower AND (tax OR ‘tax dodging’ OR ‘tax-dodging’ OR 38degrees OR ‘38 Degrees’ OR 
‘38_degrees’ OR corporation OR taxes). This yielded 10,850 tweets in total. 
 
Six spikes in conversation volume are evident. The first spike correlates with the 
news coverage following Paul Massara’s admission to the Energy and Climate Change 
Committee that npower had not paid corporation tax between 2009 and 2011. Point two 
indicates the traffic generated by the movement's original e-petition. The third, much 
smaller, peak emerged from tweets and retweets from several well-connected activist 
accounts on Twitter, including The Artist Taxi Driver (McGowan, 2013), Fuel Poverty 
Action (Fuel Poverty Action, 2013), and UK Uncut (UK Uncut, 2013). These users 
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shared a story from the Guardian reporting that HMRC had hired a former director of 
npower, Volker Beckers, as a non-executive director (Macalister, 2013). The fourth 
peak followed the publication of the front-page feature in the Sun, based on the report 
commissioned by 38 Degrees. As David Babbs (Interview 7, June 2013) points out, 
exposure in widely read professional media is still an important campaign tactic: 
 
We knew that our main lever on that [npower] was to increase the cost of being 
tax dodgers in terms of their reputation. If you’re thinking what would their 
Director of Communications most freak out about, he or she is going to freak 
out more about a headline in the Sun than almost anything else. So that is why 
we are trying, as a staff team, to serve our members agenda by freaking out 
npower and making them consider other approaches to their tax affairs… I think 
this is a relevant campaigning tactic as long as those in power think that it is 
relevant, and those in power still think that old media is relevant. 
 
While digital technologies do provide more opportunities for non-elite intervention on 
public agendas, these opportunities often derive from relationships with established 
elites, such as political parties (Kreiss, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014) and professional 
news media (Chadwick, 2011). As such, if a news agenda moves on, it can reduce the 
visibility and the material impact of a campaign. 
This was evident with the movement's next tactic, as members who were also 
npower customers were encouraged to change their energy provider to a competitor. 
Despite some brief coverage in the Daily Mirror (Hiscott, 2013) and the Guardian 
(Brignall, 2013), and several attempts by the leadership to engage with journalists on 
Twitter (38 Degrees, 2013e; 2013f; 2013g), this did not trigger significant discussion 
amongst the wider public on the social networking site. Therefore, although the 
leadership did try to gain press attention using Twitter, this was not successful in this 
campaign. Here we see evidence of the limitations of the organisational management of 
digital micro-activism. The largest spikes in conversation on Twitter, illustrated in 
Figure 5.6, were shaped by professional media coverage. The leadership of 38 Degrees 
was only successful in influencing this when liaising with journalists privately; the 
front-page coverage followed private meetings between the central team and journalists 
at the Sun. This represents a more traditional campaign logic (McNair, 2007: 151-152). 
Whereas Twitter is used as a tool for direct action, Facebook is deployed by the 
leadership to support other forms of digital and real space activism. This, in itself, is not 
new. A number of studies have outlined how digital technologies can be used to support 
on the ground campaigning (Karpf, 2012a; Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Stromer-
Galley, 2014). However, what is unique about the way in which 38 Degrees use 
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Facebook is how it underpins structural transformations, as the membership displace the 
leadership's role in the design and implementation of campaign strategy. This second 
case study illustrates how the leadership use Facebook to enable fast repertoire 
switching mid-campaign, between online and offline spaces. 
The Health and Social Care Bill, which became law in 2012, radically 
overhauled local healthcare governance, as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Strategic 
Health Authorities—responsible for the design of local healthcare services—were 
replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). The bill enabled CCGs, formed of 
local GPs, to tender local health services to providers from the private sector. In 
response to member demand, 38 Degrees initially organised an e-petition. However, 
through further member communications and expert professional and legal advice, the 
leadership reshaped the spatial focus of the campaign. 
The central team used Facebook to assist a structural shift, moving from a 
nationally coordinated, digitally networked action to a local-level, real space 
mobilisation. Over 150 local groups were created that met face-to-face and were, 
crucially, semi-autonomous. Karpf (2012: 19) offers three distinct models to describe 
how netroots organisations use the internet to organise, two of which are evident in this 
case study. In the initial phase, when the membership was encouraged to fund an event 
with GPs (Jarvis, 2012a), to fund legal work (Limneos, 2012), and to sign a localised e-
petition (Jarvis, 2012c), a “hub and spokes model” was in use. Here, I observed a large 
amount of organisation-to-member communication between the small central staff and 
the large membership base. Members predominantly took part through web-based 
actions. As Adam (Interview 5, May 2013) notes, in this model “38 Degrees doesn’t 
exist in a real, touchable way.” Communication between members is mediated through 
their mobile devices, their computer screens, and their email clients.  
In contrast, the localised efforts reflect what Karpf (2012: 19) describes as a 
“neo-federated model,” “offering ‘online tools for offline action.’” Although the 
leadership used email to offer further informational resources, each group had control 
over their own campaign strategy. Facebook became the foundation for many of these 
local groups. For instance, the group formed to influence the Nottingham City CCG 
used the service to discuss strategy, organise local events, and arrange meetings with 
representatives from its local CCG.47 As such, Facebook acts as an organisational tool, 
enabling the movement to rapidly switch its structural form. 
                                                
47 For further information on the group in Nottingham, see: 
https://www.facebook.com/38DegreesNhsNottingham. 
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Nonetheless, this approach was not adopted by all of the local groups. Without 
organisational oversight, some adopted very different repertoires. In our interview 
“George,” a retired journalist, described how he oversaw the creation of a new regional 
network, Save Our NHS - West Midlands (Interview 15, August 2013).48 This group 
used a range of online services independent from those resources provided by the 
central office. These included a unique web space, a Yahoo! mailing list, and an e-
newsletter. Furthermore, the group also organised a number of action days, where it set 
up information points across Birmingham city centre to inform the public about the 
proposed changes to their local healthcare provision.  
However, this remarkable example of self-organisation is far from the norm. 
This campaign was successful because George, who became a de-facto leader, used the 
skills that he accrued during his career in journalism to design an innovative campaign 
strategy. There were also many examples of groups that failed to self-organise without 
the guidance of the leadership. The next section reflects on a service recently launched 
by 38 Degrees, where the absence of those with campaigning expertise restricts the 
development of campaigns. 
 
5.5 Campaigns By You: The Limitations of Self-Organising Networks 
 
Social media is not the primary means of communication within 38 Degrees. As 
Chadwick (2013: 190) argues, “email underpins everything.” Email has intuitive 
benefits over Facebook and Twitter, as all members use it as a means of 
communication; membership is defined by one’s inclusion on the group’s mailing list. It 
is also more trusted. Some of the activists with whom I spoke remain sceptical about 
how secure communications are on social media. “Jack,” a 56-year-old civil servant 
from London, has doubts about whether these services do enough to protect a user’s 
privacy (Interview 18, October 2013). However, although email provides the digital 
infrastructure for the movement, this wasn’t necessarily based on a decision made by 
the founding members. As Adam (Interview 5, May 2013) notes, the design of BSD 
may influence how 38 Degrees, as a netroots organisation, operates:   
                                                
48 For further information on Save Our NHS – West Midlands, see: http://www.saveournhs-wm.org.uk/. 
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BSD is our most important platform. BSD is very good at sending emails and 
managing big lists of members. A huge percentage of our technology 
management resources go into maintaining it. Therefore if BSD, by its design, 
handled and privileged the use of social media in a different way, it is possible 
that 38 Degrees would do social differently. Ultimately, BSD may lock in 
certain thoughts and behaviours amongst its users. 
 
Adam’s comments suggest that the emphasis on email within the movement is partially 
a by-product of the group’s use of BSD. This platform, chosen from a marketplace of 
providers, has an influence on campaign strategy. As the findings from research 
conducted by McKelvey and Piebiak (2014) suggest, this type of campaign software— 
and the technological affordances that they provide—shape the parameters of the 
political activism that can be undertaken by those groups that adopt them. This 
relationship was also evident during my observations of a new platform, Campaigns By 
You, launched by 38 Degrees in 2013. 
CBY enables individual members to set up their own campaigns on the 38 
Degrees website without the direction and input of the central staff. Although the 
leadership will occasionally offer their strategic expertise to those campaigns that gain 
significant levels of support across the membership (Interview 2, May 2013), the vast 
majority of these campaigns are examples of self-organising networks. In theory, the 
member(s) who set up each campaign has full autonomy over the framing of an issue, 
the organisational approach used, and the repertoire of actions deployed.  
CBY is based on a different back end platform to BSD, which is used to support 
the leader led campaigns previously discussed in this chapter. The back end used for 
CBY is Control Shift, a platform developed by campaigners at GetUp!, a hybrid 
mobilization movement based in Australia (Interview 2, May 2013). The leadership at 
38 Degrees implemented this back end following the successful trial of similar services 
by MoveOn and GetUp! The staff I interviewed hoped that the service could be used to 
expand the movement’s campaigning to the local level, encouraging members to run 
their own campaigns within their neighbourhoods (Interview 2; Interview 3, May 2013; 
Interview 7, June 2013). The design is purposefully granular so that members can use 
the service to easily set up and run their own petitions. As David Babbs (Interview 7, 
June 2013) reflects, CBY is what the leadership originally intended 38 Degrees to be in 
its pursuit of “people power”: 
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I actually wanted to build Campaigns By You pre-launch, back in 2009, but we 
didn’t have the resources then… For me, if you are in the business of giving 
people a voice and being the most effective vehicle possible for them, then, in 
the same way that offline we are seeing the power of letting people do their own 
thing, we should be doing the same online. 
 
One benefit of diffusing power away from the leadership is that members can bring 
fresh perspective to campaign strategy. 
During my time observing the movement, Tom Woolley, an illustrator and 38 
Degrees member from Bradford, took to CBY to start a petition against proposed cuts to 
the annual funding of the Science Museum Group. This formed part of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government's comprehensive spending 
review. Given the suggested reduction in funding, it was anticipated that one of the 
three museums managed by the group would have to close; the most likely option being 
the National Media Museum in Bradford (BBC News, 2013). The petition reached over 
36,000 signatures and the proposed cuts were shelved. In part, the petition’s success 
was a result of an innovative campaign strategy on Twitter. Tom set up a dedicated 
Twitter account, @savenmem (Save NMeM, 2014), to lobby local celebrities, such as 
the controversial politician George Galloway (2013), and the famed British actor John 
Hurt (2013). However, this innovative campaign was a result of Tom’s role as a 
“leader,” as he drew upon his own marketing and design expertise to craft a visually 
compelling, social strategy. 
If one delves beyond the featured campaigns on the CBY homepage, which the 
leadership will often adopt as their own, and offer extensive support to (Interview 2, 
May 2013), there are hundreds of dormant actions.49 These range from 15 students 
angry about proposed revisions to the current GCSE grading system (Vasey, 2015), a 
few hundred members outraged by the size of the models featured in the brochure of a 
popular high-street retailer (Aliwell, 2015), and almost 8,000 supporters who are 
lobbying the Queen for another general election due to alleged electoral fraud by the 
Conservatives (Middleton, 2015). These three examples illustrate the problems facing 
CBY. Firstly, the service is prone to trivial or reactionary campaigns that jeopardise the 
legitimacy of the movement; as setting up a petition on the service is a low-threshold 
task. Secondly, as the first two examples illustrate, those campaigns on very serious 
topics often struggle to gain momentum. 
                                                
49 For example, see https://home.38degrees.org.uk/campaigns/?types[]=campaignsbyyou.  
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There are two reasons for this. Firstly, just as the technological affordances of 
BSD create the template for leader led campaigns, Control Shift locks members into 
certain behaviours and campaign norms. For the minority of the group’s membership 
who have the necessary skills to run a political campaign, this platform can restrain their 
efforts. I spoke to a handful of members, informally, during a demonstration held at 
Parliament Square in October 2013.50 They told me that the limitations of CBY 
prevented them from doing more. Instead, they had been forced offline, organising real 
space actions in their local area that used the movement’s identity but had no form of 
affiliation or communication with the central office. Requiring members to move to 
other services to develop their campaign goes against the granular activism that the 
movement strives for.51 
Other members that I interviewed, who had used CBY, felt that the tools 
provided were similar to those offered by Change.Org, a for-profit petition website on 
which political groups and individual users can create their own petitions (Interview 9, 
May 2013; Interview 19, October 2013). This comparison is a fair one, given that CBY 
is, at its core, a platform for user generated e-petitions. “Anna” (Interview 2, May 
2013), the staff member leading the development of CBY, recognises the limitations of 
the platform: 
 
At the moment, petitions sites like CBY and Change[.org] are similar in that 
they are really email capture points. You can put in your name, share it, and then 
someone can email you. That is really all you can do. Obviously, there is a 
whole bunch of stuff that you might want to do to run your campaign. 
 
Anna’s comments allude to a further restriction, as those who set up a petition on CBY 
do not have access to the full list of members’ email addresses. Users must collate their 
own mailing list by sharing their petition with wider networks. Although the central 
team plan to address a number of these limitations by expanding the tools provided to 
those using the service (Interview 2; Interview 3, May 2013; Interview 7, June 2013), 
this presupposes that those members starting a campaign have the required skill-sets to 
use these new tools effectively.  
Secondly, many of the group’s successes are, at least partially, a result of 
effective lobbying from those with campaigning expertise. The organisational 
                                                
50 This demonstration was organised as part of the movement’s opposition to the Transparency of 
Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill. The members I spoke to wish 
to remain anonymous. 
51 This also poses further questions for the slacktivist critique, as examples of slacktivism may be a result 
of the limitations of the technologies provided, rather than a consequence of the attitudes of those taking 
part. 
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management of digital micro-activism brings together the experience and judgment of a 
handful of hardened activists with large groups of loosely connected citizens, who use 
mundane technologies to set the overall priorities of the movement. When these leaders 
are removed, many members do not have the experience to bring about effective 
campaigns. Anna (Interview 2, May 2013) expressed these reservations in our 
interview, asking whether it was truly feasible for someone—who may never have been 
involved in political activism in any form—to start a campaign, and possess all of the 
required informational resources and organisational expertise to have success. In this 
context Morozov (2011: 194) is right; “not everyone can be Che Guevara.” 
As McNair (2007: 157) notes, many pressure groups are resource poor, 
compelling them to act creatively in order to shape public debate or influence the policy 
making process. Campaigners and lobbyists will spend much of their careers cultivating 
a set of contacts, which may include politicians, journalists, and those in professions 
deemed useful to their advocacy. These connections are then drawn upon in appropriate 
circumstances, i.e. when they have the most strategic significance. These attributes 
describe the opposite of what 38 Degrees, as a movement, stands for. The archetypal 
member is not a professional lobbyist but a citizen trying to maintain an interest and an 
active involvement in politics alongside other commitments within everyday life. 
Without leaders strategically managing the use of these low-threshold tools, 52  a 
substantial proportion of those campaigns started on CBY fulfil the slacktivist critique. 
 
5.6 Conclusion: The Organisational Management of Digital Micro-Activism  
 
This chapter explores the relationship between the routine use of social media and 
political participation in an activist context. I selected 38 Degrees as the focus of my 
ethnography due to the characteristics of the group’s membership. As Wood (1996: 1-2) 
notes, the costs of activism tend to mean that those small numbers who get involved are 
devoted to a particular cause. Typical 38 Degrees members do not fit this description. 
On first glance, they appear to possess the defining characteristics of a “slacktivist,” as 
members share evidence of their actions on Facebook and Twitter by way of self-
gratification. Moreover, the actions designed by the leadership often require very little 
                                                
52 This is not to say that self-organising networks can never result in effective political movements. 38 
Degrees differ from what Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 46-48) describe as “crowd-enabled connective 
action,” those movements that are organised predominantly by the crowd without the presence of formal 
organisations. Those involved in the Occupy protests in the US or the Indignados in Spain tend to 
develop stronger bonds than those within a hybrid mobilization movement, and the depth of one’s 
commitment in these protest causes tends to be higher. 
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from those involved. However, by embedding myself within the movement, and by 
contextualising the behaviours derided as slacktivism within the group’s broader 
campaign strategies, the findings from this chapter suggest that these low-threshold 
behaviours amount to more than just banal self-expression. Instead, in what I describe 
as the organisational management of digital micro-activism, the leadership deploys 
these mundane tools in political contexts in which they are still symbolically 
empowering but where they also have material impact (EF3; EF4).  
A number of studies have outlined the ways in which digital media challenge the 
established logics and norms of organisational politics (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; 
Beyer, 2014; Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Chadwick, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2012; 
Karpf, 2012a). The findings from this chapter contribute to these developments by 
analysing how these organisational level innovations lead to new opportunities for 
engagement at the individual level. As part of the free-rider theory, in which citizens 
seek the benefits of collective action without incurring the costs associated with their 
engagement, Olson (1971) sets out a number of obstacles facing involvement in 
organisational politics. These include: (1) the lack of non-elite influence within rigid 
hierarchies, (2) the individual level costs associated with participation, and, (3) the 
difficulties of forming a collective identity that is inclusive of the divergent personal 
preferences of a large membership. The leadership of 38 Degrees seeks to circumvent 
these three hurdles through the strategic use of low-effort forms of micro-activism.  
Firstly, the staff uses digital technologies to provide opportunities for members 
to shape and influence campaign strategy. The low-threshold functionality on social 
media facilitates feedback loops, through which individual members can meaningfully 
influence the direction of the group. As some, but by no means all, of the group’s 
membership feel comfortable expressing themselves on the service, Facebook provides 
the leadership with a means of surveying members’ priorities throughout each 
campaign. 
Secondly, by reducing the individual level costs associated with participation, 
the leadership attempts to make campaigning more granular. The staff offer a variety of 
ways to take part in each campaign: these include a range of more intense forms of 
participation, as members select their level of involvement based on their personal 
context. The central team uses forms of digital micro-activism to offer democratic 
shortcuts for time-poor citizens throughout the campaign process, from conception to 
action.  
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Facebook and Twitter are important sites of activation, in which interest or 
passion for an issue begins or is strengthened. Members rely on the group’s social 
media accounts as a source of information for topics ignored by professional news 
media. As such, the leadership provides informational shortcuts to an alternative 
agenda. This provides evidence to support Chadwick’s (2012) model of by-product 
learning and accidental exposure, as citizens become aware of political issues through 
their day-to-day use of social networking sites (EF1).  
By using Facebook and Twitter regularly in non-political contexts, members 
become familiarised to the way in which these services work. As forms of social media 
become more widely diffused, members develop a set of skills and competencies that 
can be drawn upon by the central team in its design of campaign actions. As Adam 
(Interview 5, May 2013) notes, social networking sites provide ideal platforms for 
granular forms of engagement as “we don’t have to teach our members how to use the 
technologies.” However, Facebook and Twitter perform very different functions within 
these action repertoires, with evidence of a service-specific logic. Facebook is used as 
an organisational tool for further real space and digital action. The latent skills that users 
develop by routinely using the service enable the central team to diffuse responsibility 
for the design of campaigns to ordinary members, so that they can coordinate their own 
local campaigns. By comparison, Twitter is used for public-political digital actions, as 
members lobby elites, either as a means of generating public attention or as a direct 
means of influencing elected representatives and commercial targets.  
In summary, these opportunities appeal to members of the group as they lack the 
same time investment as they would do in a face-to-face setting but they still offer what 
actualizing citizens want from their political participation; influence and tangible 
efficacy. 
Thirdly, the leadership uses flexible political messages that can be personalised 
by those involved. Facebook provides a space in which users can customise and share 
personal action frames (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), reflecting on their own 
experiences and forming weak tie connections in the process (EF5). Gerbaudo (2012: 
10) and Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 36) offer two very different interpretations of the 
type of bonds that are fostered by social media in contemporary popular movements, the 
former outlining their value in forming a collective identity amongst a group, while 
Bennett and Segerberg argue that digital media facilitate diverse, individualised identity 
frames. Although 38 Degrees represents a very different type of organisation to the 
mass mobilisations featured in their research, the group is unique in the sense that it 
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adopts elements of both. While citizens initially identify through personal identity, a 
collective identity is developed on the back of the connections formed with other like-
minded citizens. 
This process is integral to the organisational form of the hybrid mobilization 
movement given the conditions of membership. Members are loosely connected to the 
movement, as individuals pick and choose the issue campaigns to which they relate. In 
this way, they reflect the standby citizen model (Amnå and Ekman, 2014). Members are 
not actively engaged within the movement at all times, but passively monitor the 
information provided by the leadership, waiting for an issue that they identify with. This 
personalisation suggests that involvement is not inauthentic, but based on those issues 
that a member deems to be important. These issues were diverse, and at times 
contradictory, as I discovered during my uneasy observation of the members meal. 
However, based on the interviews that I conducted I did not doubt their sincerity, as 
many were involved in campaign actions in which they would not personally benefit 
from the desired outcome(s). As a result of this pursuit of individual autonomy, 
members share the characteristics of the actualizing citizen (Bennett, 2008). Once 
activated, these participants may use Facebook and Twitter to learn more about an issue, 
influence campaign strategy, and share evidence of their actions. These personally 
expressive behaviours blur the lines between consumption and production, as self-
expression can mobilise wider networks. However, unlike in Bennett’s (2008) original 
hypotheses, all of those members with whom I spoke, irrespective of their age, 
displayed attributes of this attitudinal logic (e.g. Interview 15, August 2013). 
In conclusion, the organisational management of digital micro-activism has 
significant implications when we consider the slacktivist critique. Integral to the critique 
is the claim that low-threshold digital interactions have no material impact; they do not 
form a link to institutional decision making or the policy making process (Couldry, 
2012: 123). However, by designing campaign actions that are granular, and by using 
technologies that are widely diffused amongst their membership, the leadership 
provides a bridge between digital micro-activism and sites of power (EF4). To achieve 
the policy change that the movement needs for its legitimacy, leaders are required who 
understand the established norms, and hierarchies, of political campaigning. While this 
tactic may seem undemocratic, or even old-fashioned, when compared to accounts of 
leaderless movements, the process taken in formulating these actions is anything but. 
Rank and file members are making the important decisions, not the staff based in 
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London. Although the levers of power remain the same, those who operate them, and 
the means by which they do so, are unique.  
Without the expertise of the group’s leaders, this political behaviour does 
resemble the slacktivist critique, as shown in the discussion of CBY. While this may be 
the case in an activist context, what about everyday life? How do social media users 
make sense of political information without the guidance of editors? Are the opinions of 
users shaped by new influencers online? The next chapter explores of how a group of 
digitally active citizens use Facebook and Twitter across the continuum of participation. 
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6. Media Diaries: Exploring the Day-to-Day Use of Social 
Media by Citizens 
 
This chapter examines how 29 digitally active citizens use social media within their 
day-to-day lives. By drawing on a mixed-method research design, in which evidence of 
citizen behaviour on Facebook and Twitter is contextualised with interviews and 
reflective weekly diary entries collected over three months, I analyse the extent to 
which the routine use of Facebook and Twitter affects political engagement.53 Despite 
some evidence to support the slacktivist critique, in terms of the lack of instrumentalist 
action undertaken by participants during the diary period, this chapter offers evidence to 
contest the critique.  
Firstly, the diaries suggest that media habits at the individual level are 
personalised, and considerably more complex than the assumed behavioural traits 
offered in the slacktivist critique; even amongst the most active social media users, no 
diarist relied exclusively on social media for their political information. This 
individualisation complements changes in the way citizens consume news, as 
participants use a range of media to shape the information they receive around issues 
that they have a longstanding interest in. Despite these findings, the diaries found no 
evidence to suggest that this personalisation invariably leads to harmful audience 
fragmentation, suggesting instead that collective exposure and shared experience still 
exist (EF1).  
Secondly, by observing the different ways in which the diarists use social media, 
this chapter offers a typology of citizen roles in social media environments that 
challenges both the attitudinal and behavioural logics that sustain the slacktivist 
critique. “Civic instigators” and “contributors,” those participants who most closely 
represent slacktivists, engage in self-expression and digital micro-activism by way of 
refining and honing their own political identity. They are also more likely to engage in 
instrumentalist forms of political action, a rejection of the substitution thesis. However, 
the expected findings of this thesis are also challenged, as social networking sites do not 
invoke a self-expressive logic by virtue of their design (EF2; EF3). The majority of 
participants in this research were “listeners,” using social media to consume political 
information but refraining from public forms of expression. Instead, they take to private 
spaces to discuss politics, either online or face-to-face. They resemble Amnå and 
                                                
53 For further information on the methodology and the sampling frame used, please see Appendix B.  
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Ekman’s (2014: 262) standby citizen model, as participants keep themselves informed 
about politics by bringing up political issues in everyday life contexts and are willing 
and able to participate if needed. When listeners do undertake acts of digital micro-
activism they are not easy, low-threshold behaviours, but painstakingly deliberated over 
with the real and imagined audience in mind. For instance, sharing an e-petition on 
Facebook and Twitter has a high cognitive load given the reputational dynamics of 
social media. As such, the slacktivist critique may actually exacerbate disengagement 
online, as the more credibility and use the term gains, the more deeply rooted these 
inhibitions may become. 
Finally, a service-specific logic exists that guides behaviour on Facebook and 
Twitter. For most diarists, Facebook is deemed to be a social space, one in which they 
are willing to consume political information but are reluctant to use for self-expression 
themselves. Meanwhile Twitter is perceived to be a service designed for sharing news 
and suited to thoughtful forms of political expression. 
 
6.1 Access: Personalisation, Fragmentation and Collective Exposure on Social 
Media 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the research design for this study extends the methodology used 
by Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2010) in Media Consumption and Public 
Engagement: Beyond the Presumption of Attention. Undertaken between February and 
July 2004, their research illustrates the nuanced relationship between media use at the 
micro-level and levels of political knowledge and engagement. Just over a decade later, 
the public’s media habits have changed immeasurably. For example, in their study just 
four of the 21 diarists used the internet as a source of news (Couldry, Livingstone and 
Markham, 2010: 98). In this research 19 of the 26 participants who completed their 
diary use online media as their primary source of news, as shown in Figure 6.1.54 
Although the extent of this shift is somewhat indicative of the sampling frame used,55 
Ofcom’s (2014: 27) annual survey of media use in Britain found that over half (54 
                                                
54 In total, 30 participants were originally recruited. Four diarists withdrew from the study prior to 
completion. Of those four, Alan, Christian, and Ron gave permission for their partially completed diaries 
to be included in the research, contributing five, six, and seven entries respectively. As a result, none of 
these diarists took part in the exit survey. Please see Chapter 4 for further information on the research 
design. 
55 Those recruited for this study resemble the type of citizen identified by the slacktivist critique. As such, 
there was an overrepresentation of participants who use Facebook and Twitter. See Appendix B1 for 
further details of the sampling frame used.  
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percent) of the general public now use the internet to access news. These changes pose 
new questions about the type of news that users are exposed to online, and whether 
these new sources of information impact how citizens perceive public issues. 
 
Figure 6.1. During the diary period where did you get the majority of your news from? 
 
 
There was great variety in the sources that diarists turn to for news, as 
participants often combined digital sources with traditional mediums as part of their 
daily routines. As we may expect, the digital versions of a number of professional 
media outlets were very popular. Almost every diarist (26) accessed BBC News Online 
in some form, with “Angela,” “Danny,” and “Sam” all observing that the BBC was their 
first port of call for the latest updates on current affairs. The Mail Online, the digital 
arm of the British newspaper the Daily Mail, was also frequently mentioned in the 
diaries (42 references), albeit in a slightly different context. Both “Christian” (entry 1; 
2) and “Marco” (entry 6) found that links to the website were often posted on social 
media as a reaction to the content itself, and it is this controversy that drives their 
attention. Others, like “Andrea” and “Joshua,” visit the Mail Online for its showbiz 
coverage, described by “Abbey” as the “sidebar of shame” (entry 5). Rather than 
consulting the website for hard news, browsing the site was deemed to be a form of 
procrastination. 
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A number of diarists also used digital publishers. One such provider was Vice 
News, an international news organisation that specialises in broadcasting investigative 
documentaries online. Andrea (entry 11), a university student from the South East, 
visits the website to maintain an interest in stories that she felt did not receive adequate 
exposure in more traditional sources; those issues that are “a bit out of the norm.” 
Likewise, “Liz” (entry 9) likes how the site’s coverage blends political content with 
entertainment. Vice News were not the only new media organisation to be used by 
diarists during the study. Across the sample, entries also reflected on stories published 
by BuzzFeed (Charlie, entry 11; Louise, entry 12; Mallory, entry 11) and the Huffington 
Post (Abbey, entry 4; Amy, entry 12; Madeline, entry 1). Although some diarists did 
visit these sites directly, the majority were accidentally exposed to these digital 
publishers on social media. 
Other participants populated their Facebook news feed and, more commonly, 
their Twitter feed with niche content by subscribing to updates from activists, 
journalists, and politicians. Marco, who has Lithuanian heritage, often discussed and re-
shared tweets on foreign policy from Rolandas Kacinskas, a Lithuanian diplomat with 
over 24,000 followers on Twitter (Kacinskas, 2015).56 Similarly, “Oliver” frequently 
reflected on Facebook updates from Mark McGowan in his weekly entries, an activist 
more commonly known as “The Artist Taxi Driver” (McGowan, 2015). In this way, 
diarists were able to personalise their news consumption through forms of social media. 
The changing norms of news consumption online form part of the slacktivist 
critique, suggesting that users identify with emotive issues that gain traction on social 
media at the expense of more deserving concerns (H3). Furthermore, this personalisation 
corresponds with wider concerns about audience fragmentation in political 
communication, in which a lack of agreement over what constitutes public issues may 
threaten societal bonds that are essential to a democracy (Sunstein, 2007: 6). 
In order to explore the effects of news personalisation, an analysis was 
undertaken of the issues included in the weekly diary entries between November 2, 
2013, and February 15, 2014. These issues were coded and cumulative values were 
calculated for all of the active diarists in a given week. These values were then weighted 
to account for the fluctuation in the number of active diarists from week-to-week. The 
two most frequently mentioned news items from each week were plotted onto a timeline 
to demonstrate the relative prominence of news items amongst the sample, as shown in 
Figure 6.2. A second timeline was created to compare the relative prominence of news 
                                                
56 Follower count correct as of February 12, 2015. 
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items in the diaries with those in four major British newspapers during the same time 
period, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.57 The front pages of the Daily Mail, the Guardian, 
the Sun, and the Times were coded over the same 16-week period and weighted values 
were calculated to look for evidence of issue fragmentation.58 
                                                
57 Please see Appendix B6 for an overview of how I coded the diaries and calculated the weighted values 
for both timelines. 
58 These four sources were selected following the design offered by Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 
(2010: 22). 
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There was some overlap between the two most frequently mentioned issues 
within the diaries and the front page coverage. For example, in the week ending 
November 23, the alleged use of illegal drugs by former Co-op bank chairman Paul 
Flowers was featured most frequently in the diaries (10.57) and on the front pages of the 
four newspapers (30). Likewise, in the week ending December 4, Michael 
Schumacher’s skiing accident featured prominently in both. However, with only 25 
percent of the issues mentioned in the diaries corresponding with those leading the four 
newspapers over the 16-week period, there was significant deviation.59 Furthermore, as 
the comparatively low weighted values on Figure 6.2 illustrate, there was less issue 
homogeneity in the weekly diary entries than in the press coverage. 
Participants would often reflect on those issues that they deemed to be important 
to them on a personal level. “Simon,” a student studying Economics based in the South 
East, was passionate about the rights of citizens online. He closely followed the leaks 
from the former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward Snowden, 
relating the revelations of the American government’s extensive surveillance 
programme to his own concerns about online privacy (entry 1; 2; 7; 8). Abbey, a clerical 
worker based in the East Midlands, focused on news items relating to women’s rights, 
including reflections on abortion law (entry 1), media coverage of rape and sexual 
assault (entry 4), and a demeaning Facebook page in which users submit provocative 
photos of women (entry 5). In pursuing these interests, diarists prioritise issues that 
relate to their own personal political identity. 
Does this selective exposure lead to harmful audience fragmentation, or, worse 
still, political ignorance? This study shows that, despite evidence of nuanced 
personalisation at the micro-level, there are still moments of collective exposure; certain 
events triggered attention across the sample. As Figure 6.4 illustrates, four examples of 
collective exposure can be identified. These news items are as follows: the Newsnight 
interview between the comedian-turned-activist Russell Brand and the journalist Jeremy 
Paxman; Typhoon Haiyan, the deadliest Philippine typhoon recorded in modern history; 
the death of Nelson Mandela; and a period of severe weather in Britain in early 2014, in 
particular the flooding of the River Thames in the South West of England. 
                                                
59 Some of this deviation can be explained by how participants perceived the purpose of the diary project. 
This is discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2. 
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By comparing Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 it is evident that three of the four events 
that triggered collective attention amongst the diarists correlate with the front page news 
coverage. As such, the fear that social media exacerbates fragmentation seems to be 
unfounded in this study, as the diarists still share common experiences. Although it 
could be argued that a survey methodology would be better suited to exploring audience 
fragmentation, the self-reflection within the diaries provides a basis to investigate how 
participants envisage and understand these public issues. Rather than simply observing 
collective exposure, I examine two of these news items in detail to ascertain whether 
interpretation varies depending on the source of information. 
On December 5, 2013, Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected 
President of South Africa, died. Given Mandela’s imprisonment and subsequent 
influence on reconciling post-apartheid South Africa, his death was keenly felt around 
the world. Nelson Mandela’s passing was the most discussed topic in this study, as 23 
participants mentioned this event at some point during their diary. Interest in this event 
was sustained by the state funeral held on December 15, 2013, and the subsequent 
scandal that surrounded the sign language interpreter at the funeral and a “selfie” taken 
by the President of the United States, Barack Obama, the Prime Minister of Denmark, 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David 
Cameron.60  
As with an event of this nature, diarists first learnt of the news in a number of 
different ways: “Claudia,” “Will” and Danny were informed of the news face-to-face; 
Andrea, “Charlie,” Oliver, Liz, “Matt,” and Christian learnt of the news on social 
media; “Cathy” overheard the news on the radio; Sam watched the breaking coverage 
on TV; and “Leo” received a message on WhatsApp. Such diversity in communication 
channels is not new when one factors in the different forms of interpersonal discussion 
available in past media systems (Norris, 2000). However, the information sources that 
are consulted after this initial point of exposure do illuminate unique behavioural shifts. 
After learning of the news at her work’s Christmas party, Claudia (entry 6) then 
consulted BBC News Online and took to Twitter to follow subsequent updates. 
“Madeline” (entry 8) switched her focus away from online news websites and turned to 
the ongoing coverage on the BBC News Channel while simultaneously reflecting on the 
news with her Mum over the phone. Christian (entry 4), who first learnt of Mandela’s 
death on Facebook, immediately referred to a news website by way of verification: 
                                                
60 A “selfie” is a photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically taken with a smartphone or other 
portable device. 
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The first news I heard of his death was via Facebook. I quickly checked the 
BBC news website to verify its authenticity, I have seen numerous posts 
claiming that people have died when they haven't… Shortly after reading about 
his death on Facebook I received a notification on my iPhone from the BBC 
app, stating that Nelson Mandela, “the first black president and anti-apartheid 
icon” had died. I followed the link and watched a short video about his life, his 
imprisonment, and his achievements. Important to note that I still found out 
about this event via social media first, the news just slips in! 
 
Charlie (pre-diary interview) expressed a similar sentiment in reference to Twitter: “it’s 
probably where I find out about most things first and then I’ll go over and look at it in 
more detail on another website, another news website.” Two themes emerge from these 
examples. Firstly, users can become exposed to news as a by-product of using Facebook 
and Twitter, just as they can learn of news accidentally through other real space social 
settings. Secondly, the routines that diarists use to validate and understand current 
events are intrinsically personalised, both in terms of the tools used to access 
information and the level of trust placed in a particular form of media. 
Despite this diversity, the way that diarists understand and give meaning to 
events was remarkably similar irrespective of what form of media they relied upon. For 
example, for most diarists the events acted as a learning experience regardless of the 
medium used to access information. Abbey (entry 6) and “Deborah” (entry 8) 
commented on Mandela’s life, and how they weren’t aware of the significance of his 
role in providing democratic rights to the citizens of South Africa. Others, such as 
Angela (entry 7), Danny (entry 7), and Matt (entry 7), used the event to reflect on the 
inequalities still rife in South Africa today.  
A number of diarists also discussed the way in which death should be treated in 
mediatised spaces. Angela (entry 9), Cathy (entry 5), and Sam (entry 9) posed questions 
of the appropriateness of the live TV coverage of Mandela’s funeral, citing the need for 
privacy for his family and loved ones. Others, like Oliver (entry 7), were critical of the 
public displays of grief by on Facebook. Joshua (entry 8), a recruiter from the East 
Midlands, complained that people were simply “jumping on the bandwagon” despite 
lacking any real knowledge of the significance of Mandela’s life. Similarly, Abbey 
(entry 6) felt her networked contacts were posting updates on the service to gain 
reputational benefits: 
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It felt a little like a competition as to who could let everyone know that they 
found out first.  I understand its human nature to express sadness when someone 
dies, but why must people do it so publicly… The way social media is making 
people attention-hungry oversharers pains me.  Live your life for you, not a 
virtual thumbs up. 
 
Despite diarists reflecting on specific forms of media in relation to Mandela's passing, 
the substance of their reactions were alike. Therefore, the information source seemingly 
had little bearing on how participants interpreted the event itself. For all intents and 
purposes, this event shares the same civic qualities as those that occurred in an era of 
relative media scarcity. 
One event that triggered reflection across the sample but did not correlate with 
the front page coverage was the interview between Russell Brand and Jeremy Paxman 
on the BBC current affairs programme Newsnight. Undertaken following public interest 
in Brand’s comments on voting in the British political magazine the New Statesman 
(Brand, 2014: 19), the interview marked his first steps into political campaigning. The 
interview covered a number of topics, most controversially Brand’s call for a 
“revolution” and a rejection of traditional political structures. 61  Unlike the other 
moments of collective exposure, only the Guardian (06/11/2013) featured the interview 
on their front page during the period of analysis. This lack of press coverage can be 
partially explained by the fact the interview itself took place prior to the start of this 
analysis, originally broadcast on October 23, 2013. Even so, the presence of this event 
across much of the sample over a week after its transmission suggests that this 
represents a qualitatively different kind of common experience. 
This case exemplifies what Chadwick (2013) describes as hybrid media logic, in 
which older and newer media logics interact and cross-fertilise in unpredictable ways. 
The momentum of this story was helped by a response to the interview from the actor 
Robert Webb (2013), who took issue with Brand for actively dissuading young people 
from voting. However, Facebook and Twitter also played a key role in generating, 
sustaining, and transforming the controversy over the weeks that followed. As Figure 
6.4 indicates, the interview had the longest life-span of any event within the diaries, 
featuring as one of the two most frequently mentioned news items for three consecutive 
weeks. It is noteworthy that, of the 13 participants who discussed this news item in their 
diaries, not a single one watched the interview when it when originally broadcast. 
Instead, all bar one diarist watched the interview on YouTube, with the video becoming 
                                                
61 The interview can be watched in full here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YR4CseY9pk.  
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one of the most watched on YouTube in Britain in 2013.62 “Annabeth” (entry 1), 
Charlie (entry 1), Christian (entry 1), Leo (entry 3), Madeline (entry 2), and Oliver 
(entry 1) were all exposed to the video by a networked contact sharing the video on 
their Facebook news feed. As Oliver (entry 1) observed, “I would not have seen the 
Brand interview were it not for Facebook.” As such, in comparison to the last case 
study, social media becomes more than just a vehicle for diffusing those issues 
determined to be on the public agenda by professional news media; Facebook and 
Twitter can bring alternative issues to collective consciousness. Although the video 
originated on broadcast television, its purpose was adapted and transformed by those 
sharing it. 
These moments emerge and are sustained, in part, due to the technological 
affordances and associated discursive norms on Facebook and Twitter. What 
differentiates this event to those that overlapped with the newspaper coverage was the 
response of the diarists; six took to Facebook to express their opinions on the subject 
matter, the largest number to do so in reaction to an event during the project.63 
Annabeth, “Joe,” Madeline, Matt, and Oliver all shared or re-shared the YouTube video, 
as shown in Figure 6.5. “Thomas” took a different approach, posting his criticism of 
Brand’s stance on voting.  
The video resulted in wide-ranging reflections within the diaries. A number of 
participants felt that the interview was significant in shedding light on alternative 
political attitudes for a wider audience, be that new forms of participation (Madeline, 
entry 2), objections to party politics (Will, entry 2), or that voter apathy can represent a 
form of resistance in its own right (Simon, entry 2). Others debated the relative value of 
Brand’s status as a celebrity. Charlie (entry 1) observed that celebrities have a 
distinctive power to generate interest in politics for those citizens who would not 
normally engage with political issues, and thus serve an important educative role. By 
her own admission, Annabeth (entry 1), a student from Sheffield, has little interest in 
politics, but she also felt compelled to explore the issues raised in the interview. As 
such, Brand’s profile did seem to be an important factor in understanding the 
widespread interest in this story. As Joe (entry 7) observes, “If I see any stories on him, 
or anything orientated with his thoughts on politics, I will generally click on it and 
read.” Some diarists were less complimentary. By using terms like revolution without 
                                                
62 As of February 2015, the video has 10,830,442 views. Thomas watched the video on the BBC News 
website. 
63 Further information on the issues that triggered public and semi-public reactions are included in Table 
6.7. 
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any precision, “Alan” (entry 1) felt Brand was “out of his depth.” Christian (entry 1) 
took issue with his attempt to be both funny and serious at the same time; “I wish he 
would make a serious point without the need to ‘Brandify’ and speak so flamboyantly 
for dramatic effect.” Finally, following Robert Webb’s rebuttal, a number of diarists 
took to Facebook to debate the relative merits of voting. Thomas offered a robust 
defence (entry 1), while Oliver (entry 2) offered a critique of what he felt was an 
outdated form of democratic engagement. 
 
Figure 6.5. Facebook posts from diarists reflecting on Russell Brand's interview on 
Newsnight, 2013 
Note: Any information that could be used to identify the participants in this study has been removed.  
 
In this way, this case study reflects Bennett’s (2008) actualizing logic, as the lines 
between consumption and production become blurred; diarists moved seamlessly 
between watching the interview and moments of self-expression. However, as I will 
illustrate in the next section, these expressive behaviours were not representative of the 
general habits of the Facebook and Twitter users in this study.  
These findings suggest that the diarists balance individually driven news 
consumption with an awareness of news and current affairs more generally, as moments 
of collective exposure still occur. This personalisation did not correlate with the degree 
to which a participant uses Facebook and/or Twitter, or any kind of media preferences, 
but was illustrative of a wider attitudinal trend (Dalton, 2008; Giddens, 1991; Norris, 
2011). Even “Arnold”, one of the two diarists who did not use either service, still 
offered highly personalised entries, relating current affairs to his involvement with a 
local community group. As Table 6.1 illustrates, personalisation was evident across 
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much of the sample. Those who did not personalise their entries tended to offer 
comment on those news stories that featured in professional news media. 
 
Table 6.1. Evidence of personalisation within the diaries 
Pseudonym Evidence of personalisation Personal orientation 
Leo Yes Banking and financial (work) 
Claudia Yes Education (work) 
Madeline Yes Health; Ukraine (diaspora) 
Angela Yes Charity sector (work) 
Sam No N/A 
Will Yes Technology (work) 
Deborah Yes Banking and financial (work); Ukraine (diaspora) 
Joshua No N/A 
Charlie Yes Environment (issue-based) 
Annabeth Yes Issues relating to university course (work) 
Louise Yes 
China (diaspora); issues relating to university course 
(work) 
Danny Yes Banking and financial (work) 
Oliver Yes Activism (issue-based) 
Joe Yes University course (work) 
Abbey Yes 
Environment (issue-based); women's rights (issue-
based) 
Liz Yes Human rights (issue-based) 
Thomas No N/A 
Zoey Yes Charity sector (work); welfare (issue-based) 
Andrea Yes Issues relating to university course (work) 
Marco Yes 
Lithuania (diaspora); politics in third spaces (music; 
TV; video games) 
Matt Yes Ideological orientation (socialism) 
Mallory Yes Denmark (diaspora); Environment (issue-based) 
Arnold Yes Community group (group-based) 
Simon Yes Human rights (issue-based); Romania (diaspora) 
Cathy Yes Local government (work) 
Amy Yes Charity sector (work) 
 
As Tewksbury and Rittenberg (2012: 161) highlight, this is not a new phenomenon; 
individuals have seemingly always brought their own sentiments to news consumption, 
but what has changed is their capacity to select and filter content.  
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This suggests that there are two types of personalisation at work. Table 6.2 
shows the frequency of mentions for terms that relate to political parties and key 
parliamentary figures. Not one of these terms, which many would traditionally associate 
with politics, featured within the 100 most frequently used terms in the diaries. For 
instance, Russell Brand had more mentions (73) than the Coalition Government (65). 
This is surprising given the remit of this research. It illustrates the issue fragmentation 
evident across the sample. Diarists personalised their news consumption around those 
issues that relate to their personal identity. Secondly, there was evidence of a personal 
orientation to current affairs, in which participants commented on popular news items 
through a personalised frame of reference. As Table 6.2 shows, the frequency of 
mentions of the Coalition Government, David Cameron, and the Labour Party were 
relatively high. This was because participants would frame discussions of policy, or 
proposed policy in the case of the Labour Party, through a personal frame of reference. I 
argue this is not narcissistic, as considering one’s own personal circumstances often 
acted as the starting point for much broader political reflection. 
 
Table 6.2. Word frequency table - mentions of political parties and key parliamentary 
figures in the diaries 
Term Search terms Frequency 
Coalition "Coalition"; "Government" 65 
David Cameron "Cameron"; "PM"; "Prime" 47 
Labour Party "Labour" 29 
Ed Miliband "Ed"; "Miliband"; "Milliband" 20 
Nigel Farage "Farage" 13 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) "UKIP" 11 
Conservative Party "Conservative";  "Tories"; "Torys" 8 
Ed Balls "Balls" 7 
George Osborne "George"; "Osborne"; "Chancellor" 6 
Liberal Democrats "Liberal"; "Dems" 5 
Michael Gove "Gove" 5 
Nick Clegg "Clegg"; "Cleggy"; "Nick" 5 
Green Party "Green" 0 
Note: All words had a minimum of three letters. 
 
This personalisation, coupled with the four examples of collective exposure, is 
indicative of a passive form of citizenship. As “Zoey’s” (pre-diary interview) quote 
illustrates, the participants in this study were watchful, scanning political information 
across different mediums with substantive interest triggered by certain events; “I like 
celebrity news and things like that, but then there will be a news story that will really 
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make me think.” Therefore, although social media tools enable personalised forms of 
news consumption, collective experiences still occur. 
 
6.2 Connection and Expression: A Typology of Citizen Roles in Social Media 
Environments 
 
The slacktivist critique is based on an assumed attitudinal logic. It is formed on the 
subjective interpretation of the actions of others, where the depth of one’s engagement 
is based on the perceived difficulty of the act itself. This represents a form of 
technological determinism, as the characteristics of the technology shape political 
behaviour, rather than the intentions of the user. The following section explores how 
and why diarists use Facebook and Twitter for political connection and self-expression. 
While a small minority of participants do reflect the actualizing logic outlined by 
Bennett (2008), the majority of diarists were much more cautious than I predicted in 
Chapter 3. Many were unwilling to express themselves online unless personally 
compelled to. These citizens are conscious of their digital identity as they move 
between public, semi-public, and private spaces. As a result, I argue that the slacktivist 
critique fails to encapsulate the nuanced motivations that underpin online forms of 
participation. In doing so, this chapter outlines a that distinguishes between the different 
attitudinal and behavioural traits at the individual level.  
These conclusions are not immediately evident at first glance. By coding all 
public and semi-public posts made by those diarists who use Facebook and Twitter over 
the duration of the project, the initial evidence seemed to support the existence of a self-
expressive logic.64 As Table 6.3 shows, almost a quarter of all posts on Facebook (135 
posts) had a political orientation, while politics was the third most frequently mentioned 
topic within the Twitter dataset (157 posts). 
 
                                                
64 Please see Appendix B8 for further details on how I collected the data, and Appendix B9 for the coding 
framework used. 
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Table 6.3. Volume of posts on Facebook and Twitter by topic 
 
Facebook  Twitter 
Frequency  % (n=560) 
 Frequency  % (n=1006) 
01 Personal  257 45.89  406 40.36 
02 Humour 115 20.54  301 29.92 
03 Music 67 11.96  117 11.63 
04 Film 11 1.96  34 3.38 
05 TV 27 4.82  80 7.95 
06 Technology and video 
games 18 3.21 
 
65 6.46 
07 Other visual arts 8 1.43  11 1.09 
08 Books and literature 9 1.61  15 1.49 
09 Sports and exercise 22 3.93  41 4.08 
10 Celebrity and gossip 26 4.64  90 8.95 
11 Travel 50 8.93  22 2.19 
12 Food and drink 40 7.14  95 9.44 
13 Retail and commerce 19 3.39  60 5.96 
14 Fashion 3 0.54  21 2.09 
15 Religion and faith 4 0.71  32 3.18 
16 Science and space 8 1.43  10 0.99 
17 Environment 9 1.61  12 1.19 
18 Animals and pets 7 1.25  28 2.78 
19 Vehicles 6 1.07  32 3.18 
20 Crime 7 1.25  18 1.79 
21 Social media  5 0.89  22 2.19 
22 Charity and social causes 39 6.96  14 1.39 
23 Current events and news 90 16.07  125 12.43 
24 Politics 135 24.11  157 15.61 
25 Other 2 0.36  5 0.50 
26 Health  13 2.32  25 2.49 
27 Weather 3 0.54  24 2.39 
28 Education 35 6.25  90 8.95 
Note: Frequency based of manual coding. Posts may feature multiple codes. 
 
However, although the total number of politically oriented posts seems to suggest a 
politically active sample when compared to other subject matter, these posts were 
shared by a small number of participants. As Table 6.4 illustrates, a handful of diarists 
were responsible for a significant proportion of these updates. 
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Table 6.4. Diarists who posted political content on Facebook and Twitter 
Pseudonym 
Frequency  %  
Facebook (n=135) 
Oliver 58 78.38 
Joe 18 26.47 
Thomas 14 35.00 
Madeline 11 9.48 
Matt 10 90.91 
Simon 10 22.22 
Deborah 3 6.52 
Liz 3 27.27 
Mallory 3 30.00 
Marco 2 13.33 
Annabeth 1 2.08 
Joshua 1 20.00 
Zoey 1 2.78 
 Twitter (n=157) 
Joe 90 37.50 
Marco 27 17.76 
Madeline 21 32.81 
Zoey 10 3.68 
Abbey 2 20.00 
Liz 2 12.50 
Simon 2 66.67 
Annabeth 1 0.54 
Joshua 1 1.75 
Will 1 100.00 
Note: See Appendix B.11 for details of those diarists that did not post any political material. Percentages 
are italicised to highlight a total post count of less than 10. Percentages in bold signify diarists for whom 
over 50 percent of their updates included code 24: Politics and political events. 
 
Matt and Oliver stand out from Table 6.4, as they were the only diarists to use 
social media primarily for political expression and discussion. Between them, they 
accounted for 43 percent of the political posts on Facebook during the diary period. 
They are representative of the actualizing citizen framework, in that they use Facebook 
to share personally expressive political content (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells and 
Freelon, 2011: 840). Moreover, their posts often question the coverage of professional 
news media (Bennett, 2008: 14). However, they also display a unique characteristic that 
differentiates them from Bennett’s citizen type. As Oliver’s (pre-diary interview) quote 
illustrates, they wish to stimulate learning and further discussion by intentionally 
provoking others: 
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I use it purely and solely for finding out information about political matters, 
sharing information on political matters, and rubbing it in people’s faces. I know 
that people don’t like it but that’s exactly why I do it… the more issues that I 
create for my network on Facebook, in terms of how do they react to me and 
how do they engage with me, the better, because it’s meant to be provocative. 
 
Both Matt and Oliver are examples of what I describe as “civic instigators,” citizens 
who actively share political material on social media and express their opinion by way 
of challenging others. For example, Matt shared a link to a BBC News article on the 
government’s decision to sell public shares in the Royal Mail. He offered a robust 
criticism of this decision, arguing that more nationalisation was needed rather than less. 
Likewise, Oliver shared a post from the activist group UK Uncut, which criticised the 
Chancellor, George Osborne MP, for failing to ensure that Vodafone fulfilled their tax 
obligations. Oliver was highly critical of this, juxtaposing it with looming cuts in 
government spending. Both posts triggered a reaction from their networked contacts, as 
others contested their opinions. This provocation is not done with any ill intent but as a 
way of generating attention, awareness, and understanding for political issues that they 
deem to be important. Ultimately, they feel that their actions fulfil an educative function 
(Matt; Oliver pre-diary interview). 
Madeline, a 25-year-old higher education professional, shared a number of 
similar behavioural traits. She was also an active user of Facebook and Twitter, 
contributing 32 posts with a political orientation in total. She also aims to inform her 
family, friends and other networked contacts through her use of both social networking 
sites: 
 
I think if you share something that’s political then you’re hoping that people 
who wouldn’t know about it might see it, say people that I went to school with, 
worked with, or family members, those that aren’t particularly politically 
engaged. I only really share things that are on an important subject. For 
example, something on feminism that my mum might not see but I know that 
she would be interested in… So it is kind of like, not to sound snobbish or 
bigheaded but, educating others. 
(Madeline, pre-diary interview) 
 
However, she differed from Matt and Oliver as she would refrain from offering her 
opinion when posting updates, only doing so when personally compelled to by the 
content of the issue. In this way Madeline reflects what I characterise as a “contributor,” 
a user who shares political material but does so without including any explicit personal 
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opinions.65 Contributors often act on the basis of a different attitudinal logic. Madeline 
felt a certain sense of gratification when informing others, but she also wanted to be 
seen as a politically articulate individual (Gantz and Trenholm, 1979). 
Joe, a student from the South East, was responsible for the largest volume of 
political updates in total, sharing 108 posts across Facebook (18) and Twitter (90). Like 
Madeline, he refrained from explicit forms of expression on Facebook. This reluctance 
to voice one’s opinion stems from his perception of his audience. Joe (entry 8) feels that 
his networked contacts do not take political discussion seriously:   
 
Not everyone on Facebook is politicised. I think that if I wrote my political 
thoughts on it I would get stupid comments that aren’t worth the light of day… 
In terms of my friends, I have witnessed a lot of people being vilified for their 
thoughts on specific issues. 
 
Joe mitigates these fears by sharing content that is politically oriented but also has an 
overtly humorous frame. On Twitter he would frequently combine political comments 
with trending topics. By using humour, Joe felt he could entertain his audience while 
also making a more meaningful point. For example he used the hashtag #JLSMemories, 
created by fans of the British pop group JLS in the wake of their breakup, to question 
the impact of austerity on society. Furthermore, he used the hashtag 
#AskKingslandRoad, a question-and-answer session with the band Kingsland Road, to 
discuss immigration policy in Britain. As such, Joe’s behaviour is akin to that of a 
contributor as he shares civically relevant material, not by way of explicit self-
expression, but in an attempt to entertain his friends. 
Contributors also reflect many of the characteristics of the actualizing citizen 
framework (Bennett, 2008). For instance, contributors, like civic instigators, were 
sometimes distrustful of newspapers and broadcast media news. A number of diarists 
used Facebook and Twitter to question the content and form of their coverage (Bennett, 
Freelon and Wells, 2011: 840). As Figure 6.6 illustrates, Oliver, Madeline, and Marco 
either posted or shared items that questioned the objectivity of British news media, 
including the BBC, the Daily Express, and the Daily Mail. 
 
                                                
65 Contributors differ from civic instigators as their posts do not include an explicit statement of one’s 
personal opinion. However, a contributor’s attitudes towards an issue may be understood implicitly by the 
nature of the content shared. 
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Figure 6.6. Facebook posts from diarists illustrating mediatisation  
  
 
These diarists also took part in new protest repertoires during the study; Oliver (entry 7) 
was involved in an occupation of his university’s student union, Madeline (entry 4) 
maintained a blog to raise awareness of civic and political issues, and Joe (entry 11) 
took to Twitter to lobby a company to reduce unfair costs. There is also an implicit 
understanding of the agenda-setting influence that they, as citizens, can wield using 
social media (Chadwick, 2012). With this in mind, these diarists are representative of a 
new form of digitally enabled citizen (Papacharissi, 2010: 19).  
They were, however, in the minority. As Will’s (pre-diary interview) quote 
alludes to, the majority of diarists very rarely discussed politics in public or semi-public 
spaces online: 
 
I rarely post… I probably post, like, once every three months or something, if 
that. Maybe once every six months. I’m a lurker. 
 
Some participants, like Alan and Leo, did not post anything publicly during the study, 
despite their diary entries indicating that they use social media on a daily basis. They 
are lurkers, regularly observing but rarely contributing, if ever. Despite the fact that past 
research has shown that the majority of internet users reflect the characteristics of 
lurkers, and that these attributes are beneficial to the emergence and development of 
online communities, the term invariably has negative connotations (Crawford, 2011: 63; 
Nonnecke and Preece, 2003). Crawford (2011: 64) presents listening as an alternative: 
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Once the activities defined as lurking are understood as forms of listening, they 
shift from being vacant and empty figurations to being active and receptive 
processes... It reflects the fact that everyone moves between the states of 
listening and commenting online; both are necessary and both are forms of 
participation. [Emphasis in original]  
 
The majority of the participants in this study reflect what I describe as “listeners,” 
citizens who use Facebook and Twitter to learn about news and political matters, either 
purposefully or as a by-product of their day-to-day use, but rarely engage in any form of 
public-political expression when using these tools.  
Prior to applying this terminology to this study, it is necessary to reflect on how 
the process of listening differs on Facebook and Twitter as opposed to through face-to-
face interactions. In a real space exchange, one is expected to listen attentively to each 
and every word; to not do so would be deemed socially unacceptable. However, social 
media users do not engage with each and every post, they are not listening in this 
conventional sense. Rather, they are “background listening,” “allowing messages to 
come and go, and occasionally ‘tuning in’ and responding” (Crawford, 2011: 68). This 
dynamic of tuning in is precisely what Will (entry 8), an IT consultant from London, 
observed when reflecting on political videos that are posted on Facebook, as different 
messages compete for our attention in a state of informational exuberance (Chadwick, 
2009; 2012): 
 
If I don’t get some instant gratification from it [a video posted on Facebook], 
then 1 or 2 minutes is the usual amount of time I’m prepared to waste before 
moving on. 
 
This process of filtering and sifting through content represents a meaningful form of 
agency, suggesting that listening can be a means of political participation in its own 
right. Therefore, Crawford (2011: 73) encourages scholarly research to move beyond 
the reification of “voice,” digital expression that we can easily observe, and instead use 
the theoretical device of listening to understand communication flows in and from 
spaces such as Facebook and Twitter.  
Given the anxieties some feel towards any form of digital interaction, and the 
specific cognitive load that accompanies political discussion, this categorisation has two 
different conditions. There are some diarists who do not seem to be so-called listeners. 
For instance, Zoey (308 posts) and Annabeth (232 posts) were two of the most 
expressive users during the diary period, as shown in Figure 6.7. They are instead 
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reflective of what I describe as “active listeners,” those who post content and contribute 
to discussion on social networking sites but do not post political material with the same 
degree of regularity.  
 
Figure 6.7. Total number of public posts on Facebook and Twitter during the diary 
period 
 
 
Other participants rarely posted any form of public or semi-public update.66 
These diarists reflect “passive listeners,” users who do not post any content regardless 
of the subject matter. Table 6.5 shows the total number of posts from those diarists who 
did not share any public-political updates during the study. Despite their lack of activity, 
                                                
66 Participants did not provide access to the activity log as part of this research. As a result, no likes and 
comments made by diarists were captured. This is problematic given that the Pew Research Center found 
that Facebook users frequently engage with content posted by other users but often don’t change their 
own status; 25 percent of those surveyed claimed that they never change or update their own Facebook 
status, as opposed to 44 percent who like posts, 31 percent who comment on posts, and 19 percent who 
send private messages on a daily basis (Smith, 2014). Therefore, the listener role is undoubtedly more 
complex and diverse than proposed in this thesis. 
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the diary entries suggest that these participants still use social media on a regular, often 
daily, basis. Sam (entry 10), a healthcare worker in the East Midlands, used Twitter to 
follow the accusations of drug abuse and financial impropriety involving the celebrity-
chef Nigella Lawson. “Amy” (entry 9) learnt of the debates surrounding the death of 
Mark Duggan, who was shot and killed by police in London in 2011, through a 
discussion on her Facebook news feed. Therefore, these passive listeners are often 
interested in current affairs, but they are averse to sharing their opinions in such a public 
space. Their quiet, discrete but focused behaviour challenges the slacktivist critique in 
its emphasis on observable political behaviour, ignoring how citizens listen and benefit 
from the contributions of others. 
 
Table 6.5. Listeners: Total number of posts on Facebook and Twitter 
Diarist n 
Andrea 20 
Danny 4 
Amy 3 
Christian 3 
Angela 2 
Claudia 1 
Charlie 1 
Leo 0 
Sam 0 
Cathy 0 
Note: These diarists did not post a political update on either Facebook or Twitter during the course of the 
diary period. 
 
The final category refers to those citizens that reflect an “apathetic” citizen role. 
I use the term apathy to refer to those citizens who have no interest in politics, broadly 
defined, actively refusing to take part in any form of participation.67 I hypothesise that 
these users deliberately ignore posts on social media that have a political orientation. 
However, no conclusions can be drawn on this citizen role as no diarist displayed these 
characteristics in this study. This is a result of the sampling frame used in this study, as 
participants were recruited who had some degree of political interest (see Appendix 
B1). I do not use apathy to refer to those citizens who are disillusioned with the 
traditional mechanisms of institutional politics, such as political parties or voting, as it 
                                                
67 This does not mean that these citizens are disengaged, as silence can be a political act in its own right. 
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is possible to be an active citizen and still hold these views. For example, there were 
civic instigators (Oliver), contributors (Marco), and listeners (Charlie) in this study who 
were all disenchanted with conventional forms of politics.  
Together, these four categories make up the typology of citizen roles in social 
media environments. The differences between these user types can be illustrated by 
making comparisons between them. Table 6.6 shows the subject matter of public posts 
on Facebook and Twitter for five diarists: two civic instigators, Matt and Oliver; one 
contributor, Madeline; and two active listeners, Zoey and Annabeth. This comparison 
exemplifies the tendencies of the different citizen roles. For instance, 58 of Oliver’s 74 
posts were political, as opposed to 11 of Zoey’s 308 contributions. A similar trend can 
also be illustrated by contrasting the volume of posts on current affairs, as 12 percent of 
Madeline’s updates referred to the news as opposed to just 3 percent of Annabeth’s. As 
such, active listeners post updates on other topics. Over half of Annabeth’s 
contributions were personal (134 posts), as she often reflected on her first year of 
university. Meanwhile Zoey touched upon a range of different subjects, from celebrity 
gossip (33 posts) to food and drink (34 posts).  
 
19
4 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
6.
 C
iv
ic
 in
st
ig
at
or
s, 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
s a
nd
 li
st
en
er
s:
 V
ol
um
e 
of
 p
os
ts
 b
y 
to
pi
c 
on
 F
ac
eb
oo
k 
an
d 
Tw
itt
er
 
 
C
iv
ic
 in
st
ig
at
or
 
 
C
on
tr
ib
ut
or
 
 
L
is
te
ne
r 
(A
ct
iv
e)
 
  
O
liv
er
 
M
at
t 
 
M
ad
el
in
e 
 
Z
oe
y 
A
nn
ab
et
h 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=7
4)
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=1
1)
 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=1
80
) 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=3
08
) 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=2
32
) 
01
 P
er
so
na
l  
9 
12
.1
6 
5 
45
.4
5 
 
10
3 
57
.2
2 
 
12
2 
39
.6
1 
13
4 
57
.7
6 
02
 H
um
ou
r 
10
 
13
.5
1 
2 
18
.1
8 
 
29
 
16
.1
1 
 
98
 
31
.8
2 
78
 
33
.6
2 
03
 M
us
ic
 
6 
8.
11
 
1 
9.
09
 
 
12
 
6.
67
 
 
34
 
11
.0
4 
9 
3.
88
 
04
 F
ilm
 
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
3 
1.
67
 
 
7 
2.
27
 
13
 
5.
60
 
05
 T
V
 
2 
2.
70
 
1 
9.
09
 
 
13
 
7.
22
 
 
9 
2.
92
 
19
 
8.
19
 
06
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
an
d 
vi
de
o 
ga
m
es
 
3 
4.
05
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
8 
4.
44
 
 
10
 
3.
25
 
9 
3.
88
 
07
 O
th
er
 v
is
ua
l a
rts
 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
1 
0.
56
 
 
2 
0.
65
 
1 
0.
43
 
08
 B
oo
ks
 a
nd
 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
1 
1.
35
 
4 
36
.3
6 
 
8 
4.
44
 
 
2 
0.
65
 
2 
0.
86
 
09
 S
po
rts
 a
nd
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
4 
2.
22
 
 
13
 
4.
22
 
1 
0.
43
 
10
 C
el
eb
rit
y 
an
d 
go
ss
ip
 
5 
6.
76
 
1 
9.
09
 
 
10
 
5.
56
 
 
33
 
10
.7
1 
13
 
5.
60
 
11
 T
ra
ve
l 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
31
 
17
.2
2 
 
3 
0.
97
 
6 
2.
59
 
12
 F
oo
d 
an
d 
dr
in
k 
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
13
 
7.
22
 
 
34
 
11
.0
4 
28
 
12
.0
7 
13
 R
et
ai
l a
nd
 
co
m
m
er
ce
 (i
.e
. 
sh
op
pi
ng
) 
5 
6.
76
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
7 
3.
89
 
 
10
 
3.
25
 
11
 
4.
74
 
14
 F
as
hi
on
 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
2 
1.
11
 
 
8 
2.
60
 
9 
3.
88
 
15
 R
el
ig
io
n 
an
d 
fa
ith
 
2 
2.
70
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
2 
1.
11
 
 
24
 
7.
79
 
2 
0.
86
 
 
19
5 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
6 
C
iv
ic
 in
st
ig
at
or
s, 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
s a
nd
 li
st
en
er
s:
 V
ol
um
e 
of
 p
os
ts
 b
y 
to
pi
c 
on
 F
ac
eb
oo
k 
an
d 
Tw
itt
er
 (C
on
t’d
.) 
 
C
iv
ic
 in
st
ig
at
or
 
 
C
on
tr
ib
ut
or
 
 
L
is
te
ne
r 
(A
ct
iv
e)
 
 
O
liv
er
 
M
at
t 
 
M
ad
el
in
e 
 
Z
oe
y 
A
nn
ab
et
h 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=7
4)
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=1
1)
 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=1
80
) 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=3
08
) 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
%
 
(n
=2
32
) 
16
 S
ci
en
ce
 a
nd
 sp
ac
e 
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
4 
1.
30
 
1 
0.
43
 
17
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
4 
5.
41
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
5 
1.
62
 
1 
0.
43
 
18
 A
ni
m
al
s a
nd
 p
et
s 
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
2 
1.
11
 
 
14
 
4.
55
 
5 
2.
16
 
19
 V
eh
ic
le
s 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
4 
2.
22
 
 
3 
0.
97
 
7 
3.
02
 
20
 C
rim
e 
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
1 
0.
56
 
 
5 
1.
62
 
1 
0.
43
 
21
 S
oc
ia
l m
ed
ia
  
1 
1.
35
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
5 
2.
78
 
 
7 
2.
27
 
0 
0.
00
 
22
 C
ha
rit
y 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 
ca
us
es
 
4 
5.
41
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
18
 
10
.0
0 
 
3 
0.
97
 
0 
0.
00
 
23
 C
ur
re
nt
 e
ve
nt
s a
nd
 
ne
w
s 
31
 
41
.8
9 
4 
36
.3
6 
 
22
 
12
.2
2 
 
20
 
6.
49
 
7 
3.
02
 
24
 P
ol
iti
cs
 
58
 
78
.3
8 
10
 
90
.9
1 
 
32
 
17
.7
8 
 
11
 
3.
57
 
2 
0.
86
 
25
 O
th
er
 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
0 
0.
00
 
1 
0.
43
 
26
 H
ea
lth
  
3 
4.
05
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
7 
3.
89
 
 
18
 
5.
84
 
1 
0.
43
 
27
 W
ea
th
er
 
0 
0.
00
 
0 
0.
00
 
 
3 
1.
67
 
 
12
 
3.
90
 
1 
0.
43
 
28
 E
du
ca
tio
n 
9 
12
.1
6 
0 
0.
00
 
 
12
 
6.
67
 
 
4 
1.
30
 
18
 
7.
76
 
 
 196 
 
The absence of a self-expressive logic for those diarists categorised as 
contributors and listeners challenges the expected findings of this thesis, that social 
networking sites foster political conversation and communication by virtue of their 
design (EF2; EF3). Although diarists tailor news consumption around their personal 
interests using Facebook and Twitter, this did not lead to the use of these platforms for 
personal expression and discursive engagement. The typology of citizen roles in social 
media environments raises a number of questions over the attitudinal logics that 
underpin these different behavioural traits. 
Firstly, why do passive listeners use Facebook and Twitter, if not for self-
expression and conversation? As Figure 6.8 illustrates, over half of those involved (17) 
were either “very busy” or “busy” for the duration of the diaries. Many participants 
found difficulty in balancing the competing demands on their time, be they professional 
responsibilities (Liz, entry 7; Sam, entry 1), family commitments (Alan, entry 2), or 
leisure activities (Joshua, entry 9). Furthermore, the anxieties created by this perceived 
lack of time can further restrict temporal autonomy. Cathy (pre-diary interview), who 
held a management position at a charity in the Midlands, observed how she would often 
stress about deadlines at work when she was trying to unwind. These time pressures can 
make remaining informed difficult. As a result, listeners use social media as an 
informational shortcut, a process in which communication can reduce the access costs 
associated with finding news and politically relevant information. As Amy (pre-diary 
interview) notes, “I just see it as a quick way of finding out about news for people who 
don’t have enough time.” This is not a new phenomenon; citizens have long been using 
informational shortcuts. Just as Arnold (entry 1), Cathy (entry 1), and Sam (entry 7) 
used the radio to learn about current affairs while undertaking other activities, others, 
like Abbey (week 3) and Simon (week 4), used social media as a bridge to political 
information. These informational shortcuts on social media are beneficial across the 
typology. For those listeners who have lower levels of political interest, social 
networking sites can provide some awareness of current affairs, something that Alan 
(entry 2) and Angela (entry 8; 9) argued was vital given the social costs of not being 
informed. Likewise, social media can provide a sense of ongoing public concerns for 
those civic instigators with specific issue interests. However, as the first section of this 
chapter shows, diarists do not depend on these sources in isolation. They serve a 
specific function as part of a repertoire of media sources. 
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Figure 6.8. Thinking back to the period of time when you were completing your diary, 
what sort of time was it for you? 
 
 
Secondly, if listeners are interested and willing consumers of news and current 
affairs, why do they refrain from contributing to discussion online? A number of diarists 
felt apprehensive about how they would be judged by other networked contacts. For 
example, Amy (pre-diary interview) had been deterred by the tense conversations she 
had seen on her news feed. Likewise, Christian (entry 5) felt that other users were quick 
to get abusive if they disagreed with your posts, referring to a particularly unkind 
comment thread in reference to George Osborne MP. Listeners are acutely aware of the 
real and imagined audience, mindful of the damage that could be caused to their 
reputation by a wayward comment. Some of this anxiety can be explained by the 
typology offered, as diarists associate political discussion on social media with the 
characteristics of civic instigators. Those who do take part tend to do so vociferously, as 
Andrea (pre-diary interview) notes, “it is very ranty and it can be a bit cringey.” This is 
something Christian (entry 3) observed during a debate over the conduct of cyclists in 
London: 
 
I did not comment on this thread, as I never do, but read each new comment 
with intrigue. What bothers me about Facebook arguments is that everyone 
thinks they are right about whatever point they are making. I just want to say, it 
is possible to have an argument where you can see both sides!  
 
Joshua (entry 12) was on the receiving end of such insults from other outraged users 
when he commented on a Facebook page, initially set up for local gossip, to intervene in 
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a discussion on immigration that he deemed to be racist. As such, listeners feel alienated 
by the aggressive manner in which these polarised discussions are conducted. 
The adversarial nature of political conversation, coupled with uncertainty over 
the reach and potential implications of a public or semi-public post, give rise to forms of 
social anxiety when using Facebook and Twitter. As Zoey (pre-diary interview) 
observes, self-expression on social networking sites requires self-confidence, or at least 
confidence in your beliefs. Oliver, the participant most politically active on Facebook, 
demonstrates how forms of public expression can fuel these social anxieties. In his 
second entry Oliver noted his suspicions that some of his networked contacts on 
Facebook had unsubscribed from his posts as a result of his politically charged “rants.” 
This led him to question his approach, as he felt that his “facetious, alarmist, and 
sometimes vulgar sentiments” may lead to fewer people engaging with him (Oliver, 
entry 4). This conflict between Oliver’s (entry 6) desire to voice his opinions and his 
apprehension over the social implications of his communication left him in a difficult 
predicament: 
 
It annoys me that Facebook is used for short trivial interaction by my network. 
But what can I do? Either accept that and pander to it, or continue to challenge 
that form of engagement. But if I challenge people I risk further isolating myself 
from others in my network.  
 
While Oliver ultimately continued to express his views on Facebook, regardless of the 
reactions that he may face, these inhibitions are key to understanding why listeners are 
reluctant to use these platforms to air their views.  
This does not mean that listeners never post political material on Facebook and 
Twitter. As Table 6.4 shows, 15 participants shared political content at some point 
during the study. However, for many diarists these posts were low in volume when 
compared to their contributions on other topics. Seemingly, a public or semi-public 
form of political expression represents a qualitatively different experience. I argue that 
the reputational logic that is central to the slacktivist critique (H3), in which users act on 
the basis of a desired image that they wish to portray to their network, works in reverse; 
users are impeded by a fear of social repercussions and avoid certain forms of 
expression online by way of managing their identity across public and semi-public 
spaces. Listeners, like Liz (entry 12) and Zoey (pre-diary interview), fear that they do 
not know enough about political topics to be able to hold a discussion within this 
volatile environment. In this way, listeners often only feel comfortable expressing 
themselves when they possess a comprehensive understanding of an issue.  
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Intuitively, these topics tend to be closely tied to an individual’s private interests 
and personal circumstances. This personalisation can come in a number of forms. Zoey, 
who works for a charity in the Midlands, focused on her professional interests, raising 
awareness of issues relating to mental health care. Deborah, a banking professional 
from Yorkshire, shared three politically oriented posts that were based on her 
identification with the Ukrainian diaspora. Abbey used Twitter to share two tweets 
about threats to women’s rights across the globe, an issue that she was evidently 
passionate about given the content of her weekly entries (entry 1; 3; 5; 7; 11; pre-diary 
interview). While the lack of posts on their public profiles during the study may suggest 
that these participants are apathetic or disengaged, the diary entries show evidence of 
attentive and articulate citizens who are activated into online forms of public 
participation on the basis of their personal interests. 
 This cognitive load challenges the premise that digital forms of engagement are 
effortless and instinctive, undertaken without any real consideration of their meaning or 
democratic value. By contextualising social media use with reflective diaries over a 
period of three months, it is possible to identify and understand the triggers for these 
moments of self-expression and digital micro-activism. For listeners, conscious of their 
audience and how they might perceive their character, a click or a status-update can be a 
high-threshold behaviour. Publicly voicing one’s political opinions can require a great 
deal of consideration, time, and effort. For instance, Will (entry 12) took part in 
question and answer session with Edward Snowden on Twitter. While this may seem 
like a relatively innocuous contribution, this 125-character tweet was carefully 
deliberated over. As such, the low-effort nature of such actions masquerade these 
complex cognitive processes.  
This trend is reflected in an analysis of the political subject matter that diarists 
most frequently shared posts over during the diary period, as shown in Table 6.7. The 
most frequently mentioned topic on Facebook was the Conservative Party (18 posts), all 
of which were critical contributions from Oliver, a civic instigator. Similarly, 
immigration (18 posts) was the most discussed subject matter on Twitter, as Joe, a 
contributor, frequently shared links to news articles debating the merits of the open 
border policy of the European Union. However, what the table doesn’t show is perhaps 
of more interest. In total there were 41 different topics discussed on Facebook and 45 on 
Twitter, supporting the notion that listeners often give voice to those events and issues 
that are of particular importance to them personally.  
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Table 6.7. Most frequently mentioned topics on Facebook and Twitter 
Topic 
Facebook 
Topic 
Twitter 
Frequency (n=135) Frequency (n=157) 
Conservative Party 18 
Immigration and 
EU 
18 
Brand and Paxman 9 UKIP 12 
Ukraine 8 
Criticism of 
broadcast media 
10 
Snowden 8 Snowden 8 
Criticism of 
broadcast media 
8 Welfare reforms 8 
Note: Key of terms provided in Appendix B7. 
 
These results point to a more pressing concern regarding connection and 
communication on social media; do those who shout the loudest dominate conversations 
on these services? If civic instigators post the most frequently and listeners rely on 
social media for informational shortcuts, does this mean that there is a “spiral of 
silence” on Facebook and Twitter in which civic instigators shape how other users 
perceive public issues?  
The spiral of silence, first proposed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974), 
occurs when a citizen does not share their own opinion due to an underlying fear that 
they are in the minority, as they do not wish to risk social isolation. Findings from a 
study by the Pew Research Center suggest that social media may exacerbate the spiral 
of silence, as they “do not provide new forums for those who might otherwise remain 
silent to express their opinions and debate issues” (Hampton et al., 2014). However, 
drawing inferences on general user behaviour based on this survey is problematic, as the 
study focused on the leaks from Edward Snowden. As such, the issue itself may act as 
an intervening variable as it involves government surveillance of the very tools in 
question.  
Evidently, this theory has relevance to the findings of this study as the majority 
of participants were listeners, wary of public forms of communication, while only a 
small minority were willing to share political content. Furthermore, posts from civic 
instigators tend to have highly distinctive frames. For example, Matt would often share 
links from BBC News Online and the Mail Online by way of asserting the relevance of 
socialism in contemporary politics (entry 1; 8; 9; 10). The reflective diaries show that 
others pay attention to contentious posts like these (Annabeth, entry 2; Christian, entry 
5; Joshua, entry 10). However, despite their interest and the controversial themes, other 
users were often unwilling to engage in discussion and correct perceived inaccuracies. 
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Of the 135 political posts on Facebook in this study, 24 posts had no likes or comments 
in response. Furthermore, 82 posts had a low number of interactions, where the 
cumulative total of likes and comments was less than nine. The five politically oriented 
posts that had a very high level of interactions, defined as those posts with over 30 likes 
and/or comments, had either a personal orientation, such as when Oliver (entry 8) put 
forward a proposal to his local council, or were related to an event that triggered 
collective attention, as illustrated by the 13 likes and 19 comments when Joe (entry 2) 
shared Jeremy Paxman’s interview with Russell Brand. This comment thread consisted 
of a visceral debate about the merits of voting between two civic instigators (Joe, entry 
2). Given the frequency of posts from civic instigators, the strength of their political 
ideals, and the reluctance of listeners to offer a response, the opinions of those most 
vocal often go unchallenged. As such, these findings do show evidence of political 
polarisation online, raising questions as to the content and conditions of consumption on 
Facebook and Twitter (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; Conover et al., 2011; Prior, 2007). 
As Munson and Resnick (2010) suggest, “increased polarization would make it harder 
for society to find common ground on important issues.” 
However, the use of Facebook and Twitter as an informational shortcut did not 
result in listeners simply adopting the opinions offered by civic instigators. Rather, the 
diaries demonstrate a multi-step flow of communication that occurs after the point of 
consumption on a social networking site. These often unseen processes work in contrast 
to how they were originally conceived by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), in which opinion 
leaders, shaped by mass media, influence the wider population. In this study, those 
active users who are comparable to opinion leaders, the civic instigators, are challenged 
in private spaces. Listeners take to private modes of communication to contextualise, 
discuss, and sometimes challenge the information they receive on social networking 
sites. For example, Christian, a graphic designer from London, discussed the ongoing 
crisis in Syria at work following a post that he had seen on his Facebook news feed. In 
the conversation that followed, Christian (entry 2) reflected on the possibility of 
military intervention given the defeat of the British government’s motion to support US-
led air strikes against President Bashar al-Assad's regime: 
 202 
 
This week I had a very long conversation with a girl at work about the issues 
surrounding why Britain should not get involved with the conflict in Syria. The 
conversation started because we both saw statements on Facebook, and this 
prompted her to tell me that her fiancé was in the Royal Artillery and had seen 
two tours of Iraq and one of Afghanistan. I asked her what she thought about the 
prospect of him going to Syria, and she told me that in his barracks, his squad 
was prepped and told to go into work with the imminent threat of being shipped 
out to Syria. Obviously she was shocked and extremely worried in fighting 
another pointless war. I asked her why she thought it was pointless, she 
responded with “I accept they are killing innocent people, but can we really 
justify the cost of war in our current situation.” I asked what the current situation 
was, and we spoke about the cuts to the NHS and policing, and the cost of the 
war in Iraq, both in monetary value and the cost to innocent lives. The whole 
conversation was prompted through social media, it sparked a greater discussion 
about politics and war. 
 
There was evidence of a multi-step flow of communication across the entire sample, as 
participants often turned to those with whom they had a strong tie relationship to 
discuss politics. These conversations took place in private, either online or face-to-face. 
Amy spoke with her husband at home about a range of political issues that she was 
exposed to online (entry 1; 2; 4; 5; 7; 8; 9; 12). Similarly, Leo (entry 7) used WhatsApp 
to challenge a Facebook post that criticised the influence of the EU on policy making in 
Britain. Using WhatsApp to discuss and contest content posted on social media with 
others, either one-to-one or in private groups, was relatively common (Abbey, entry 12; 
Danny, entry 5; 6; Joshua, entry 5; Will, entry 6). The private messaging functionality 
of Facebook was also used in this way (Charlie; Christian, pre-diary interview), 
challenging the perception of Facebook as a public facing mode of communication. 
Consequently, the threat of political polarisation cannot simply be inferred from the 
content on social networking sites that is visible. Such judgements ignore the rich forms 
of private and semi-public communication that take place, as listeners challenge and 
contest information they receive on Facebook and Twitter, but also from professional 
media sources. 
In summary, the typology of citizen roles in social media environments 
illustrates the complex attitudinal characteristics that underpin political behaviour 
online. By focusing on public-political acts online in isolation, the slacktivist critique 
disregards the agency of users and the different cognitive loads that are associated with 
public forms of self-expression. Furthermore, the critique offers a one-dimensional 
analysis of Facebook and Twitter as it disregards the multi-step flow of communication 
as it that moves between public, semi-public, and private spaces. Even in these private 
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exchanges, the lines between producer and consumer become blurred, posing new 
questions about the nature of mediated citizenship.  
While the typology identified in this study illuminates some of the complex 
attitudinal motivations that underpin behaviour on social media, this is further 
complicated by distinctions that exist between the two social networking sites in focus, 
Facebook and Twitter. 
 
6.3 Connection and Expression: A Service-Specific Logic 
 
I see Facebook as more like friends, and pictures, whereas Twitter is more 
current and relating to political things. 
(Claudia, pre-diary interview) 
 
I think most of the things that I see on Facebook are fairly superficial and I don’t 
delve deeply into Facebook at all. It all seems to be froth and tittle and tattle… 
Twitter is different. 
(Sam, pre-diary interview) 
 
As the quotes from Claudia and Sam suggest, there was evidence of a service-specific 
logic in this study; Facebook is deemed to be a social space while Twitter is an overtly 
politicised and news-oriented service. This logic was evident in the way that diarists 
used each platform to access political information, but also in how each site was used 
for self-expression. 
By exploring the diaries and public posts of the 16 participants who used both 
services it is evident that this sub-sample predominantly used Twitter, rather than 
Facebook, for posting political content. Facebook was often associated with specific 
concerns relating to reputation management. As Liz (pre-diary interview) observes, “I 
think it’s interesting to look at politics on Facebook but I wouldn’t do it myself. It’s 
very public and I wouldn’t do it.” The use of the term “public” in this quote is 
significant given the default settings on both social networking sites. All posts on 
Twitter are publically accessible, whereas Facebook is a closed service, as updates are 
only accessible to those contacts that you approve. As such, Liz is not apprehensive of 
the public in a literal sense, an abstract term referring to all people, but a distinctive set 
of groups that trigger similar fears of other forms of openness. It is the makeup of the 
audience on Facebook that makes sharing sensitive posts seem more daunting. The 
public that Liz refers to on Facebook often includes an eclectic mix of close friends, 
work colleagues, and family members. Users can often feel overwhelmed as these 
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diverse sets of social circles overlap, in what Marwick and boyd (2011) describe as a 
“context collapse.”68  
The disparities between the audience on Facebook and Twitter can be 
demonstrated by Zoey (pre-diary interview), the only diarist to have her Facebook and 
Twitter account linked. This sometimes had unintended consequences, as Zoey (pre-
diary interview) felt much more at ease expressing herself on Twitter: 
 
I’ve got my two accounts linked so if I put something on Twitter it automatically 
puts it onto Facebook. It is a bit of a nightmare because sometimes I’ll put 
something on Twitter without thinking and then my Mum, who is friends with 
me on Facebook, will ask, ‘What’s the matter? What have you put that for?’ I 
forget that the two are linked. 
 
Even Oliver (entry 2), a civic instigator who frequently used the service to air his views, 
recognised the presence of a certain etiquette on Facebook; “Facebook is seen as a 
social tool, purely for entertainment and fun. There is a kind of ‘don’t talk politics at the 
dinner table’ mentality embedded within its use.” Other diarists supported this 
viewpoint. Claudia (pre-diary interview) and Leo (pre-diary interview) feel that clear 
distinctions exist over the kind of serious discussion that a user can engage in on 
Facebook, deeming personal achievements and significant events appropriate but 
politics as a topic to avoid. As such, the composition of the audience on Facebook 
shapes user behaviour. 
An analysis of all political posts made by participants with accounts on both 
social networking sites illustrates this service-specific logic. As Table 6.8 shows, there 
were considerably more contributions with a political subject matter on Twitter (157 
posts) than on Facebook (50). While this is expected given that Twitter is a 
microblogging platform, posts on the service were also more expressive; almost half of 
all political tweets (47.13 percent) contained evidence of a user’s opinion, as opposed to 
just over a quarter (26 percent) of updates on Facebook. Diarists in this sub-sample 
were more likely to share information on Facebook without offering their own 
judgements. 
 
                                                
68 “A context collapse occurs when people are forced to grapple simultaneously with otherwise unrelated 
social contexts that are rooted in different norms and seemingly demand different social responses” 
(boyd, 2014: 31). 
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Joe, a contributor, provides perhaps the most fitting example of the expressive 
norms associated with Twitter. During the diary period there was a significant 
discrepancy between the volume of political posts that he made on Twitter (90) in 
comparison to Facebook (18). Joe explained this deviation in his diary (entry 5), noting 
that Twitter was a more fitting platform because of his audience; he believed those who 
follow him tend to take political material seriously, whereas he feared that his Facebook 
network would mock any attempts to talk about his beliefs. Marco, another contributor, 
took a similar approach, as the majority of his political contributions were shared on 
Twitter (27) rather than Facebook (2). Like Joe, Marco (pre-diary interview) visualised 
a different audience when moving between the two social networking sites, noting that 
those who follow him on Twitter tend to do so because of shared interests.  
Even amongst those who did not have an account on the service, the majority of 
diarists perceived Twitter to be a space better suited to political discussion. I argue that 
this interpretation is a result of the real and imagined audience on each service. On 
Facebook, users struggle to balance their various identities: friend, family member, 
colleague, acquaintance, hookup and so on. Formulating a voice that speaks to each of 
these identities is difficult. On Twitter, the audience tends to be more defined, based 
around specific interests that the user joined the service to pursue. For instance, Amy 
(pre-diary interview) joined the service to follow her professional interests, using the 
platform to keep abreast of developments in the charity sector. Similarly, Christian (pre-
diary interview) uses the site to network with fellow designers, while Leo (pre-diary 
interview) joined Twitter to become better informed on local news. In each of these 
cases, the diarist has a clear perception of what their expressions represent. Therefore, 
this service-specific logic can impact the content and form of political expression 
(Bernstein et al., 2013; Marwick and boyd, 2011; Papacharissi, 2012).   
 
6.4 Action… and Lack Thereof 
 
The typology of citizen roles in social media environments describes how civic 
instigators, contributors, and listeners possess distinct attitudes towards political 
expression on Facebook and Twitter. These characteristics also result in different 
behavioural traits. Figure 6.9 shows the forms of participation that diarists were 
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involved in over the three-month period.69 While over half of participants signed a 
petition and donated money to a civic or political group, there was little evidence of 
diarists participating in goal-orientated public-political action. As such, there were 
many more examples of expressive engagement than instrumental action throughout the 
study. However, I argue that this does not necessarily reflect the substitution thesis, in 
which low-effort online forms of engagement are replacing “tried and tested” offline 
methods (H2). Such a conclusion would depend on equating online self-expression with 
forms of real space instrumental action as if they are like-for-like. This is conceptually 
misleading, as online expression often represents discursive engagement in a new space. 
These behaviours therefore refer to different stages on the continuum of participation.  
 
Figure 6.9. During the time spent completing your diary did you do any of the following 
to influence political representatives, public decisions, laws, or policies? 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Outside of this overview of political behaviour, these results also illustrate methodological issues. For 
instance diarists sometimes omitted public-political actions from their weekly entries, as they focused on 
their use of media for information consumption or did not perceive these acts to be political. Sam noted in 
his exit survey that he had taken part in a public consultation on healthcare reform, but felt that this was 
in keeping with his professional interests rather than any political aspirations. There was also evidence of 
a discrepancy in how the participants interpreted the survey statements. Only eight diarists confirmed that 
they had contributed to a discussion online, despite the data collected from their public profiles 
suggesting otherwise. 
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The substitution thesis can be explored through a comparison of the levels of 
digital micro-activism and real space action. In this study those who were most active 
on social media, by posting political material and engaging in low-threshold forms of 
online activism, also took part in forms of substantive political action. As Table 6.9 
shows, there was a correlation between citizen role and the depth of one’s engagement. 
The civic instigators, Matt and Oliver, were two of the most active participants in the 
study, investing their time in a wide range of activities from political meetings to 
demonstrations. Contributors, such as Joe and Madeline, also participated in 
instrumental forms of action. Listeners, however, were less active, only triggered into 
action under specific circumstances. As such, those who most closely resembled the 
characteristics specified in the slacktivist critique were the most politically active 
citizens in this study. 
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Table 6.9. Level of participation based on a typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments 
Citizen role  Pseudonym Forms of participation 
Civic instigator 
Matt • Donation to charity / campaign group 
• Boycotted products 
• Attended political meetings 
• Contributed to a discussion online 
Oliver • Contacted representative 
• Created or signed an e-petition 
• Donation to charity / campaign group 
• Boycotted products 
• Attended political meetings 
• Donation to a party 
• Taken part in a demonstration 
• Contributed to a discussion online  
• Taken part in a public consultation 
Contributor 
Joe • Contacted representative 
• Created or signed an e-petition 
• Voted in an election 
• Contributed to a discussion online 
Madeline • Created or signed an e-petition 
• Donation to charity / campaign group 
• Taken part in a demonstration 
Listener (Active) 
Annabeth • Donation to charity / campaign group 
Zoey • Created or signed an e-petition 
Listener (Passive) 
Amy • Donation to charity / campaign group 
Leo • None of the above 
Note: The forms of participation listed in this table are based on those provided in the Audit of Political 
Engagement (Hansard Society, 2014: 90). See Appendix B1 for further details. 
 
There was further evidence to support the reputational logic on Facebook. 
Despite 15 diarists signing an e-petition during the diary period, only three participants 
promoted a petition on their public profile during this time. Deborah (entry 4) signed a 
petition that her daughter posted on the service but did not share this with her own 
networked contacts. Similarly, Simon (entry 2; 7) reflected on a number of petitions that 
he had signed on Avaaz, none of which he shared on Facebook or Twitter. As such, this 
casts doubt on the claim that citizens engage in digital micro-activism for social 
benefits, rather than genuinely held personal beliefs (H3). 
The three participants who did share an e-petition on Facebook were Oliver, 
Madeline, and “Mallory.” Each of these diarists participated in campaigns that were 
based on their own personal interests. Oliver, who shared four petitions in total, seemed 
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to follow the distinctive attitudinal patterns that were evident in his reflective diaries 
and public posts. During the study he encouraged his friends on Facebook to: sign a 
petition lobbying the Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt, to abolish a legal 
clause that allowed the government to close hospital services without consultation;70 
stop the ban on real space demonstrations at the University of Sussex;71 and encourage 
online retailer Amazon to increase pay for its workers.72 With each of these petitions, 
Oliver expressed his own views by way of encouraging others to sign. This approach 
differed to Madeline and Mallory, who simply shared the petition without any personal 
sentiment. An example of this can be seen directly, as both Oliver and Madeline shared 
the same petition. This campaign, led by 38 Degrees, was designed to stop the 
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration 
Bill becoming law. As Figure 6.10 shows, Oliver, a civic instigator, offered his own 
rationale for signing the petition, arguing that the legislation would restrict political 
campaigning in the run up to the 2015 general election. In comparison Madeline, a 
contributor, offered no such indication of her motivations; her support was inferred 
from the fact that she shared the petition. This further illustrates the differences between 
the citizen roles. 
 
                                                
70 For further information: “38 Degrees: Jeremy Hunt: Axe the Hospital Closure Clause” 
https://you.38degrees.org.uk/petitions/jeremy-hunt-should-resign-and-take-his-hospital-closure-clause-
with-him.  
71 For further information: “Change.org: Stop the protest ban at Sussex University” 
https://www.change.org/p/stop-the-protest-ban-at-sussex-university.  
72 For further information: “Change.org: AmazonUK: Deliver the Living Wage in 2014” 
https://www.change.org/p/amazonuk-deliver-the-living-wage-in-2014.  
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Figure 6.10. Examples of micro-activism from Oliver, a civic instigator, and Madeline, 
a contributor 
 
 
This reluctance to post personally expressive material, or political content 
entirely in the case of listeners, is problematic for campaign groups and political parties. 
Described as informational shortcuts in Chapter 5, the leadership of political groups 
depend on users sharing evidence of their political behaviour by way of encouraging 
others to participate. By providing easy access to political information for wider 
publics, the costs associated with involvement are reduced. While this does not 
necessarily lead to instrumental action, under certain conditions it can. For instance, 
Marco (exit survey) became aware of the debates surrounding electoral reform in 
Britain following exposure to a Change.org petition on his Facebook news feed. This 
interest resulted in Marco contacting his local MP on this issue. In this way, digital 
micro-activism can act as a gateway to new issues and enhanced political interest. 
Abbey (pre-diary interview) epitomises this process through her interest and 
involvement in women’s issues, which was evident through her weekly entries (entry 1; 
3; 5; 7; 11): 
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The first time I saw No More Page 3 [http://nomorepage3.org/] was when 
someone posted a link to the petition on Facebook saying ‘sign this petition, this 
is what its about.’ And the more I started to think about it, the more it was like, 
well, I have never been comfortable with Page 3 and, to find that I am not a 
weirdo in finding it a bit strange, was quite enlightening really. It just seems to 
be very basic. For some reason, it really appeals to me. I don’t know if its 
because I used to work in a warehouse… The things that they used to say about 
women, and the way that they would treat Page 3, was embarrassing. So I am 
glad that this is coming out. I love it because it’s slowly leading me down the 
road to feminist enlightenment. 
 
This quote illustrates two conditions that explain when access and exposure on social 
media transform into more substantive forms of engagement. Firstly, this chance 
sighting of an e-petition on Facebook resonated with Abbey’s own pre-existing 
sentiments and personal experiences. This is typical for listeners who, like those 
members of 38 Degrees in the last chapter, share characteristics with the standby citizen 
model (Amnå and Ekman, 2014). Social media acts as a site of activation for these 
seemingly passive citizens. Secondly, Abbey’s involvement was strengthened by the 
knowledge of a wider community of other like-minded citizens. Here, social media 
provides a space for connection over a diverse range of issues. The presence of these 
communities helps foster political participation. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: Experiential Learning, Standby Citizens and the Redundancy of 
the Slacktivist Critique 
 
The rationale for this study was to observe and analyse how citizens use social 
networking sites for political participation in an everyday context. By drawing on data 
collected from Facebook and Twitter, and then contextualising these actions with rich 
ethnographic data in the form of diaries and interviews, this study offers a unique 
insight into the attitudes that guide political behaviour online. In doing so, it is clear that 
neither the slacktivist critique nor the theoretical framework proposed by thesis (EF2; 
EF3) fully explain the individual level attitudes that guide online self-expression and 
digital micro-activism. I propose a typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments to identify the different ways in which users engage with political 
material on social media. The findings, structured around the four stages of the 
continuum of participation, provide evidence to illustrate how these different citizen 
roles act in practice.  
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Firstly, by comparing the content of the diaries with the lead stories of four 
British newspapers, I show that personal identity increasingly drives more 
individualised forms of news consumption. Both Twitter and, to a lesser extent, 
Facebook are used to tailor news consumption around a user’s own interests. However, 
these tools do not substitute professional media coverage, as social networking sites 
complement traditional modes of communication. This represents a hybridisation of 
media consumption habits (Chadwick, 2013). The extent to which diarists relied on 
these personalised sources of news varied amongst the sample. For some, it was the 
focal point of their news consumption. Marco and Oliver, two of the more politically 
active participants, emphasised the value of social media in providing information on 
alternative issues. While others were sceptical of the usefulness of social networking 
sites for maintaining an awareness of current affairs, even Sam and Thomas, whose 
weekly entries rigidly followed those issues that were featured in professional news 
media, used Twitter to monitor specific issues. As such, Facebook and Twitter were 
used to access information on topics that were personally relevant (Papacharissi, 2010: 
22; Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012: 172). These characteristics are reflective of an 
actualizing logic, in which self-actualisation shapes media consumption (Bennett, 2008; 
Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2010; Bennett, 2012). 
The implications of this personalisation for democratic engagement do not 
reflect the ominous forecasts of the slacktivist critique; in this study there was no 
evidence of selective exposure leading to harmful audience fragmentation. The 
comparison between the diaries and newspaper coverage illustrates that this 
personalisation was balanced by moments of collective exposure, as citizens focused 
their attention on public issues. Therefore, while the dynamics of media consumption 
have irreversibly changed, citizens still participate in democratically beneficial shared 
experiences. This collective exposure may occur conventionally, as illustrated by the 
passing of Nelson Mandela, or by cascades on social media. The interest shown by 
diarists in the interview between Russell Brand and Jeremy Paxman demonstrates how 
social networking sites can disrupt and transform the norms of news making. However, 
the diarists did not simply adopt the views shared by Brand, a dynamic suggested in 
those critiques of the #Kony2012 campaign. Instead they referred to professional news 
media and other citizens to contextualise and process this information. While these 
findings cannot be generalised across broader populations given the small sample on 
which they are based, the content of these news items and the way that they are shaped 
and sustained on social media pose important questions for future research. 
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Secondly, this chapter proposes a typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments that outlines the different ways in which citizens engage with politics on 
Facebook and Twitter. This typology challenges the attitudinal (H3) and behavioural 
(H2) hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique. A small number of diarists reflect 
what I describe as civic instigators or contributors, both of which signify active 
producers of political content on social networking sites.73 While these diarists were 
more likely to participate than listeners, there was no evidence of a causal relationship 
between public forms of online self-expression and goal-orientated instrumental action. 
However, despite this absence of causation, I argue that these citizens are not 
slacktivists. By tracking political attitudes over the course of three months using a 
multi-method approach, I found evidence to suggest that these digitally active citizens 
learn through self-expression and digital micro-activism. According to Kolb (1984: 38), 
an educational theorist, “learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through 
the transformation of experience.” Civic instigators and contributors hone their personal 
identity through these low-threshold online interactions as part of an “experiential 
learning cycle,” as shown in Figure 6.11. These diarists reflect on their behaviour on 
social media, interpret and make sense of discursive exchanges when they occur, and 
then use this as a basis for future political engagement. Therefore, self-expression and 
digital micro-activism do not represent vacuous and ephemeral banalities, but are 
connected to the development of a citizen’s political identity. 
 
                                                
73 As noted earlier in the chapter, these two citizen roles are distinguished by the motivations that 
underpin their political activity online. Civic instigators seek to challenge other users by exposing wider 
publics to provocative views, while contributors share content without an explicit indication of their own 
opinions. 
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Figure 6.11. Kolb's experiential learning cycle 
 
Source: Kolb (1984) 
 
Facebook and Twitter become sites of learning for these politically interested 
citizens. Unlike listeners who benefit from the informational shortcuts provided online, 
social networking sites reflect what Flanagan (2013: 18) describes as “mini-polities”: 
through their experiences in these spaces, civic instigators and contributors “formulate 
ideas about their membership, rights, and obligations as citizens in the broader polity.” 
Oliver’s diary exemplifies this experiential learning cycle. He often used Facebook to 
express his criticism of institutional politics in Britain. A theme running through his 
diary was the emergence of a politically active Russell Brand. At first Oliver (entry 1) 
was encouraged by the political vision offered in Brand’s interview, as the ideas 
resonated with his own personal frustrations; “this video was cathartic, assuring me that 
I am not alone in my ideas and aspirations.” However, after sharing a subsequent 
interview with the comedian-turned-political activist on his Facebook profile (entry 2), 
the reaction from other users made Oliver question Brand’s authenticity; “it soon 
dawned on me that the focus on Brand’s very general message of political deviancy 
came at the expense of its substance.” Ultimately, Oliver (entry 4) deemed Brand to be a 
“commodity of rebellion” that was undermining more serious political activism. Oliver 
discussed his own behaviours in reaction to this, reflecting on how he could tap into the 
Concrete 
Experience 
Doing or having an 
experience 
Reflective 
Observation 
Reviewing or 
reflecting on the 
experience 
Abstract 
conceptulisation 
Concluding or 
learning from the 
experience 
Active 
experimentation 
Planning or trying out 
what you have 
learned 
 216 
interest shown by his friends in Brand. This experiential learning creates the conditions 
for future mobilisation. 
When considering the behavioural claims of the slacktivist critique, it is clear 
that those completing the diaries were not representative of the committed activists that 
Gladwell (2010) and Morozov (2011) identify. While there was evidence of political 
learning and discussion in private spaces, examples of instrumental action were few and 
far between. Those who did participate in substantive forms of political action were 
civic instigators and contributors, those who most closely resemble slacktivists. This 
correlation challenges the substitution thesis, the claim that digital micro-activism 
displaces tried and tested forms of real space participation. These findings support those 
of Christensen (2011; 2012) and others (Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide & Center 
for Social Impact Communication at Georgetown University, 2011; Vaccari et al., 
2015) who have also shown that expressive forms of digital activism are positively 
associated with goal-oriented public-political action.  
I did not find evidence of an active model of citizenship amongst the majority of 
participants in this study, certainly not one that is purposive in terms of political action. 
However, as outlined in Chapter 1, such expectations are unrealistic and ultimately 
unhelpful. As Dalton (2007: 1) argues, rather that focusing on how good citizenship has 
been defined in the past we must ask “what does it mean to be a ‘good citizen’ in 
today’s society?” I argue that those citizens that I characterise as listeners are beneficial 
to a democracy. Listeners represent citizens who use these services to learn about news 
and political matters, either purposefully or as a by-product of their day-to-day use, but 
rarely engage in any form of public-political expression. They can further be 
distinguished as either active listeners, those who frequently post content on non-
political topics but consciously avoid anything that they deem to be political, or passive 
listeners, those who avoid public forms of expression entirely. For these diarists, 
politics still represents a taboo topic within public spaces, much like in Eliasoph’s 
(1998) influential study Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday 
Life. Although they value the informational shortcuts provided by social networking 
sites, the lines between content consumption and production were resolutely drawn; 
public-political actions still require a public face. 
Therefore, their lack of online self-expression is not indicative of disinterest but 
represents a distinctive attitudinal logic, one that challenges the very premise of 
slacktivism (H3). For listeners, what may seem like a simple click of a button, such as 
sharing a petition, is part of a complex decision-making process. This is because of the 
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reputational risks on social networking sites, and the threats posed by the real and 
imagined audience. The slacktivist critique is correct in suggesting that image 
management online does play a significant role in shaping behaviour, but it constrains 
citizen action rather than promoting it. This is particularly true on Facebook, as the 
multiple audiences present on the service heighten cognitive anxieties. Those involved 
in this study were conscious that their posts would be deemed to be indicative of their 
character. As such, the slacktivist critique may even exacerbate participatory 
inequalities, as the more credibility and use the term gains, the more deeply rooted these 
inhibitions may become. 
When listeners do participate in self-expression and digital micro-activism these 
acts are not triggered by inauthentic reputational management, or the ease of the act 
itself, but by something much more meaningful. They overcome these cognitive loads 
on those issues that resonate with their deeply held personal beliefs. As such, listeners, 
both active and passive, reflect the characteristics of Amnå and Ekman’s (2014: 262) 
standby citizen, those citizens who “appear passive” but “in reality are prepared for 
political action, should circumstances warrant.” Just because they lack the same 
behavioural data trail as their contemporaries does not mean they are disinterested. They 
use Facebook and Twitter in a different way to civic instigators and contributors. As 
Joshua (entry 9) notes, “I always have it on, but I’m never using it.” Listeners are 
purposive in the selection of political materials that they consume, and they actively 
express themselves on political issues in everyday life. Self-expression occurs in private 
spaces, either online or offline, with strong tie connections often in the form of family 
or close friends. As such, this chapter shows evidence of a multi-step flow of 
communication across public, semi-public, and private spaces (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1955). The conditions of this cross-fertilisation between access to information on public 
and semi-public social networking sites and discussion in private spaces further 
strengthens calls for research across different media. In particular, the cross-platform 
mobile messaging app WhatsApp was used by a number of diarists to discuss news and 
current affairs. It is only through multi-method, individual level research that we can 
observe and unearth these complex behavioural patterns. 
Although this thesis has illustrated the democratic benefits of informational 
shortcuts in an activist context and within day-to-day life, it is important to remember 
that Facebook and Twitter are not unmoderated spaces. Algorithms influence what a 
user is “accidentally” exposed to, with certain news stories or providers gaining 
prominence. These algorithms are unseen—only Charlie (pre-diary interview), 
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commented on their impact—yet they are having important consequences for news 
dissemination online. Bell (2014) argues that the absence of editors can be dangerous if 
citizens rely on social media for news. This is particularly true on Facebook, where 
popularity is one of the key determinants of content prioritisation (Constine, 2014). As a 
result, new media organisations such as BuzzFeed have begun to use social networking 
sites to distribute their content. Annabeth, Abbey, Madeline, Joe, Mallory, and Zoey all 
discussed articles from BuzzFeed over the course of the diary research. The influence of 
information type and popularity on political behaviour will be explored in the next 
chapter, through two laboratory experiments that are designed to directly intervene in 
user behaviour on Facebook. 
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7. Laboratory Experiments: An Experimental Intervention to 
Explore Slacktivism 
 
This chapter will examine the slacktivist critique through two laboratory experiments 
designed to directly intervene in user behaviour on Facebook. The findings from the 
ethnography of the hybrid mobilization movement 38 Degrees, and the diary research, 
suggest that digitally active citizens use social networking sites for informational 
shortcuts. Those involved in this research share similar characteristics to Amnå and 
Ekman’s (2014) standby citizen model, as they are triggered to participate on the basis 
of exposure to personally relevant political issues. Given the passive model of 
citizenship evident, the conditions in which they acquire this political information are 
significant.  
Those advocating the slacktivist critique hypothesise that political content 
shared on social networking sites is distorted, as users seek to manage their reputation 
online (H3). This social presentation results in online cascades. As Sunstein (2007: 84) 
notes, there are two types of cascades online. Firstly, informational cascades, in which 
users cease to rely on private information and instead depend on the issues that become 
established within a social group (Velasquez, 2012: 1287-1288). This can lead to 
emotive and inconsistent information becoming viral on social networking sites at the 
expense of other, more deserving or urgent, causes (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2009; 
2011: 190). Secondly, reputational cascades can also occur on social media, as 
audiences are susceptible to trends or the sway of popular opinion. As discussed in the 
#Kony2012 case study, some argue that the visible metrics embedded within platforms 
like Facebook and Twitter affect political behaviour, as users go along with the crowd 
to maintain the good opinion of others (Morozov, 2011; White, 2010; 2011). These 
experiments probe the conditions in which informational and reputational cascades 
occur on Facebook.  
As such, ensuring that the experimental news feeds closely represented 
something akin to everyday user experience was paramount to the design of this study. 
As McDermott (2011: 27) notes, “the purpose of an experiment informs the degree to 
which emphasis should be placed on internal versus external validity.” As outlined in 
Chapter 3, mundane realism took precedence over experimental realism in the design of 
these experiments. Therefore, this is a quasi-experimental study; it is an attempt to 
understand user behaviour on Facebook in relation to the slacktivist critique. 
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The first experiment focuses on informational cascades, by exploring the 
relationship between information type and the likelihood of future political 
mobilisation. Information type refers to the style, genre, and format of content, with 
evidence of considerable diversity in the political materials that are shared on Facebook. 
By exposing participants to four different types of information on the same issue from a 
range of content providers, this experiment will investigate what type of source material 
triggers attention and engagement. I focus on two digital publishers, BuzzFeed and 
Upworthy. Both organisations blur the boundaries between entertainment, news, and 
activism to maximise their reach on social media. Their content distribution revolves 
around what Morozov (2013: 159) describes as “meme logic,” “the tendency to assess 
everything in terms of how the intended audience is likely to react according to what is 
known about that audience.” According to the slacktivist critique, this type of 
journalism represents a threat to the norms of democratic engagement as it favours 
receiver satisfaction and easy dissemination over information accuracy. It produces 
what White (2010) describes as “a race to the bottom,” as actors seek to compress 
political information to suit the granular medium. As such, both BuzzFeed and 
Upworthy have been criticised for distracting citizens from serious political news and 
lowering the tone of political debate through coverage that prioritises clickthrough rates 
(Ball, 2014; Preston, 2014; Zara, 2013).  
The second experiment investigates reputational cascades, examining whether 
publicly visible social recommendations from other users on Facebook drives attention 
and engagement. I test the willingness of subjects to click on and sign an e-petition on 
the basis of the number of Facebook likes on the post, a proxy measure for social 
information (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004: 606). 
The findings from these experiments suggest that young internet users do not 
participate on the basis of stylistic information or popularity (H3), but respond to 
information that resonates with their own pre-existing political attitudes (EF5). The 
results from the first experiment show that while subjects were attentive to both the 
BuzzFeed and Upworthy stimuli, they were conscious of and, at times, critical of their 
unique journalistic style. In particular, participants felt uneasy at the attempt by 
BuzzFeed to blur the boundaries between soft news and political journalism. While any 
form of information had some affect on a participant’s future willingness to engage in 
comparison to the control group, the strength of this association was dwarfed by 
evidence of a positive correlation between pre-existing political attitudes and political 
engagement across all treatment conditions. The results from the second experiment 
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suggest that visible signs of popularity do not impact a participant’s willingness to sign 
an e-petition, or to participate on the same issue in the future (H3). Rather, a 
participant’s pre-existing interest in the treatment issue was a more plausible 
explanatory variable for micro-activism, supporting the claim that individual autonomy 
and self-efficacy are the overriding motivational logics for online participation (Bennett, 
2008; Papacharissi, 2010).  
 
7.1 Rationale for Experiment 1: Testing for the Effect of Information Type 
 
As the evidence from the media diaries has shown, users are exposed to a vast array of 
political stimuli on social networking sites. Given this diversity, concerns have been 
raised over the type of informational stimuli that influence political engagement 
(Mirani, 2011; Morozov, 2011; White, 2010). Two factors led to these concerns. Firstly, 
the boundaries between what we categorise as news, opinion, entertainment, humour, 
and advocacy content are now essentially fluid. This collapse in media genres has been 
widely documented within the literature (Chadwick, 2013; Delli Carpini and Williams, 
2000; Jenkins, 2006). Secondly, the hybridisation of genres and norms has led to the 
creation of a number of new organisations online that appeal to younger audiences by 
virtue of their unique journalistic style. BuzzFeed and Upworthy epitomise these new 
media organisations (Ball, 2014; Gorkana, 2014). They use social media as their main 
vehicle for content delivery, with notable success; in November 2013 BuzzFeed and 
Upworthy were the second and third most popular publishers on Facebook, calculated 
by the cumulative total of likes, shares, and comments on content published on their 
Facebook page (Corcoran, 2013). By using social networking sites, these organisations 
can challenge the reach of professional news media. For instance, BuzzFeed have much 
higher levels of audience interaction on Facebook. In February 2015 BuzzFeed UK had 
7,845,965 interactions on Facebook, more than double the total received on content 
published by the Daily Telegraph (telegraph.co.uk).74 This was despite the Daily 
Telegraph publishing over 18 times more content over this period (Corcoran, 2015).75 
BuzzFeed and Upworthy organisations are phenomena in viral media.  
                                                
74 The total number of interactions is calculated by the total number of likes, shares, and comments on 
content during a specific period. During the same period the Daily Telegraph had 3,638,379 total 
interactions on Facebook (Corcoran, 2015). 
75 During February 2015 BuzzFeed UK published 554 articles, while the Daily Telegraph published 
10,249 (Corcoran, 2015). 
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BuzzFeed, an internet news media company, was founded in 2006 by current 
CEO Jonah Peretti. With articles such as “18 Reasons Cats Think Humans Are Terrible 
At Being Cats” (Main, 2013) and “11 Delightful Poems Found In PornHub Comments” 
(Mallikarjuna, 2013), the most fitting characterisation of BuzzFeed is perhaps “soft 
news,” a journalistic style that blurs the lines between information and entertainment. 
The website is renowned for its cat memes, quizzes and “listicles,” short-form articles 
that are structured as a list. Although this type of content may seem trivial, its design 
helps to illustrate the website’s meteoric rise and exemplifies an important dynamic of 
news consumption on Facebook and Twitter. The overriding objective for the editors at 
BuzzFeed is to produce and deliver content that is shareable. As Peretti (quoted in 
Shontell, 2012) states, “I care a lot about whether we're consistently creating content 
that people think is worth sharing.”  
While the website initially focused on publishing light-hearted content, over the 
past two years the company has diversified into news and political journalism. In 2011 
the company hired Ben Smith, formerly of Politico, as the site’s editor-in-chief. In 
doing so BuzzFeed began producing long-form, original-content with an emphasis on 
politics and breaking news. Despite a plagiarism scandal involving one of their writers 
in 2014, their output has been positively received (Cresci, 2014). In 2013 BuzzFeed 
launched a dedicated UK arm. Jim Waterson, formerly of business newspaper City 
A.M., was hired as the website’s political editor, with Jamie Ross joining from BBC 
Scotland shortly after. Like their American contemporaries, the UK subsidiary has had 
favourable reviews. Bell (2014) argues that the website’s news coverage could provide 
an important entry point for younger audiences into a range of complex geopolitical 
stories. 
However, the distinctive approach adopted by BuzzFeed is not without criticism. 
A number of commentators have accused the website of distracting citizens from 
serious political topics, especially given their success in securing prime “real estate” on 
the Facebook news feed, a constantly updating list of posts from connected contacts and 
pages that a user follows on Facebook (Maynor, 2014: 11). Preston (2014) has also cast 
doubt on whether the tone and style that BuzzFeed adopts is suited to rigorous 
investigative journalism. Likewise, questions have been asked of the democratic 
benefits accrued by their audience, as evidence of sharing does not necessarily equate to 
evidence of political learning. 
Social sharing is also the key method of content distribution for Upworthy. 
Formed in March 2012 by Peter Koechley, formerly of the news satire website The 
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Onion, and Eli Pariser, Board President of the hybrid mobilization movement 
MoveOn.org, the staff at Upworthy curate and share pre-existing content online. They 
do this with three principles in mind, that subject material must be “awesome,” 
“meaningful,” and “visual” (Koechley, 2012). Consequently, the material they publish 
blends the publishing styles adopted by the founders’ former employers; political 
content that entertains. This often has an overt ideological orientation, something that 
the staff at Upworthy (2014) do not try to hide:  
 
We're a mission-driven media company. We're not a newspaper — we'd rather 
speak truth than appear unbiased… But we do have a point of view. We're pro-
gay-marriage, and we're anti-child-poverty. We think the media is horrible to 
women, we think climate change is real, and we think the government has a lot 
to learn from the Internet about efficiency, disruption, and effectiveness. 
 
Despite the website’s popularity, Upworthy has been criticised for using 
emotive clickbait headlines.76 With titles such as “4 things you should do when you're 
told 'Black Lives Matter'” (Wanjuki, 2015) and “You don't want to get involved in 
changing the world? Here's 90 seconds that might give you pause” (Kelley, 2014), the 
staff at Upworthy provides just enough information to pique the reader's curiosity, but 
not enough to satisfy it without clicking through to the linked content (Waldman, 2014). 
With over 87 million unique visitors during November 2013, the website has been 
successful at achieving user engagement (Meyer, 2013). As a result, other professional 
news media have begun to employ the “Upworthy style” (Bryan, 2013). For some, the 
use of emotion and the “curiosity gap” to spark attention is disingenuous and 
undermines the organisation’s lofty aims (Powers, 2013; Silver, 2014). As a result, 
Upworthy is often the object of scorn from those sympathetic with the slacktivist 
critique. Some argue that the videos they share promote “backpatting” at the expense of 
real activism, as citizens who share the website’s content achieve a certain sense of 
emotional and political fulfilment (Powers, 2013; Silver, 2014). 
While I have outlined the criticisms of both media organisations, it is necessary 
to state that an alternative reading may argue that BuzzFeed and Upworthy offer widely 
accessible political content that can challenge the dominant frames typically set by 
political elites or broadcast media (Chadwick, 2011; 2013; Pariser in Salam, 2014; 
Maynor, 2014). The fact that BuzzFeed and Upworthy do not resemble the gatekeepers 
                                                
76 However, it is important to recognise that emotive framing is not something unique to these new hybrid 
media organisations, but a technique used throughout the recent history of news making in order to make 
information accessible to citizens (Graber, 2001; 2004). Further research is therefore necessary to explore 
if and how these organisations differ in their strategic use of emotion in comparison to traditional forms 
of professional news media. 
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of old does not mean that we should automatically assume that they debase the values 
and norms of news making. As such, this experiment will not produce substantive 
conclusions on the democratic value of either BuzzFeed or Upworthy in providing 
informational goods to citizens.  
This experiment is designed to observe and analyse the motivational context for 
those behaviours derided as slacktivism. The slacktivist critique claims that viral 
content can vary significantly in terms of its reliability, leading to political actions being 
formed on the basis of erroneous information (H3; Morozov, 2011: 179-186). However, 
information accuracy is a difficult variable to operationalise. For example, BuzzFeed 
(Peretti, 2014) and Upworthy (Savener, 2014) both have strict editorial guidelines in 
place. Therefore, as exemplified by the Hollywood-style editing of the #Kony2012 
video created by Invisible Children, it is more the style, type, and format of content that 
forms the basis of the critique. This experiment will present participants with varying 
types of information on the same issue, the People’s Climate March that took place in 
London on September 21, 2014, and then measure what effect this exposure has on the 
likelihood of future political mobilisation. BuzzFeed and Upworthy are contrasted with 
two other sources, BBC News Online and Change.org. BBC News Online is the most 
popular news website in the UK (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015: 25). Change.org is 
a global petition website that provides users with the tools to set up their own petition. 
By drawing on these four contrasting sources this experiment explores whether 
information type, and the way in which the content is presented, affects engagement. 
 
7.2 Results for Experiment 1: Testing for the Effect of Information Type 
 
The findings for both experiments are structured around two outcome variables: 
attention and engagement. Attention is explored in this experiment to observe how 
subjects respond when exposed to the treatment. This corresponds with the first stage of 
the continuum of participation model, “access.” Prior to reporting the findings it is 
necessary to highlight the need for caution when interpreting the results of these 
experiments, as the mean values may be unreliable given the low number of participants 
in each treatment condition. I provide the standard deviation for all averages to show the 
variation within the data. A rigorous participant debrief was undertaken following each 
experiment in order to address some of the methodological shortcomings outlined in 
Chapter 4. These discussions provided an opportunity to discuss the information types 
used as the treatment. These reflections are included within the results. 
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The first measure of attention is clickthrough rate, referring to the percentage of 
subjects that clicked on the treatment post in each group. Typically used by those within 
the advertising industry, the clickthrough rate is used to measure the effectiveness of a 
piece of information in capturing attention. As Table 7.1 shows, the clickthrough rate 
was highest for the two websites that rely on social media to distribute their content, 
BuzzFeed and Upworthy. The titles of both pieces were notably different to the more 
conventional approach adopted by the BBC. BuzzFeed blurred the boundaries between 
politics and entertainment by mentioning the celebrities involved with the protest, while 
Upworthy used clickbait as a device to attract page views. However, the difference in 
clickthrough rate between the three media organisations was minimal when we factor in 
the small sample size. In contrast, the petition on Change.org had a noticeably lower 
clickthrough rate. In the debrief three participants in this experimental group explained 
their noncompliance, noting that they would normally only click on a petition for an 
issue that related to their own interests or personal experiences.   
 
Table 7.1. Clickthrough rate on the treatment 
Treatment: Information Type Page views Group size Clickthrough % 
BBC News 7 10 70.0 
BuzzFeed 7 8 87.5 
Change.org 4 7 57.1 
Upworthy 7 8 87.5 
 
Clickthrough rates only provide rather shallow evidence of initial exposure; they 
do not provide any clarity on the depth of someone’s attention. I also calculated the 
amount of time a user spent browsing each web page on the news feed. Figure 7.1 
shows the inter-quartile range for the amount of time that participants spent browsing 
each treatment post. Calculated using the median average, subjects spent the most time 
on the BBC News article (110 seconds), followed by the Upworthy post (96 seconds), 
and the BuzzFeed piece (88 seconds). These results are somewhat representative of the 
format and length of these articles. The BBC News article featured the highest volume 
of text, with an estimated read time of 137-seconds.77 The article also featured a 53-
second video, meaning that the average time spent on the page under experimental 
                                                
77 This is based on an average reading speed of 300 words per minute (Noyes and Garland, 2008). 
However, this is a workaround. Reading times vary dramatically depending on the individual (see Nelson, 
2012). For further information on this tool: http://www.edgestudio.com/production/words-to-time-
calculator. 
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conditions was 80 seconds lower that than the 190 seconds required for a person of 
average reading speed to read the text and watch the video. This was not the case with 
the Upworthy post, as subjects spent longer browsing the page than was required to 
watch the 85-second video.78 Participants spent longer on the BuzzFeed piece (88 
seconds) than the average amount of time required to read the text (68 seconds), 
although this is most likely due to the large number of images of celebrities at the 
protest on the web page. Subjects only spent 48 seconds on the Change.org petition 
page, despite the 82 seconds required for a person of average reading speed to read the 
rationale for the petition. 
 
Figure 7.1. Amount of time spent on the treatment 
 
 
User attention was also measured through two post-test survey questions, as the 
sentiment of the receiver cannot be inferred on the basis of the amount of time spent 
browsing the treatment. These questions offer some insight into the subjects’ attitudes 
towards the different content providers. As Table 7.2 highlights, all of the users who 
viewed the Upworthy post either agree or strongly agree that the post was interesting. 
This, along with the high clickthrough rate, suggests that participants were attracted to 
content produced by Upworthy. In comparison, the image heavy and celebrity focused 
                                                
78 The staff at Upworthy have since changed the video on the page. For the original video: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWgALnxc8D4.   
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style adopted in the BuzzFeed piece was more divisive. Six of the seven participants 
who accessed the BBC News article deemed it to be interesting.79 
Based on Chadwick’s (2009; 2012) hypothesis of accidental exposure and by-
product learning on social media, participants were also asked if the treatment post 
made them want to learn more about the environment. There was evidence of potential 
by-product learning for those subjects who were exposed to the BBC News article and, 
interestingly, the Upworthy post, as shown in Table 7.3. This challenges the substitution 
thesis, in that sharing emotive viral video content displaces other political acts. As noted 
in Chapter 1, viral videos can amplify interest in a civic or political cause and 
sometimes act as a gateway to further engagement. By comparison, five of the seven 
participants exposed to the BuzzFeed piece either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
this statement. During the debrief for this experimental group a number of participants 
indicated that they perceived BuzzFeed to be an entertainment space and, as such, 
apolitical. The hypothesis that users click onto the website for lolcats and then stay for 
the news content was dismissed for those in this experiment (Peretti, 2014). This wasn’t 
the case for Upworthy, with a number of participants in the debrief stating the source 
was both educational and informative. 
 
                                                
79 I have omitted Change.org from this discussion due to the low clickthrough rate in that experimental 
condition. 
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The second set of analyses focus on the relationship between information type 
and political participation. Engagement is operationalised through a range of post-test 
survey measures.80 While the 11-point scale used to measure the likelihood of future 
engagement is highly interpretive, as confidence levels in political attitudes can vary 
from person-to-person, the data does provide some indication of whether media effects 
occur. Seven forms of political participation are used to account for the other three 
states on the continuum of participation model: “expression,” “connection,” and 
“action.” These forms of engagement are included to account for the scaled nature of 
political involvement. These include low-threshold forms of “expression” and 
“connection,” such as discussing an issue with others or sharing campaign materials, 
and high-threshold “actions,” like taking part in a demonstration. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the mean values for the subjects’ future intention to 
participate across each experimental condition. Two indicators are used that reflect 
those acts most closely associated with the slacktivist critique; the likelihood a subject 
will write or sign a petition, and the possibility a participant will distribute or share 
information over social media. The findings show that exposure to any form of 
information from a media organisation leads to a higher likelihood of micro-activism, 
regardless of the information type. The one exception was that those in the control 
group were more likely to write or sign a petition relating to the environment than those 
who were exposed to the Upworthy post. There is one comparison that is particularly 
interesting in respect of the slacktivist critique; those exposed to the Upworthy post 
were less likely to engage in self-expression and digital micro-activism than those who 
clicked on the BBC News article. This suggests that an emotive viral video does not 
necessarily translate into digital micro-activism, as witnessed in the #Kony2012 case 
study. Even more surprisingly given the nature of the information, those that clicked on 
the petition on Change.org were less likely to participate in these acts than the control 
group. However, the prohibitively small sub-sample limits the inferences that can be 
drawn from this comparison. 
                                                
80 I used an 11-point likert scale in order to analyse the data using measures of central tendency. 
However, there are intense disputes surrounding the suitability of treating ordinal data as if it were 
interval data. Jamieson (2003: 1214) argues that the mean and standard deviation are inappropriate for 
ordinal data, as we cannot presume that participants perceive the differences between adjacent levels to be 
equal. However, as Kostoulas (2013) argues, these criticisms typically apply to a four or five point scale. 
A likert scale where central tendency can be measured is usually composed of a series of four or more 
likert-type items that represent similar style responses, but are instead combined into a single composite 
score. The 11-point scale used required participants to position themselves on a scale with 11 equidistant 
anchors. These were unlabelled radio buttons. Participants were only informed that 0 refers to “very 
unlikely” and 10 refers to “very likely.” The scale also had an unseen midpoint. As Norman (2010) 
argues, this type of likert scale is widely used for calculating the mean and standard deviation. 
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Figure 7.2. Mean score for future intention to participate in digital micro-activism based 
on treatment 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows the mean scores for each of seven modes of engagement across 
the treatment groups, the control group, and also for those subjects within the 
experimental groups who were not exposed to the treatment (i.e. noncompliance). As in 
the previous figure, the average mean score for all measures of engagement, bar one, 
were lower in the control group than in the experimental conditions with content from 
BBC News Online, BuzzFeed, and Upworthy. This suggests that information of any 
kind, excluding the e-petition, correlates with the likelihood of engagement. Those 
exposed to the BuzzFeed piece were most likely to participate across three indicators, 
despite this stimulus focusing on celebrity involvement in the People’s Climate March. 
At first glance, this may seem to support the slacktivist critique. However, as Table 7.4 
demonstrates, one should be sceptical of these averages as this experimental condition 
had the highest level of standard deviation amongst all of the treatment groups.  
Furthermore, by comparing the results from the BBC news article to the Upworthy 
video, those exposed to the video were actually more likely to engage in high-threshold 
forms of participation, such as taking part in a demonstration. Finally, the low mean 
scores from the e-petition on Change.org are also surprising, given that the very nature 
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of the source is to persuade others to act. This, alongside the low mean scores for those 
participants that did not click on the treatment, suggests that other variables may offer a 
more plausible explanation for this relationship. 
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Levels of interest in a range of different issues were also measured for this 
experiment in the pre-test survey. As Figure 7.3 illustrates, there was evidence of a 
positive linear relationship between the level of interest a participant had in the 
environment and the likelihood they would participate in forms of digital micro-
activism in the future.81 This suggests support for the expected findings (EF5) and those 
who argue that online forms of participation are driven by private, personalised beliefs. 
 
Figure 7.3. Mean score for future intention to participate in digital micro-activism based 
on the level of interest in the environment 
 
 
As Table 7.5 shows, this positive correlation is present across four of the seven 
different measures. There are three forms of engagement that do not reflect this trend: 
(1) contact the media; (2) contact an official; and (3) donate money to a charity or 
campaign. Those subjects who declared themselves to be “fairly interested” were more 
likely to undertake these acts than those who described themselves as “very interested” 
in the environment. This finding reflects a broader trend across both experiments, in 
that, regardless of the level of interest in the issue, subjects seemed highly unlikely to 
                                                
81 I did not undertake any correlation analysis to determine the strength of the association between the 
two variables due to the sample size. As De Vaus (2014: 258) notes, it is much easier to obtain a 
spuriously large correlation coefficient with a small sample. 
8.29 
9.00 
5.87 
6.39 
3.20 
4.00 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Write or sign a digital or written petition Distribute or share information 
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e 
Forms of political engagement 
Very interested (N=7) Fairly interested (N=23) Not very interested (N=10) 
 234 
engage in any form of correspondence with elected representatives or with forms of 
broadcast media. One may hypothesise that this is a result of low levels of public trust 
in these actors, especially evident amongst this age demographic (see Hansard Society, 
2014). This is reflective of Bennett’s (2008: 14) actualizing citizen framework, in which 
young citizens turn their back on the media and politicians in favour of connections 
formed with like-minded others online. These results also show evidence of a positive 
correlation between pre-existing issue interest and the likelihood of digital micro-
activism, casting doubt on the hypothesis that low-threshold online actions are 
undertaken inauthentically (H3). 
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7.3 Conclusion for Experiment 1: Critical Citizens 
 
This experiment found no clear evidence to suggest that young internet users participate 
on the basis of information type (H3). On the contrary, subjects respond to those issues 
that resonate with their own pre-existing personal preferences (EF5). While the results 
show that young citizens are interested in the content provided by new media producers 
like BuzzFeed and Upworthy, they do not simply accept the views that they are exposed 
to. The university students that took part in this experiment are critical citizens. I 
borrow this term from Norris (1999: 24), who introduced it to characterise the rise of 
citizens who question traditional sources of authority. I argue that those involved in this 
experiment, recruited because of their similarities to those deemed to be “slacktivists,” 
maintain the same scepticism when consuming political information on social media. 
The findings from this experiment and from the debrief suggest that, while they 
both drive attention on social media, BuzzFeed and Upworthy differ in terms of their 
perceived function. During the debrief a number of participants stated that BuzzFeed as 
a media organisation is not particularly suited to political reporting. We can see 
evidence of this, as participants were not motivated to learn more about the treatment 
issue. Subjects felt that the website has clearly defined boundaries; users visit the site 
for enjoyment and to procrastinate. Participants felt uneasy at the possibility of a 
convergence of styles, with BuzzFeed combining their knack for creating viral content 
on social platforms with the norms, customs, and expectancies that young citizens 
expect from political journalism. This scepticism was also evident in the diary research. 
As “Charlie” (entry 11) notes, chasing clickthrough rates may come at the expense of 
journalistic quality: 
 
The thing I think I dislike about it most is that BuzzFeed will be successful at 
selling news, well it will when it measures its articles in clicks and shares… 
What it might not be successful in is presenting a balance. News isn’t supposed 
to be clickable content, it is supposed to be news coverage. 
 
This suspicion, evident in both the media diaries and the experiment debrief, challenges 
the slacktivist critique, as those young social media users who took part are not as 
impressionable as feared (Morozov, 2011: 81-82; White, 2010; 2011). On the contrary, 
they critique the information they consume online. 
In contrast, participants considered the emotive video shared on Upworthy to be 
both engaging and informative. This was illustrated by the average time spent on the 
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page lasting over the full length of the video, the high level of interest shown in the post 
based on the survey responses, and the desire to learn more about the environment 
following exposure. As such, while Upworthy may have been criticised for their use of 
clickbait headlines to gain attention, what differentiated the website from BuzzFeed in 
the debrief discussion was the clear purpose with which content is curated and 
published. The coherence of the ideological frame adopted by Upworthy was noted 
during the participant debrief. This was true for those who were familiar with the 
organisation, but also for participants who were visiting the website for the first time. 
Upworthy benefit from boundary drawing (Chadwick, 2013: 185), as the transparency 
of their motives and political biases seemed to resonate with participants. Upworthy 
successfully blend the roles and functions associated with both an activist group and a 
legacy news producer. This sheds some light on how the organisation may have been 
misinterpreted. Rather than viral video campaigns displacing more traditional forms of 
engagement, it may be the case that Upworthy represents a new type of media producer, 
one that uses the personalised narratives outlined in Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) 
logic of connective action by way of challenging the established norms of agenda 
setting. Their tagline—“Things that matter. Pass ‘em on.”—suggests they are an 
organisation of attention, not of mobilisation. In this way, the scaled continuum of 
participation offers a useful starting point for exploring their democratic function. In 
doing so, the case studies identified by the slacktivist critique as examples of laziness 
become a very different phenomenon. In this experiment, this quick fix did not result in 
a lack of deep thinking; those who viewed the video wanted to learn more about the 
issue. As Massing (2015) notes, even the #Kony2012 viral video brought an alternative 
point of view to international attention. The findings from Chapter 6 and this 
experiment show that the presentation of content can increase exposure but not shape 
attitudes; young, digitally active citizens are purposive in their information 
consumption. 
As for the second outcome variable, the findings were somewhat unclear on 
whether information type and content presentation can influence political engagement. 
There was some evidence of correlation, but the reliability and validity of this 
association is questionable. In comparison to the control group, participants that 
accessed the BuzzFeed and Upworthy stimuli were more likely to participate in 
activities relating to the environment. Surprisingly, when compared to the reaction to 
the #Kony2012 video described in Chapter 1, those exposed to the Upworthy video 
were less likely to take part in digital micro-activism and more likely to take part in 
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effort-intensive acts than those shown the article from BBC News Online. However, 
these results are somewhat unconvincing given the challenges of noncompliance and the 
other contradictory results. One cannot make a confident assessment on the findings 
from those primed with the Change.org petition, as just four participants were exposed. 
Likewise, although those in the treatment group containing the BuzzFeed piece were 
most likely to engage across four of the indicators for participation, there were high 
levels of standard deviation associated with these means. This was common across all 
of the experimental groups, most likely a result of the prohibitively small number of 
participants in each group. Therefore, while the results illustrate evidence of a 
correlation between information type and engagement, this is not reliable.  
The results also provide evidence of possible explanatory variables. On finding 
the low mean scores for those participants that did not click on the treatment, I also 
found evidence of a positive linear relationship between the level of pre-existing interest 
in the environment and four indicators of future participation. It may be the case that the 
level of one’s interest in the environment acts as an intervening variable. However, I am 
unable to undertake elaboration analysis to determine what lies behind the correlations 
due to the limitations imposed by the sample size. 
 
7.4 Rationale for Experiment 2: Testing for the Effect of Facebook Likes 
 
Understanding why an individual undertakes an act of digital micro-activism is central 
to this thesis. The slacktivist critique offers two hypotheses. Firstly, Morozov (2011: 
194) argues that popularity cascades may result in certain causes gaining a 
disproportionally higher place on one’s agenda, as the opinions and actions of a citizen 
can be swayed by the popularity of an issue rather than its normative value. This can be 
a result of technological design, as algorithmic prioritisation on Facebook can result in 
content that is more popular featuring more prominently on a user’s news feed.82 
Secondly, the networked characteristics of social media foster an environment in which 
digital micro-activism is undertaken on the basis of self-interest, as users neglect private 
opinion and pursue the will of the majority (see H3). This is a digital manifestation of 
the spiral of silence, as users are aware that their online behaviour is visible and alter it 
to appeal to their networked peers even if sometimes they may not privately agree with 
such attitudes or behaviours (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). This is problematic, as opinions 
                                                
82 Although the precise algorithm for the Facebook news feed is not publically known, Facebook have 
revealed that content popularity is a contributory factor (Constine, 2014). 
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can become normalised when citizens turn away from minority views in fear of social 
isolation.  
The second experiment examines the willingness of participants to engage in an 
act of digital micro-activism on the basis of its popularity. An e-petition was designed, 
calling for the expense claims made by MPs to be kept in the public domain. This was 
based on an ongoing campaign coordinated by 38 Degrees, responding to a consultation 
established by the IPSA asking whether those MPs under investigation for the improper 
use of expenses should be granted anonymity (see Chapter 4). By using an e-petition, I 
was able to observe how the popularity of content affects the level of attention, in terms 
of clicks and time spent on the petition page, and whether that attention then converts 
into political action. Political engagement will be measured in two ways. Firstly, by 
virtue of a participant signing the petition. Secondly, through a series of likert-style 
questions that measure each subject’s future intention to engage on the treatment issue. 
This experiment uses the Facebook “Like” button, a function in which users can 
express their approval of content posted on the service, to explore the influence of social 
information on participant behaviour. This feature is included on status updates, 
comments, photos, advertisements and links shared by friends.83 The like button also 
displays the total number of Facebook users who approve a post. This includes a full or 
partial list of each user’s name, their profile picture, and a link to their Facebook 
profile.84  
Unlike Twitter, Facebook is not a “neutral” platform. The timeline on Twitter 
includes all updates from accounts that the user chooses to follow. On Facebook, a 
complex algorithm is used to prioritise content on the news feed for each individual user 
(Constine, 2014). By using a range of indicators to determine the relevancy of a post to 
a user, Facebook can offer more targeted advertising. The commercial goals of 
Facebook are important to understanding the context of this experiment, as brands and 
media organisations are a key growth area for the social networking site. In 2013 the 
average user liked 50 percent more Facebook pages than in the previous year, where 
pages are defined as profiles for businesses, brands, and other organisations (Constine, 
2014). As users are encouraged to like more pages, space on the news feed becomes an 
increasingly valuable commodity. Posts from friends and pages compete against each 
                                                
83 For further information on the Facebook like button: 
https://www.facebook.com/help/452446998120360.  
84 This list of users may be full or partial depending on privacy settings. The button also displays a list of 
any mutual friends and provides a button to add the user as a friend.  
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other for exposure on a user’s news feed. As the number of brands and organisations 
willing to pay for sponsored updates has increased, the organic reach of posts has fallen. 
As Facebook seek to prioritise the content that is most important to a user, the 
need for a robust algorithm becomes acute. At present, the algorithm used to determine 
what is shown on a user’s news feed relies on “over 100,000 highly personalised 
factors” (Constine, 2014). In an interview with the technology website TechCrunch, 
Will Cathcart (as cited in Constine, 2014) the Director of Product Management at 
Facebook disclosed that popularity, in the form of likes, comments, clicks, and shares, 
is a powerful determinant of whether a post is shown on a user’s News Feed: 
 
Essentially, everyone has to earn their space in the news feed. If they publish 
posts that are interesting enough to get likes, comments, shares, and clicks, their 
reach increases. If their posts bore people and are ignored and scrolled past by 
anyone who sees them, their reach decreases.  
 
As such, the algorithm fulfills an automated gatekeeping role, in which certain posts 
receive additional exposure (Bell, 2014a). 
The conclusions drawn from the diary research illustrate how the issues and 
stories that people are exposed to day-to-day can vary depending on their primary 
means of news consumption. Concerns exist that those who depend on social media 
miss important civic and political issues due to algorithmic prioritisation (Dewey, 2015; 
Jurgenson, 2015). This argument is exemplified in the dissemination of news relating to 
the 2014 protests in Ferguson, which followed the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a 
police officer. Tufekci (2014b) highlighted how, on August 14 with the unrest at its 
peak, Twitter provided a constant stream of updates from both journalists and citizens 
on the ground. However, she found that the story received very little coverage on 
Facebook. This is what Tufekci describes as “algorithmic censorship,” as popular 
content supersedes more pressing political and social issues. Crucially, these are topics 
that an editor of a newspaper would prioritise. Instead, news feeds were inundated with 
users sharing examples of the Ice Bucket Challenge, a fundraising activity in which 
someone is filmed pouring ice and water onto their head to raise money for research 
into Motor Neurone Disease (McDermott, 2014; Zuckerman, 2014). While the 
normative value of this civic engagement in comparison to coverage of the unrest in 
Ferguson is a point for debate, the importance of popularity as a determinant of 
prioritisation and subsequent attention is significant. 
Facebook likes are therefore used as the treatment in this experiment by virtue of 
their role in determining news feed prioritisation. This experiment explores whether 
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subjects are more attentive to popular content, and if evidence of social approval leads 
to political engagement. The experiment will also further explore one of the findings 
from the diary research, that diarists pay attention to popular or controversial content 
but do not simply adopt the opinions or attitudes that they are exposed to. I investigate 
these conclusions by analysing the post-test responses of those that clicked on the 
treatment, to see if exposure shapes the likelihood of future engagement. 
 
7.5 Results for Experiment 2: Testing for the Effect of Facebook Likes 
 
As in the previous experiment, the results are structured around the two outcome 
variables, attention and engagement. The first measure of attention is the clickthrough 
rate on the e-petition in each experimental condition. In total 22 participants clicked on 
the treatment, accounting for around 58 percent of the entire sample. As Table 7.6 
shows, there was some correlation between the level of likes and the probability that a 
participant would view the treatment. The treatment with the highest number of likes 
had a higher clickthrough rate (70 percent) than in the other treatment conditions. In 
comparison the control group, where no posts had any likes, also had a clickthrough rate 
of 70 percent. The findings suggest that observable social information has an influence 
on the clickthrough rate on an e-petition when the threshold of likes on the post is 
comparatively lower than the other items within a news feed.  
 
Table 7.6. Clickthrough rate on the treatment 
Treatment: Threshold of likes 
on e-petition Page views Group size Clickthrough % 
None (0) 4 9 44.4 
Low (3) 4 9 44.4 
High (16) 7 10 70.0 
Control group 7 10 70.0 
 
In order to further explore the relationship between the threshold of likes and the 
clickthrough rate, I also analysed how participants interacted with all of the other items 
on the news feed. These nine posts, outlined in Chapter 4, were constant across the three 
treatment groups, providing a larger sample to analyse. As Figure 7.4 shows, there was 
no evidence of a relationship between observable social information and clickthrough 
rate. Using Pearson’s correlation (r=0.08) just 1 percent of the variation in clickthrough 
rate is due to the level of likes on a Facebook post. This suggests that there are other 
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variables that explain why Facebook users engage with content, such as the level of 
interest in the subject matter, the relationship of the receiver to the sharer, and the 
placement of the item on the news feed. 
 
Figure 7.4. Clickthrough rate on all non-treatment posts in the news feed 
 
 
In addition, if we compare the combined clickthrough rate on all non-treatment 
posts in each experimental condition with the control group, which had the same posts 
without any social information, the clickthrough rate is largely mirrored. The only 
exceptions are three posts that have a comparatively lower level of likes. As Figure 7.5 
illustrates, there were two posts for which there was at least a 10 percent difference in 
clickthrough rate, both of which had a low number of likes in comparison to the rest of 
the news feed; a BBC News article with three likes and a post on Digital Spy with four 
likes. This trend was also evident on the Bleacher Report article, which had one like, 
albeit to a lesser degree. Therefore, as with the treatment posts, the number of Facebook 
likes on a post only has an influence on click-though rate when the total number of likes 
is comparatively lower than on other posts. However, there was one exception to this 
association; the article from Upworthy only had four likes, but received a higher 
clickthrough rate in the treatment groups than in the control group. As noted in the first 
experiment, this suggests that the form of content provided by Upworthy can attract 
attention. 
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Figure 7.5. Comparison of clickthrough rate in treatment groups and control group 
 
 
In order to further explore how the level of likes influenced attention, I also 
quantified the order in which participants clicked on non-treatment items. These results 
investigate whether the number of Facebook likes influence how participants prioritise 
content on the news feed.85 The values in Figure 7.6 were calculated by assigning a 
rank-value to each article according to when the participant accessed it during the 
experiment. This was based on the data provided by the browser history for each 
participant. Those articles clicked first were assigned a value of ten, with subsequent 
items given a value decreasing in increments of one as priority decreased. A total was 
calculated for each item, which was then divided by the number of clicks on that post. 
This provided a mean score for the priority that users assigned to items on the news 
feed. Using Pearson’s correlation (r=0.46), there was evidence of a moderate positive 
relationship between the number of likes on a Facebook post and the order that 
participants interacted with each post. Those posts with a higher number of likes were 
slightly more likely to be given higher priority in terms of attention. However, this 
relationship is negligible when we consider the sample sizes involved. 
                                                
85 All posts included in this analysis had at least 10 clicks. Therefore, none of the treatment posts were 
included. 
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Figure 7.6. Content prioritisation scores for items on the news feed in treatment groups 
 
 
Given that the number of likes did not have a clear influence on attention, I also 
explored another possible explanatory variable; the level of interest in the MPs’ 
expenses scandal. As Table 7.7 shows, there is evidence of an association between the 
level of interest in the issue and the clickthrough rate, with those most interested in the 
cause more likely to click on the petition. This seems to suggest that a pre-existing 
interest in the scandal was a determinant of attention during the experiment, although 
the low number of participants who declared themselves as “not at all interested” makes 
the reliability of these results somewhat questionable. This supports the personalised 
forms of political action that run through this thesis. In particular, it illustrates the 
organisational management of digital micro-activism in action. For 38 Degrees, sharing 
evidence of ones involvement helps to trigger like-minded others. This correlation is 
investigated further during the analyses of the second outcome variable, engagement. 
 
Table 7.7. Clickthrough rate on the treatment based on the level of interest in MPs' 
expenses 
Level of interest in MPs’ 
expenses Page views n Clickthrough % 
Very interested 10 11 90.9 
Fairly interested 8 16 50.0 
Not very interested 3 8 37.5 
Not at all interested 1 3 33.3 
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Engagement in the second experiment is measured in two ways. Firstly, 
participants were able to sign the e-petition that was used as the treatment post. Only 8 
participants signed the petition across all experimental groups, accounting for around 21 
percent of the sample. Given the low number of participants who signed the petition, it 
is difficult to offer any definitive conclusions about participant behaviour. As Table 7.8 
shows, the experimental condition with the most signatories was the treatment post with 
no Facebook likes. This table also shows the results for the sub-sample who clicked 
onto the petition, rather than the entire group. In the high-threshold condition and the 
control group just 28.6 percent of those who accessed the e-petition went on to sign it, 
suggesting that other explanatory variables account for why subjects participate. As 
such, there was no correlation between the threshold of likes and the number of petition 
signatories across the different experimental groups. 
 
Table 7.8. Petition signatories in each treatment group 
Treatment: Threshold of likes 
on e-petition Signatories 
Entire group  Clickthrough only 
Group 
size %  
Group 
size % 
None (0) 3 9 33.3  4 75.0 
Low (3) 1 9 11.1  4 25.0 
High (16) 2 10 20.0  7 28.6 
Control group 2 10 20.0  7 28.6 
 
There was evidence to suggest a weak correlation between the level of interest in 
the MPs’ expenses scandal and the likelihood of a subject signing the petition. While 
bearing in mind the limitations of the sample size, seven of those that signed the petition 
were either very interested or fairly interested in the issue. Interpreting the results in a 
purely descriptive manner, Table 7.9 shows that those subjects who were more 
interested in the MPs’ expenses scandal were slightly more likely to sign the petition. 
However, this association is problematic given the inconsistent sample proportionality 
for each band of interest. There were a number of limitations in using an e-petition as 
the treatment. Some participants felt that they were not permitted to sign the petition, as 
this would break the rules of the experiment. Likewise, others felt uneasy signing a 
petition in an experimental setting because of the Hawthorne effect, when participants 
change their behaviour because they know they are being monitored (McDermott, 2011: 
35). 
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Table 7.9. Petition signatories based on level of interest in MPs' expenses 
Level of interest in MPs’ 
expenses Signatories n % 
Very interested 3 11 27.3 
Fairly interested 4 16 25.0 
Not very interested 1 8 12.5 
Not at all interested 0 3 0.0 
 
The amount of time that a participant spent browsing the treatment page before 
signing the petition raises some questions in relation to the slacktivist critique. Although 
the length of time participants spent on the page was more varied for those that did sign, 
the median value was actually marginally higher for those that did not sign the petition 
(47.5 seconds) than for those subjects that did (45.5) as shown in Figure 7.7. Both of 
these median values are lower than the average reading time for the page, calculated at 
56 seconds for 282 words. Of the eight participants that did sign the e-petition, only 
three spent more than 56 seconds browsing the page. This would seem to support the 
slacktivist critique in that the ease of the action displaces the care and attention that are 
necessary for other more demanding acts (H2). Furthermore, none of the subjects 
clicked on the links to further information included on the petition page. These links to 
professional news media provided information on the suggested changes by the IPSA. 
However, this was likely a result of the experimental conditions, as subjects were asked 
to only click and engage with the links included on the news feed (see limitations in 
Chapter 4). 
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Figure 7.7. Amount of time spent on the treatment 
 
However, we must not take this at face value. As Nelson (2012) notes, 
undergraduate-level students tend to read at 450 words per minute (wpm), a faster rate 
than the average citizen (300 wpm). If accurate, a university student would need 42 
seconds to read the petition rationale, thereby reducing the number of subjects who read 
the petition page faster than this to just three. Furthermore, reading habits online are 
quite unique; as citizens adapt to the mass of information online, they increasingly scan 
material rather than read it in-depth. Described as a “lean forward” medium (Will, 
2012), the audience are active in the sense that they are able to interact with the 
medium, controlling the information they consume by switching to different web pages. 
This differs with “lean back” medium, like television, which is a more passive 
experience.  
The experiment also did not account for each participant’s knowledge of the 
treatment issue. While one participant spent 33 seconds browsing the petition page prior 
to signing it and a further two only spent 23 seconds, they all described themselves as 
being “very interested” (N=2) or “fairly interested” (N=1) in MPs’ expenses. It is not 
possible to discount the possibility that these subjects were already well informed on the 
issue and therefore signed the petition on that basis. Still, irrespective of this potential 
expertise it is questionable whether it is possible to pay an e-petition due diligence in 
such a small amount of time, especially when we consider that this petition was not 
established by a trusted campaign group. In the same way that Morozov (2011: 179-
181) refers to the Colding-Jorgensen experiment as an example of slacktivism in action, 
-20 30 80 130 180 
Time (seconds)  
Did not sign (N=14) 
Sign (N=8) 
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some may deem this experiment to be supportive of the critique given that eight 
participants were willing to provide their personal details to a petition that was not 
legitimate. However, as four of the eight signatories noted during the debrief, they were 
willing to trust the petition because of the controlled, experimental conditions, and they 
would be more distrustful of an online campaign in an everyday setting. Consequently, 
there is a pressing need for further research in this area in order to understand both the 
motivational context and the level of campaign awareness when a citizen signs an e-
petition. If it is the case that people sign without any real understanding of who is 
leading the campaign, this could have dangerous implications for the validity of e-
petitions as a campaign tactic. 
Engagement was also measured across seven indicators that measured the 
likelihood of future participation. The mean scores for these forms of engagement for 
those participants that clicked on the e-petition in each group are shown in Table 7.10. 
The condition with the highest likelihood of future action across six of the seven 
measures was the experimental group with no social information expressed through 
Facebook likes. Conversely, the group with the highest threshold of likes had the lowest 
mean scores for four modes of engagement. This seems to demonstrate that the number 
of likes forms a negative association with political engagement. However, the validity 
of these results is problematic given that only four people clicked on the treatment in 
two of the experimental conditions.  
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If we extend the sample to include all participants in each experimental group, 
assuming that participants were exposed to the petition on their Facebook news feed, 
there is evidence of a remarkable level of similarity. While a significant proportion of 
these subjects did not click on the link to the petition (N=16), they were almost certainly 
exposed to the treatment: the number of likes on the treatment post. The e-petition was 
the fourth item on the news feed, meaning subjects would have had to scroll past the 
treatment post when navigating to the links listed below. As Table 7.11 shows, there 
was no evidence in this experiment of a relationship between the number of likes on the 
treatment post and the likelihood of future engagement. The mean scores across all 
seven forms of engagement are relatively varied. Unlike in the previous table, those 
participants in the high level of likes condition were most likely to share information on 
social media, while those in the low like condition were most likely to sign a petition 
relating to MPs’ expenses. However, the standard deviation of these averages raises 
questions about the reliability of this data. In contrast, there is evidence of a correlation 
between the level of interest in the MPs’ expenses scandal and the likelihood of future 
engagement. Table 7.12 presents a cross-tabulation of issue interest and the mean scores 
for future engagement. The more interested a subject was in the MPs’ expenses scandal, 
the more likely they were to participate across all seven indicators, with a strong 
association for those political acts included within the scope of slacktivism (signing a 
petition; sharing information on the issue on social media). However, the accuracy of 
these mean scores is questionable as the standard deviation was higher for those who 
declared themselves to be very interested. 
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7.6 Conclusion for Experiment 2: Likes Don’t Save Lives, or Dictate Them 
 
These results show evidence of a correlation between the threshold of Facebook likes 
and user attention in some contexts, but no such association with engagement. As the 
analysis of the non-treatment items in the news feed shows, I did not find evidence of a 
linear relationship between the level of likes and the clickthrough rate. However, by 
undertaking comparisons with the control group, the clickthrough rate did decrease for 
those items with a proportionally lower number of likes than other posts on the same 
feed. Other explanatory variables were also considered, with evidence of a positive 
correlation between pre-existing issue interest and clickthrough rate. Therefore, the 
results of this experiment challenge the causal assumptions of the slacktivist critique. 
By arguing that content popularity dictates attention, those who support the critique 
overlook the complexity of individual level decision-making.   
The results from this experiment challenge the hypothesis derived from the 
slacktivist critique; digital micro-activism was not based on popularity cascades (H3). 
There was no correlation in this study between the level of likes on the e-petition and 
the likelihood of signing it. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a relationship 
between visible social indicators and the likelihood of future engagement, regardless of 
the difficulty of these actions. On the contrary, prior interest in the MPs’ expenses 
scandal seemed to offer a much more plausible explanation for both measures of 
participation. Subjects seem to be acting on the basis of their own pre-established 
personal preferences rather than on the basis of visible social approval from others 
(EF5). This would seem to cast doubt over the hypothesis that acts of micro-activism are 
inauthentic or narcissistic. However, these results did not reject the hypotheses of the 
slacktivist critique entirely. Of the eight participants that did sign the e-petition, three 
spent only 33 seconds or less browsing the rationale before committing their support to 
the campaign. Further research is therefore required to explore and understand the 
factors and conditions that result in a citizen signing an e-petition. 
A theme running throughout this thesis is to encourage researchers to avoid 
over-emphasising the easily observable. Acts of slacktivism are precisely this. Without 
contextual understanding it may seem rational to assume that these easy actions are 
fundamentally irrational, that their ease of use makes them trivial and prone to the 
undue influence of popularity. Yet, just as the media diaries show how exposure to 
political material on social media can trigger rich deliberative exchanges in private 
spaces, the slacktivist critique also does not account for those who do not act when 
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faced with these stimuli. Political campaigns gain traction and user attention on 
Facebook and Twitter on a regular basis, but that does not necessarily lead to 
widespread engagement. When the real space mobilisation failed to materialise 
following the widely shared #Kony2012 video, this was heralded as proof of the futility 
of digital micro-activism. But perhaps this overlooks the reasons why those who had 
shared the video did not decide to engage further. The research on the hybrid 
mobilization movement 38 Degrees, and the results from the media diaries show that 
citizens act on the basis of complex personal judgements. The findings from this 
experiment develop this logic, showing that the assumption that popularity dictates user 
behaviour is flawed and vastly underestimates the role of the individual’s own 
reasoning or identifications. 
 
7.7 Evaluation: The Conditions of Personalised Activation 
 
The algorithms used by Facebook to filter news posts have an effect on the 
information seen by users – but not nearly as much as the choices made by users 
themselves. 
(Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015) 
 
This chapter has found evidence of a correlation between pre-established personal 
preferences and political participation, rather than the form in which political content is 
presented or its popularity with wider publics (H3). As such, digitally active students are 
more information savvy than the slacktivist critique gives them credit for (Morozov, 
2011: 190). The correlations that emerged from this quasi-experimental study show that 
users respond to information on Facebook that resonates with their own private political 
beliefs (EF5).  
These results further develop the interpretive findings from Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, demonstrating that personal identity is a significant explanatory variable for 
political participation. In an activist context, members of 38 Degrees pick and choose 
the campaigns to which they relate; their activism is formed around their own issue 
interests. In day-to-day life, those diarists that I categorise as listeners overcome the 
cognitive loads associated with public behaviour on social media when faced with an 
issue that resonates with their own privately held beliefs. Consequently, these 
experiments support the causal claim raised by the slacktivist critique: users can be 
triggered into political action by material that they are exposed to on social media. 
However, they show that this behaviour is not inauthentic. Rather, the conditions of 
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activation at the individual level revolve around personal identity; subjects monitor the 
information space and wait for an issue that they identify with (Amnå and Ekman, 
2014).  
These findings provide evidence for the description of mediated citizenship 
provided in the theoretical framework (Bennett, 2008; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; 
Papacharissi, 2010) and further illustrate the typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments. Across both experiments there was evidence of a correlation between 
issue interest and the two outcome variables, attention and engagement.  
Firstly, in showing that content presentation (Table 7.1) and popularity (Table 
7.6) correlate with attention but not engagement, the results offer further support for the 
findings from Chapter 6; digitally active citizens do not act on the basis of informational 
shortcuts alone. On the contrary, young, university-educated citizens maintain a healthy 
scepticism of the political information that they access on social networking sites. 
Although the #Kony2012 case study in Chapter 1 shows how an emotive campaign can 
lead to questions over the information literacy skills of young people, these case-
specific concerns should not be applied to an entire medium.  
By analysing the triggers of attention in these experiments, this chapter explores 
the conditions in which accidental exposure and by-product learning occur on Facebook 
(Chadwick, 2012). The findings from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 both illustrate that users 
are accidentally exposed to political content on social networking sites, but differ in 
how this access relates to attention and political action. In the media diaries, participants 
would reflect upon a range of political issues they had been exposed to on social media, 
some of which they disagreed with. The trigger for attention was often the controversial 
nature of the post or the specific circumstances surrounding an issue, such as the 
presence of a celebrity like Russell Brand. As such, diarists learnt of opposing views 
which opposed their own.86 However, when the content shared is a call to action, 
subjects are more purposeful. Members of 38 Degrees often become activated and 
involved in the movement when exposed to evidence of digital micro-activism. 
Similarly, in the second experiment there was a correlation between a subject’s level of 
interest in the MPs’ expenses scandal and clickthrough rate (Table 7.7). This is also 
illustrated in the first experiment, as the Change.org petition had a lower clickthrough 
rate when compared to the other sources of information (BBC News Online; BuzzFeed; 
                                                
86 There is a pressing need for further research on the effects of political polarisation on day-to-day media 
habits, with substantial debate over the prevalence of echo chambers in the literature (Bakshy et al., 2015; 
Barberá et al., 2015; Conover et al., 2011; Kosinski; Stillwell and Graepel, 2013). No conclusions can be 
drawn on political polarisation in this study as, although issue interest did not correlate with clickthrough 
rate in the first experiment, the diversity in information providers acts as an intervening variable. 
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Upworthy). In itself, this is intuitive; citizens pay attention to campaign material on 
issues that they are interested in.  
The second experiment also develops our understanding of the conditions in 
which digital micro-activism occurs, as there was a correlation between the level of 
interest in MPs’ expenses and the likelihood of signing an e-petition or contributing to a 
discussion on social media. This suggests support for the theoretical framework offered 
in this thesis. This individualisation is representative of Bennett’s (2008: 13) actualizing 
citizen model, as young citizens become more responsible for the production and 
management of their own political identities. Furthermore, by triangulating the findings 
across the three empirical studies in this thesis there is evidence to support 
Papacharissi’s (2010: 131-132) conceptualisation of the private sphere, as these digitally 
active citizens participate in both public and private spaces around individualised 
motivations.  
By equating motivation to technological design, the slacktivist critique is an 
example of technological determinism. As I outlined in Chapter 1, “cognitive 
mobilization,” in which the public’s ability to process information has increased due to 
improvements in education provision and a reduction in the cost of acquiring 
information, has fundamentally changed how the public conceives and acts upon their 
citizenship (Dalton, 1984; 2008; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1970; 1990; Norris, 2011). 
However, the slacktivist critique ignores these attitudinal shifts. As the empirical 
research in this thesis shows, if we look beyond publically visible actions and account 
for individual level political attitudes, there is evidence of rich forms of mediated 
citizenship. 
Finally, the experiments also provide further support for the typology of citizen 
roles in social media environments introduced in Chapter 6. Civic instigators and 
contributors engage in digital micro-activism by way of refining their political identity. 
For them, engaging in these acts is relatively easy. However, few diarists reflect these 
categories. The majority were listeners, using social media to consume political 
information but refraining from public forms of expression. This divergence in online 
behaviours was evident in the experiments, which is surprising given that the sampling 
frame was designed to recruit those who fit the description of a “slacktivist”; 
participants were heavy Facebook users and held an interest in politics. Despite this 
homogeneity there was evidence of a stark dissimilarity in the willingness to participate 
in the indicators most closely associated to slacktivism, that is, signing an e-petition and 
raising awareness by sharing information on social media. I first noticed this trend 
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during my analysis of the second experiment. As Figure 7.8 shows, there is a higher 
standard deviation for the mean scores for these two indicators in comparison to the 
likelihood that subjects would engage in other forms of political engagement in the 
future. This variance was evident across each of the three treatment groups and the 
control group. This dispersion shows that the mean does not accurately represent what 
is typical. 
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In order to ascertain if this trend was isolated to this specific issue I explored the 
two dummy issues used in each experiment in order to mask the treatment, as shown in 
Table 7.13. As the stimulus for these issues was the same across all experimental 
conditions, there was a larger sub-sample to analyse. For three of the four dummy 
issues, these two indicators have the highest level of standard deviation, although the 
dispersion is not as distinctive as in the previous illustration. Therefore, even amongst a 
relatively homogenous sample of digitally active young people, there is still evidence of 
a real divide in the willingness to engage in digital micro-activism.  
 
Table 7.13. Standard deviation of mean scores for intention to engage based on the 
control issues 
Forms of engagement 
Control issues 
LE1: 
Women’s 
rights 
LE1: 
Immigration 
LE2: 
Rights of 
persons 
with 
disabilities 
LE2: 
Immigration 
Discuss the issue  2.75 1.86 2.64 1.73 
Take part in a demonstration 2.39 2.82 2.51 3.52 
Contact the media 2.35 2.24 2.09 1.98 
Contact an official 1.60 2.48 2.67 2.62 
Donate money to a charity / 
campaign 
2.19 2.55 2.97 3.46 
Write or sign a digital or 
written petition 
2.91 3.34 3.51 3.81 
Distribute or share 
information on social media 
2.80 2.88 3.00 3.30 
n 34 38 32 30 
Note: The two forms of engagement with the largest standard deviation for each issue are in bold. 
 
While these conclusions contravene the hypotheses of the slacktivist critique 
(H3), there are some reliability issues. Both experiments were exploratory in their 
design, and therefore do not offer causal inferences on user behaviour. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, a significant limitation of these experiments is that they are small-N, with a 
maximum of 10 participants in each experimental condition. While this may seem to 
detract from the norms of experimental research, in that experiments are generally used 
to generate powerful empirical claims (Druckman et al., 2011: 9), the aim of this 
experiment was not to generalise a pre-existing theoretical assumption. These 
experiments were designed to explore the hypotheses of the slacktivist critique outlined 
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in Chapter 3, while also observing how users engage with the Facebook news feed more 
broadly.  
The difficulties of collecting data on Facebook should not detract from our 
efforts to research it. Although it may be easier to collect data from Twitter in a valid 
and reliable way, Facebook is still the most widely used social networking site in the 
UK, with over 30 million users.87  It is imperative that those who study the service 
continue to work towards new and innovative research designs, detailing both their 
successes and flaws so that we can collectively offer solutions to the complex 
methodological questions posed by social media research (see Dennis, Gillespie and 
O’Loughlin, 2015). As this thesis has shown, if we move past the reification of the 
easily observed offered by slacktivist critique, we can find rich forms of democratic 
engagement taking place across the continuum of participation in hybridised, often 
private, spaces. 
  
                                                
87 For further information on the Facebook UK user base: http://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-
15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/. 
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8. Conclusion: The Candle Burns Bright 
 
These symbolic, epistemic acts online —derided as “slacktivism”— may well be 
among the most important effects of the Internet.  
(Tufekci, 2014a) 
 
Set in the ongoing debates around slacktivism, a pejorative term that refers to 
inauthentic, low-threshold forms of political engagement online, this thesis examined 
the effect of routine social media use on political participation in Britain. By generating 
thick, descriptive data on individual level political attitudes and behaviours, this study 
provided an account of how the use of Facebook and Twitter can bring benefits to forms 
of democratic citizenship. 
I argue that the slacktivist critique has an overly narrow focus, isolating those 
routine actions which users undertake day-to-day from other forms of communication 
and modes of engagement. An alternative theoretical approach—the continuum of 
participation—was proposed to understand what happens before collective, or 
connective, action. A series of research questions were formulated based on this: What 
political information do citizens consume on Facebook and Twitter? Do these social 
networking sites provide a space for discursive engagement, and if so, what is the nature 
of this discussion? And, crucially, do these low-effort interactions evolve into further 
participatory acts? When they do, what are the attitudinal motivations driving this 
involvement? 
An experimental, mixed-methods research design was used to explore these 
questions in three different settings. Firstly, in an activist context, through an 
ethnography of the political movement 38 Degrees. Secondly, within day-to-day life, by 
combining evidence of participant behaviour online with reflective diaries. Thirdly, in 
those conditions in which slacktivism is hypothesised to thrive, through a series of 
laboratory experiments conducted on Facebook. 
The main findings of this study suggest that Facebook and Twitter create new 
opportunities for cognitive engagement, discursive participation, and political 
mobilisation. 38 Degrees uses social media to support engagement repertoires that blend 
online and offline tactics. This organisational management of digital micro-activism 
provides participatory shortcuts for wider audiences, enabling their grassroots members 
to shape campaign strategy. But, in contrast to both proponents and critics of online 
participation, there is no evidence of a widespread self-expressive logic. Instead, this 
study identifies a typology of citizen roles in social media environments. “Civic 
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instigators” and “contributors,” those who most closely represent slacktivists, engage in 
digital micro-activism by way of refining their political identity. Meanwhile, “listeners” 
use social media to consume political information but refrain from public forms of 
expression. Instead, they take to private spaces for political discussion. When listeners 
do act it is not effortless, but carefully considered. According to the results of the 
experiments, this is based on pre-established personal preferences, rather than the 
stylistic presentation of information or visible indicators of popularity. As such, I argue 
that these symbolic acts should not be dismissed as slacktivism but understood as forms 
of active citizenship. 
This chapter begins by firstly outlining the main findings from this study. 
Secondly, by comparing the results of this micro-level analysis to those from macro-
level studies, I consider the limitations of this thesis and suggest the need for future 
comparative research. Finally, the most significant contributions of this thesis are 
discussed in relation to the utopian-dystopian divide at the heart of this field. I reflect on 
how these disputes stem from fundamental differences in how participation is 
conceptualised. 
 
8.1 Main Findings 
 
This thesis challenges slacktivism as a judgement on contemporary political action. 
Each of the expected findings and the hypotheses derived from the slacktivist critique 
will be revisited, to illustrate the limitations of the concept as a representation of how 
citizens use social networking sites for political engagement. 
Firstly, there was evidence that Facebook and Twitter users are exposed to 
political information as a by-product of using either service (EF1). In an activist context, 
38 Degrees members depend on the movement for political information on topics that 
they deem to be “alternative,” ignored by professional media (e.g. Interview 8, June 
2013; Interview 22, November 2013). In everyday use, the diaries demonstrate a 
service-specific logic in which Facebook users are more likely to be accidentally 
exposed to political information online, supporting Chadwick’s (2012) hypothesis, 
while Twitter users tailor their news consumption around their own personal interests. 
However, this personalisation does not mean that these citizens bypass important 
political issues, as a comparison of the content of the diaries with the lead stories of four 
British newspapers showed that moments of collective exposure still occur. Rather than 
social media being used as an alternative to other sources of news (H2), the diaries show 
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how Facebook and Twitter are used to complement long-standing sources of 
information; a hybridisation of media habits. 
Secondly, participants in this research did have political conversations that were 
based on their use of Facebook and Twitter, but not in the way that I expected based on 
the theoretical framework (EF2); they were not what I characterised as “Facebook 
activists,” ready and willing to express themselves and deliberate in public and semi-
public online spaces. Although in a campaign setting 38 Degrees members were more 
willing to share political information, the diaries showed little evidence of a widespread 
self-expressive logic on social media. However, this does not mean that these users 
simply passively consume the information that they are exposed to online, as suggested 
by the slacktivist critique, but rather that they take to private spaces to discuss this 
material. This can either take place online, with WhatsApp playing a prominent role for 
some diarists, or face-to-face. This shows that although technological boundaries may 
be porous, social boundaries are not (EF6). Furthermore, this thesis supports the 
findings of Bakshy, Rosenn, Marlow and Adamic (2012), as participants were often 
exposed to political information shared by weak ties. These were predominantly civic 
instigators and contributors, those who frequently post about politics. However, rather 
than challenge this user or discuss the issue with them, listeners discuss the topic with 
strong tie contacts in a private environment. Although these forms of discursive 
engagement are not public, they are still examples of active citizenship, as posts on 
social media trigger political talk. 
This evidence paints a picture far removed from those accounts decrying a crisis 
of political apathy in Britain (Hatfield, 2015). However, it should be noted that much of 
this rich political discussion took place in private spaces and did not result in public-
political actions. If this typology can be applied to the target population more generally, 
does this lead to significant inequalities in terms of who shapes political discussion 
within semi-public spaces, like Facebook? Does the presence of civic instigators explain 
the polarised and fractious nature of some political discussion online (Baek, Wojcieszak 
and Delli Carpini, 2012; Valenzuela, Kim and Gil de Zúñiga, 2011)? Furthermore, 
algorithmic prioritisation on Facebook and asymmetric visibility on Twitter, neither of 
which were considered in this study, also affect a user’s reach. These questions suggest 
that exploring the dynamics of the typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments represents a fruitful avenue for future research. Coleman and Blumler 
(2009) have suggested one potential solution to the disparities in influence. They 
recommend that a dedicated, publicly funded “civic commons” could be created to 
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facilitate a more equal, deliberative space. However, the feasibility of this is 
questionable given that many of the democratic benefits found in this thesis were a by-
product of using social media for personal use. 
Thirdly, participants used Facebook and Twitter for private expression on 
public-political agendas, but in ways that were surprising and more nuanced than I 
predicted (EF3). Only a minority of the sample supported the theoretical framework due 
to the inhibitions that some felt in expressing their private self in public spaces online; 
Goffman’s theatrical metaphor still holds true (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Chadwick, 
2012; Papacharissi, 2010). The purpose and frequency of these forms of public and 
semi-public expression were related (EF3). Civic instigators and contributors—those 
most reflective of slacktivists—hone their political identity through frequent public-
political interactions. Meanwhile, listeners act infrequently on the basis of deeply held 
private motivations. 
The ethnography of 38 Degrees demonstrated how staff strategically use the 
low-threshold functions on Facebook and Twitter in a variety of ways across the 
continuum of participation: social media is used as a discursive space, so that members 
can influence issue selection and campaign strategy; members are encouraged to share 
material to raise awareness amongst wider publics; and, Facebook and particularly 
Twitter can be an effective space for forms of online activism. These logics are often 
intertwined in a single campaign. I saw this practice first hand as the movement tried to 
gain support for an amendment to the Energy Bill to decarbonise the UK’s electricity 
generation by 2030. As point 1 on Figure 8.1 illustrates, 38 Degrees initially asked the 
membership for their views on the bill and how the movement should respond to it. 
Following this consultation, point 2 demonstrates how social media was used as a 
means of raising public awareness of the bill and widening support for the cause. 
Finally, point 3 illustrates how, on the day of the vote, the movement mobilised 
members to tweet their MP and apply pressure on them to vote in support of the 
decarbonisation target. The amendment was narrowly defeated by just 23 votes. 
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Figure 8.1. Examples of the organisational management of digital micro-activism from 
the Energy Bill campaign, 2013 
 
 
Fourthly, although there were examples of 38 Degrees members and diarists 
signing e-petitions and contacting their representatives digitally, the argument that low-
threshold political acts on Facebook and Twitter simply replace equivalent low-effort, 
offline forms of engagement obfuscates more complex participatory processes (EF4). 
For some diarists, the antecedents of political behaviour online were not low-
threshold.88 The real and imagined audience on Facebook and Twitter pose a unique 
obstacle for listeners as they navigate the various transfigurations of public, semi-
public, and private spaces. This can raise the threshold of micro-activism. At the 
organisational level, my findings indicate that these tools are being used to cultivate a 
new type of netroots activism: political activism organised through social media. The 
leadership at 38 Degrees believes that this granular approach makes it easier for those 
citizens who are on the periphery of the “Westminster Bubble”89 to get involved 
(Interview 4, May 2013; see Grant and Warhurst, 2014). While further research is 
required to verify this claim, this thesis suggests that member-led, hybrid mobilization 
movements use social networking sites to provide a variety of substantive ways in 
                                                
88 Doubt must also be raised over whether sending a postcard or placing a sticker on you car bumper also 
represent easy, low-threshold acts, as similar social anxieties may be present. 
89 The Westminster Bubble is a characterisation those working in Parliament as being isolated from life 
outside it. The politicians, civil servants, and journalists working in and around Westminster are 
considered as a community removed from the experiences and concerns of the general public. 
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which members can both shape and take part in campaigns. This organisational 
management of digital micro-activism connects digitally mediated actions to real space 
action repertoires, rather than replacing them as hypothesised by the slacktivist critique 
(H1). There was no evidence of this at the individual level either, as those who 
contributed the most online were also the most involved offline. This supports the 
hypotheses of Christensen (2011; 2012) within a British context. 
Fifthly, engagement in this study was based on a reflexive, individually defined 
notion of political identity (EF5). This was in stark contrast to the hypothesis that acts of 
slacktivism on social media are inauthentic, undertaken by users on the back of 
cascades to cultivate a managed identity online (H3). While the slacktivist critique is 
correct to suggest that Facebook and Twitter can act as a site of activation, in which 
interest for an issue is ignited, this is formed by more than just incidental exposure. 
Based on the experiments undertaken as part of this thesis, stylistic information and 
popularity do not spark engagement. Instead, this activation requires a confluence of 
pre-existing interests and private experiences. For those diarists I describe as listeners, 
public expression and action is based on those issues that they are most passionate 
about. Given the audience dilemma, these actions are only undertaken when they are 
compelled to do so, most commonly on topics that relate to them personally. 
Conversely, civic instigators and contributors engage in low-threshold public actions 
online as part of a sense-making process, as they continue to formulate and adapt their 
own personal, political identity. What unifies these citizen roles is this emphasis on the 
individual. 
In line with those that argue that personal efficacy is driving citizen activists 
from ineffective traditional structures of group-based politics to new activist groups 
(Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2011; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004), members of 38 Degrees 
mobilise around campaigns that resonate on an individual level. This is despite the deep 
ideological divisions that I encountered during a fractious, and at times very awkward, 
members meal that I organised as part of my fieldwork (see Chapter 5). The identity 
framing by which members take collective action is inherently private. It is through 
exposure to emotionally salient information that the leadership brings together its 
ideologically disparate and geographically dispersed membership. Therefore, emotive 
forms of self-expression, which are derided by the slacktivist critique as inauthentic, act 
as an identity frame. These personal action frames provide momentum for further digital 
and real space action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). 
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Their involvement is sustained by the ways in which the leadership prioritises 
member influence. Those 38 Degrees members that I interviewed are reflective of 
Bennett’s (2008) actualizing citizen framework, as their participation is framed by their 
pursuit of individual autonomy.90 Members influence the selection of each campaign, 
shape tactics, and ultimately choose which actions to be part of and to what degree, but 
depend on the leadership at 38 Degrees for its campaigning expertise. This was evident 
in the early adoption of the Campaigns By You service, as members sought to create 
and manage their own campaigns, but were frustrated by the technological restrictions 
that the website imposed on them.  
Although the overall findings from this thesis suggest a positive interpretation of 
the value of Facebook and Twitter for democratic engagement, there were a number of 
cases that support some of the concerns raised by the likes of Gladwell (2010) and 
Morozov (2009; 2011). One is the quality of information that micro-activism is based 
on, given the speed of dissemination on social networking sites (H3). As the 38 Degrees 
petition to stop the Conservative Party restricting public access to GP appointments 
shows, social media dramatically accelerates the speed of campaigning. While this 
agility can sustain the momentum of a campaign, it can also risk the movement’s 
legitimacy if the rationale for an action is not clear. The results from the experiments 
also raise questions about the decision-making processes that citizens undertake when 
deciding to sign a petition. Of the eight participants that signed the e-petition in the 
second experiment, three spent less than 33 seconds browsing the petition text before 
committing their support to the campaign. Further research is therefore required to 
understand what factors lead citizens to support a petition. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the final expected finding proved to be the most important 
(EF6). As the typology of citizen roles in social media environments indicates, social 
boundaries proved to be the story of this thesis, rather than interconnectivity. The 
slacktivist critique assumes that all those who engage in forms of micro-activism do so 
from the same state; that these actions are universally low-threshold for all participants. 
As the research on 38 Degrees, the media diaries, and the results from the experiments 
show, this is not the case. Even within a relatively homogenous sampling frame, as used 
in the experiments, there was still widespread divergence in the participants’ 
willingness to engage in public forms of self-expression and micro-activism. 
 
                                                
90 My interviews predominantly focused on those members who would be described as active within the 
movement. These form the minority and, as such, this argument cannot be extended to all those citizens 
that the leadership describe as “members.” 
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8.2 Limitations and Future Research: Contextualising Digital Micro-Activism 
Nationally and Globally 
 
The results from two large-scale, representative survey projects provide a basis to 
contextualise these findings, both nationally and globally. The annual Digital News 
Report (http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/), provided by the Reuters Institute for the 
Study of Journalism, tracks digital news consumption internationally. The Audit of 
Political Engagement (http://www.auditofpoliticalengagement.org/), undertaken by the 
Hansard Society, provides a yearly benchmark to measure political participation in 
Britain. The results from both demonstrate that the sampling frame used throughout this 
thesis is not representative of the attitudes and behaviours of the wider British public. 
However, these surveys also demonstrate how the contributions of this thesis offer a 
starting point for further research on general behavioural trends. 
Firstly, although the content published by BuzzFeed and Upworthy feature 
amongst the most shared on Facebook, they are not amongst the most widely used news 
sources in the UK. Both are still niche content providers. As Figure 8.2 illustrates, 
BuzzFeed only has a very small slice of the online news audience, with BBC Online 
accounting for a substantial proportion of weekly visits to news websites. This trend 
was illustrated in Chapter 6, where it was found that many of the diarists relied on a 
variety of BBC sources. However, as the latest instalment of the Digital News Report 
(Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015: 25) notes, BuzzFeed UK only launched their news 
arm in 2013. That their online audience share is already larger than the Independent 
online and ITV News is quite remarkable. With significant investments in their news 
operations being made following the appointment of Janine Gibson as editor-in-chief in 
June 2015, the role of BuzzFeed and similar organisations who rely on social media as a 
vehicle for content distribution remains an important area for future research. 
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Figure 8.2. Percentage distribution of weekly visits to online publishers in the UK, 2015 
 
Source: Data adapted from Newman, Levy and Nielsen (2015: 25). 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; which, if any, of the following have you used 
to access news in the last week? Via online platforms (web, mobile, tablet, e-reader). N=2149. 
 
When we consider the use of social media for news consumption more broadly, 
there is evidence to suggest that an increasing number of citizens in the UK are using 
Facebook and Twitter as a source of news. As Figure 8.3 shows, there was a significant 
increase in those respondents who accessed news content on social networking sites in 
the latest Digital News Report (2015). Precisely how social media is being used 
depends on the service, with the report supporting the service-specific logic introduced 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, as more citizens “seek news on Twitter but bump into it on 
Facebook” (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015: 14). This would suggest that the 
literature on news personalisation and accidental exposure on social media applies to 
specific services (Chadwick, 2012; Prior, 2007). 
The size of this increase is a cause of concern for those sceptical of the benefits 
of social networking sites for political learning. For example, Dewey (2015) and 
Jurgenson (2015) argue that the algorithms used on Facebook tend to filter out content 
that the user would disagree with. However, it is important to not confuse use with 
dependency. It is not the case that social media is becoming the main source of news for 
British citizens, as just 6 percent of those surveyed in the Digital News Report use it as 
their primary source (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 2015: 11). Even the most prolific 
users of social media in this study still combine these platforms with other mediums. 
These micro-level characteristics, indicative of uses and gratifications theory, exemplify 
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the need for further research to understand the complex ways in which these different 
spaces become entwined, and whether or not these conditions are beneficial for political 
learning and further democratic engagement. 
 
Figure 8.3. Social media as a source of news in the UK, 2012-15 
 
Sources: Data adapted from Newman (2012: 27), Newman and Levy (2013: 10), Newman and Levy 
(2014: 14), and Newman, Levy and Nielsen (2015: 52-53). 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; which, if any, of the following have you used 
in the last week as a source of news? Please select all that apply. N=1778 (2012); 2078 (2013); 2082 
(2014); 2149 (2015). 
 
Although access to news and political information online is increasing, forms of 
self-expression and public discussion on social media are relatively stagnant in the UK. 
This seems to be at odds with the general consensus across this research area. While 
vociferous debates are still raging about the nature of information consumption and 
political expression on social media (Bennett 2008; Chadwick, 2012; Fuchs, 2014; 
Morozov, 2011; Papacharissi, 2010; see Boulianne, 2015 for an overview), there seems 
to be a common assumption that the volume of public-political posts is increasing. 
However, this does not necessarily equate to an increase in the number of participants. 
The Digital News Report project also includes a range of indicators that measure 
whether respondents share news content online, and if they interact with others. Figure 
8.4 shows little to no evidence that interaction with news content on social media has 
become more commonplace amongst citizens in the UK. Furthermore, respondents in 
this study were much more likely to discuss news face-to-face than engage in any form 
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of digital participation. These findings, interpreted alongside the typology of citizen 
roles in social media environments introduced in Chapter 6, exemplify how behaviours 
related to news consumption and political expression on social media are not symbiotic. 
This challenges the premise that social networking sites cultivate self-expression and 
political discussion by virtue of their design. Further research should focus on the 
increasing levels of news consumption on social media, analysing the type and form of 
private interactions that occur post-consumption. 
 
Figure 8.4. Engagement with news coverage on social media in the UK, 2013-15 
 
Sources: Data adapted from Newman and Levy (2013: 66), Newman and Levy (2014: 73), and Newman, 
Levy and Nielsen (2015: 84). 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; during an average week in which, if any, of the 
following ways do you share or participate in news coverage? N=2078 (2013); 2082 (2014); 2149 (2015). 
 
It is important to stress that the adoption of social networking sites for public 
expression is context dependent. The Digital News Report project includes insights on 
10 countries. Table 8.1 shows the percentage of respondents who have either shared or 
discussed news on social media for six countries: the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
US, Denmark, and France. Data is provided from the last three reports, published 
between 2013 and 2015. While respondents from the UK and Germany tend to be more 
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reserved on social media, in other cultural contexts there is support for the hypothesis 
that online expression is growing. In Denmark and France for example, the willingness 
of citizens to publicly share and comment on news content has increased alongside the 
growth of news consumption on social media. By comparison, the results from Italy, 
Spain, and the US show that citizens are already actively sharing and commenting on 
news material. In Italy almost one-in-three respondents shared a news story on a social 
network in 2015, while in Spain almost one-in-five posted a news-related picture or 
video to a social networking site. 
These findings can be compared to the typology of citizen roles in social media 
environments. On a macro-level, citizens in the Italy, Spain and the US seem to share 
the behavioural traits of civic instigators and contributors, taking to public spaces to 
discuss and debate current events. Those in the UK seem to share the characteristics of 
listeners, consuming news through social media but taking to private spaces for 
discussion. This indicates that distinctive cultural contexts could affect online forms of 
political engagement. Further comparative research is therefore required to explore the 
relationship between political socialisation and public forms of digital expression.  
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Table 8.1. Percentage distribution of participation on social media by country, 2013-15 
  As % of respondents (n) 
Forms of 
participation 
 UK Germany Italy Spain USA Denmark France 
Share a news 
story via SNS 
2013 11 8 33 30 22 13 14 
2014 12 13 35 30 22 17 11 
2015 14 13 30 34 21 19 18 
Comment on a 
news story in a 
SNS 
2013 10 8 26 27 21 11 10 
2014 13 11 23 25 21 14 11 
2015 13 11 25 32 21 16 15 
Post a news-
related picture 
or video to a 
SNS 
2013 4 5 10 10 12 5 6 
2014 5 6 11 11 10 6 6 
2015 1 6 10 17 10 9 9 
Rate or like a 
news story 
2013 6 9 29 26 14 12 11 
2014 8 17 31 25 15 17 10 
2015 8 14 16 32 16 20 18 
Talk to friends 
online 
2013 16 11 30 30 31 10 16 
2014 16 13 19 24 29 8 15 
2015 16 15 20 32 26 21 18 
Talk about news 
face to face 
2013 44 39 50 55 51 49 34 
2014 39 39 40 48 44 51 30 
2015 42 40 42 48 45 58 33 
n 
2013 2078 1062 965 979 2028 1007 979 
2014 2082 2063 2010 2017 2197 2036 2017 
2015 2149 1969 2006 2026 2295 2019 2026 
Sources: Data adapted from Newman and Levy (2013: 66), Newman and Levy (2014: 73), and Newman, 
Levy and Nielsen (2015: 84). 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; during an average week in which, if any, of the 
following ways do you share or participate in news coverage? The wording for each action was altered 
slightly in each report but the meaning remained the same.  
 
Finally, using measures from the Audit of Political Engagement, it is also 
possible to trace political action on social media over the same time period.  While there 
has been an increase, as shown in Figure 8.5, citizens who have signed an e-petition or 
discussed politics online still account for a small proportion of the wider UK 
population. As such, given that the sampling frame for this research was designed with 
slacktivists in mind, caution should be exercised when generalising these findings more 
broadly.  
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Figure 8.5. Political participation in the UK, 2013-15 
 
Sources: Data adapted from Hansard Society, 2013: 38; 2014: 90; 2015: 55. 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; in the last 12 months have you done any of the 
following to influence decisions, laws or policies? N=1128 (2013); 1286 (2014); 1123 (2015). 
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media.91 Understood within the wider context of the UK, there is evidence to suggest 
that the opportunity to benefit from digital tools is skewed based on the level of 
education (Sloam and Kisby, 2015), or where a person lives (Hansard Society, 2015). 
As such, further research is essential to understand whether these demographic factors 
affect user behaviour online.  
 
8.3 The Personal is Political: Outlining the Contributions of the Thesis 
 
As Figure 8.4 shows, if 56 percent of those citizens surveyed in the latest Audit of 
Political Engagement (2015) report have not undertaken any political action in the last 
12 months, one may argue that this shows evidence of widespread political apathy in 
Britain. Such criticism alludes to a theme running throughout this thesis, one that is 
controversial and likely to divide scholars working in both political science and media 
and communication; how should we define participation? Your response to this 
question will frame the value that you assign to this research.  
Some scholars argue that participation must be public and seek to change the 
goal-orientated behaviour of others (see Carpentier, 2011b for an overview). It is this 
action-focused definition of participation that sustains the slacktivist critique. If you 
approach the concept from this perspective, then the findings of this research may seem 
to have little value. However, by adopting this logic one equates participation with 
cause and effect, disregarding the democratic benefits that are accrued prior to 
instrumentalist forms of political engagement. Such an interpretation ignores the pre-
conditions that are necessary for substantive forms of activism. For example, Dahlgren 
(2011: 8) argues that “participation has a clear material and actionist dimension, and 
cannot be reduced to how we think or feel.” I disagree. We cannot truly understand 
political action unless we attempt to unpick the experiences, interactions, and emotions 
that result in mobilisation. 
This limitation can be demonstrated if we consider the concept of power. If, as 
Hay (2007: 168) suggests, “power is to political analysis what the economy is to 
economics,” then power is the currency of political participation; different actors seek to 
exercise power, or influence those who possess it, in order to affect change. Carpentier 
(2011b: 69) argues that it is the absence of conflict over decision-making that 
distinguishes participation from information consumption or political discussion. 
                                                
91 Italicised in order to note that active can be understood in the sense of both consumption and 
production traits. 
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However, by adopting this narrow conceptualisation of participation we revert back to a 
one-dimensional view of power, in which power is behavioural and can only be 
understood in terms of its effects (Dahl, 1957; 1961; Hay, 2007: 173). Actions do not 
occur spontaneously. As decades of rights-based movements have shown, activism is 
deeply engrained within everyday experiences. These protest movements often target 
both material and symbolic goals, as political elites also wield influence over the ways 
in which individual level preferences are formed (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 
2005). Indeed, the literature on media effects, which comprises some of the most 
important theoretical contributions to political communication as a discipline, is reliant 
on such a definition. As such, I argue that the processes that citizens take prior to forms 
of public-facing action also have value. 
Therefore, the findings of this thesis dispute the notion that political 
participation is a public-only phenomenon. Each empirical chapter illustrates how 
politics is increasingly understood through the prism of everyday, personal experiences: 
38 Degrees members mobilise around the campaigns that are personally relevant; the 
evidence from the diaries suggests that citizens understand news and current affairs 
through the lens of their own individually-driven interests; and the measures for future 
engagement in both experiments correlate positively with pre-existing issue interest. 
This personalisation is representative of a distinct generational shift in citizenship 
within Western democracies (see Amnå and Ekman, 2014; Bennett, 2008; 2012; Dalton, 
2008; Inglehart, 1990; Zukin et al., 2006). These findings suggest that we cannot 
separate our private, everyday experiences from our public actions. As such, 
participation should be conceptualised as a process, whereby listening, everyday 
political conversations, and private forms of expression are all indictors of the health of 
a democracy. While these private political interactions do not always result in 
instrumental forms of action, these behaviours are empirically significant. I argue that 
they should not be analysed separately. 
Future research should avoid using easily accessible, publicly available data as a 
reflection of the routine, day-to-day use of social media. Public modes of expression 
form just one function of the many different ways that citizens use these tools in 
everyday life. Private and semi-public forms of digitally mediated self-expression can 
still be beneficial for cultivating active citizenship. Whether it was “Claire,” a member 
of 38 Degrees, whose interest in a number of issues was triggered by casually browsing 
the movement’s posts on her newsfeed (Interview 8, June 2013), or “Deborah” who was 
motivated to sign a petition based on a link shared by her daughter on Facebook (entry 
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4), social media can act as a site of activation in which interest for an issue is ignited or 
strengthened. This activation is an important dynamic when we consider the 
characteristics of contemporary citizenship, such as Schudson’s (1999) concept of the 
monitorial citizen and Amnå and Ekman’s (2014) notion of the standby citizen. The 
digitally active citizens in this study use Facebook and Twitter in a similar way, as they 
monitor the information space, waiting for an issue that they identify with. This logic is 
supported by the data from the latest Audit of Political Engagement (Hansard Society, 
2015), with 69 percent of respondents stating they would take part in some form of 
action if they felt strongly enough about an issue. To this end, listening92 and private 
forms of communication are significant for understanding digital citizenship.  
In this way, these findings support Papacharissi’s (2010: 167) hypothesis that 
the convergence of the private-personal and the public-political facilitates new forms of 
collective action between like-minded individuals. Fuchs (2014: 186) is critical of this 
approach, arguing: 
 
Papacharissi reduces collective action to individual action and the public sphere 
to the private sphere. She ignores the materiality of protest action. Her approach 
is individualistic, reductionist and philosophically idealistic. 
 
However, Fuchs’ criticisms are unfounded as he and Papacharissi are theorising about 
intrinsically different phenomena. 
Papacharissi (2010: 89) offers an explanation as to how the norms of democratic 
citizenship are evolving in light of the development of online digital media. Such work 
is based on the idea that political identity in advanced industrial democracies is no 
longer collective in a traditional sense, but privatised, a result of years of social 
fragmentation (Bauman, 2001; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990). In this way, social 
media acts as a facilitator, enabling autonomous citizens to craft political identity and 
connect with others. In contrast, Fuchs (2014: 186) stresses the value of real space 
activism, arguing that such interpretations overlook the importance of “co-presence and 
physicality.” He contends that a cohesive political movement relies on the social bonds 
that are built face-to-face, rather than online, and that offline forms of protest are more 
effective than digitally mediated action. 
This argument is symptomatic of the slacktivist critique. Both claims are 
examples of “either/or” propositions, ones that ignore the relationships that are formed 
between the internet and offline activism. Although Fuchs (2014: 186) does 
                                                
92 “Listening” in this context is used to refer to role of the receiver online. It encapsulates all forms of 
information consumption online, such as reading, watching, and listening (see Crawford, 2011). 
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acknowledge that social media can be beneficial as an organisational tool, by rejecting 
Papacharissi’s hypothesis he tacitly equates participation to public-political action. In 
doing so he negates the value of digital technologies, as they are not deemed capable of 
cultivating the strong tie connections required for high-cost activism. However, such 
actions account for a tiny proportion of the many ways in which citizens can participate. 
For example, The Big Tax Turnoff campaign, in which those 38 Degrees members who 
were also npower customers changed their energy provider to a competitor, only 
required a weak tie network. Furthermore, Fuchs disregards the ways that citizens 
become activists. The local mobilisation efforts to minimise the impact of the United 
Kingdom’s 2012 Health and Social Care Act, discussed in Chapter 5, are an example of 
this. In the first instance a weak tie network between like-minded individuals was 
necessary, formed through the leadership’s use of e-petitions and Facebook groups. This 
then provided the infrastructure for local collective action, as over 150 groups formed, 
meeting face-to-face to lobby their CCG. The strong tie bonds that formed were 
therefore dependent on the weak tie networks. Crucially, the success of this campaign 
was not the result of just face-to-face interactions, or just digital communication, but it 
was part of a process that required both; private and semi-public connection can foster 
public action. 
Secondly, Fuchs (2014: 186) argues that “social media cannot replace collective 
action that involves spatio-temporal presence.” He is correct to suggest that social 
media cannot, and will not, replace the role of real space political mobilisation. But, on 
the basis of this thesis, there is no evidence to suggest that groups like 38 Degrees use 
social media by way of replacing traditional engagement tactics. Facebook and Twitter 
are used to support and sustain diverse repertoires of online and offline political actions. 
Some of the innovative forms of on-the-ground activism organised by 38 Degrees are 
only made possible by the technological affordances of these social networking sites. 
For example, the “Save Our NHS” campaign illustrates how Facebook can be used to 
rapidly transform the movement’s structural form, from a national collective to over 150 
localised groups. This emphasis on offline actions obfuscates these rich forms of 
interdependence. As Chadwick (2013: 4) argues, we need to reject these dichotomies 
and adopt more hybrid thinking. 
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8.3.1 The Continuum of Participation Model 
 
An alternative descriptive model is proposed in this thesis. In order to critically evaluate 
the relationship between social media and political participation, it is necessary to form 
an understanding of the contexts in which these new forms of social and political self-
expression take place. The continuum of participation is designed to capture the nuance 
of mediated citizenship at the individual level. By adopting this descriptive device we 
can observe how the work of both scholars discussed above reflect different stages of 
the same process, as the private forms of identity construction that Papacharissi 
describes are necessary pre-conditions for the forms of real space political action that 
Fuchs prioritises. 
This is a key contribution of this thesis; what happens before collective, or 
connective, action? This was not necessarily my intention when embarking on this 
research project. Instead, this focus emerged from the conceptual weaknesses of the 
slacktivist critique. Slacktivism is used to represent those actions that are indicative of 
normal, day-to-day use. However, the critique is inherently disconnected from the 
norms of everyday life. It is hardly surprising that examples of slacktivism are deemed 
to be pointless when they are isolated from other forms of engagement, modes of 
communication, and private experiences. 
The continuum of participation is based on the idea that engagement is a process 
rather than an outcome. This, in itself, is not new. Despite its normative orientation, 
Sherry Arnstein’s seminal article “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (1969) introduced 
the notion that participation is a fundamentally scaled phenomenon. Others have 
expanded upon this logic in light of the development of interactive digital media. See, 
for example, the “four categories of civic learning” (Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011). 
The continuum of participation, introduced in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.1 for an 
overview), consists of four stages. Access refers to cognitive engagement, and the ways 
in which citizens pay attention to politics and public affairs. Expression encapsulates 
forms of political communication between citizens, inclusive of the various 
transfigurations of the audience, such as: one-many; real-imagined; online-offline; 
public-private. Connection represents the process of political organisation, as citizens 
join other like-minded actors to coordinate political action. Finally, action signifies 
goal-orientated, public-political acts. 93  By adopting this theoretical orientation, 
                                                
93 See Table 4.3 for an overview of the indicators represented by each stage of the continuum of 
participation. 
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connections can be observed between how citizens use social media to shape their 
political identity and the kind of political behaviour, if any, that occurs as a result. 
  There are two important conditions when using this theoretical device for 
empirical research. Firstly, behaviours under each category are inclusive of those 
undertaken in public, semi-public, and private settings. By emphasising the role of 
public-political actions in isolation we ignore the role of the receiver, and the positive 
democratic goods that can be accrued through private forms of communication. 
Secondly, Chadwick’s (2013) hybrid media system marks the parameters for media use, 
providing the context for media consumption and production at the individual level. In 
this hybrid logic, information is increasingly fragmented and consumption is 
personalised. Within this thesis hybridity is used alongside this model to analyse how 
citizens mix their use of social media with other forms of online and offline 
communication (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; 2012; Jenkins, 2006; Wohn and Eun-
Kyung, 2011). 
By contrast, the slacktivist critique refers to just a tiny proportion of those 
indicators that I define as routine, low-threshold actions on social media. Liking a 
Facebook post, posting a tweet, or sharing campaign material on Facebook may seem 
inconsequential when contrasted with the lofty political ambitions of the actor engaging 
in these practices. But these actions are often not isolated. What Fuchs (2014: 186-187) 
dismisses as harmless online politics can be tied to more substantive forms of real space 
activism. 
As noted in the discussion of the main findings of this thesis, Gladwell (2010) 
and Morozov (2009; 2011) shed some light on valid concerns within the context of this 
continuum. However, these get lost in the sensationalist, polarised debate between those 
that deem social media to be democratising by virtue of its networked design, and the 
equally redundant slacktivist critique. While this dichotomy has been critiqued and 
widely dismissed by a number of scholars (Kreiss, 2012: 194; Wright, 2012a), it is still 
evident in popular discourse (Glenday, 2015; McElvoy and Parkinson, 2015; Miller, 
2014; Ranasinghe, 2015). These so-called utopians and dystopians narrowly focus on 
social media in relation to monumental political change, such as the 2009 Iranian 
presidential election protests (Morozov, 2011), or the use of Facebook and Twitter to 
overthrow the Communist Party in Moldova in 2009 (Shirky, 2011). In the context of 
the title of this thesis, they treat social media as a sun—a panacea for democracy across 
the globe—ignoring other incremental acts along the continuum. Rather than simply 
dismissing these acts as ineffectual, or assuming that they are inauthentic, a process-
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based approach raises new questions regarding the conditions in which digitally 
mediated action becomes chaotic and unproductive.  
It is important to note that this framework is descriptive and does not advocate 
that a deterministic relationship exists; access to information and discursive 
opportunities do not guarantee that further civic or political actions follow. As Couldry, 
Livingstone and Markham (2010: 3) argue, “no amount of communication, however 
stylish and informative, will engage people in politics, unless they are paying attention.” 
This model is designed precisely to identify the conditions in which social media 
triggers attention, and its effects. By adopting this theoretical device throughout this 
thesis I have shown that Facebook and Twitter do create opportunities for cognitive 
engagement, discursive participation, and political mobilisation. 
 
8.3.2 The Organisational Management of Digital Micro-Activism 
 
For campaign groups like 38 Degrees, forms of micro-activism form part of 
interconnected engagement repertoires, which blend online and offline engagement 
tactics. This is what I describe as the organisational management of digital micro-
activism; the leadership use social media to enable their membership to guide the 
strategic direction of the movement, from choosing what they should be fighting for, to 
crowdsourcing their advice on how it should be done. In this activist context, Facebook 
and Twitter are important sites of activation. Members only choose those campaigns 
that they are passionate about, using personal action frames to motivate wider publics 
on social networking sites. In this way, the organisational management of digital micro-
activism helps to facilitate the movement’s objective of “people-power,” by enabling 
members to participate on the basis of their own political identity. 
This absence of ideology has been criticised in the past. As Dean (2005: 70) 
argues: 
 
By sending an e-mail, signing a petition, responding to an article on a blog, 
people can feel political. And that feeling feeds communicative capitalism 
insofar as it leaves behind the time-consuming, incremental and risky efforts of 
politics. MoveOn likes to emphasize that it abstains from ideology, from 
division… this sort of non-position strikes me as precisely that disavowal of the 
political I’ve been describing: it is a refusal to take a stand, to venture into the 
dangerous terrain of politicization. 
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While this criticism is perhaps relative to the time in which it was made, more recent 
evidence illustrates how MoveOn connects these e-petitions to a range of online and 
offline action requests, such as localised activism and forms of representative contact 
(Karpf, 2012a: 32-33). In the same way as the legacy pressure groups and social 
movements that preceded them, members of 38 Degrees are also thrust into the political 
arena and some become involved in high-cost activism. During the 2015 general 
election campaign, over 11,000 members took to high streets across the length-and-
breadth of Britain to campaign against the privatisation of the NHS (Dennis, 2015b).  
I argue that this, at times risky, politicisation happens precisely because of the 
fragmented and individualised nature of hybrid mobilization movements; 38 Degrees is 
able to mobilise such large numbers of impassioned citizens because individuals can 
choose those campaigns they wish to promote and support. Social networking sites, in 
combination with email, offer an important tool for facilitating this, providing the weak 
tie networks and feedback loops that allow members to influence campaign strategy. 
Therefore, the organisational management of digital micro-activism is a rejection of 
Gladwell’s (2010) hypothesis that “weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism.”  
Although substantive forms of action tend to be taken up by a small proportion 
of their overall membership, the granular nature of Facebook and Twitter enables the 
leadership at 38 Degrees to provide informational and participatory shortcuts for wider 
audiences. This is recognised and valued by its membership, many of whom are time-
poor and feel that the movement provides a collective, powerful voice for “ordinary” 
citizens (Interview 18; Interview 20; Interview 21, October 2013).  
The slacktivist critique overlooks personal context. Citizens have to manage 
their political interests with the demands of modern life. The diaries encapsulate this, as 
the majority of diarists, from students to those of retirement age, complained of an acute 
time pressure. Irrespective of whether this time pressure is real or imagined, its 
influence exists. It is through this organisational management of digital micro-activism 
that campaign actions become granular. This is not “small change” as Gladwell (2010) 
argues, but a democratising feat in its own right. Where Gladwell’s critique does have 
substance is regarding CBY, where campaigns seldom progressed beyond ineffectual e-
petitions. Without the expertise of the leadership at 38 Degrees, who use social 
platforms to craft opportunities for involvement, members lack the time or campaigning 
proficiencies to create meaningful forms of political action. 
These findings add value to the rich scholarly literature exploring how digital 
media logics have fostered the evolution of existing organisational forms, and the 
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growth of entirely new ones (Beyer, 2014; Bimber, Stohl and Flanagin, 2009; Bimber, 
Flanagin and Stohl, 2012; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; 2013; Chadwick, 2007; 2013; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Karpf, 2012a).  
 
8.3.3 The Typology of Citizen Roles in Social Media Environments 
 
By adopting a mixed-method approach, that combines reflective diaries with evidence 
of user behaviour online, this thesis offers an analysis of how digitally active citizens 
use social media within their day-to-day lives. Despite the hypotheses derived from the 
slacktivist critique and the expected findings developed from the theoretical framework 
(Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011; Chadwick, 2012; Papacharissi, 
2010), this thesis rejects the assumption that social networking sites cultivate public and 
semi-public expression by virtue of their design. The findings from this thesis suggest 
that the reality is much more complex than this, as participants were acutely aware of 
the real and imagined audience. 
A typology of citizen roles in social media environments is offered by way of 
identifying the different ways in which users engage with political material on 
Facebook and Twitter, as shown in Table 8.2. This challenges the assumption that forms 
of micro-activism and online expression are lazy and easy forms of self-gratification.  
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Table 8.2. A typology of citizen roles in social media environments 
Citizen role Description Corresponding citizenship theory 
Civic Instigator 
Frequently share information, offer their 
opinion, and engage in forms of digital micro-
activism by way of refining and honing their 
own political identity. 
 
Most likely to engage in more substantive 
forms of political action. 
Actualizing citizen 
(Bennett, 2008) 
 
Digitally-enabled 
citizen (Papacharissi, 
2010) 
Contributor 
Share political content but do so often without 
including any personal opinions. 
 
Contributors seek to inform or entertain other 
users. 
Active Listener 
/ Passive 
Listener 
Active listeners frequently post content on 
non-political topics, but consciously avoid 
anything that they deem to be political. 
 
Passive listeners use Facebook and Twitter to 
consume information but avoid public forms 
of expression entirely. 
 
Use social media to consume political 
information. Take to private spaces to discuss 
politics, either online or face-to-face. Micro-
activism deliberated over given the 
reputational dynamics of social media. 
Monitorial citizen 
(Schudson, 1999) 
 
Standby citizen 
(Amnå and Ekman, 
2014) 
 
Thin citizenship 
(Howard, 2006) 
Apathetic 
Indifference towards political activities and 
politics more broadly. 
N/A 
 
The typology of citizen roles in social media environments illustrates the complex 
attitudinal characteristics at the individual level, and contributes to the literature on 
mediated forms of citizenship (Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011; 
Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Dahlgren, 2009; Graber, 2004; Howard, 2006; 
Papacharissi, 2010). Lance Bennett’s (2008) actualizing citizen framework formed the 
basis of what I expected to find during my fieldwork. Although the majority of 
participants in the diary study did not reflect this, a small minority did. These citizens 
were the most likely to engage in instrumentalist forms of political action. In 
contradiction with the substitution thesis, they were also the most vocal online. As 
proposed by Bennett, Wells and Freelon (2011: 840), these citizens use Facebook and 
Twitter to shape their information consumption around individual political preferences 
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and frequently share political content, as the lines between content production and 
consumption become blurred. However, it is clear that participants’ motivations, and the 
democratic benefits their actions accrued, differed significantly. Civic instigators share 
personally-expressive posts in order to challenge others. They refine their political 
identity based on this feedback. As such, micro-activism forms part of an experiential 
learning cycle, as low-threshold interactions shape political attitudes.  
Contributors also share political material to stimulate political learning amongst 
wider networks, but they do not share their opinions under normal circumstances. They 
are apprehensive of how they will be perceived by their audience. Even amongst those 
committed 38 Degrees activists that I interviewed during a protest against the “Gagging 
Law”94 outside the Houses of Parliament in 2013, some felt uncomfortable at the 
prospect of expressing their political opinions on Facebook. Instead these members 
perceive social media to be a space to inform others and to learn, rather than to debate. 
On the basis of my interviews there was a clear sense that generating awareness of these 
issues fulfilled a distinctive civic function, separate from self-expression. 
The majority of participants in this research refrained from public forms of 
political expression, either online or offline. Using the methodological orthodoxy of 
social media research, which emphasises publicly observable interactions, these 
listeners would not be accounted for. But such an interpretation overlooks how 
information consumption on Facebook and Twitter is deeply ingrained within wider 
citizen practices in a hybrid media system. By operationalising the continuum of 
participation it is possible to see how this consumption links to a variety of different 
forms of communication, which merge across different public, semi-public and private 
settings. These are examples of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) “multi-step flows of 
communication,” with private modes of digital communication like Facebook 
Messenger and WhatsApp becoming sites for political talk.  
While these processes rarely manifest in public-facing actions, there was 
evidence of cognitive engagement and discursive participation. Listeners are, in effect, 
on standby. They are politically interested and ready to mobilise under specific 
circumstances. These findings offer further support for Amnå and Ekman’s (2014) 
notion of “standby citizenship,” where citizens engage with civic and political issues 
that resonate with their own private beliefs and personal identity.  
Future research should focus on the implications of “listening” for democratic 
citizenship. Does this aversion to public forms of expression and discursive engagement 
                                                
94 The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act, 2014. 
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have implications for the type of political information that is shared on social media? If 
so, does this provide an opportunity for the commodification of these tools by political 
parties and mass media news organisations? Further research is also needed to 
understand the threshold and conditions for activation.  
 
8.3.4 The Value of Everyday Communication 
 
As my friends and colleagues will attest, outside of political communication my biggest 
passion is Derby County, an English football club. The club’s most famous coach was 
Brian Clough, who guided the club to their first ever league championship in 1972. 
Affectionately nicknamed “Ol’ Big head,” Clough was a polarising figure, renowned for 
his outspoken opinions; he is perhaps the archetypal civic instigator. Despite his 
domineering demeanour, Clough placed much of his managerial success down to a 
spirit of mutuality that he fostered between himself and his playing staff. 
Communication was a key facet of his managerial style. As he noted during an 
interview with David Frost: 
 
I believe in communicating… I believe in talking to people. You would be 
amazed how many people want to talk and never get a chance. 
(Clough, 1974) 
 
The majority of participants involved in this thesis were interested in politics and well-
informed on those issues that they deemed to be important; yet they were uncomfortable 
in expressing these opinions in public spaces. Despite the development of interactive 
forms of online media, there is still evidence of a stark difference in both the style and 
substance of political conversations in public and private places (Eliasoph, 1998: 6). 
The difference today, as opposed to 1974 when Clough made these remarks, is that 
those who wish to talk now have more and more diverse opportunities to do so. 
Through their everyday use of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and private messaging 
applications like WhatsApp, these listeners can connect with like-minded others in new 
and unique ways. The slacktivist critique ignores these lifestyle-based forms of political 
talk and self-expression. This is problematic, as these experiences shape the dynamics 
of collective action. As Eliasoph (1998: 8) argues, “the ability to discuss politics allows 
citizens to generate power together.” This is not to say that this relationship between 
private connection and public action did not exist before social media, but platforms 
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such as Facebook and Twitter can certainly make the process easier for citizens to act 
collectively on their personal preferences. 
Ironically, the emphasis on effort within the slacktivist critique is emblematic of 
the very technological determinism that cyber-pessimists seek to counter. Emphasising 
the individual level costs associated with a technological function, such as clicking a 
button, disregards the cognitive processes that result in such an act. While it may be the 
case that some of these actions are done on the basis of very little forethought or 
planning, to assume that all are done on this basis is inaccurate. For some, these actions 
can be deliberated over at great length. Likewise, it seems quite perverse to suggest that 
just because these actions require less effort than other forms of activism did in the past, 
these citizens are somehow acting inauthentically. If these actions help to reduce costs 
at the individual level and enable a larger, more diverse range of citizens to participate 
in substantive action repertoires, should they not be valued? These tools are evidently 
not designed to “save the world,” and to judge them in such terms is disingenuous. No 
form of communication will bring about systemic political change, but, in both activist 
contexts and in day-to-day life, social media can be of benefit to citizens.  
As the title of this thesis suggests, it is only when we adjust our focus away from 
deterministic, impossibly grand claims about the impact of social media that we begin 
to see the symbolic possibilities for democratic enrichment in the milieu of everyday 
life; the candle burns bright. 
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Appendix A. Supporting Information for Chapter 5 
A1. List of 38 Degrees Emails 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. Invitation to post-CCG Conference reception, RSVP 
today. [email]. Sent 19/04/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. A reminder about tomorrow's 5.00pm reception. 
[email]. Sent 23/04/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. What happened last night. [email]. Sent 25/04/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS - vote now. [email]. Sent 30/04/2012. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS. [email]. Sent 04/09/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS in [your area]. [email]. Sent 14/09/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS in [your area]. [email]. Sent 20/09/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS in [your area]. [email]. Sent 24/09/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. Are you free [date] to meet up with other 38 Degrees 
members? [email]. Sent 02/10/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS in your area. [email]. Sent 04/10/2012. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. Save our NHS: [your area] get-together. [email]. Sent 
16/10/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS: Your name is missing. [email]. Sent 18/10/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. [Your area] is missing. [email]. Sent 23/10/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. Are you free [date] to meet up with other 38 Degrees 
members? [email]. Sent 26/10/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. [First name], how was your get-together? [email]. Sent 
31/10/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. Are you free on [date]? [email]. Sent 01/11/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
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action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS: next steps. [email]. Sent 15/11/2012. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS. [email]. Sent 16/11/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS. [email]. Sent 20/11/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS - stopping privatisation. [email]. Sent 
23/11/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS petition hand in - can we help?. [email]. Sent 
30/11/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS: write to your local newspaper. [email]. Sent 
12/12/2012. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2012. NHS: let’s get writing. [email]. Sent 13/12/2012. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. Haringey: local NHS campaign success. [email]. Sent 
27/02/2013. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. NHS. [email]. Sent 05/04/2013. Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower. [email]. Sent 17/04/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower: Can you help? [email]. Sent 26/04/2013. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. Scandalous. [email]. Sent 30/04/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower update. [email]. Sent 03/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. FW: npower. [email]. Sent 14/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower vote now. [email]. Sent 15/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower: Switch now. [email]. Sent 16/05/2013. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower. [email]. Sent 17/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower: Switch now. [email]. Sent 17/05/2013. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
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action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower. [email]. Sent 21/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower: Join in now. [email]. Sent 21/05/2013. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower. [email]. Sent 22/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower: Join in now. [email]. Sent 22/05/2013. 
Retrieved 29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. npower. [email]. Sent 28/05/2013. Retrieved 
29/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. NHS: A serious threat. [email]. Sent 28/05/2013. 
Retrieved 28/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. NHS victory. [email]. Sent 30/05/2013. Retrieved 
30/05/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. This is Tom Woolley’s story. What’s [Firstname] 
[Surname]?. [email]. Sent 05/08/2013. Retrieved 05/08/2013. 
 
action@38degrees.org.uk, 2013. Just 1 vote for our climate [email]. Sent 04/06/2013. 
Retrieved 04/06/2013.  
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A2. List of Interviews 
 
Anonymity was offered as part of the agreement allowing internal access to 38 Degrees. 
The gender of interviewees should not be implied from their pseudonyms.  
 
Interviews with 38 Degrees staff members: 
No. Pseudonym Role Date 
1 Jessica Member Services Manager May, 2013 
2 Anna Campaigns By You Manager May, 2013 
3 Jonathan Campaigns Manager May, 2013 
4 Amy Campaigns Director May, 2013 
5 Adam Technology Manager May, 2013 
6 Paul Campaigner May, 2013 
7 David Babbs Executive Director June, 2013 
Note: Given his role within 38 Degrees, David agreed to be interviewed without anonymity.  
 
Interviews with 38 Degrees members: 
No. Pseudonym Age City Profession Date 
8 Claire 25 Leicester Archive centre operative June, 2013 
9 Mike 24 London Engineering June, 2013 
10 Daniela 21 London Student June, 2013 
11 Siobhan 20 London Student June, 2013 
12 Nina 22 London Unemployed June, 2013 
13 Geraldine 68 Liverpool Retired June, 2013 
14 Helen 49 Essex Civil servant July, 2013 
15 George 63 Birmingham Retired August, 2013 
16 Mary 63 Hertfordshire Retired October, 2013 
17 Ian 60 Brighton Teacher October, 2013 
18 Jack 56 London Civil Servant October, 2013 
19 Liam 38 London Charity sector October, 2013 
20 Joanna 57 Essex Volunteer October, 2013 
21 Joan 73 London Artist October, 2013 
22 Danni 24 London Advertising November, 2013 
!
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A3. Ethical Considerations 
 
This project received ethical approval from the Research Committee at the Department 
of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway. All staff and members were 
aware of my status as a researcher. I provided clearance forms for all those involved in 
the study, which clearly outlined the focus of the research and how any data collected 
would be stored and used. These forms are available on request. All information 
provided has been anonymised, excluding the interview with David Babbs, the 
Executive Director of 38 Degrees.  
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Appendix B. Supporting Information for Chapter 6 
B1. Sampling Frame and Demographic Information 
 
This convenience sample was designed to identify participants with media habits that 
were reflective of the slacktivist critique. The sample is heavily skewed towards citizens 
who use digital media. Of the 29 diarists, 24 had a Facebook account and 20 used 
Twitter. Just two participants, Arnold and Ron, did not use either service. Furthermore, 
15 diarists stated that they used online providers as their main source of news, while 
four participants use social networking sites. This does not mirror general trends, as 
television is still the most widely used medium for news consumption in Britain 
(Ofcom, 2014: 2). As a recent study by Ofcom illustrates, the dependency on online 
forms of news is perhaps reflective of the age bias of the sample, with 21 diarists aged 
34 or under:  
 
Nine in ten (90%) people aged 55 and over use TV as a platform for consuming 
news, compared to three in five (59%) of the 16-24 age group. The same pattern 
is observed for consumption of news through newspapers (54% in the 55+ age 
group vs. 33% for those aged 16-24) and for consumption of news through the 
radio (41% vs. 27%). Conversely, consumption of news through any internet or 
app is three times higher for those in the 16-24 age group (60%) than in the 55 
and over age group (21%). 
(Ofcom, 2014: 2) 
 
No quotas for age, gender, or socio-economic groupings were used during 
recruitment. As a result there was a slight overrepresentation of young people with 
either a Facebook account, as shown in Figure B.1, or a Twitter account, illustrated in 
Figure B.2. This has implications for the conclusions drawn from this research given the 
youth-oriented focus of the theoretical framework (see actualizing citizen framework, 
Bennett, 2008; Bennett, Wells and Freelon, 2011). 
 
 334 
Figure B.1. Number of diarists with a Facebook account by age group 
 
 
Figure B.2. Number of diarists with a Twitter account by age group 
 
 
However, as Figure B.3 shows, this bias does not pose too much of a problem 
when we consider the adoption of social media by the British public, with younger 
internet users more likely to have set up an account on a social networking site (Ofcom, 
2013a: 25). Therefore younger citizens are generally a more accurate representation of 
the target population, i.e. social media users in Britain. Although eight diarists in this 
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project are aged 35 or over in order to offer some comparability across age groups, any 
conclusions must be cautiously interpreted with an understanding of this sampling bias.  
 
Figure B.3. Percentage of internet users in Britain who have set up a profile on a social 
networking site by age group 
 
Source: Ofcom (2013a: 25) 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; which, if any, of these things have you ever 
done online: Set up your own social networking site page or profile on a site or app such as Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Tumblr or Pinterest. N=1346 
 
The sample also had a gender and socioeconomic status bias. There was a slight 
overrepresentation of males with 16 male and 13 female participants. Three male 
diarists dropped out of the project before completion, meaning that an equal number of 
men and women completed the study. Secondly, as shown in Appendix B2, there was a 
significant overrepresentation of citizens who were either in the process of undertaking 
or had already completed an undergraduate degree when compared to UK census data. 
Likewise, the occupational status of those involved was not representative of the wider 
population, with all but one diarist in work and many with incomes higher than the 
national average (£26,500). As Sloam (2012a) argues, this has implications for the 
findings of this research as new repertoires of political engagement tend to be structured 
in favour of citizens with higher levels of education and higher levels of household 
income. 
The convenience sample was also designed to recruit citizens with an interest in 
politics. As with media habits, political interest was an important variable in order to 
identify participants who may represent the slacktivist critique. As such, this means that 
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the findings of this study are limited to those citizens with some level of interest in 
politics. Political interest was calculated through a measure of political activity. 
Participants were asked what political actions they had completed over the previous 12 
months. This question, and the responses offered, were based on those included in the 
Audit of Political Engagement (Hansard Society, 2014: 90). As the comparison between 
Figure B.4 and B.5 shows, there are two measures in which the sample had significantly 
lower levels of political activity; singing a paper petition and taking part in a public 
consultation. Otherwise, the participants in this research are generally representative of 
the target population, i.e. politically active individuals in Britain. 
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Figure B.4. Diarists: In the last 12 months have you done any of the following to 
influence political representatives, public decisions, laws or policies? 
 
 
Figure B.5. Audit of Political Engagement (2014): In the last 12 months have you done 
any of the following to influence political representatives, public decisions, laws or 
policies? 
 
Source: Hansard Society (2014: 47) 
Note: This Figure does not include the majority of respondents (n=670) who selected “None of the 
above.” This data was omitted given the sampling frame for this thesis required citizens with some level 
of interest in politics. N=616. 
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B3. Exemplar Diary Format 
 
This form is based on the template provided by Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 
(2010: 48). 
 
Using Media Diaries to Explore Political Participation 
 
Diarist number:  
Week number:  / 12 
 
 
 
Date: 
 
Please turn over if you want to add more & feel free to attach extra pages  
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B4. Pre-Diary Interview Questions 
 
All interviews took place between October and November 2013. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, over the phone, or over Skype. All interviews were transcribed 
and coded inductively using NVivo during the data analysis phase of the research. 
These questions are adapted from Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2010). 
 
A: Introduction 
 
This study aims to explore how social media is changing the way in which we learn 
about civic and political information, communicate with others about public matters, 
and express ourselves. This project has two underlying goals: 
 
Firstly, this study seeks to explore how different people use different forms of media in 
different ways. 
 
Secondly, this project seeks to trace each diarist’s civic and political actions over a 
period of three months. 
 
Before we discuss the diary itself, I have a few questions to try and help me understand 
you, your relationship with media, and your relationship with politics. 
 
B: Opening questions - understanding the time pressures of modern life 
 
1. How much of your time does your occupation take up each week? What about 
family demands, domestic chores and so on - how much time do these take up?  
2. How much time, if any, does that leave you with free for yourself? 
3. What do you like to do with your free time?  
 
C: Moving onto questions on media consumption 
 
4. In a typical week, what sorts of media do you use? [Prompt if necessary - TV, 
radio, newspaper, internet, social media, novels, magazines, video games]  
5. Is there a particular form of media you couldn’t do without?  
6. What sort of [newspaper reader] [internet user] etc. would you describe yourself 
as? 
7. Would you say your use of media has changed much over the past few years? If 
so, how?  
8. Thinking about social media… Do you use Facebook? [if yes]  
9. What do you use Facebook for?  
10. Has this changed at all in the last few years? 
11. What sort of things do you post? How do you feel about political content or 
news on Facebook?  
12. Do you use Twitter? [if yes]  
13. What do you use Twitter for?  
14. Has this changed at all in the last few years? 
15. What sort of things do you post? How do you feel about political content on 
Twitter?  
 
D: Questions on political engagement / civic involvement  
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To begin with I’d like to ask some very broad, conceptual questions. There is no right or 
wrong answer to these, they are an attempt to understand your personal take, so feel free 
to answer them whatever way you like. 
 
16. For you, what is political participation? 
17. For you, what is citizenship? 
18. Within this research I am interested in how you perceive politics, political 
participation, and civic matters – what sort of things do you consider as 
political? 
19. What things do you consider as civic? 
20. Would you say that you are politically engaged? 
21. Would you say that you are civically engaged? 
22. Can you tell me whether you vote in elections? If yes / no, why? 
 
E: Questions on personal identity 
 
23. I’m also interested in understanding what political and civic matters you are 
personally interested and involved in. Are there any issues that you have a long 
standing interest in? 
24. If we take the type of public issues or themes that interest you, where do you 
generally get your information about it from? 
25. Do you belong to any group or organisation linked to these issues? [prompt: any 
charity, self-help group, national organisation, political party, forum, Facebook 
group] 
26. Why did you become interested in this/these issue/s?  
 
F: Introducing the diary 
 
This study aims to generate citizens’ own reflections on civic and political issues. 
Throughout the process you are encouraged to describe behaviours, actions, 
conversations, and reflect on them. 
 
In doing so diarists are asked to track and reflect on the following:  
 
Firstly, your use of media. This includes both consumption activities, such as watching 
the television or reading a newspaper, and production activities, such as posting a tweet 
or expressing an opinion to a friend. Where this consumption and expression takes place 
is important (e.g. at work; on Facebook; with your family at home etc.). We have 
touched on the type of public issues and activities you’re interested in and think are 
important and it is your sense of what’s important that I am interested in, not necessarily 
the thoughts of others. 
 
Secondly, any civic or political acts that you may undertake during the three-month 
period (e.g. attend a public meeting; donate to a charity; share a news story on 
Facebook).  
 
Finally, a rough estimate of the time that you devote to certain activities is also useful. 
Our understanding of time has an important role on our relationship with media and 
with political engagement. If you find yourself constantly checking your Facebook feed 
or Twitter feed, make a note of it and highlight what you are doing. Likewise, if reading 
a newspaper from cover-to-cover or watching the 6pm news broadcast fits in with your 
routine, reflect on why you do this.   
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B5. Post-Diary Survey Questions 
 
This survey was shared with participants in June 2014. This provided a period of 
reflection so that diarists could consider their involvement in the project. The survey 
was designed using Google Sheets and all data was stored on Google Drive. 
 
1. How did you find completing the diary? Did you enjoy it? Did it cause you any 
problems? 
2. Thinking back to the period of time when you were completing your diary – 
what sort of time was it for you?  
a. Very busy 
b. Busy 
c. Normal 
d. A quiet period 
e. A very quiet period 
3. While you were filling in the diary did you notice anything that surprised you 
regarding your media habits? 
4. In your diary did you find yourself commenting on topics you wouldn’t have 
expected to comment on? 
5. During the diary period where did you get your news from? Please indicate all 
that apply. 
a. TV 
b. Radio 
c. Newspaper 
d. Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
e. Blogs 
f. Social media (e.g. Facebook; Twitter; Reddit; YouTube) 
g. Magazines 
h. Word of mouth 
i. Other - please specify 
6. During the diary period where did you get the majority of your news from? 
Please select one option only. 
a. TV 
b. Radio 
c. Newspaper 
d. Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
e. Blogs 
f. Social media (e.g. shared on Facebook and Twitter) 
g. Magazines 
h. Word of mouth 
i. Other - please specify 
7. During the diary did you undertake any political actions, such as contacting an 
MP or signing a petition? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
8. Has doing the diary changed your media use at all? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
9. Has doing the diary changed your view about: 
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a. The role that media play in your life? 
b. What public issues are important? 
10. In the last 12 months have you done any of the following to influence political 
representatives, public decisions, laws, or policies?95 Please tick all of those that 
apply: 
a. Contacted a local councillor or MP/MSP/Welsh Assembly Member 
b. Contacted the media 
c. Created or signed a paper petition 
d. Created or signed an e-petition 
e. Donated money or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaigning 
organisation 
f. Boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons 
g. Attended political meetings 
h. Donated money or paid a membership fee to a political party 
i. Taken part in a demonstration, picket or march 
j. Voted in an election 
k. Contributed to a discussion or campaign online or on social media 
l. Taken part in a public consultation 
m. None of the above 
11. If yes, please tick all those that occurred while you were completing your diary: 
a. Contacted a local councillor or MP/MSP/Welsh Assembly Member 
b. Contacted the media 
c. Created or signed a paper petition 
d. Created or signed an e-petition 
e. Donated money or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaigning 
organisation 
f. Boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons 
g. Attended political meetings 
h. Donated money or paid a membership fee to a political party 
i. Taken part in a demonstration, picket or march 
j. Voted in an election 
k. Contributed to a discussion or campaign online or on social media 
l. Taken part in a public consultation 
m. N/A 
 
  
                                                
95 Question adapted from the Audit of Political Engagement survey (Hansard Society, 2014: 90). “Taken 
an active part in a campaign” has been removed as I deemed this to be too vague. 
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B6. News Comparison: Research Notes 
 
A timeline was used as to compare the relative prominence of news stories in the British 
press with those issues raised in the diaries. To do this I adopted the same approach as 
used in Media Consumption and Public Engagement: 
 
For the diaries, each mention of a news story was recorded and dated, and 
references to news items across the sample were added up and calculated week-
to-week. In some cases the specific date of diary entries was not clear, and had 
to be inferred by previous and subsequent entries as well as the content of the 
entry. These totals were then weighted so as to control for the number of diarists 
writing in any given week. 
Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2010: 212 
 
A weighted value was calculated to account for the fluctuation in the number of active 
diarists each week. To do this, the maximum number of diarists active during a single 
week was identified; there were 27 diarists active during the week ending November 16, 
2013. During those weeks in which there were fewer than 27 diarists active, the 
weighted value was calculated using this formula: 
 
Weighted value = Observed counts x 
 
 
There were three weeks during the project where the formula may have oversimplified 
the prominence of certain stories, as the total number of diarists was fewer than 10.96 
The press timeline is based on data collected over the course of the diary period 
from the front pages of four British newspapers: the Sun, the Daily Mail, The Times and 
the Guardian. These four sources were selected in order compare the prominence of 
stories in this study with those in Media Consumption and Public Engagement. This 
study collated the front pages of these publications using Paperboy,97 a free-to-access 
digital archive of image files of newspapers from around the globe. When an image of a 
front page was not available, or not of a high enough quality, a combination of 
LexisNexis and Twitter were used to identify news items. BBC journalist Nick Sutton 
(@suttonnick) shares the front page of British newspapers on a daily basis. These 
include the hashtag #tomorrowspaperstoday. By using a combination of different 
                                                
96 These are as follows: the week ending December 28, 2013 – 7 diarists active; the week ending 
February 8, 2014 - 9 diarists active; the week ending February 15, 2014 – 8 diarists active. 
97 For further details on Paperboy: http://www.thepaperboy.com/uk/. 
27 
No. active diarists 
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Boolean word searches in the Twitter search tool, I was able to identify all of the news 
items required. 
In order to compare the press timeline with the diarist timeline, the volume of 
mentions of news items in the newspapers had to be weighted. As in the design used by 
Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2010: 213), a news reference point was selected; 
this was the news item that received the most mentions by diarists in a single week. 
This occurred during the week ending December 7, 2013, in which 21 diarists discussed 
the passing of Nelson Mandela. The number of references made by diarists to this event 
was then divided by the number of mentions on the same issue in the four selected 
newspapers; 7 mentions. As such, a ratio of 3 was used to weight mentions of news 
items. 
The timelines are structured on a weekly basis, with each week starting on a 
Saturday. While this may seem unorthodox, this is because participants often sent their 
weekly entries on a Saturday. The timelines span four months and, as such, do not cover 
the entire diary period. This decision was made to avoid those weeks in which only a 
handful of diarists were active.  
All three timelines (Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4) only include the two codes that had 
the largest weighted volume for each week. Codes emerged inductively from an initial 
analysis of the diaries and were then systematically applied to both the diaries and the 
newspaper front pages. The news items were categorised through precise references, but 
also amalgamated into broader topics when appropriate (see Appendix B7 for further 
details). 
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B7. News Comparison: Key to Timelines 
 
Abbreviation News item 
Bad weather Storms, flooding and heavy snowfall in Britain 
Leveson “The Leveson Inquiry,” a judicial public inquiry into the culture, 
practices, and ethics of the British press following the phone hacking 
scandal 
Snowden Edward Snowden, an American computer professional who leaked 
classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA) 
Health Specific items relating to healthcare in the UK, including debates 
surrounding the legal status of drugs, NHS reforms etc. 
Philippines 
Typhoon 
Typhoon Haiyan, a tropical cyclone that devastated Southeast Asia  
Co-Op Allegations of drug abuse and financial impropriety against the 
former Co-operative Bank chairman, Paul Flowers 
Slavery Cases of slavery in the UK and USA 
Immigration 
and EU 
Immigration and items relating to European Union, in particular the 
lifting of migration restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens 
Nigella Lawson A series of stories relating to the celebrity chef Nigella Lawson, 
including allegations of drug abuse, the trial of two of her personal 
assistants, and her divorce from Charles Saatchi 
Helicopter 
crash 
A police helicopter crash at a pub in Glasgow 
Mandela Death of Nelson Mandela, who served as President of South Africa 
from 1994 to 1999 
Child abuse 
scandals 
Child abuse allegations, including both mentions of cases relating to 
“Operation Yewtree,” an investigation into the historical sexual abuse 
of children, and the trial of the musician, Ian Watkins 
Economy Items relating to the state of the British economy 
David Cameron Specific items relating to the Prime Minister, David Cameron 
Michael 
Schumacher  
A skiing accident involving the Formula 1 driver, Michael 
Schumacher 
Welfare 
reforms 
Items on reforms of the welfare system in the UK, including the 
Under Occupancy Penalty, popularly branded the Bedroom Tax, child 
tax credits etc. 
Mark Duggan Inquest into the death of Mark Duggan 
Rennard 
scandal 
Allegations of sexual abuse aimed at the Liberal Democrat peer, Lord 
Chris Rennard 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Specific items relating to the Liberal Democrats 
Labour Party Specific items relating to the Labour Party, including the party’s 
relationship with the union, Unite 
Brand and 
Paxman 
BBC Newsnight interview with celebrity-activist Russell Brand, by 
journalist Jeremy Paxman  
Energy prices Items on the cost of energy in the UK 
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Abbreviation News item 
Paul Walker Death of Paul Walker, actor 
MPs’ pay rise Stories on a suggested 11 percent pay rise for MPs 
Apollo theatre Collapse of the Apollo Theatre in London 
One Direction Liam Payne, a member of One Direction, apologises for a dangerous 
photo 
Volgograd Terrorist attack at the Winter Olympics in Russia 
“Benefits 
Street” 
Channel 4 documentary series exploring the life of people on benefits 
Women’s rights Items on the rights of women, including equal pay 
Afghanistan Exit strategy for UK armed forces in Afghanistan 
Environment Items relating to the environment 
Ukraine Protests and conflict in Ukraine 
Social media Items on social media, including Twitter abuse and “Neknominate,” 
an online drinking game in which the participant must film 
themselves drinking a beverage and upload the footage online before 
nominating others 
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B8. Details of Data Scraping 
  
All diarists with a Facebook and Twitter profile were asked to provide evidence of their 
public interactions. All but one diarist, Louise, agreed to this. In order to collect this 
data I added all of their diarists as a friend on Facebook and then sorted them into a 
private list. This functionality enabled me to access all public posts made without 
algorithmic restrictions. I collected all public posts made by the diarists during their 
involvement in the project. This did not include comments or likes on the content of 
other Facebook users or private interactions.  
A number of data scraping tools were considered for use during this project, 
such as OutWit and import.io. However I encountered difficulties with both tools when 
scraping the data required from Facebook, as neither could differentiate between the 
various post types (e.g. textual updates; embedded video). As such, I manually captured 
all of the data posted by participants using the Mac OSX print screen function. These 
images were added to a PDF file for each diarist and imported into NVivo for manual 
coding using the select region function. While this process was time consuming, it 
ensured that all visual stimuli were included and gave me a clearer understanding of the 
content posted by diarists (Karpf, 2013).   
All diarists gave permission for their posts on Twitter to be used in the research. 
However, one diarist was excluded from the analysis. Although Thomas originally 
provided consent, he left the service before the data collection took place. The data 
collected from Twitter included all public interactions made by diarists during the diary 
period, including public responses to other accounts (@mentions). 
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B9. Coding Framework 
 
All data collected from Facebook and Twitter was coded on NVivo using this 
framework. 
 
Facebook: 
 
A Type of post (discrete coding) 
 
1. Status-update: text only 
2. Status-update: image 
3. Status-update: video 
4. Sharing content: text only or link 
5. Sharing content: image 
6. Sharing content: video 
7. Changing profile picture 
8. Changing cover photo 
9. Creating / sharing an event 
10. Re-sharing content from a Friend, Page or application: text only or link 
11. Re-sharing content from a Friend, Page or application: image 
12. Re-sharing content from a Friend, Page or application: video 
13. Adding photo(s) to album / uploading an album 
14. Location tag 
 
B Content of post (non-discrete coding) 
 
1. Personal: friends and family; health; careers and work etc. 
2. Humour 
3. Music and radio 
4. Film 
5. TV 
6. Technology and video games 
7. Other visual arts 
8. Books and literature 
9. Sports and exercise 
10. Celebrity and gossip 
11. Travel 
12. Food and drink 
13. Retail and commerce 
14. Fashion 
15. Religion, faith, and spirituality 
16. Science and space 
17. Environment and energy 
18. Animals and pets 
19. Vehicles 
20. Crime and legal 
21. Social media (e.g. reflecting on the service itself, or on the behaviour of users on 
the service) 
22. Charity, community and social causes 
23. Current events and news 
24. Politics and political events 
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25. Other 
26. Health (non-personal) 
27. Weather 
28. Education 
 
C Level of interaction on post (discrete coding; cumulative total) 
 
1. None: No likes, comments, or shares 
2. Low: Between 1-9 likes, comments, and shares 
3. Medium: Between 10-19 likes, comments, and shares 
4. High: Between 20-29 likes, comments, and shares 
5. Very high: Above 30 likes, comments, and shares 
 
D  Politics: Type of post (non-discrete coding) 
 
1. Sharing information from a broadcast or print media source (recognised media 
outlets) 
2. Sharing information from an alternative source, including new media outlets 
(e.g. BuzzFeed, Upworthy, Vice) an advocacy group; a citizen activist 
3. Sharing information from a networked contact (e.g. a Friend on Facebook) 
4. Expression of opinion contained within a status update 
5. Expression of opinion: link to user generated content (e.g. blog post; vlog) 
6. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: e-petition 
7. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: donating to a civic or political cause 
8. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: consumer activism (e.g. boycotting 
and buycotting) 
9. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contacting political representatives 
10. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contacting the broadcast or print 
media 
11. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: volunteering 
12. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: activity related to group membership  
13. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: forms of public demonstration  
14. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: forms of illegal protest activity 
15. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: voting 
16. Organising, or contributing to the organisation of, a political action 
17. Other 
18. Sharing information from a political party or political representative 
19. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contribution to a public meeting, 
consultation, or debate 
 
Twitter: 
 
A Type of tweet (discrete coding) 
 
1. Tweet – no link, no user mentions, and not a Retweet (RT) 
2. Tweet – interaction (@mention) with another user(s) 
3. Retweet of another user (done natively or in the traditional style) 
4. Modified tweet (MT) from another user 
5. Tweet - @reply 
 
B Content being shared (discrete coding) 
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1. No links 
2. Embedded content (e.g. images; YouTube videos) 
3. Link to external content (e.g. blogs; e-petition; news) 
 
C Content of post (non-discrete; links are included in the coding if they are still 
accessible) 
 
1. Personal: friends and family; health; careers and work etc. 
2. Humour 
3. Music and radio 
4. Film 
5. TV 
6. Technology and video games 
7. Other visual arts 
8. Books and literature 
9. Sports and exercise 
10. Celebrity and gossip 
11. Travel 
12. Food and drink 
13. Retail and commerce 
14. Fashion 
15. Religion, faith, and spirituality 
16. Science and space 
17. Environment and energy 
18. Animals and pets 
19. Vehicles 
20. Crime and legal 
21. Social media (e.g. reflecting on the service itself, or on the behaviour of users on 
the service) 
22. Charity, community and social causes 
23. Current events and news 
24. Politics and political events 
25. Other 
26. Health (non-personal) 
27. Weather 
28. Education 
 
D  Politics: Type of post (non-discrete coding) 
 
1. Sharing information from a broadcast or print media source (recognised media 
outlets) 
2. Sharing information from an alternative source, including new media outlets 
(e.g. BuzzFeed, Upworthy, Vice) an advocacy group; a citizen activist 
3. Sharing information from a networked contact (e.g. another user on Twitter) 
4. Expression of opinion contained within a tweet 
5. Expression of opinion: link to user generated content (e.g. blog post; vlog) 
6. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: e-petition 
7. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: donating to a civic or political cause 
8. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: consumer activism (e.g. boycotting 
and buycotting) 
9. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contacting political representatives 
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10. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contacting the broadcast or print 
media 
11. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: volunteering 
12. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: activity related to group membership  
13. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: forms of public demonstration  
14. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: forms of illegal protest activity 
15. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: voting 
16. Organising, or contributing to the organisation of, a political action 
17. Other 
18. Sharing information from a political party or political representative 
19. Sharing evidence of / promoting an action: contribution to a public meeting, 
consultation, or debate 
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B.11 Ethical Considerations 
 
This project received ethical approval from the Research Committee at the Department 
of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway. During the initial interview 
all diarists were asked to sign a research consent form. This clearly outlined the focus of 
the research and how any data collected would be stored and used. These forms are 
available on request. All the data collected was stored on a password-protected external 
hard drive, with a backup on a password-protected cloud facility. Diarists had the option 
to request that their personal data be destroyed upon completion of the research. The 
identity of all diarists has been anonymised throughout the research.  
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Appendix C. Supporting Information for Chapter 7 
C1. Sampling Frame and Demographic Information 
 
Over 80 percent of all participants were aged between 17 and 24, and no participants 
were aged over 35, as shown in Table C.1. Although age may seem to have little 
relevance to acts of slacktivism, 98  the critique, especially in the aftermath of 
#Kony2012, often relates to the actions of younger citizens. For example, questions 
have been raised over whether young people are critical enough of the information they 
consume online (Bartlett and Miller, 2011). Subsequently, this has led to renewed calls 
for an increased focus on information literacy in schools (McDougall and Livingstone, 
2014).  Furthermore, young users comprise the most politically active age group on 
social media. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American 
Life Project found that 72 percent of all users aged between 18-24 are politically active 
on social networking sites, the highest of all age cohorts surveyed (Smith, 2013: 32). 
Thus, although recruiting participants of a similar age was necessary for internal 
validity, it also bolstered external validity too given the target population. 
 
Table C.1. Participants by age 
Age category 
Overall  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
n %  n %  n % 
17-24 64 82.1  34 85.0  30 78.9 
25-34 14 17.9  6 15.0  8 21.1 
35-44 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
45-54 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
55-64 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
65+ 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Total 78 100  40 100  38 100 
 
Secondly, it was necessary to recruit those students who are politically interested 
and open to engaging in acts of digital micro-activism. Table C.2 shows which 
department each participant is affiliated to, with 46 of the 78 participants undertaking 
their degree in the Department of Politics and International Relations and Philosophy. 
Furthermore, all of the nine students from the Department of Economics are registered 
to joint honours degrees that include politics. 
                                                
98 Originally the term was applied specifically to young people, referring to “bottom up activities by 
young people to affect society on a small personal scale” (Christensen, 2011). 
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Table C.2. Participants by university department 
Department 
Overall  Experiment 1 
 Experiment 
2 
n %  n %  n % 
Biological Sciences 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Classics 1 1.3  1 2.5  0 0.0 
Criminology and Sociology 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Computer Science 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Earth Sciences 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Economics 9 11.5  5 12.5  4 10.5 
English 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
European Studies 4 5.1  3 7.5  1 2.6 
Geography 3 3.8  3 7.5  0 0.0 
History 2 2.6  1 2.5  1 2.6 
Information Security 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Management 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Mathematics 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Media Arts 5 6.4  0 0.0  5 13.2 
Modern Languages, Literatures and 
Cultures 
0 0.0 
 
0 0.0 
 
0 0.0 
Music 1 1.3  0 0.0  1 2.6 
Politics and International Relations and 
Philosophy 
46 59.0 
 
23 57.5 
 
23 60.5 
Psychology 2 2.6  1 2.5  1 2.6 
Social Work 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Other 5 6.4  3 7.5  2 5.3 
Total 78 100  40 100  38 100 
 
Finally, the convenience sample was designed to identify citizens who are active 
social media users. Within the sample over 90 percent of participants access Facebook 
at least twice a day. Moreover, as Table C.3 shows, almost half of the participants in the 
experiment (47.4 percent) make over ten visits to the social networking site each day. 
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Table C.3. Participants by frequency of visits to Facebook 
How often do you visit Facebook? 
Overall  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
n %  n %  n % 
More than 10 times a day 37 47.4  27 67.5  10 26.3 
2-10 times a day 36 46.2  13 32.5  23 60.5 
Once a day 3 3.8  0 0.0  3 7.9 
Every other day 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
A couple of times a week 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Once a week 1 1.3  0 0.0  1 2.6 
Less often 1 1.3  0 0.0  1 2.6 
Don't know 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Total 78 100.0  40 100.0  38 100.0 
 
Participants also use social media to access news and political information. This 
was important given that content providers such as BuzzFeed and Upworthy often tailor 
their output for dissemination across social media. In total 74 participants, 94.9 percent 
of the sample, use some form of social media to access news content in a typical week, 
as shown in Table C.4. 
 
Table C.4. Participants: In a typical week, which of these do you use to access news? 
Source of 
news 
Overall  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
Frequency %  n=78  Frequency 
%  
n=40  Frequency 
%  
n=38 
Television 31 39.7  15 37.5  16 42.1 
Radio 21 26.9  10 25.0  11 28.9 
Newspaper 29 37.2  12 30.0  17 44.7 
Online news 
websites 
73 93.6  38 95.0  35 92.1 
Blogs 21 26.9  12 30.0  9 23.7 
Social 
media  
74 94.9  39 97.5  35 92.1 
Magazines 13 16.7  5 12.5  8 21.1 
None of the 
above 
0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
 
As Figure C.1 shows, the media habits of those taking part in this experiment 
reflect a distinctive kind of information consumer, with almost all participants regularly 
using online news websites (93.6 percent) and social media (94.9 percent) and relatively 
few using newspapers (37.2 percent) or radio (26.9 percent). These trends differ from 
the preferences of the wider British population. Ofcom’s (2014) annual report on news 
consumption trends in Britain revealed that 75 percent of adults use the TV as a source 
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of news, notably higher than the sample in this experiment. The report also found that 
just 41 percent of the respondents use any form of online news source. As such, the 
findings from these experiments cannot be generalised to the wider British population. 
They are indicative of a small proportion of younger, digitally active citizens who use 
forms of social media for news consumption.  
 
Figure C.1. Participants: In a typical week, which of these do you use to access news? 
 
 
This shift in the population of interest also diverges from that used in the 
ethnographic research. An interesting finding from the participant observation of 38 
Degrees was that those who were most involved were older than I had anticipated prior 
to undertaking this research; many of the most active and engaged members that I 
interviewed were retired (see Chapter 5). Therefore, the sampling frame used within 
these experiments limits what I can infer comparatively when trying to triangulate the 
findings across the thesis. 
Given this emphasis on digitally active and politically interested young people, 
participants were not excluded based on other criteria, such as their ethnicity, gender, or 
socio-economic background. As a result there were a number of discrepancies when 
comparing the sample to the target population. These demographic traits are important, 
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as the meaning conveyed by the information within the news feed can vary depending 
on one’s social background and personal circumstances (Dalton, 2008; Dahlgren, 2009). 
Firstly, as Table C.5 shows, the sample was more ethnically diverse, with 66.7 percent 
of participants identifying as white as opposed to 86.0 percent of the British population 
who identify as white in the latest census data. 
 
Table C.5. Participants by ethnicity 
Ethnic group 
Overall  Experiment 1  
Experiment 
2 
n %  n %  n % 
White 52 66.7  28 70.0  24 63.2 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 10 12.8  5 12.5  5 13.2 
Asian / Asian British 9 11.5  3 7.5  6 15.8 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black 
British 
3 3.8  2 5.0  1 2.6 
Other Ethnic Group 4 5.1  2 5.0  2 5.3 
Total 78 100  40 100  38 100 
 
The sample also featured an overrepresentation of women (60.3 percent), as 
shown in Table C.6. However, while this is not reflective of past research on the gender 
gap in levels of political activity (see Furlong and Cartmel, 2012), this is in keeping 
with the desired sampling frame as di Gennaro and Dutton (2006: 305) found women to 
be slightly more likely to engage in online activism than men. 
 
Table C.6. Participants by gender 
Gender 
Overall  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
n %  n %  n % 
Female 47 60.3  25 62.5  22 57.9 
Male 31 39.7  15 37.5  16 42.1 
Total 78 100  40 100  38 100 
 
While efforts were taken to try and measure the socio-economic status of 
participants, designing a survey question that accurately measures a student’s 
background proved challenging. Given that the majority of the sample were first-year 
students embarking on their studies during the 2014/15 academic year, participants were 
asked about their household income for 2013. This was an attempt to understand their 
social background. However, this proved to be problematic given that 38.5 percent of 
participants either did not know what this was, or did not feel comfortable in providing 
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this information, as shown in Table C.7. This is significant when we consider that new 
repertoires of online political engagement tend to be dominated by well-off citizens 
(Sloam, 2012a: 10). 
 
Table C.7. Participants by estimated annual income in 2013 
Annual household income in 2013 Frequency % Cumulative percent 
£0- £5,000 4 5.1 5.1 
£5,000 - £10,000 6 7.7 12.8 
£10,000 - £20,000 17 21.8 34.6 
£20,000 - £30,000 8 10.3 44.9 
£30,000 - £40,000 3 3.8 48.7 
£40,000 -  10 12.8 61.5 
Don't know 17 21.8 83.3 
Prefer not to say 13 16.7 100.0 
Total 78 100.0  
 
In summary, this study recruited digitally active, politically-engaged students for 
two reasons. Firstly, this sampling frame benefits the internal validity of the 
experiments. As randomisation from a wider population was not feasible, this 
homogenous sample offered a control for the effect of demographics. Secondly, the 
sample was also generally representative of the actors who are deemed to be 
slacktivists. 
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C2. Survey Design 
 
The full surveys and debriefing forms for both experiments can be found online: 
https://db.tt/y5rk27v2  
 
Laboratory experiment 1: Information Type 
 
Questionnaire (1): Your Media Use 
 
The following questions have been designed to understand how you use different forms 
of media, especially Facebook, and what news and information you consume regularly. 
 
In a typical week, which of these do you use to access news? Please tick all those that 
apply: 
• Television 
• Radio 
• Newspaper 
• Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
• Blogs 
• Social media (e.g. Facebook; Twitter) 
• Magazines 
• None of the above 
 
If you do access news, which of these is your main source of news? Please select one 
option: 
• Television 
• Radio 
• Newspaper 
• Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
• Blogs 
• Social media (e.g. Facebook; Twitter) 
• Magazines 
 
How often do you visit Facebook? Please select one option: 
• More than 10 times a day  
• 2-10 times a day 
• Once a day 
• Every other day 
• A couple of times a week  
• Once a week 
• Less often 
• Don’t know 
 
People can access and post links to information from a range of sources on Facebook. 
These include entertainment blogs, news organisations, and sports websites. Which of 
these sources are you aware of? Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
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• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 
Which of these sources have you seen on your Facebook news feed? The news feed is 
the constantly updating list of stories in the middle of your Facebook home page. It 
includes status updates, photos, videos, links, app activity and likes from people, pages 
and groups that you follow on Facebook. Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 
Of the sources you have seen on your Facebook News Feed, which of these sources do 
you Like and/or Follow on Facebook? i.e. You have personally chosen to subscribe to 
their updates by clicking Like or Follow on their page. Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 366 
 
Questionnaire (2): Your Facebook News Feed This Week 
 
These questions concern your level of interest and opinions on popular topics on 
Facebook this week. 
 
How interested would you say you are in women’s rights? Please select one option:  
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
Are you aware of media critic Anita Sarkeesian cancelling a speech at Utah State 
University due to death threats? Please select one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
If yes, have you seen any posts about this news story on Facebook? Please select one 
option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
How interested would you say you are in the environment? Please select one option: 
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
Are you aware of the People’s Climate March? Please select one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
If yes, have you seen any posts about this news story on Facebook? Please select one 
option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
How interested would you say you are in immigration? Please select one option: 
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
Are you aware of the proposal to place quotas on the migration of European Union 
workers to Britain? Please select one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
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If yes, have you seen any posts about this news story on Facebook? Please select one 
option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Post-test survey 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. We now have several questions regarding 
your interaction with the news feed. 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to women’s rights? Mark only one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to the environment? Mark only one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to immigration? Mark only one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
During the experiment did you see a post on media critic Anita Sarkeesian cancelling a 
speech at Utah State University due to death threats? Please select one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
If yes, thinking about the post, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? Please select one option per row: 
• The post was interesting 
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• The post made me want to learn more about women’s rights 
 
Scale: 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
• Don’t know 
 
During the experiment did you see a post on the People’s Climate March? Please select 
one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
If yes, thinking about the post, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? Please select one option per row: 
• The post was interesting 
• The post made me want to learn more about the environment 
 
Scale: 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
• Don’t know 
 
During the experiment did you see a post on the proposal to place quotas on the 
migration of European Union workers to Britain? Please select one option: 
• Yes 
• No 
 
If yes, thinking about the post, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? Please select one option per row: 
• The post was interesting 
• The post made me want to learn more about the immigration 
 
Scale: 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
• Don’t know 
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Laboratory experiment 2: Facebook Likes 
 
Questionnaire (1): Your Media Use 
 
The following questions have been designed to understand how you use different forms 
of media, especially Facebook, and what news and information you consume regularly. 
 
In a typical week, which of these do you use to access news? Please tick all those that 
apply: 
• Television 
• Radio 
• Newspaper 
• Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
• Blogs 
• Social media (e.g. Facebook; Twitter) 
• Magazines 
• None of the above 
 
If you do access news, which of these is your main source of news? Please select one 
option: 
• Television 
• Radio 
• Newspaper 
• Online news websites (e.g. BBC; The Huffington Post) 
• Blogs 
• Social media (e.g. Facebook; Twitter) 
• Magazines 
 
How often do you visit Facebook? Please select one option: 
• More than 10 times a day  
• 2-10 times a day 
• Once a day 
• Every other day 
• A couple of times a week  
• Once a week 
• Less often 
• Don’t know 
 
People can access and post links to information from a range of sources on Facebook. 
These include entertainment blogs, news organisations, and sports websites. Which of 
these sources are you aware of? Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
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• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 
Which of these sources have you seen on your Facebook news feed? The news feed is 
the constantly updating list of stories in the middle of your Facebook home page. It 
includes status updates, photos, videos, links, app activity and likes from people, pages 
and groups that you follow on Facebook. Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 
Of the sources you have seen on your Facebook News Feed, which of these sources do 
you Like and/or Follow on Facebook? i.e. You have personally chosen to subscribe to 
their updates by clicking Like or Follow on their page. Please tick all those that apply: 
• BBC News  
• BuzzFeed  
• College Humour  
• Daily Mail 
• The Daily Dot  
• The Daily Mash  
• Daily Mirror  
• Digital Spy 
• E! Online  
• ESPN  
• Eurosport  
• The Guardian  
• IGN 
• The Independent  
• Heatworld  
• Huffington Post  
• Mashable 
• Metro 
• NME 
• The Onion 
• Perez Hilton  
• Pitchfork 
• Rolling Stone 
• SB Nation 
• Sky Sports  
• Telegraph  
• Thought Catalog  
• TMZ 
• Upworthy 
• None of the above 
 
Post-Test survey 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. We now have several questions regarding 
your interaction with the news feed. 
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How interested would you say you are in the rights of persons with disabilities? Please 
select one option:  
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
How interested would you say you are in MPs’ expenses? Please select one option:  
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
How interested would you say you are in immigration? Please select one option:  
• Very interested  
• Fairly interested  
• Not very interested  
• Not at all interested  
• Don’t know 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to the rights of persons with disabilities? Mark only 
one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to MPs’ expenses? Mark only one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
Using the scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, please 
indicate how likely it is that in the next six months you will personally engage in the 
following activities directly related to immigration? Mark only one oval per row: 
• Discuss the issue with family, friends or acquaintances  
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• Take part in a protest/rally/demonstration  
• Write, call or email a newspaper, magazine, or television news organization 
• Contact an official  
• Donate money to a charity or campaigning organisation 
• Write or sign a digital or written petition 
• Distribute or share information over social media 
 
In the last 12 months have you done any of the following to influence political 
representatives, public decisions, laws, or policies? 
• Contacted a local councillor or MP/MSP/Welsh Assembly Member [any elected 
representative] 
• Contacted the media 
• Created or signed a paper petition 
• Created or signed an e-petition 
• Donated money or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaigning 
organisation  
• Boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons 
• Attended political meetings 
• Donated money or paid a membership fee to a political party 
• Taken part in a demonstration, picket or march 
• Voted in an election 
• Contributed to a political discussion online or on social media 
• Taken part in a public consultation 
• None of the above 
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C3. News Feed Design 
 
Table C.8 lists all of the articles that were included in the news feed for the first 
experiment.99 These articles are listed in the order that they appeared in each of the 
experimental groups. All sources were selected on the basis of trending news articles on 
Facebook and trending topics on Twitter on October 21, 2014, one day prior to the 
experiment. The comments accompanying the posts on Facebook were the titles for 
each article. While this is not necessarily reflective of normalised use, as users tend to 
post a personalised message or omit a message altogether, this measure was essential as 
it ensured that the comment wording did not act as an intervening variable when 
exploring the relationship between information type and political attitudes.  
A similar set of procedures were employed for the second experiment, designed 
to examine if the level of likes on an e-petition influences participant behaviour. 
However, there were some slight modifications made given the challenge of populating 
the feed with Facebook likes. As before, all sources were selected on the basis of 
trending news articles on Facebook and trending topics on Twitter, on October 25, 
2014. This approach differed to the first experiment, as articles were collected four days 
before the experiment took place. This additional time was necessary to allow for 
volunteers to populate the treatment groups with Facebook likes. As Table C.9 
illustrates, I increased the number of items included on the feed to ten. This was to 
provide more choice by way of understanding if visible identifiers of social information 
influence browsing behaviour. I based the comments that accompanied each post on 
publically available tweets, rather than using the headline on each article as in the first 
experiment. This was an attempt to make the news feed seem more realistic. This also 
helped to mask the content providers for each article.  
 
                                                
99 Each treatment post was only included in the corresponding experimental group. 
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The proportion of news content included within each newsfeed is based on a 
survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre. The survey asked respondents the 
following question, “How about the people you are friends with on social networking 
sites? How much of what they share and post is related to politics, political issues or the 
2012 elections?” (Rainie and Smith, 2012: 12). Participants had the choice of five 
different responses: (1) all / almost all; (2) most; (3) some; (4) just a little; and (5) none 
at all. These responses were coded and a mean was calculated as a guide for the average 
amount of political content on a user’s news feed, as shown in Table C.10. As a result, 
three posts that include political content were included in each news feed. Although the 
coding of these survey responses is yet another “kludge” (Karpf, 2012b), it is an 
example of my intent to design a news feed that is representative of normal use. 
 
Table C.10. The volume of political content on social networking sites 
Proportion of political content 
on news feed 
Coded 
proportion % 
Survey 
respondents % 
Mean total 
value 
All / almost all 100 3 300 
Most 80 6 480 
Some 50 30 1500 
Just a little 20 36 720 
None at all 0 23 0 
Don’t know N/A 2 N/A 
Total  100 3000 
Average 30.61% 
  Source: Adapted from Rainie and Smith (2012: 11). 
Note: Results are based on the following survey question; how about the people you are friends with on 
social networking sites? How much of what they share and post is related to politics, political issues or 
the 2012 elections? N=1047. 
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C5. Survey Results 
 
The results from both experiments can be found online: 
!
Laboratory experiment 1: Information Type https://db.tt/3L3Iu4Ol 
Laboratory experiment 2: Facebook Likes https://db.tt/cLHnvvYo 
!
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on completion of the experiment. All participants were made aware of how the data 
collected from the experiments would be used and stored. No information has been used 
in this thesis that may identify the subject. All data collected during the research has 
been anonymised and stored on a password-protected, cloud based storage facility. 
